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
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
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
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


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HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

GEORGE GROTE, Esq.

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Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in Sicily.—Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians—its ruinous effects upon Athens.—Athens becomes a military post—heavy duty in arms imposed upon the citizens.—Financial pressure.—Athens dismisses her Thracian mercenaries—massacre at Mykaléssus.—The Thracians driven back with slaughter by the Thebans.—Athenian station at Naupaktus—decline of the naval superiority of Athens.—Naval battle near Naupaktus—indecisive result.—Last news of the Athenians from Syracuse—ruin of the army there not officially made known to them.—Reluctance of the Athenians to believe the full truth.—Terror and affliction at Athens.—Energetic resolutions adopted by the Athenians—Board of Proboli.—

Prodigious effect of the catastrophe upon all Greeks—enemies and allies of Athens as well as neutrals—and even on the Persians.—Motions of king Agis.—The Eubœans apply to Agis for aid in revolting from Athens—the Lesbians also apply, and are preferred.—The Chians, with the same view, make application to Sparta.—Envoys from Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus come to Sparta at the same time.—Alkibiadês at Sparta—his recommendations determine the Lacedæmonians to send aid to Chios.—Synod of the Peloponnesian allies at Corinth—measures resolved.—Isthmian festival—scruples of the Corinthians—delay about Chios—suspicions of Athens.—Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth to Chios—it is defeated by the Athenians.—Small squadron starts from Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, to go to Chios.—Energetic advice of Alkibiadês—his great usefulness to Sparta.—Arrival of Alkibiadês at Chios—revolt of the island from Athens.—General population of Chios was disinclined to revolt from Athens.—Dismay occasioned at Athens by the revolt of Chios—the Athenians set free and appropriate their reserved fund.—Athenian force despatched to Chios under Strombichidês.—Activity of the Chians in promoting revolt among the other Athenian allies—Alkibiadês determines Milêtus to revolt.—First alliance between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernês, concluded by Chalkideus at Milêtus.—Dishonorable and disadvantageous conditions of the treaty.—Energetic efforts of Athens—democratical revolution at Samos.—Peloponnesian fleet at Kenchreæ—Astyochus is sent as Spartan admiral to Ionia.—Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos.—Ill success of the Chians—Lesbos is maintained by the Athenians.—Harassing operations of the Athenians against Chios.—Hardships suffered by the Chians—prosperity of the island up to this time.—Fresh forces from Athens—victory of the Athenians near Milêtus.—Fresh Peloponnesian forces arrive—the Athenians retire, pursuant to the strong recommendation of Phrynichus.—Capture of Iasus by the Peloponnesians—rich plunder—Amorgês made prisoner.—Tissaphernês begins to furnish pay to the Peloponnesian fleet. He reduces the rate of pay for the future.—Powerful Athenian fleet at Samos—unexpected renovation of the navy of Athens.—Astyochus at Chios and on the opposite coast.—Pedaritus, Lacedæmonian governor at Chios—disagreement between him and Astyochus.—Astyochus abandons Chios and returns to Milêtus—accident whereby he escaped the Athenian fleet.—The Athenians establish a fortified post in Chios, to ravage the island.—Dorieus arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii, to join Astyochus—maritime contests near Knidus.—Second Peloponnesian treaty with Tissaphernês, concluded by Astyochus and Theramenês.—Comparison of the second treaty with the first.—Arrival of a fresh Peloponnesian squadron under Antisthenês at Kaunus—Lichas comes out as Spartan commissioner.—Astyochus goes with the fleet from Milêtus to join the newly-arrived squadron—he defeats the Athenian squadron under Charminus.—Peloponnesian fleet at Knidus—double dealing of Tissaphernês—breach between him and Lichas.—Peloponnesian fleet masters Rhodes, and establishes itself in that island.—Long inaction of the fleet at Rhodes—paralyzing intrigues of Tissaphernês—corruption of the Lacedæmonian officers..... 353-402

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LV.

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY.

My last chapter and last volume terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C., between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace — negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain — resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading them to listen to the peace-party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties of what had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had been surrendered by capitulation : according to which reserve the Athenians, while prevented from recovering Plataea, continued to hold Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the revolted allies of Athens in Thrace ; that is, Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so, but only to pay reg-

ularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy. Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave them, was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skiônê, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylus, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiônê.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred Pan-Hellenic festivals, either by land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which might arise.¹

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still, there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians also on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of them, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might, by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper.²

¹ Thucyd. v, 17-29.

² Thucyd. v, 18.

Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.¹

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot: an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.²

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras with two other envoys to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, these envoys met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the

¹ Thucyd. v, 14, 22, 76.

² Plutarch. Nikias, c. 10.

resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible, and he was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.¹

The latter were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any one of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing of the peace, awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and per-

¹ Thucyd. v, 21, 22.

haps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years; not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance, with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians respecting their serf-population: but at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylos, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis, probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without violating the oath.¹ Moreover, the treaty was directed to be inscribed on two columns: one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê, in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something

¹ Thucyd. v, 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people; then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second treaty and the first (*οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον*, v, 24), may have been more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace, the manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of Kleiaridas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.

not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartan ephors and Nikias at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.¹

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiadês was competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more important after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her second best, without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy; advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay, more; in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under these marked indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for that alliance was at this moment, under the uncertain relations with Argos,

¹ Thucyd. v, 24.

not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that, if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed by decisive coöperation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, "Give us the men in the island, and accept in exchange peace, together with our alliance."¹ At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But *now*, there were no reasons in its favor, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material importance to her; but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit, and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved unproductive in reality? The alliance, in fact, prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became, as Thucydides himself² admits, no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.

Thucydides states on more than one occasion, and it was the

¹ Thucyd. iv, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἡμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διαλυσὶν πολέμου, δίδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ἑνυμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλήν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἄλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταγοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας.

² Thucyd. v, 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὅν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, etc.

sentiment of Nikias himself, that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens;¹ alluding chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter; for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Methônê. Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Lacopian leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage, suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace, and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly there was never any public recommendation of Kleon, as far as our information goes, so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. Probably the Spartan ephors amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, with his crimminative eloquence, had passed away, replaced only by an inferior successor, the lamp-maker² Hyperbolus, and leaving the Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for birth and station, descended from gods and heroes, there remained no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: "Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or, if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative — Amphipolis in exchange for the captives."

¹ Thucyd. v, 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἡ τε Λακεδαιμόνιος μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκονε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς συμφορὰς. — (Νικίας) λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ (Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, etc. (v, 46) — Οἱς πρῶτον μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ συμφορῶν ἢ ζυμβασίς, etc.

² Aristophan. Pac. 65–887.

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course, the place was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained unperformed.¹ The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Boeotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the Boeotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.²

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the Athenian prisoners in Boeotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which was, they said, all the intervention in their power, since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Boeotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so

¹ Thucyd. v, 21-35.

² Thucyd. v, 32.

far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens,¹ for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the surrender of Pylus, or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian garrison with the Helót deserters from that place, leaving in it none but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been performed, none even seemed in course of being performed: so that they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.² Their remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.³

The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next — though favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her promises — renounced all these advantages, and

¹ Thucyd. v, 35. λέγοντες αὐτὸς ὡς μετ' Ἀθηναίων τούτους, ἦν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσονται· χρόνους δὲ προῦθεν τοῦ ἄνευ συγγραφῆς, ἐν οἷς χρὴν τοὺς μὴ εἰσόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους εἶναι.

² Thucyd. v, 35. τούτων σὺν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπουν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴδὲν δίκαιον διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀνδρας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες, etc.

³ Thucyd. v, 35, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ θέρει οὐδὲν, etc.

procured for Sparta almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on Grecian history, who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens. Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydides and Euklês : it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of Nikias.

So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendancy of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring : Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides ;¹ while her military force was just now farther strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens.² To a democratical government like Argos, such

¹ Thucyd. v, 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the Argeians, *δίχουθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφιστα*.

He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding the Peace of Nikias, about four or five months after the battle of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas ; not two years later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date in the play itself, upon which he lays too great stress.

² Thucyd. v, 67. *Ἀργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἡσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρείχε.*

Diodorus (xii, 75) represents the first formation of this Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this time, and I think he is here worthy of credit ; so that I do not regard the expression of Thucydides *ἐκ πολλοῦ* as indicating a time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantinea. For Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would

an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment, the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.

The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives: in the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover, that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy.¹ And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conferences at Sparta, — where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace, — the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that

be a *long* time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping up this select regiment, during all the period of their long peace, just now coming to an end.

¹ Thucyd. v, 29. μή μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιων δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii, 75.

city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion — privately made by the Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterwards — was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.¹

Meanwhile, the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantinea and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself only a year and a half before in a bloody but indecisive battle.² Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia, and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta: while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantinea was less so, though she was still enrolled in and acted as a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself³ a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of

¹ Thucyd. v, 28.

² Thucyd. iv, 134.

³ Thucyd. v, 29. Τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκადίας κατέστρωπτε

village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens; a period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy; so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay, moreover, near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments — and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens — ever since the disaster in Sphacteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the ascendancy of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta; especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy.¹ Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantinea. Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta² (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.

ὑπήκουον, ἐτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιψέσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον.

As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and imperial states, see farther on, pages 25 and 26, in the case of Elis and Lepreum.

¹ Thucyd. i, 125.

² Thucyd. v, 29. Ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητὶον τοῦτο, νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἕνα δι' ὁργῆς ἔχοντες, etc.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. "They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the peace, — for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy, that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, except in such cases as involved some offence to gods or heroes." Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies, Bœotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,¹ etc., the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace, namely, that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium: since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious; upon that reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each member with reference to his own pious feeling. "It *was* a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they revolted from Athens: and we should have infringed those separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any

¹ Thucyd. v, 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅσοι οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδὰς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ μὲν ἡδικοῦντο, οὐ δηλοῦντες ἀντικρυσ etc.

resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present." With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again at the next conference.¹

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in part doubtless by the bitterness of Lacedæmonian reproof; for the open consummation of this revolt, apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very old feelings; but still more by the discovery that their friends, who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states — left to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the Corinthians — spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the oligarchy at Sparta:² they were linked together by

¹ Thucyd. v, 30.

² Thucyd. v, 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες ἡσέχαζον, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ νομίζοντες σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἥσσαν ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.

These words, *περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων*, are not clear, and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators, as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted (with Dobree) to strike out the words *ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων* as a gloss, and thus to construe *περιορώμενοι* as a middle verb, "waiting to see the event," or literally, "keeping a look-out about them." But taking the text as it now stands, the sense which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited.

Most of the critics translate *περιορώμενοι* "slighted or despised by the Lacedæmonians." But in the first place, this is not true as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we ought to have an adversative

communion of interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse, the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident so

conjunction instead of *καὶ* before *νομίζοντες*, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would then be in opposite directions. "The Boeotians, though despised by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian democracy dangerous." And this is the sense which Haack actually proposes, though it does great violence to the word *καί*.

Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate *περιωρόμενοι* "feeling themselves slighted;" and the latter says, "The Boeotians and Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than the constitution of Sparta." But this again puts an inadmissible meaning on *ἡσύχαζόν*, which means "stood as they were." The Boeotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves with Argos, and this they decline doing: they prefer to *remain as they are*, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of *καί*.

I submit that the word *περιωρᾶν* does not necessarily mean "to slight or despise," but sometimes "to leave alone, to take no notice of, to abstain from interfering." Thus, Thucyd. i, 24. *Ἐπιδάμνιοι — πέμπουσιν εἰς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις — δεόμενοι μὴ σφᾶς περιωρᾶν φθειρομένους*, etc. Again, i, 69, *καὶ νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἕκας ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς ὄντας περιωρᾶτε*, etc. The same is the sense of *περιιδεῖν* and *περιόψεσθαι*, ii, 20. In all these passages there is no idea of contempt implied in the word: the "leaving alone," or "abstaining from interference," proceeds from feelings quite different from contempt.

So in the passage here before us, *περιωρόμενοι* seems the passive participle in this sense. Thucydides, having just described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the words here in discussion) that no similar interference was resorted to by them to prevent the Boeotians and Megarians from joining her: "The Boeotians and Megarians remained as they were, left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians, and thinking the Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of Sparta."

confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantinea, in thus revolting from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus; in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began,¹ and the Lacedæmonians began to call for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against

¹ Thucyd. v, 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον· ἔπειτα, πανσάμενων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ἡλείοι ἐπηνάγκασον, οἱ δ' ἐράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.

For the agreement here alluded to, see a few lines forward.

the Eleians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and pronounced the Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began, — to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.¹

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the junction of that city, seemingly the most

¹ Thucyd. v, 31. *τὴν συνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἰρητο, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὥς οὐκ ἴσων ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, etc.*

Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. It was extremely important to such of the confederates as were imperial cities; that is, which had subordinates or subject-allies.

Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive the scope of the agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would be a question of superiority of force, for no agreement could bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own imperial *immediate* members, and the *mediate* or subordinate dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the same time gave its guarantee, that the imperial state should reënter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of Mantinea, mentioned a few pages back, p. 19, the Mantineians had violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the autonomy of the latter.

powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success we are not told. The mere fact of Mantinea having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing the same : and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected, having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position as insecure on the side of Athens ; with whom they were not at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance : a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice, which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Bœotians maintained their ten days' armistice ; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace *de facto*, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.¹

¹ Thucyd. v, 32. Κορινθίους δὲ ἀνακωχὴ ἀσπονδος ἦν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantinea and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantinians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis.¹ These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they had caused two thousand of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims personally, but simply from fear of the whole body and of course greater fear of the bravest.²

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: "By *ἀσπονδος* is meant a mere agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath."

Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes. There was no agreement at all, either in words or by oath. There was a simple absence of hostilities, *de facto*, not arising out of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of *ἀνακωχή*, i, 66; iii, 25, 26.

The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better reason, have declined to conclude the ten day's armistice with the *Boeotians*, because these latter still remained allies of Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of the latter.

¹ Thucyd. v, 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously enfranchised, or the sons of such.

² Thucyd. iv, 80.

It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidæa Helots that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger — real or supposed — from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of Sphacteria had been untarnished by any dishonor, nevertheless these men could hardly fail to be looked upon as degraded, in the eyes of Spartan pride; or at least they might fancy that they were so looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the ephors contracted suspicions of their designs, and condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale.¹ This species of disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers were at length relieved from it, the danger being supposed to be over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly from Thucydides, that many of these captives were among the first and wealthiest families in the state, and the ephors may have apprehended that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a long imprisonment — justly pointed out by modern historians — would not weigh much with the ephors under any symptoms of public danger.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age, selling the women and children into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised at such treatment against

¹ Thucyd. v. 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε κῆτε ἄρχειν μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.

subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê and its territory was made over to the Plataean refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat of Amphipolis had created a belief at Athens that this removal had offended the gods; under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian exiles.¹ They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.²

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—king Pleistoanax as well as the ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer—seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 421—the year of these ephors expired, and new ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of the five new ephors, two—Kleobûlus and Xenarês—were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and

¹ Thucyd. v, 32.

² Thucyd. v, 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold in preferring the conjecture of Poppo, *Χαλκιδῆς*, in this place.

the remaining three apparently indifferent.¹ And we may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional monarchy of Sparta, the least popular government in Greece, both in principle and detail.

The new ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which among the rest Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,² originated, in concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would grasp at in preference, so these ephors affirmed, even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.³

Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the bœotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan ephors and the wishes of these

¹ Thucyd. v, 36.

² Thucyd. v, 37. *ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπὸ τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ Ξενάρους καὶ σοὶ φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, etc.*

³ Thucyd. v, 36.

Argeians. The bœotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from "the Four Senates of the Bœotians;" bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known. But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent that the bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans accordingly.¹ They proposed to these four Senates a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial: their particular object being, as they stated, to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace, for mutual defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties named was the same, all being recusants of the recent peace. But the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed farther afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, skilfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even hear of alliance with Corinth, so much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connection with a city which had

¹ Thucyd. v. 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἰπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα φηγεῖσθαι ἢ ἂν σφίσι προδιαγνόντες πειραινοῦσιν. . . . ταῖς τέσσαρα βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κύρος ἔχουσι.

revolted from her. Nor did the *bœotarchs* think it safe to divulge their communications with *Kleobûlus* and *Xenarês*, or to acquaint the *Senates* that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in *Sparta* herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the *Senates*, no farther proceedings could be taken. The *Corinthian* and *Chalkidian* envoys left *Thebes*, while the promise of sending *Bœotian* envoys to *Argos* remained unexecuted.¹

But the anti-Athenian ephors at *Sparta*, though baffled in their schemes for arriving at the *Argeian* alliance through the agency of the *Bœotians*, did not the less persist in their views upon *Panaktum*. That place — a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between *Attica* and *Bœotia*, apparently on the *Bœotian* side of *Phylê*, and on or near the direct road from *Athens* to *Thebes* which led through *Phylê*² — had been an *Athenian* possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the *Bœotians*.³ A special provision of the treaty between *Athens* and *Sparta*, prescribed that it should be restored to *Athens*; and *Lacedæmonian* envoys were now sent on an express mission to *Bœotia*, to request from the *Bœotians* the delivery of *Panaktum* as well as of their *Athenian* captives, in order that by tendering these to *Athens* she might be induced to surrender *Pylos*. The *Bœotians* refused compliance with this request, except on condition that *Sparta* should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the *Athenians*. Now the *Spartans* stood pledged by their covenant with the latter, either by its terms or by its recognized import, not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of *Panaktum*; while the prospect of breach with *Athens*, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which *Kleobûlus* and *Xenarês* desired. Under these feelings, the *Lacedæmonians* consented to and swore the special alliance with *Bœotia*. But the *Bœotians*, instead of handing over *Panaktum* for surrender, as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to the ground; under pretence of some ancient

¹ *Thucyd.* v, 38.

² See Colonel *Leake*, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii, ch. xvii, p. 370

³ *Thucyd.* v, 3.

oaths which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants, as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture. •

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian ephors thus seemed to be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But when they learned that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the destruction of Panaktum being conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. Under such a persuasion,—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent,—the Argeians saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson, two Argeians much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city, to press for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian ephors this application was eminently acceptable, the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring about: and negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys at first proposed that the disputed

possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative, the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will be recollected, that about one hundred and twenty years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by three hundred champions on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity, even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece.¹ Yet since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at

¹ Thucyd. v, 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον εἶναι) συνεχώρησαν ἐφ' οἷς ἤξιον, καὶ συνεγράψαντο.

By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that the treaty was not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by the secretary or authorized officer, and ultimately engraved on a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but seemingly no official signature.

the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan ephors seemed now to have carried all their points; friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means — through the possession of Panaktum — of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylos. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, at the time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at Sparta, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens: nevertheless, Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: Panaktum as well as the prisoners was thus *restored*, he pretended; for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and he claimed the cession of Pylos in exchange.¹

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping this alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum and Pylos had been brought to a close. Both this alliance, and the demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened by the quibble of Andromedês, that demolition of the fort, being tantamount to restitution, and precluding any farther tenancy by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent notes and protocols, to employ a modern phrase; yet not one of

¹ Thucyd. v. 42.

the conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed, except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number; while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.¹

Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading men, to whose improvident facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them — Alkibiadês son of Kleinias — who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the ekklesia, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax, and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens,² that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a trireme of his

¹ Thucyd. v. 42.

² Thucyd. v. 43. 'Αλκιβιάδης... ἀνὴρ ἡλικία μὲν ὧν ἐτι τότε νεός, ὥς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος.

The expression of Plutarch, however, ἐτι μειράκιον, seems an exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10).

Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men, defined a *young man* to be one under thirty years of age, the senatorial age at Athens (Xenophon, Memor. i. 2. 35).

own at the seafight of Artemisium against the Persians. A Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadēs, and a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him; but even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of Periklēs and his brother Ariphron.¹ His violent passions, love of enjoyment, ambition of preëminence, and insolence towards others,² were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and mature man, caused him to be much run after by women,³ and even by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence, amidst corrupting influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position, it was not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadēs. The anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet the general type

¹ Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 2, 3, 4; Isokratēs, De Bigis, Orat. xvi, p. 353, sect. 33, 34; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1.

² Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἂν τις εἰσοίτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι δυντινοῦν.

This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Alkibiadēs, in the Symposium, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato Alkibiad. i, c. 1, 2, 3.

Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i, 2, 16-25.

Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνηικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὥς δηλὸν ἐστὶ τοῖς παιδικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2).

³ I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words, the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2. 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὐτὸ διὰ τὴν κάλλος ἐκτὸς πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν νυναικῶν θηρώμενος, etc.

of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hipparetê, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents: when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadês violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiâr characteristic of Alkibiadês. He strikes the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer; he strikes Taureas,¹ a rival chorêgus, in the public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes Hipponikus, who afterwards became his father-in-law, out of a wager of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology; he protects the Thasian poet Hêgêmôn, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the published list in the public edifice, called Metrôon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on for trial.² Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared to bring Alkibiadês to trial before the dikastery, though we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness³ which marked his private life;

¹ Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi. 16; Antipho apud Athenæum, xii, p. 525.

² Athenæus, ix, p. 407.

³ Thucyd. vi, 15. I translate the expression of Thucydides, which is of great force and significance—*φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίαιταν*, etc. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi, 28. *τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν παρανομίαν*.

The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the *λοιδορία* of Antipho (Athenæus, xii, p. 525).

The description of Alkibiadês, given in that Discourse called the *Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος*, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês (c. 12, p. 1414), is mor-

a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal, judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or discredited, and which were recognized as modifying elements in the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech which Thucydides¹ ascribes to Alkibiadês before the

discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical compositions. Τοῦτο δ', Ἀλκιβιάδην εὐρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν πολλῷ χειρόν διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερῆφανῶς, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς, τὰ δ' ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προσηγμένον ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας πολλὰ μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικρυσψάμενον.

Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad tendencies of Alkibiadês, full illustrations will be seen in his proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence here ascribed to Sokratês is unfortunately far less borne out.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2; Plato, Protagoras, c. 1.

I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to Alkibiadês in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217) can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as Sokratês is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the general relations of Alkibiadês with others: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 29, 30; iv, 1-2.

Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures of the palæstra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them, and the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the Lysis and the Charmidês; also the Rivaies, where the scene is laid in the house of a γραμματιστής, or schoolmaster. In the Lysis, Sokratês professes to set his own conversation with these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their good-will. Οὕτω χρῆ, ὡς Ἰππόδαμος, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαννοῦντα καὶ διαθρῦποντα (Lysis, c. 7, p. 210).

See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadês as a youth, Euripid. Supplic. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the beautiful lines in the Atys of Catullus, 60-63.

There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this society and conversation

Athenian public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.

Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiadês stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger; owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratês, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadês also served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratês, by protecting him against the Boeotian pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him; expensive duties, which, as we might expect, he discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact, expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves off. The first appearance of Alkibiadês in public life is said to have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the ekklesia, when various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.¹

To a young man like Alkibiadês, thirsting for power and pre-

of their boyish years; though the subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be produced and discussed.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 10.

eminent, a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers,¹ Prodikus, Protagoras, and others; but most of all that of Sokratês. His intimacy with Sokratês has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadês — like the oligarchical Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter — was attracted to Sokratês by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting new thoughts and combinations, his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations, his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long cross-examination, his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack from Sokratês,² and to copy his formidable string of

¹ See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317

² See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12–24, 39–47.

Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους, ὠμιλησάτην, ὃν χρόνον ὠμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὠρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἐτι γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τισι μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττονσι τὰ πολιτικά... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἔτι προσήεσαν, οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν, ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπραττον, ὥνπερ ἔνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23; c. 22, p. 33.

Xenophon represents Alkibiadês and Kritias as frequenting the society of Sokratês, for the same reason and with the same objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the Sophists: see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D.

“Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 16) objiciunt comici, docere eum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et contra Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato.”

interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiadês, who not only owed his life to the generous valor of Sokratês at Potidæa, but had also learned in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.¹ But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratês with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists, Prodikus and Protagoras not less than Sokratês; for in the Athenian sense of the word, Sokratês was a sophist as well as the others: and to the rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadês and Kritias, such society was highly useful.² It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, including

The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired by Sokratês over Alkibiadês, and of the deference and submission of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon. Isokratês goes so far as to say that Sokratês was never known by any one as teacher of Alkibiadês: which is an exaggeration in the other direction. Isokratês, *Busiris*, Or. xi, sect. 6, p. 222.

¹ Plato, *Symposium*, c. 35-36, p. 220, etc.

² See the representation, given in the *Protagoras* of Plato, of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratês goes to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction. Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 2, p. 310 D.; c. 8, p. 316 C.; c. 9, p. 318, etc.: compare also Plato, *Meno*, p. 91, and *Gorgias*, c. 4, p. 449 E., asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between teaching to speak and teaching to think — λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν, etc.

It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the polemical charges against those who are called Sophists, even as we find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their favor which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.

This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.

mental accomplishments as well as political success. it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded: it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and obstructions of human well-being, both public and private: it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely their purpose in the pursuit.¹

¹ I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratês and the Sophists, depicting Alkibiadês as "ensnared by the Sophists," while Sokratês is described as a good genius preserving him from their corruptions (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, pp. 312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes so pointedly Sokratês from the Sophists; when he describes the Sophists as "pretenders to wisdom;" as "a new school;" as "teaching that there was no real difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong," etc.

All the plausibility that there is in this representation, arises from a confusion between the original sense and the modern sense of the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation of the word at Athens, it meant not a *school* of persons professing common doctrines, but a *class* of men bearing the same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative, partly professional; but they differed widely from each other, both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratês, cont. Sophistas, Orat. xiii; Plato, Meno. p. 87 B.) Whoever made himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation, was called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money, and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratês himself was so fond of dwelling (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 12), has plainly no essential bearing on the case. When Æschinês the orator reminds the dikasts, "Recollect that you Athenians put to death the Sophist Sokratês, because he was shown to have been the

Alkibiadēs, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to

teacher of Kritias," (*Æschin. cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74.*) he uses the word in its natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to make against Sokratēs, who had then been dead more than forty years; but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just as he would have said, *Hippokratēs the physician, Pheidias the sculptor*, etc. Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and Isokratēs sophists (*Ars Rhetor. De Compos. Verborum, p. 208 R.*). The Nubes of Aristophanēs, and the defences put forth by Plato and Xenophon, show that Sokratēs was not only called by the name Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls "the new School of the Sophists;" as "a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or falsehood, right or wrong," etc. See a striking passage in the *Politicus* of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks, as I think, that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratēs, will be careful how he advances them against the general profession to which Sokratēs belonged.

That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of Sophists—as there are and always have been among schoolmasters, professors, lawyers, etc., and all bodies of men—I do not doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonizing exclusively Sokratēs and his followers, will be felt, when we recollect that the well-known Apologue, called the *Choice of Hercules*, was the work of the Sophist Prodikus, and his favorite theme of lecture (Xenophon, *Memor. ii, 1, 21–34*). To this day, that Apologue remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with which it presents one of the most important points of view of moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratēs, Plato, or Xenophon. To treat the author of that Apologue, and the class to which he belonged, as teaching "that there was no real difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood," etc., is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of Dr. Thirlwall's history.

I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of the *Republic* (vi, c. 6, 7, pp. 492–493), refutes the imputation against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth. He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that morality which was received as true and just in their age and society; nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor, he says, is society itself; the Sophists merely repeat the voice and judgment of society. Without inquiring at present how far Plato or Sokratēs were right in condemning the received morality of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what was considered good morality among

be found in Athens, that of Sokratês most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done, without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiadês attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind; how much the ends which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokratês was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiadês and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public life, Alkibiadês came forward with a reputation stained by private enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in execution, not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and what distinguished him from all was his extraordinary flexibility of character¹ and consummate

the Athenian public: there were doubtless some who taught a better morality, others who taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.

Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the corruption of the character of Alkibiadês; wealth, rank, personal beauty, flatterers, etc.; but he does not name the Sophists among them (*Memorab.* i. 2. 24, 25).

¹ *Cornel. Nepos*, Alkibiad. c. 1; *Satyrus apud Athenæum*. xii, p. 534; *Plutarch*, Alkibiad. c. 23.

Ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτον δέι, τοιοῦτος εἶμ' ἐγώ, says Odysseus, in the *Philoklêtês* of Sophoklês.

power of adapting himself to new habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. Like Themistoklēs, whom he resembled as well in ability and vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means, Alkibiadēs was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a secondary quality, subordinate to action; and though he possessed enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at least according to the high standard of Athens.¹ But his career affords a memorable example of splendid qualities, both for action and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from middling citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in the public festivals, transcending the

¹ I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of Demosthenēs (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the eloquence of Alkibiadēs (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. c. 8, p. 804.

Antisthenēs, companion and pupil of Sokratēs, and originator of what is called the Cynic philosophy, contemporary and personally acquainted with Alkibiadēs, was full of admiration for his extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly, and audacious, but unschooled, ἀπαίδευτον. His scandals about the lawless life of Alkibiadēs, however, exceed what we can reasonably admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenēs ap. Athenæum, v, p. 220, xii, v. 534). Antisthenēs had composed a dialogue called Alkibiadēs (Diog. Laërt. vi, 15).

See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenis (by A. G. Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, pp. 17-19).

The comic writers of the day — Eupolis, Aristophanēs, Pherekratēs, and others — seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels against the excesses of Alkibiadēs, real or supposed. There was a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadēs, who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity, had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the Baptæ. See Meineke, Fragm. Com. Græc. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες (vol. ii, pp. 447-494), and Aristophanēs Τριφάλῃς, p. 1166; also Meineke's first volume, Historia Critica Comicæ Græcæ, pp. 124-136; and the Dissertat. xix, in Buttmann's *Mythologus*, on the Baptæ and the Cotyttia.

largest measure of private fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by overthrowing¹ the constitution to make himself master of the persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired confidence or esteem in any one; and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments: "The Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him," was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet; while we find also another pithy precept delivered in regard to him: "You ought not to keep a lion's whelp in your city at all; but, if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behavior."² Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an exile and enemy, but the great harm which he did to her was in his capacity of adviser; awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for showy, rapacious, uncertain, perilous aggrandizement which dictated his own personal actions.

Mentioning Alkibiadès now for the first time, I have somewhat anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion's whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire strength nor disclosed his full-grown claws.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the Peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Periklês, were democratical: his grandfather Alkibiadès had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced an established connection of hospitality with the

¹ Thucyd. vi, 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4, p. 800. The sketch which Plato draws in the first three chapters of the ninth Book of the Republic, of the citizen who erects himself into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens, exactly suits the character of Alkibiadès. See also the same treatise, vi, 6-8, pp. 491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his translation of the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadès the first.

² Aristophan. Ranzæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadès, c. 16; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.

Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiadēs himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and philo-Laonian sentiment, doubtless far more consonant to his natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same general party with Nikias and Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards became his bitter opponents; and it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.¹

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives; and indeed not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta for carrying them through at Athens. From these selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta, Alkibiadēs thus became a partisan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laonian concessions of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances, not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Lachēs, whose prudence would commend, if it did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alkibiadēs yet shown the mighty move-

¹ Thucyd. v, 43, vi, 90; Isokratēs, *De Bigis*, Or. xvi, p. 352, sect. 27-30.

Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadēs as being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.

ment of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal of the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,¹ he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiadês had therefore ample pretext for altering his tone respecting the Spartans, and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, now free by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connection with Athens, and this policy was strongly recommended by Alkibiadês, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies, Mantinea, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argæian plans of Alkibiadês; and when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedês arrived at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of Panaktum in exchange for Pylos; when it farther became known that the Spartans had

¹ Thucyd. v, 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἡναντιοῦτο, διὰ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχτηος ἐπραξαν τὰς σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητά ἐπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἣν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπέων διανοεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι. Παντάχοθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι· τὸ τε πρῶτον ἠντίζειν, etc.

already concluded a special alliance with the Boeotians without consulting Athens, the unmeasured expression of displeasure in the Athenian ekklesia showed Alkibiadês that the time was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his own voice to strengthen this discontent against Sparta, he at the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace, having been sent thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without allies to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with Athens, a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, but not interfering with their own primacy in Peloponnesus, — than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian :¹ the alliance between these three cities had already been rendered more intimate by a second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a party ; but Corinth had refused all concern in the second.²

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without a moment's delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens,³ Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius ; with full powers to settle all matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all alliance of Athens with Argos, to explain that the alliance of Sparta with Boeotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of evil to Athens, and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylos should be re-

¹ Thucyd. v, 43.

² Thucyd. v, 48.

³ Thucyd. v, 44. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις κατὰ ῥῆχος, etc.

stored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition : and when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families.¹ This probably assisted in procuring

¹ Thucyd. viii, 6. 'Ενδίῳ τῷ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα φίλος — ὁθεν καὶ τοῦτομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν ἔσχεν 'Ενδίου γὰρ 'Αλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο.

I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of Endius was *not* named Alkibiadês, but that Endius himself was nevertheless named 'Ενδίου 'Αλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the peculiar intimacy of connection with the Athenian family in which that name occurred. If the father of Endius was really named Alkibiadês, Endius himself would naturally, pursuant to general custom, be styled 'Ενδίου 'Αλκιβιάδου : there would be nothing in this denomination to call for the particular remark of Thucydidês. But according to the view of the Scholiast and most commentators, all that Thucydides wishes to explain here is, how the father of Endius came to receive the name of Alkibiadês. Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used the terms which we read : the circumstance to be explained would then have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself, nor to the family generally. His words imply that the family, that is, each successive individual of the family, derived his Laconian designation (not from the name of his father, but) from his intimate connection of hospitality with the Athenian family of Alkibiadês. Each successive individual attached to his own personal name the genitive case 'Αλκιβιάδου, instead of the genitive of his real father's name. Doubtless this was an anomaly in Grecian practice ; but on the present occasion, we are to expect something anomalous ; had it not been such, Thucydides would not have stepped aside to particularize it.

for him a secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of the senate: so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain nothing by intimidation, explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper, and he (Alkibiadês) would speak emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos, a step which his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. He gave them his solemn pledge — confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch — that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel.¹ The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of these suggestions,² and still more delighted to find that the man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them, probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming that policy. They were sure of the support of

¹ Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοῦς, ἣν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἔχειν, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (πίσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἡθνηαίους, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τᾶλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστήσαι ταῦτα ἐπραττε, καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐδὲν ἄληθές ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταῦτα, τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ.

² Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ὄρκους ἐδωκεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ, καὶ θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σύνεσιν, ὡς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς ἔσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

Nikias and his party, under all circumstances ; if, by complying with the recommendation of Alkibiadês, they could gain *his* strenuous advocacy and influence also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly, they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting but without even warning Nikias, which was exactly what Alkibiadês desired, and had probably required them to promise.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced ; upon which Alkibiadês himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came ?¹ what powers they brought with them ? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct contrary, — the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from their lips, — lastly, most of all, Nikias himself, — their confidential agent and probably their host at Athens, — who had doubtless announced them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management of their cases before the assembly, — all were alike astounded, and none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation of the people equalled their astonishment : there was a unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians ; never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys ; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed before. Nor was this all :² he took advantage of

¹ Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πάντες φιλανθρωπῶς, ἐφ' οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἡκεῖν αὐτοκράτορες.

² Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκετι ἡνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐσήκουν τε καὶ ἐτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν τοὺς Ἀργεῖους, etc.

Compare Plutarch, *Al'kib.* c. 14 : and Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 10.

the vehement acclamation which welcomed these invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon — an earthquake — had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognized as paramount.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from Thucydids. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein of Fielding's Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of the much-decried demagogues of Athens — not one of those sellers of leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes — ever surpassed, if they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying what they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards their own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.¹

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplic-

Euripid. *Andromach.* 445-455; Herodot. ix, 54.

able, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage; the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must show it forthwith: 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.¹

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required: a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobûlus and Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens.

¹ Thuc. d. v, 46.

The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadēs was permitted to introduce the envoys — already at hand in the city — from Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.¹

The words of this, which Thucydidēs gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.² [The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantinea and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory, or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.³

¹ Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

² Thucyd. v, 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι.

³ Thucyd. v, 48. καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἂν ἄρχωσιν ἕκαστοι. The

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oaths, — by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantinea; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæa. "The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now approaching."

"The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths."¹

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace

tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the phrase in the former part of the treaty — *τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἀρχουσιν ἐκάτεροι*.

The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of troops, required to be left open for application to the actual time.

¹ Thucyd. v, 47.

had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance¹ concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.²

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 B.C.: the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.³ That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legation, or *theôry*, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.⁴ Now that such exclusion was removed,

¹ Thucyd. v, 48.

² Thucyd. v, 48-50.

³ Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳσι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς νυνί (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty.

⁴ Doriens of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 B.C.) Rhodes was included among the tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend were privileged and (as it

and that the Eleian heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the Athenian visit was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. Some curiosity was entertained to see what figure the theory of Athens would make as to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Zeus.

Alkibiadēs took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian theory, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.¹ But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadēs himself appeared as competitor at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extra-

were) sacred persons, who were never molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch, Aratus, c. 28).

But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a Rhodian theory, could have come to Olympia between 431–421 in safety.

From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little can be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of 420 B.C., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50).

¹ Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, *Memorabil.* iii, 3, 12.

ordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation, it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theôrs provided for their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate tent, which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens — Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos — are said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of Hellas.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;¹

¹ Thucyd. vi, 16. *Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ἐπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεὶ τῆς Ὀλυμπίας τε θεωρίας, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν κατακεπολεμῆσθαι· διότι ἄρματα μὲν ἑπτα καθῆκα, οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε, καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τὰλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασάμην.*

The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and the Athenian allies towards Olympia, — and of Alkibiadês himself towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece, — in the first half of the year 420 B.C.

Alkibiadês obtained from Euripidês the honor of an epinikian ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few lines are preserved

dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power.

by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious that the poet alleges Alkibiadēs to have been first, second, and *third*, in the course; while Alkibiadēs himself, more modest and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and *fourth*. Euripidēs informs us that Alkibiadēs was crowned twice and proclaimed twice — *δὶς στεφθέντ' ἐλαίᾳ κάρυκι βοᾶν παραδοῦναι*. Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this word *δὶς* to *τρίς*, without any authority, which completely alters the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has properly restored the word *δὶς*.

How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the Oratio de Bigis of Isokratēs, composed in defence of the son of Alkibiadēs at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps more. Isokratēs repeats the loose assertion of Euripidēs, *πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος* (Or. xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The spurious Oration called that of Andokidēs against Alkibiadēs also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadēs in a very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story of Alkibiadēs having robbed an Athenian named Diomédēs of a fine chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratēs; see Andokid. cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadēs may have left one of the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadēs by the Chians, Ephesians, etc., as described in that oration, is likely to be substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ. i, p. 3.

Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the seven chariots of Alkibiadēs ran, — in how many races, — for all the seven could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since the course involved going *twelve* times round the goal (Pindar, Ol. iii, 33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race described by Sophoklēs (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to construe strictly the expression of the poet, — *δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν δχον*, — it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description in Sophoklēs (compare Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Λογ. p. 1410), who refers indeed to a Pythian and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main circumstances must have been common to both; and we know that the twelve turns (*δωδεκάγυαμπτον δωδεκάδρομον*) were common to both (Pindar, Pyth. v, 31).

Alkibiadēs was not the only person who gained a chariot victory at this

He was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient to repel the charge from himself, which it was his pur-

90th Olympiad, 420 B.C. Lichas the Lacedæmonian also gained one (Thucyd. v. 50), though the chariot was obliged to be entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted from attendance.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316) says: "We are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these chariot-victories of Alkibiadēs were gained, can be distinctly fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424."

In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C. 424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition, and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424, would occur just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious theōry, to pass by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i, 4, 20.

Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce for one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals. The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C., without impediment, these stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning. But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.

I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadēs contended with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all suitable.

Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there was only one chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all the seven chariots of Alkibiadēs ran in this one race, and that in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained the prize: thus implying that Alkibiadēs could not have gained the prize at the same festival.

I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and unfounded.

We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the stadiodromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were not brought out

pose to do, both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by speculation or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated by this stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favor.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantinea. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one thousand hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally

in one race. They were distributed into sets, or batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat, and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was sure to have won two heats.

Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of spectators. Alkibiadēs and Lichas may therefore both have gained chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of them can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two that was it is impossible to say.

proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce, during which all violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the "Olympian law," of two minæ for each man, two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the borders), so that *they* were interdicted from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the

Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games ; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred legation called *theôry*, occupying a formal and recognized place at the solemnity.¹

As all the other Grecian states — with the single exception of Lepreum — were present by their *theôries*² as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan *theôry* “shone by its absence” in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed, was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken ; so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterian disaster,³ that they were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance ; and to escort their *theôrs* into the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand hoplites from Mantinea as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack : while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot racing. Lichas,⁴ a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator ; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrol-

¹ Thucyd. v, 49, 50.

² Thucyd. v, 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἰργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἰκοὶ ἐθνον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν, πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν.

³ Thucyd. v, 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἡ τε Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκτισσε, καὶ ὑπερώφη διὰ τὰς συμφορὰς, οἱ τε Ἀργεῖοι ὕριστα ἔσχον τοὺς πᾶσι, etc.

⁴ See a previous note, p. 56.

lable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows.¹ Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption.² The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiadēs and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had never prospered. It had

¹ Thucyd. v, 50. Αἷχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἐπὶ τῶν βαβδούχων πληγὰς ἐλαβεν, οἷοι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους, καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσσεως προσελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος δηλῶσαι οἷοι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἄρμα.

We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered and required to repress the disorder by turning the person out, and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).

² It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve years afterwards, during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 17).

been persecuted from the beginning by the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.¹

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An

¹ Thucyd. v, 51, 52

earthquake — possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience — abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians — though seemingly distrusting Argos, now that she was united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta — were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the other.¹

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspirations of Alkibiadês, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war, she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklês. After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the thirty years' truce, at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill-success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed, the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage, without regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done, as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward, if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiadês, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens — if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case — was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athe-

¹ Thucyd. v, 48-50.

nian ardor into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort the hardships and extreme cold, insupportable to all except the iron frame of Sokrates, which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidæa twelve years before,¹ and which any armament destined to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the Isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadēs exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters, a spectacle at that moment new and striking.² He first turned his attention to the Achæan towns in the north-west, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf; whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would have become masters of the commerce of the gulf.

¹ Plato, *Symposion*, c. 35, p. 220. *δεινὸν γὰρ αὐτοῖσι χειμῶνες, πάγου ὅλον δεινοτάτου*, etc.

² Thucyd. v, 52. Isokratēs (*De Bigis*, sect. 17, p. 349) speaks of this expedition of Alkibiadēs in his usual loose and exaggerated language: but he has a right to call attention to it as something very memorable at the time.

But the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme, and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.¹ Yet the march of Alkibiadēs doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian interest throughout the Achæan coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum, the southeastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula, whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo Pythæus (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurus and other neighboring cities, seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs.² The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations, one of which, arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news that king Agis with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on the northwest, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to

¹ Thucyd. v, 52.

² Thucyd. v, 53, with Dr. Arnold's note.

his own soldiers or officers, or allies.¹ But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavorable, that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which they set out was already the twenty-sixth of the month preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the twenty-sixth of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding day still the twenty-sixth, thus disallowing the lapse of time, and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance, that their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, not being Dorians, were under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly, the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the field,

¹ Thucyd. v, 54. ἤδει δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν οὐδὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμψθησαν.

This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force of her allies without any regard to their feelings, quite as decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too powerful to be thus treated.

invoked the aid of their allies; who, however, had already been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies, however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by entering the territory alone.¹

¹ Thucyd. v, 54. Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι φθίνοντος, καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσβαλὼν ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδaurίαν καὶ ἐδῆον. Ἐπιδaurioi δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο. ὧν οἱ μὲν τὸν μήνα προύφασίσαντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδaurίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον.

In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views of all the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems to me that even the best of them are here embarrassed and unsatisfactory.

The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and literal possible: "The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of the month before Karneius, and *keeping that day during the whole time*, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and went on ravaging it." By "*during the whole time*" is meant, during the whole time that this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgment, they kept the twenty-sixth day of the antecedent month for a whole fortnight or so; they called each successive day by the same name; they stopped the computed march of time; the twenty-seventh was never admitted to have arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates it (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 331: "They began their march on a day which they had *always* been used to keep holy." But surely the words πάντα τὸν χρόνον must denote some definite interval of time, and can hardly be construed as equivalent to αἰεί. Moreover the words, as Dr. Thirlwall construes them, introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main affirmation of the sentence.

The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd than the two votes of the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.), who being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that month should be the month Anthestêrion; next, that it should be the month Boêdromion; in order that Demetrius Poliorkêtês might be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Dêmêtêr, both at once and at the same time. Demetrius arrived at Athens in the month Munychion, and went through both ceremonies with little or no delay; the religious scruple, and the dignity of the Two Goddesses, being saved by altering the name of the month twice (Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 26).

Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies at Mantinea, for the purpose of discussing propositions

Besides, if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at a subsequent period (B.C. 389, Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 2, 5; v, 1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with the calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on the ground of its being the period of the holy truce,—though it *really was not so*,—*οὐχ ὅποτε καθήκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ὅποτε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ἐπέφερων τοὺς μῆνας*—Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν ὅδ' ὀνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἐπεμψαν, ὡς περὶ εἰώθεσαν, ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς. On more than one occasion, this stratagem was successful: the Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of the heralds, who affirmed that it *was* the time of the truce, though in reality it was not so. At last, the Spartan king Agesipolis actually went both to Olympia and Delphi, to put the express question to those oracles, whether he was bound to accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a sham plea (*ὑποφέρειν*). The oracles both told him that he was under no obligation to submit to such a pretence; accordingly, he sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons, and invaded the Argeian territory.

Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference; that the Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the calendar in order to blot out the holy truce where it really ought to have come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they commit similar falsification in order to introduce the truce where it does not legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore, that such an analogous incident completely justifies the interpretation which I have given of the passage now before us in Thucydides.

But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel, I should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state of the ancient Grecian calendars, the proceeding imputed to the Argeians ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd for adoption, with the same eyes as we should regard it now.

With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the calendar of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the months of all were lunar months, and that the practice followed in regard to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient divergence between lunar and solar time, was different in each different city. Accordingly, the lunar month of one city did not, except by accident, either begin or end at the same time as the lunar month of another. M. Boeckh observes (ad Corp. Inscr. t. i, p. 734): "Variorum populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos annorum cardines respondent, non quovis conveniunt anno, nisi cyclus intercalatio-

of peace: perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiadēs. What other deputies attended

num utrique populi idem sit: sed ubi differunt cycli, altero populo prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat alter, eorum qui non intercalarunt mensis certus cedit jam in eum mensem alterorum qui præcedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus iste mensis: quod tamen negligere solent chronologi." Compare also the valuable Dissertation of K. F. Hermann, Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde, Götting. 1844, pp. 21-27, where all that is known about the Grecian names and arrangement of months is well brought together.

The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F. Hermann, pp. 84-124): indeed, the only single name resting on positive proof, is that of a month *Hermæus*. How far the months of Argos agreed with those of Epidaurus or Sparta we do not know, nor have we any right to presume that they did agree. Nor is it by any means clear that every city in Greece had what may properly be called a *system* of intercalation, so correct as to keep the calendar right without frequent arbitrary interferences. Even at Athens, it is not yet satisfactorily proved that the Metonic calendar was ever actually received into civil use. Cicero, in describing the practice of the Sicilian Greeks about reckoning of time, characterizes their interferences for the purpose of correcting the calendar as occasional rather than systematic. Verres took occasion from these interferences to make a still more violent change, by declaring the Ides of January to be the calends of March (Cicero, Verr. ii, 52, 129).

Now where a people are accustomed to get wrong in their calendar, and to see occasional interferences introduced by authority to set them right, the step which I here suppose the Argeians to have taken about the invasion of Epidaurus will not appear absurd and preposterous. The Argeians would pretend that the real time for celebrating the festival of Karneia had not yet arrived. On that point, they were not bound to follow the views of other Dorian states, since there does not seem to have been any recognized authority for proclaiming the commencement of the Karneian truce, as the Eleians proclaimed the Olympic and the Corinthians the Isthmian truce. In saying, therefore, that the twenty-sixth of the month preceding Karneius should be repeated, and that the twenty-seventh should not be recognized as arriving for a fortnight or three weeks, the Argeian government would only be employing an expedient the like of which had been before resorted to; though, in the case before us, it was employed for a fraudulent purpose.

The Spartan month *Hekatombeus* appears to have corresponded with the Attic month Hekatombeon; the Spartan month following it, *Karneius*, with the Attic month Metageitnion (Hermann, p. 112), our months July and August; such correspondence being by no means exact or constant. Both Dr. Arnold and Göller speak of Hekatombeus as if it were the *Argeian*

we are not told; but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted even at the opening of the debates upon the inconsistency of assembling a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still, however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned to renew their devastations in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested and forced to return by unfavorable border-sacrifices. Intimation of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alkibiadês, at the head of one thousand Athenian hoplites, was sent to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded; so that his services were no longer required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.¹

month preceding Karneius: but we only know it as a *Spartan* month. Its name does not appear among the months of the Dorian cities in Sicily, among whom nevertheless Karneius seems universal. See Franz, *Comm. ad Corp. Inscript. Græc.* No. 5475, 5491, 5640. Part xxxii, p. 640.

The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political authorities for party purposes, are well known to every one. And even in some states of Greece, the course of the calendar was so uncertain as to serve as a proverbial expression for inextricable confusion. See Hesychius — *Εν Κέφ τας ημερας*; 'Επὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐγνώστων οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἐν Κέφ τις ἡ ἡμέρα, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστῶσιν αἱ ἡμέραι, ἀλλ' ὥς ἑκαστοὶ θέλουσιν ἄγουσι. See also Aristoph. *Nubes*, 605.

¹ Thucyd. v, 55. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν ὀπλίται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγός, πυνθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι· καὶ ὥς οὐδὲν ἐτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπῆλθον. This is the reading which Portus, Bloomfield, Didot, and Gölher, either adopt or recommend; leaving out the particle δὲ which stands in the common text after πυνθόμενοι.

If we do not adopt this reading, we must construe ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι, as Dr. Arnold and Poppe construe it, in the sense of "had already completed their expedition and returned home." But no authority is produced for putting such a meaning upon the verb ἐκστρατεύω: and the view of Dr. Arnold, who conceives that this meaning exclusively belongs to the preterite

The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a detachment of three hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this, the Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens; and they had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighboring station of Ægina, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbor of Epidaurus. But they took another ground of complaint, somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory, without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylos, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alkibiadês, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless, they still abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or breaking it in any other way.¹ The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained in name, peace and alliance, so far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality, hostile action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even

or pluperfect tense, is powerfully contradicted by the use of the word ἐξεστρατευμένων (ii, 7), the same verb and the same tense, yet in a meaning contrary to that which he assigns.

It appears to me the least objectionable proceeding of the two, to dispense with the particle δέ.

¹ Thucyd. v, 56.

had the advantage, yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians determined during the course of the ensuing summer to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.¹

Towards the month of June (B.C. 418) they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under king Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus,—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasiens, etc., were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies were very considerable, for we hear of five thousand Bœotian hoplites, and two thousand Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also five thousand light-armed, five hundred horsemen, and five hundred foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydides himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantinea. Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching first to Mantinea, and there taking up the force of that city as well as three thousand Eleian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of *lochus*, who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the battle of Platæa, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact, that no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that

¹ Thucyd. v, 57.

the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argos itself; next, to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians, were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point; while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians, followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine, called the Trêtus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis was much superior in number to the Argeians: but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trêtus, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argeians would have had a position highly favorable to their defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea, to come and attack him in the plain: the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea and the Trêtus open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the night; while the Argeians,¹ hearing at daybreak that he was near their

¹ Thucyd. v, 58. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γνόντες ἐβοήθ. π ἡμέρας ἡδὲ ἐκ τῆς Νεμίας, etc.

city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which had reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, and which lay nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides, the armies were marshalled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road through the Trêtus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantinea, seemed to have possessed any horsemen; a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of this very critical position, both the Argeians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatient for battle; thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front, which appeared to be inclosed between them and their city, and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger; and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without the least consultation or privity on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them, and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to

one of the official Spartans near him. Immediately, he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the Boeotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike unexpected and unwelcome.¹ For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home, — so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled, — the Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed their cause.

On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no more than he deserved: but we read with no small astonishment that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated against Thrasyllus,² whom they accused of having traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus, or winter torrent near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Thrasyllus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal

¹ Thucyd. v, 60. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἰποντο μὲν ὡς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ εἶχον κατ' ἀλλήλους πολλῇ τὸν Ἄγιν, etc.

² Thucyd. v, 60. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπεὶ ἐν πολλῷ πλέονι αἰτία εἶχον τοὺς σπεισασμένους ἀνευ τοῦ πλῆθους, etc.

safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.¹

Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: one thousand hoplites, with three hundred horsemen, under Lachês and Nikostratus. Alkibiadês came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiadês even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argeians. Alkibiadês contended strenuously that the recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void; since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; the Argeians, also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Mantinea on the northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were however in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantinea, to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance, and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.²

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake; the Eleians contending strenuously for a march against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbor Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians

¹ Thucyd. v, 60.

² Thucyd v, 62.

preferred the latter, incomparably the more important enterprise of the two: but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantinea, organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta,¹ when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just saved themselves by despatching the most urgent message to Sparta, and receiving the most rapid succor. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in the sum of one hundred thousand drachmæ, or about twenty-seven and two-thirds Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict on him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been before a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.²

To the great good fortune of Agis, a pressing message now arrived announcing the imminent revolt of Tegea, the most important ally of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head, the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.³ When they arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia, in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger was

¹ Thucyd. v, 64. *δσον οὐκ ἀφέστηκεν*, etc.

² Thucyd. v, 63.

³ Thucyd. v, 64. *ἐνταῦθα δὲ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἰλωτῶν πανόημι δρεία καὶ οἱ ὅλοι πρότερον*. The outmarch of the Spartans just before the battle of Platæa (described in Herodot. vii, 10) seems, however, to have been quite as rapid and instantaneous.

somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the forces, for home defence, the oldest as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians and Boeotians, as well as to the Phocians and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantinea. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather, as it appears, that they could not get into the territory of Mantinea except by passing through that of Argos,¹ which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present, into the territory of Mantinea, and took up a position near the Herakleion, or temple of Hêraklê,² from whence he began to ravage the neighboring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth from Mantinea, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground, and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding "to heal mischief by mischief." So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army and gave orders for retreat, though actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin from the enemy.³

¹ Thucyd. v, 64. *ἐννέκλῃ γὰρ διὰ μέσσοι.*

² The Lacedæmonian kings appear to have felt a sense of protection in encamping near a temple of Hêraklê, their heroic progenitor (see Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 31).

³ Thucyd. v, 65. See an exclamation by an old Spartan mentioned as productive of important consequences, at the moment when a battle was going to commence, in Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 4, 25.

His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantinea and Tegea — both situated on a lofty but inclosed plain, drained only by katabothra, or natural subterranean channels in the mountains — was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantinea, where it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantinians and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem however was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt, next retreat, and lastly disappear, their surprise was very great: and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the least prepared to see them: they were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect

order of battle. The Mantineians occupied the right wing, the post of honor, because the ground was in their territory: next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family, trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, the remaining Argeian hoplites, with their dependent allies of Kleonæ and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their horsemen.

It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience.¹ But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each *taxis*, or company, indeed, had its own *taxiarch*, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not recognized. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority, "commanders of commanders," each of whom had his special duty in insuring the execution of orders.² Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and was given to the polemarchs (each commanding a *mora*, the largest military divis-

¹ Thucyd. v, 66. μάλιστα δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐς δ' ἐμέμνηντο, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλήγησαν· διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἢ παρασκευῇ αὐτοῖς ἐτίγνετο, etc.

² Thucyd. v, 66. Σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν, πλὴν ὀλίγων, τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ὑρχόντων εἰσὶ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.

Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. xi, 5. Αἱ παραγωγαὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κήρυκος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνωμοτάρχου λόγῳ δηλοῦνται: compare xi, 8, τῷ ἐνωμοτάρχῃ παρεγγυᾶται εἰς μέτωπον παρ' ἱσπίδα καθίστασθαι, etc.

ion), who intimated it to the lochagi, or colonels, of the respective lochi. These again gave command to each pentekontêr, or captain of a pentekosty; lastly, he to the enômotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision, called an enômoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except from the enômotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for his enômoty; but the pentekontêr and the lochage were responsible also each for his larger division; the pentekosty including four enômoties, and the lochus four pentekosties, at least so the numbers stood on this occasion. All the various military manœuvres were familiar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives, to form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater promptitude¹ and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array was attained with regularity as well as with speed.

The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of Laconia, skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the Eurotas, near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Perioeki, with peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming recklessness.² Next to the Skiritæ, who were six hundred in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamôdes, both probably summoned home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian de-

¹ Thucyd. v, 66. εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο ἐς κόσμον τὸν ἐαυτῶν, "Ἀγίδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἑκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον, etc.

² Xenophon, Cyrov. iv, 2, 1: see Diodor. xv, c. 32; Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xiii, 6.

pendent allies, Heræan and Mænalians, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honor. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian horsemen.¹

Thucydides, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired; but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about *their* numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks were not less misleading. In the absence of assured information about aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity we cannot determine, as he was an exile from his country. First, he states that the Lacedæmonian army *appeared* more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were six hundred in number, the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, each enômoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different enômoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ); each lochus comprised four pentekosties, each pentekosty contained four enômoties.² Multiplying four hundred and

¹ Thucyd. v, 67.

² Very little can be made out respecting the structure of the Lacedæmonian army. We know that the enômoty was the elementary division, the military unit: that the pentekosty was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of enômoties: that the lochus also was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of pentekosties. The mora appears to have been a still larger division, consisting of so many lochi (according to Xenophon, of four lochi): but Thucydides speaks as if he knew no division larger than the lochus.

Beyond this very slender information, there seems no other fact certainly

forty-four by eight, and adding the six hundred Skiritæ, this would make a total of four thousand one hundred and eighty-four hoplites, besides a few horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate — but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and youngest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement: and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether Mantinea should continue to be a free and imperial city, with Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was, or should again be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders dwelt upon

established about the Lacedæmonian military distribution. Nor ought we reasonably to expect to find that these words *enômoty*, *pentekosty*, *lochus*, etc., indicate any fixed number of men: our own names *regiment*, *company*, *troop*, *brigade*, *division*, etc., are all more or less indefinite as to positive numbers and proportion to each other.

That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the teaching a small number of men like an *enômoty* (twenty-five, thirty-two, thirty-six men, as we sometimes find it), to perform its evolutions under the command of its *enômotarch*. When this was once secured, it is probable that the combination of these elementary divisions was left to be determined in every case by circumstances.

Thucydides states two distinct facts. 1. Each *enômoty* had *four men in front*. 2. Each *enômoty varied in depth*, according as every *lochagus* chose. Now Dobree asks, with much reason, how these two assertions are to be reconciled? Given the number of men in front, the depth of the *enômoty* is of course determined, without any reference to the discretion of any one. These two assertions appear distinctly contradictory; unless we suppose (what seems very difficult to believe) that the *lochage* might make one or two of the four files of the same *enômoty* deeper than the rest. Dobree proposes, as a means of removing this difficulty, to expunge some words from the text. One cannot have confidence, however, in the conjecture

the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendancy in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and neighbor. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their enemy in Peloponnesus.

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. "They knew (says the historian¹) that long practice beforehand in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment." As among professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard among them with a view to get their order of battle and position perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover, various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers in attendance — an hereditary caste at Sparta — began to play, while the slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy: who having no pipers or other musical instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,² fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat

¹ Thucyd. v, 69. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἠπίσταντο τὴν παρακελευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σώζουσιν ἢ λόγων δι' ὀλίγου καλῶς ῥηθέντων παραίνεσιν.

² Thucyd. v, 70. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοί, ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστῶτων, οὗ τοῦ θεοῦ χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθεῖν αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μέγαλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.

aslant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honor, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion, even the Lacedæmonian discipline being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly, he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and slow march, of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order.¹ Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while in order to fill

¹ Thucyd. v, 67. *Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν ἐβώνημον Σκιρίται αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο, ἀεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες*, etc.

The strong and precise language, which Thucydides here uses, shows that this was a privilege pointedly noted and much esteemed: among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient routine was more valued than elsewhere. And it is essential to take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the generalship of Agis, which has been rather hardly criticized.

up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two polemarchs Aristoklēs and Hipponoidas, who had their lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-wagons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the wagons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right; where Agis, with his body-guard of three hundred chosen youths called Hippeis, and with the Spartan lochi, found himself in front conflict with the centre and left of the enemy;—with the Argeians, their elderly troops and the so-called Five Lochi; with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos, and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance; indeed, on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears; and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.¹ While thus

¹ Thucyd. v, 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς Ἀργείους) Ἐτρεψαν, οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ', ὥς ἐπύρσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εὐθὺς

defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis's army, and the Athenians

ἐνδόντας, καὶ ἐστὶν οὗς καὶ καταπατηθέντας, τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet satisfactorily cleared up.

They all admit that the expressions, τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ, preceding the infinitive mood as here, signify *design* or *purpose*; *ἐνεκα* being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence satisfactorily with this meaning: accordingly they here ascribe to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes of Poppo, Gölle, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of other critics are cited and discussed.

Some say that τοῦ μὴ in this place means the same as ὥστε μή: others affirm, that it is identical with διὰ τὸ μὴ or with τῷ μὴ. "Formula τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ (say Bauer and Gölle), plerumque *consilium* significat: interdum *effectum* (i. e. ὥστε μή); hic *causam* indicat (i. e. διὰ τὸ μὴ, or τῷ μὴ)." But I agree with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged meanings is wholly unauthorized; while the second, which is adopted by Dr. Arnold himself, is sustained only by feeble and dubious evidence; for the passage of Thucydides (ii, 4. τοῦ μὴ ἐκφύγειν) may be as well construed, as Poppo's note thereupon suggests, without any such supposed exceptional sense of the words.

Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι here in their regular and legitimate sense of *ἐνεκα τοῦ*, or *consilium*. But first an error must be cleared up which pervades the view of most of the commentators. They suppose that those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been "*trodden under foot*," were so trodden down by the Lacedæmonians in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit, qualities which are dwelt upon by Thucydides in regard to this very battle. They were not at all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only anxious to run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, they would spear them, not trample them under foot.

To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the numerous Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii, 173; Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them down to secure their own escape. It seems

here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand.

quite plain that it was the Argeians in front — not the Lacedæmonians — who trod down their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight men in every file), in order to escape themselves before the Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xen. Hellenic. iv, 4, 11; *Æconomic*. viii, 5.

There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydides describes, three distinct subjects: 1. The Lacedæmonians 2. The Argeians soldiers, who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian soldiers, who trod them down in order to get away themselves. Out of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative, just as much as if he had written *καταπατηθέντας ὑπ' ἑλλήνων*, or *ὑπ' ἀλλήλων*, as in Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 11.

Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative, but not formally specified (i. e. those Argeians who trod down their comrades in order to get away themselves), or rather to the second and third conjointly and confusedly, that the *design* or *purpose* (*consilium*) in the words *τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι* refers.

Farther, the commentators all construe *τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν*, as if the last word were an accusative case coming *after* *φθῆναι* and governed by it. But there is also another construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense. In my judgment, *τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν* is here the accusative case coming *before* *φθῆναι* and forming the *subject* of it. The words will thus read (*ἐνεκα*) *τοῦ τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι* (*ἐπελθοῦσαν αὐτοῖς*): "in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in coming upon them;" "might not come upon them too soon," i. e. "sooner than they could get away." And since the word *ἐγκατάληψις* is an abstract active substantive, so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute the concrete words with which it correlates, i. e. *τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγκαταλαμβάνοντας*, subject as well as attribute, for the active participle is here essentially involved.

The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up and the meaning expressed in full and concrete words — *ἐστὶν οὖς καὶ καταπατηθέντας ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φευγόντων* (or *βιαζομένων*), *ἐνεκα τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαμβάνοντας αὐτοὺς* (*τοὺς φεύγοντας*): "As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the Argeians gave way at once, without staying for hand-combat: and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape."

Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have *τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι* used in its regular and legitimate sense of *purpose*, or *consilium*. We have moreover a plain and natural state of facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire sentence which was present to the writer's own mind. To do this

Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians; and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharax, enjoyed abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy.¹

There fell in this battle seven hundred men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; two hundred Athenians, together with both the generals Lachês and Nikostratus; and two hundred Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about three hundred men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned back home.²

Such was the important battle of Mantinea, fought in the month of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was, however, greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the preëxisting stain upon

properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of an expositor of Thucydides.

¹ Thucyd. v, 73; Diodor. xii, 79.

² Thucyd. v, 73

the honor of Sparta. The disaster in Sphacteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantinea silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military preëminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs: but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantinea any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "artists in warlike affairs." So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so, had they been well advised, the troops in the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in reëstablishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.¹

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had wellnigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards, on their return to Sparta.²

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side,

¹ Thucyd. v, 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τότε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἐς τε μὲν λακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδυτήτα, ἐν δὲ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· τύχη μὲν, ὡς ἐδόκειν, κακίζόμενοι, γνώμη δὲ, οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ ὄντες.

² Thucyd. v, 72.

we may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their three thousand men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Periklês at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious coöperation.¹ Shortly after the defeat, the three thousand Eleians came back to the aid of Mantinea, — probably regretting their previous untoward departure, — together with a reinforcement of one thousand Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began, a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle,² and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians was here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them — the fortification of the cape on which the Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated — was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.³

So far, the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force, at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in

¹ Thucyd. i. 141.

² Thucyd. v, 75.

³ Thucyd. v, 75

the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party, philo-Laconian and anti-democratical and the effect of the defeat of Mantinea had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders, who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to maintain an ascendancy in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior to Sparta, now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantinea, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,¹ and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the Peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantinea reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical

¹ Aristotle (Politic. v, 4, 9) expressly notices the credit gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of Mantinea, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution, notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten: *Οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκίμησαντες ἐν Μαντινείᾳ*, etc.

An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the Athenian army under Alkibiadēs and Thrasylus, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, Hellen. i, 2, 15-17.

party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.¹

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadês, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which being already adopted by the ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

“The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantinea, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Respecting the

¹ Thucyd. v, 76; Diodor. xii, 80.

• sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves.¹ Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business."²

¹ Thucyd. v, 77. The text of Thucydides is incurably corrupt, in regard to several words of this clause; though the general sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an oath. In regard to this purifying oath, it seems to have been essential that the oath should be *tendered* by one litigant party and *taken* by the other: perhaps therefore *σέμεν* or *θέμεν λῆν* (Valckenaer's conjecture) might be preferable to *εἰμεν λῆν*.

To Herodot. vi, 86, and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i, 16, 6, which Dr. Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny, in his *System des heutigen Römischen Rechts*, sects. 309-313, vol. vii, pp. 58-83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant party to the opposite, in hopes that the latter would refuse to take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favor of the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and formalities, with respect to this *jusjurandum delatum*, which Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity.

² Thucyd. v, 77. 'Επιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς συμμάχοις ἐμβάλισθαι, αἱ καὶ αὐτοῖς δοκῇ· αἱ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο δοκῇ τοῖς συμμάχοις, οἷκαδ' ἀπὶ ἀλλεῖν. See Dr. Arnold's note, and Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr. ch.* xxiv, vol. iii, p. 342.

One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words, but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text. The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantinea; all hostile in feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even with rudeness, if they desired any change.

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadēs at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance, holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon

I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (*ἐπιδείξυντας*) has reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is, that of a resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to Argos

amicable adjustment.¹ If any allied city shall quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution."

It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty, that of insuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantinea, or any other larger state which might have dependencies.² And accordingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their

¹ Thucyd. v, 79. *Αἱ δὲ τινὶ τῶν πολιῶν ἢ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τῶν ἐντὸς ἢ τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννήσου, αἴτε περὶ ὧν αἴτε περὶ ἄλλου τινος, διακριθῆμεν.*

The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were at this time standing disputes between Boeotia and Athens, and between Megara and Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the alleged rights of Boeotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard themselves against such necessity in this clause.

M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (*Die Privat. Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens* (Halle, 1846), sect. 19, p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory.

² All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced by this treaty to be (if we employ the language employed with reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the Peace of Nikias) *αὐτόνομους, αὐτοτελεῖς, αὐτοδίκους*, Thucyd. v, 19. The last clause of this treaty guarantees *αὐτοδικίαν* to all, though in language somewhat different, *τοῖς δὲ ἑταῖς κατὰ πάτρια δικάζεσθαι*. The expression in this treaty *αὐτοπόλις* is substantially equivalent to *αὐτοτελεῖς* in the former.

It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydides the very convenient Herodotean word *δωσίδικοι* (Herodot. vi, 42), though there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it would be useful to his meaning.

Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter, according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.¹ The Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed of Lepreum, — through the Brasideian settlers planted there, — they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon — about November or December, 418 B.C. — had still farther depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed and even new engagements concluded; while Peridikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly, Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.² In farther pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged

¹ Thucyd. v, 81; Diodor. xii, 81. ² Compare Thucyd. v, 80, and v, 83.

it prudent to send Dêmosthenês to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.¹ Having no intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, two years before the Peace of Nikias.²

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of one thousand hoplites from each city,—the first joint expedition under the new alliance,—against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyônian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyôn: but that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, the joint enterprise against Sikyôn was nothing more than a pretext to

¹ The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i, 150), and the precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his treatise called *Poliorketicus*, c. 17.

² Thucyd. iv, 80. Καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίους ἀνανεωσάμενοι τὰς σπονδὰς, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τεῖχος. We are here told that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but I know no truce previously between them except the general truce for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with Sparta (iv, 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423.

cover the introduction of one thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyôn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.¹

This revolution, accomplished about February, B.C. 417, the result of the victory of Mantinea and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta, raised her ascendancy in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose, perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês thither, two years before; accordingly, she now remodelled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counterwork her or to favor Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendancy at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern, yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them suspicious and probably cruel. Nor was such cruelty their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos, comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like

¹ Thucyd. v, 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες, τὰ τ' ἐν Σικυνῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔλθόντες, καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνα ξυναμφοτέροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἀργεὶ δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία ἐπιτηδεῖα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη: compare Diodor. xii, 80.

Athens, such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand — men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station — construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep:¹ a terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled women² to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as coexistent, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the *Gymnopædiæ* was in course of being solemnized at Sparta, — a festival at which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection, and after a sharp contest gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily

¹ Pausanias, ii, 20, 1.

² See Herodot. v, 87; Euripid. *Hecub.* 1152, and the note of Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama.

refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed, but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.¹

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown, after a continuance of about four months,² from February to June, 417 B.C., and the chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,³ who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless, the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause, and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand; so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

¹ Thucyd. v, 82; Diodor. xii, 80.

² Diodorus (xii, 80) says that it lasted eight months: but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydides does not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.

³ Thucyd. v, 82. *ἐννέδρασαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τινες πόλεις.*

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens, in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population — men and women, free and slave — set about the work with the utmost ardor: while Alkibiadēs brought assistance from Athens,¹ especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea,² required a long time. Moreover, the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles without, — a party defeated but not annihilated, — strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to assist; the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection.³ Accordingly about the end of September, 417 B.C., king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the long walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiaë, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.¹

¹ Thucyd. v, 82. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανόημελ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ ἐκέρται, ἐρείχιζον, etc. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.

² Pausanias, ii, 36, 3.

³ Thucyd. i, 107.

¹ Thucyd. v, 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the Argeians had already built their long walls down to the sea — πρὸ θάλασσης τοὺς Ἀργεῖους

The close neighborhood of such exiles, together with the declared countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical party within the walls, kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadês was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in the ascendancy, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected three hundred marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party, B.C. 416. Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And again, about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices — always offered previous to leaving their own territory — so unfavorable, that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so, to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape.² Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices, entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part), and established the Argeian oligarchi-

ῥιποδομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης (xii, 81). Thucydides uses the participle of the present tense — τὰ οἰκοδομοῦμενα τεῖχη ἐλόντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες, etc.

² Thucyd. v, 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, μελλήσαντες εἰς τὴν Ἀργεῖαν στρατεύειν. . . . ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποτοπήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ἐνέλαβον, οἱ δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον.

I presume μέλλησιν here is not used in its ordinary meaning of *loitering*, *delay*, but is to be construed by the previous verb μελλήσαντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv, 126 — “prospect of action immediately impending:” compare Diodor. xii, 81

cal exiles at Orneæ: from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian reinforcement.¹

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens: very different from the splendid hopes which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantinea, hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendancy within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta,—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party,—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylos became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians.² Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.³ Nor was the license of free

¹ Thucyd. vi, 7.

² Thucyd. v, 115.

³ Thucyd. vi, 105. The author of the loose and inaccurate *Oratio de Pace*, ascribed to Andokidês, affirms that the war was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the Argeians (*Orat. de Pac.* c. 1, 6, 3, 31, pp. 93–105). This assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among others, some of them more powerful. Thucydides tells us that the

intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.¹

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region, situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command, and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman, Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously

persuasions of Argos, to induce Athens to throw up her alliance with Sparta were repeated and unavailing.

¹ Thucyd. v, 83.

urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails; partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint, partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, with express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceedings, which display as much silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manœuvred by the Lacedæmonian diplomaey, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias, the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantinea had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the Peace of Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters, where she is brought

near to ruin by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadês combined for, by singular misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was in one of the three years between 420—416 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadês.¹ The political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition — probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since Alkibiadês was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous — was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Cheremês, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadês. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanês as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx:² if this were true, his supposed demagogic preëminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydidês does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the Peace of Nikias. Thucydidês only mentions him once, in 411 B.C., while

¹ Dr. Thirlwall (*History of Greece*, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.

His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called *Andokidês* against Alkibiadês, the genuineness of which he seems to accept (see his Appendix ii, on that subject, vol. iii, p. 494, *seq.*).

The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I feel persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two generations after the time to which it professes to refer. My reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous notes, nor do I think that Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix is successful in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech. See my preceding vol. vi, ch. xlvii, p. 6, note.

² Aristophan. *Pac.* 680.

he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him, "one Hyperbolus, a low busy-body, who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city."¹ This sentence of Thucydides is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydides.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between Nikias and Alkibiadēs, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been that of Periklēs and Thucydides son of Melēsius, the latter of whom was ostracized about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover, there was now full confidence in the numerous dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals, thus abating the necessity as conceived in men's minds, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At a moment of extreme heat of party dispute, the friends of Alkibiadēs probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting a vote of ostracism; each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 73. Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ ἀσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. According to Androtion (Fragm. 48, ed. Didot.) — ὡστρακισμένον διὰ φανλότητα.

Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 13; Ælian. V. H. xii, 43; Theopompus, Fragg. 102, 103, ed. Didot.

the partisans of both changed their views, and preferred to let the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly, the two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs, or *hetæries*, and according to some accounts the friends of Phæax also, united to turn the vote against some one else: and they fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked, Hyperbolus.¹ By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence, and he was sent into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognized by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydides himself distinctly implies this; for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiadês had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary — antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.

It was in the beginning of summer (416 B.C.) that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 13; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11. Theophrastus says that the violent opposition at first, and the coalition afterwards, was not between Nikias and Alkibiadês, but between Phæax and Alkibiadês.

The coalition of votes and parties may well have included all three.

Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens: but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint,¹ until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian and two Lesbian, twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and fifteen hundred hoplites from the allies, with three hundred bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Athens.

It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece, even in governments not professedly democratical — to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, and admitted the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of this conversation Thucydidês professes to give a detailed and elaborate account, at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no one of them separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue carried on is dramatic, and very impressive. There is, indeed, every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydidês is in far larger proportion his own and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now as all the Melian population were slain imme-

dially after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydides could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them the general character of what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.

The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in which they now stand, in spite of the disposition of the Melians to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians, or to set forth injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he that justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it.¹ To

¹ In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy, I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by the English government in 1807, together with the language used by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. We read as follows in M. Thiers's *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire* :—

“ L'agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C'étoit M. Jackson qui avoit été autrefois chargé d'affaires en France, avant l'arrivée de Lord Whitworth, à Paris, mais qu'on n'avoit pas pu y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit qu'il manifestoit en toute occasion. Introduit auprès du régent, il alléguait de prétendues stipulations secrètes, en vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit, (disoit on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d'une coalition contre l'Angle terre: il donna comme raison d'agir la nécessité où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions pour que les forces navales du Danemark et le passage du Sund ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des Français: et en conséquence il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu'on livrât à l'armée Angloise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande le Sund, le port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même — promettant de garder le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit remis en

this the Melians reply, that — omitting all appeal to justice, and speaking only of what was expedient — they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others. — “ We are not afraid of *that* (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta; it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the mean time, let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety; wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us.” — “ Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta?” said the Melians. — “ No (is the reply); your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies; your enmity will give a demonstration of our power.” — “ But do your subjects really take such

possession de ce qu'on alloit lui enlever, dès que le danger seroit passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne perdrait rien, que l'on se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires et en amis — que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce qu'elles consommeroient. — Et avec quoi, répondit le prince indigné, payeriez vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérons à cette infame proposition? — Le prince continuant, et opposant à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui n'avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les avoit toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le surprendre — *M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, qu'il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus fort quand on étoit le plus foible. Le prince congédia l'agent Anglois avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu'il alloit se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince et de citoyen Danois.* (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, tome viii, livre xxviii, p. 190.)

a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?" — "They do: for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too, while we are lords of the sea." — "But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies." — "We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, or already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril." — "We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless, we trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice; and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from very shame to aid us." — "We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which men believe in regard to the gods, and wish in regard to themselves. What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed, — not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue for ever, — and knowing well too that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their

remaining deaf to your call, we congratulate you indeed on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behavior towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honorable, and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety."

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a certain interval were recalled by the Melian council to hear the following words: "We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens: we shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for seven hundred years; we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves, relying on that favorable fortune which the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party, and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable."—"Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance, through your own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and, with your all, you will come to ruin."

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade, both by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time, the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment, under Philokratês. At length the provisions within were exhausted;

plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydides does not say; but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiades¹ was strenuous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community: apparently not as *kleruchs*, or out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.²

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mélos from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover, the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small insular population, who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire by a new conquest — easy to

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiades, c. 16. This is doubtless one of the statements which the composer of the Oration of Andokides against Alkibiades found current in respect to the conduct of the latter (sect. 123). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of it.

² Thucyd. v, 106. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκησαν, ἀποϊκοῦντες ἑστέρον πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9): some, therefore, must have escaped or must have been spared.

effect, though of small value — was doubtless her chief motive ; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted, and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue set forth by Thucydides. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out into deductions and illustrations,¹ thus dramatizing the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers, as Dionysius of Halikarnassus² long ago remarked ; intimating his suspicion that Thucydides had so set out the case for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false pretences, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *sophistry*, where their purpose needs it.³ Now the language of the envoy at Mēlos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession — falsely called a school — named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for a sort of audacious frankness ; a disdain not merely of sophistry, in the modern sense of the word, but even

¹ Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 348.

² Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Thucyd. c. 37–42, pp. 906–920, Reisk : compare the remarks in his Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, de Præcipuis Historicis, p. 774, Reisk.

³ Plutarch, Alkibiad. 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους δεῖ τὰ πρᾶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἀμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδίδας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας. To the same purpose Plutarch, Solon, c. 15.

of such plausible excuse as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued, as if "*The good old plan, that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can,*" had been first discovered and openly promulgated by Athenian sophists; whereas the true purpose and value of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word — putting aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called sophists at Athens — is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification, so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon this "good old plan" as much as he pleases, but without avowing it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop's fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Mēlos speaks in a manner totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Dionysius has observed.

As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, as matter of pride and glory:¹ and when we come to the times of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Mēlos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification, — a good plea, if he can, — a false

¹ Compare also what Brasidas says in his speech to the Akanthians, v, 86: *Ισχυος δικαιώσει ἢν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν*, etc.

plea, or sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. He even disdains to mention, what might have been said with perfect truth as a matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency as a justification, that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her allies, without any payment of their own.

So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic fragment,—*Μήλου Ἀλώσις* (The Capture of Melos),—if we may parody the title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus “The Capture of Miletus.” And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydides will suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and tragical effect. The capture of Mēlos comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though thus crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, declining,—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration,—until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydides, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by this dramatic fragment of the envoys at Mēlos. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxes into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch’s insolence and superhuman pride, by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral

contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydides — having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of time — has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation ; not those of the Athenian envoy, — still less, those of the Athenian public, — least of all, those of that much-calumniated class of men, the Athenian sophists.

CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY.

IN the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect : so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank : to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 461–416 B.C., and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse,¹ followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately, our memorials respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther, transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property. The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile, transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and provided settlements for numerous emigrants and mercenaries devoted to their interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary revolution was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the territory of Messène, partly in the reëstablished city of Kamarina in the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.²

¹ See above, vol. v, ch. xliii, pp. 204-239, for the history of these events I now take up the thread from that chapter.

² Mr. Mitford, in the spirit which is usual with him, while enlarging upon the suffering occasioned by this extensive revolution both of inhabitants and of property throughout Sicily, takes no notice of the cause in which it originated, namely, the number of foreign mercenaries whom the Gelonian dynasty had brought in and enrolled as new citizens (Gelon alone having brought in ten thousand, Diodor. xi, 72), and the number of exiles whom they had banished and dispossessed.

I will here notice only one of his misrepresentations respecting the events of this period, because it is definite as well as important (vol. iv, p. 9, chap. xviii, sect. i).

"But thus (he says) in every little state, lands were left to become public property, or to be assigned to new individual owners. *Everywhere, then, that favorite measure of democracy, the equal division of the lands of the state, was resolved upon:* a measure impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be maintained as executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained."

Again, sect. iii, p. 23, he speaks of "that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands," etc.

Now, upon this we may remark:—

1. The *equal division of the lands* of the state, here affirmed by Mr. Mitford,

But though peace was thus reëstablished, these large mutations of inhabitants first begun by the despots, — and the incoherent mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which was brought about unavoidably during the process, — left throughout Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness.¹ The wonder indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the half century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied, beginning from the westward by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came Syracuse, possessing the southeastern cape, and the southern portion of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, and Naxos: Messênê, on the strait adjoining Italy. The centre of the island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans: on this coast, Himera was the only Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner of the island was occupied

is a pure fancy of his own. He has no authority for it whatever. Diodorus says (xi, 76) *κατεκληρούχησαν τὴν χώραν*, etc.; and again (xi, 86) he speaks of *τὸν ἀναδασμὸν τῆς χώρας*: the *redivision* of the territory; but respecting *equality of division*, not one word does he say. Nor can any principle of division in this case be less probable than equality; for one of the great motives of the redivision was to provide for those exiles who had been dispossessed by the Gelonian dynasty: and these men would receive lots, greater or less, on the ground of compensation for loss, greater or less as it might have been. Besides, immediately after the redivision, we find rich and poor mentioned, just as before (xi, 86).

2. Next, Mr. Mitford calls "the equal division of all the lands of the state" the *favorite measure of democracy*. This is an assertion not less incorrect. Not a single democracy in Greece, so far as my knowledge extends, can be produced, in which such equal partition is ever known to have been carried into effect. In the Athenian democracy, especially, not only there existed constantly great inequality of landed property, but the oath annually taken by the popular heliastic judges had a special clause, protesting emphatically against *redivision of the land or extinction of debts*

¹ Thucyd. vi, 17.

by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried, and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the infliction of temporary preventive banishment.¹ Under this law several powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine, by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meagre abstract given by Diodorus, and especially to know the precautionary securities by which the application of the ostracizing sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenes at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary, if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently

¹ Diodor. xi, 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was called the *petalism*; because, in taking the votes, the name of the citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive, instead of a shell or potsherd.

open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism, or petalism, at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth, and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan admiral Phaëllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried and banished, a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apellês being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica, at that time a Tyrrhenian possession, and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized by a large number of captives and a rich booty.¹

Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities into something like city life and collective coöperation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he induced all the Sikel communities, with the exception of Hybla, to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hill-top, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the neighboring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Paliki.² As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in

¹ Diodor. xi, 87, 88.

² Diodor. xi, 78, 88, 90. The proceeding of Duketius is illustrated by the description of Dardanus in the *Iliad*, xx, 216: —

part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighborhood, rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palikê, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, probably with some Greeks intermingled.

The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna:¹ Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power, when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a victory, in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon, as the Syracusans believed, insomuch that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting

Κρίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἴλιος ἱρή
 Ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,
 Ἄλλ' ἐθ' ἐπωρείας φέκον πολυπιδάκον Ἰδης.

Compare Plato, de Legg. iii, pp. 681, 682.

¹ Diodor. xi, 76.

in them the strongest emotions : and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder citizens — earnestly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis — found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of "Save the suppliant."¹ Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth, under his engagement to live there quietly for the future ; the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence,— just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Dorieus, and induced to spare his life, on an occasion which will be hereafter recounted.² If in some instances the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous sentiment, carried severities to excess,— so, in other cases, as well as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalê Aktê on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great credit on the score of superior foresight.³

¹ Diodor. xi, 91, 92. 'Ο δὲ δῆμος ὥσπερ τιμὴ μᾶ φωνῇ σώζειν ἅπαντες ἐβόων ῥὸν Ικέτην.

² Xenophon, Hellen, i, 5, 19 ; Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.

³ Mr. Mitford recounts as follows the return of Duketius to Sicily : "The Syracusan chiefs brought back Duketius from Corinth, apparently to make

But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again in the island, and again formidable, were so indignant that they declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, these latter solicited and obtained peace.¹ The discord between the two cities, however, had left leisure to Duketius to found the city of Kalé Aktê, and to make some progress in reëstablishing his ascendancy over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of the Sikel townships in the island, regaining his former conquest, Morgantinê, and subduing even the strong position and town called Trinakia,² after a brave and desperate resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

him instrumental to their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted, or rather encouraged him to establish a colony of mixed people, Greeks and Sicels, at Calé Acté, on the northern coast of the island," (ch. xviii, sect. i, vol. iv, p. 13.)

The statement that "the Syracusans brought back Duketius, or encouraged him to come back, or to found the colony of Kalé Aktê," is a complete departure from Diodorus on the part of Mr. Mitford; who transforms a breach of parole on the part of the Sikel prince into an ambitious manœuvre on the part of Syracusan democracy. The words of Diodorus, the only authority in the case, are as follows (xii, 8): Οὗτος δε (Duketius) ὀλίγον χρόνον μέinas ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ, τὰς ὁμολογίας ἔλυσσε, καὶ προσποιήσμενος χρημάτων ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἑαυτῷ δεδοσθαι, κτίσαι τὴν Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον μετὰ πολλῶν οἰκητόρων· συνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Ἀρχωνίδης, ὁ τῶν Ἑρβιταίων δυναστεύων. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν οἰκισμὸν τῆς Καλῆς Ἀκτῆς ἐγένετο· Ἀκραγαντῖνοι δὲ, ἅμα μὲν φθονοῦντες τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, ἅμα δ' ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς διὰ Δουκέτιον ὄντα κοινὸν πόλεμον διέσωσαν ἄνευ τῆς Ἀκραγαντίνων γνώμης, πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις.

¹ Diodor. xii, 8.

² Diodor. xii, 29. For the reconquest of Morgantinê, see Thucyd. iv, 65.

By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending her ascendancy throughout the island : with which view her horsemen were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were constructed.¹ Whether any, or what, steps were taken to realize her designs our historian does not tell us. But the position of Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first city as to power, indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.

Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public monuments of Agrigentum, especially appear to have even surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of Sicily,² particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was very great: the number of rich men keeping chariots and competing for the prize at the Olympic games was renowned, not less than the accumulation of

Respecting this town of Trinakia, known only from the passage of Diodorus here, Paulmier (as cited in Wesseling's note), as well as Mannert (*Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, b. x, ch. xv, p. 446), intimate some skepticism; which I share so far as to believe that Diodorus has greatly overrated its magnitude and importance.

Nor can it be true, as Diodorus affirms, that Trinakia was the only Sikel township remaining unsubdued by the Syracusans, and that, after conquering that place, they had subdued them all. We know that there were no inconsiderable number of independent Sikels, at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily (Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 2).

² Diodor. xiii, 81.

¹ Diodor. xii, 30.

works of art, statues and pictures,¹ with manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing that this prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.

Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea in the gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece, Parmenidès and Zeno. Empedoklès of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedoklès and Pôlus at Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini, acquired great reputation.² The constitution established at Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the reëstablishment of a despotism, when Empedoklès, availing himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand, and render the government completely democratical. His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and pretence to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner

¹ Diodor. xiii, 82, 83, 90.

² See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, Brut. c. 12; Plato, Phædr. p. 267, c. 113, 114; Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Isocrate, p. 534 R. and Epist. ii, ad Ammæum, p. 792; also Quintilian, iii, 1, 125. According to Cicero (de Inventione, ii, 2), the treatises of these ancient rhetoricians, "usque a principe illo et inventore Tisiâ," had been superseded by Aristotle, who had collected them carefully, "nominatim," and had improved upon their expositions. Dionysius laments that they had been so superseded (Epist. ad Ammæ. p. 722).

similar to Pythagoras.¹ The same combination of rhetoric with physical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini, whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.

In this state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears to have never aimed at any political ascendancy even over that town, much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference,² were yet connected, by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily, — Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messênê, — together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy.³ Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily — Naxos, Katana, and Leontini — were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior

¹ Diogen. Laërt. viii, 64–71; Seyfert, *Akras und sein Gebiet*, sect. ii, p. 70; Ritter, *Geschichte der Alten Philosophie*, vol. i, ch. vi, p. 533, *seqq.*

² Thucyd. iv, 61–64. This is the tenor of the speech delivered by Hermokratês at the congress of Gela in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. His language is remarkable: he calls all non-Sicilian Greeks *ἀλλοφύλους*.

³ The inscription in Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptt.* (No. 74, part i, p. 112) relating to the alliance between Athens and Rhegium, conveys little certain information. Boeckh refers it to a covenant concluded in the archonship of Apseudês at Athens (Olymp. 86, 4, B.C. 433–432, the year before the Peloponnesian war), renewing an alliance which was even then of old date. But it appears to me that the supposition of a renewal is only his own conjecture; and even the name of the archon, *Apseudês*, which he has restored by a plausible conjecture, can hardly be considered as certain.

to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any coöperation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbor Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 438-432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to coöperation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy,—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch—whom most historians have followed—is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown in a former chapter. At that moment, Sparta and Corinth anticipated large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.¹

If we could believe the story in Justin iv, 3, Rhegium must have ceased to be Ionic before the Peloponnesian war. He states, that in a sedition at Rhegium, one of the parties called in auxiliaries from Himera. These Himeræan exiles having first destroyed the enemies against whom they were invoked, next massacred the friends who had invoked them: "*ausi facinus nulli tyranno comparandum.*" They married the Rhegine women, and seized the city for themselves.

I do not know what to make of this story, which neither appears noticed in Thucydides, nor seems to consist with what he does tell us.

¹ Thucyd. i, 36.

In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organizing their first invasion of Attica, and full of hope that Athens would be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet of five hundred ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to refrain from any immediate declaration against Athens until their fleet should be ready.¹ Of such expected succor, indeed, little was ever realized in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the expectations and orders of Sparta, show

¹ Thucyd. ii, 7. Καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν, πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις, ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τακείνων ἐλομένοις, ναὺς ἐπετάχθησαν ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὥς ἐς τὸν πάντα ἄριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσόμενον, etc.

Respecting the construction of this perplexing passage, read the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller: compare Poppo, ad Thucyd. vol. i, ch. xv, p. 181.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and Göller in rejecting the construction of αὐτοῦ with ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, in the sense of "those ships which were in Peloponnesus from Italy and Sicily." This would be untrue in point of fact, as they observe: there were no Sicilian ships of war in Peloponnesus.

Nevertheless I think, differing from them, that αὐτοῦ is not a pronoun referring to ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, but is used in contrast with those words, and really means, "in or about Peloponnesus." It was contemplated that new ships should be built in Sicily and Italy, of sufficient number to make the total fleet of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, including the triremes already in Peloponnesus, equal to five hundred sail. But it was never contemplated that the triremes in Italy and Sicily *alone* should amount to five hundred sail, as Dr. Arnold, in my judgment, erroneously imagines. Five hundred sail for the entire confederacy would be a prodigious total: five hundred sail for Sicily and Italy alone, would be incredible.

To construe the sentence as it stands now, putting aside the conjecture of νῆες instead of ναῦς, or ἐπετάχθη instead of ἐπετάχθησαν, which would make it run smoothly, we must admit the supposition of a break or double construction, such as sometimes occurs in Thucydides. The sentence begins with one form of construction and concludes with another. We must suppose, with Göller, that αἱ πόλεις is understood as the nominative case to ἐπετάχθησαν. The dative cases (Λακεδαιμονίοις — ἐλομένοις) are to be considered, I apprehend, as governed by νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν: that is, these dative cases belong to the first form of construction, which Thucydides has not carried out. The sentence is begun as if νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν were intended to follow.

that here as elsewhere she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighboring towns, a hope which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realized, we are not distinctly told; and we find Hermokratès the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards, immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, with their antecedent apathy.¹ But it is easy to see, that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest, — neither wrongs to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens, — nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or Selinus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating, — Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbors, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city Syracuse, and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding

¹ Thucyd. vi, 34 : compare iii, 86.

themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succor, as allies¹ and Ionians, and to represent that, if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. The eminent rhetor Georgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains, not merely in Athens but in many other towns of Central Greece,² though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: and they sent twenty triremes under Lachês and Charœakês, with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Lachês did something towards rescuing the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse.³ Throughout the ensuing year, he pressed the war in the neighborhood of Rhegium and Messênê, his colleague Charœadês being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messênê, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities.⁴ He also

¹ Thucyd. vi, 86.

² Thucyd. iii, 86; Diodor. xii, 53; Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 282, B. It is remarkable that Thucydides, though he is said, with much probability, to have been among the pupils of Georgias, makes no mention of that rhetor personally as among the envoys. Diodorus probably copied from Ephorus, the pupil of Isokratês. Among the writers of the Isokratean school, the persons of distinguished rhetors, and their supposed political efficiency, counted for much more than in the estimation of Thucydides. Pausanias (vi, 17, 3) speaks of Tisias also as having been among the envoys in this celebrated legation.

³ Thucyd. iii, 88; Diodor. xii, 54.

⁴ Thucyd. iii, 90; vi, 6.

contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egesta, in the northwest portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the river Halex :¹ after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inèssus. This was a native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis ; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss.² Lachês concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodôrus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.³

That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring, under Eurymedon and Sophoklês, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachês insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther reinforcements, at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes of bringing the contest to a speedy close.⁴

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklês started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenês on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which, in conjunction with the land-forces under the command of Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylos, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole war, the capture of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphakteria.⁵ But the fleet was so long occupied, first in

¹ Thucyd. iii, 99.

² Thucyd. iii, 115.

³ See the preceding vol. vi, ch. lii.

⁴ Thucyd. iii, 103.

⁵ Thucyd. iii, 115.

the blockade of that island, next in operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.¹

Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodôrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachês at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messênê, which had surrendered to Lachês a few months before; and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprized of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail — half Syracusan, half Lokrian — was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messênê to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land-force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles: these latter were even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favorable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the diversion prevented all succor from Rhegium to Messênê. The latter town now served as a harbor for the fleet hostile to Athens,² which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory, in an action brought on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force at Cape Pelôrus near Messênê, others under the Lokrian force near Rhegium, each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.³ This de-

¹ Thucyd. iv, 48.

² Thucyd. iii, 115; iv, 1.

³ Thucyd. iv, 24. *καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχους ἀπέπλευσαν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐτυχον, ἐς τὰ οἰκεία στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναὺν ἀπολέσαντες, etc.*

I concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of this passage, yet conceiving that the words *ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐτυχον* designate the flight as disorderly, inasmuch that all the Lokrian ships did not get back to the Lokrian station, nor all

feat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against the latter place, that their land-force retired from the Rhegine territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the opposite coast under Cape Pelôrus. Here the ships were moored close on shore under the protection of the land-force, when the Athenians and Rhegines came up to attack them; but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme, which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling-iron; her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along-shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbor of Messênê, in which transit they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off with the loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.¹

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbor, the Chalkidic city of Naxos, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesinês near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels were seen descending the neighboring hills to succor the Naxians: upon which the latter, elate with the sight, and mistaking the new comers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than one thousand men, and with a still greater loss sustained in

the Syracusan ships to the Syracusan station: but each separate ship fled to either one or the other, as it best could.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 25. ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων.

I do not distinctly understand the nautical movement which is expressed by ἀποσιμωσάντων, in spite of the notes of the commentators. And I cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr. Arnold's explanation, when he says, "The Syracusans, on a sudden, threw off their towing-ropes, made their way to the open sea by a lateral movement, and thus became the assailants," etc. The open sea was what the Athenians required, in order to obtain the benefit of their superior seamanship.

their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back also to Messênê, from whence such of the ships as were not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection under Demomelês, while the Leontines and Naxians, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force; but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Messênê, however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.¹

Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodôrus.² Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind, the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing humiliation of Sparta during the months immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylos and Kythêra, so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island.³ The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighboring city of Gela; at which latter place deputies were invited to attend from

¹ Thucyd. iv, 25.

² Thucyd. i, 48.

³ Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan Hermokratês, nine years afterwards, when the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse was on its way, respecting the increased disposition to union among the Sicilian cities, produced by common fear of Athens (Thucyd. vi, 33).

all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.¹

This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokratês, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his country; but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydides places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokratês impressed upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere, even without invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation, under pretence of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided them, but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse — the first city in the island, and best able to sustain the brunt of war — was prepared to set the example, without that foolish over-valuation of favorable chances so ruinous even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the

¹ Thucyd. iv, 58.

ture. Let them all feel that they were neighbors, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.¹

This harangue from Hermokratês, and the earnest dispositions of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanor for the future. Accordingly, the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantinê to Kamarina, on receipt of a fixed sum of money.²

¹ See the speech of Hermokratês, Thucyd. iv, 59-64. One expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by Thucydides many years after its proper date, subsequently to the great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 415 B.C.; though I doubt not that Thucydides collected the memoranda for it at the time.

Hermokratês says: "The Athenians are now near us with a few ships, lying in wait for our blunders," — *οἱ δύνανται ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰς τε ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν, ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες*, etc. (iv, 60).

Now the fleet under the command of Eurymedon and his colleagues at Rhegium included all or most of the ships which had acted at Sphacteria and Korkyra, together with those which had been previously at the strait of Messina under Pythodôrus. It could not have been less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been sixty sail. It is hardly conceivable that any Greek, speaking in the early spring of 424 B.C., should have alluded to this as a *small* fleet: assuredly, Hermokratês would not thus allude to it, since it was for the interest of his argument to exaggerate rather than extenuate, the formidable manifestations of Athens.

But Thucydides, composing the speech after the great Athenian expedition of 415 B.C., so much more numerous and commanding in every respect, might not unnaturally represent the fleet of Eurymedon as "a few ships," when he tacitly compared the two. This is the only way that I know, of explaining such an expression.

The Scholiast observes that some of the copies in his time omitted the words *ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ*: probably they noticed the contradiction which I have remarked; and the passage may certainly be construed without those words.

² Thucyd. iv, 65. We learn from Polybius (Fragm. xii, 22, 23, one of the *Excerpta* recently published by Mai, from the Cod. Vatic.) that Timæus

The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification ; a condition agreed to by all, except the Epizephyrian Lokrians.¹ They then acquainted Eurymedon and his colleagues with the terms ; inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily. Nor had these generals any choice but to close with the proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities, with liberty of access reciprocally to any single ship of war, but no armed force to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.²

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues Sophoklês and Pythodôrus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet—so the Athenians believed—was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the three colleagues were differently treated we are not informed.³ This sentence was harsh and unmerited ; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace, while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained in his conduct, as recounted by Thucydidês, is, that his arrival at Rhegium with the entire fleet in September, 425 B.C., does not seem to have been attended with any increased vigor or success, in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians—besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities, which we shall find fatally misleading them hereafter—were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means intrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle of Delium

had in his twenty-first book described the congress of Gela at considerable length, and had composed an elaborate speech for Hermokratês : which speech Polybius condemns, as a piece of empty declamation.

¹ Thucyd. v, 5.

² Thucyd. vi, 13-52.

³ Thucyd. iv, 65.

and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphakteria.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrolment of many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town upon whom the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands, forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos.¹ While these exiles found shelter as

¹ Thucyd. v, 4. Δεοντῖνοι γὰρ, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς, καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενδύει ἡναδάσασθαι. Οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι Συρακοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλουσι τὸν δῆμον. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, etc.

Upon this Dr. Arnold observes: "The principle on which this ἀναδασμός γῆς was redemanded, was this; that every citizen was entitled to his portion, κλῆρος, of the land of the state, and that the admission of new citizens rendered a redivision of the property of the state a matter at once of necessity and of justice. It is not probable that in any case the actual κλῆροι (properties) of the old citizens were required to be shared with the new members of the state; but only, as at Rome, the *ager publicus*, or land still remaining to the state itself, and not apportioned out to individuals. This land, however, being beneficially enjoyed by numbers of the old citizens, either as common pasture, or as being farmed by different individuals on very advantageous terms, a division of it among the newly-admitted citizens, although not, strictly speaking, a spoliation of private property, was yet a serious shock to a great mass of existing interests, and was therefore always regarded as a revolutionary measure."

I transcribe this note of Dr. Arnold rather from its intrinsic worth than from any belief that analogy of agrarian relations existed between Rome and Leontini. The *ager publicus* at Rome was the product of successive conquests from foreign enemies of the city: there may, indeed, have been originally a similar *ager publicus* in the peculiar domain of Rome itself, anterior to all conquests; but this must at any rate have been very small,

they could in other cities, the rich Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse,

and had probably been all absorbed and assigned in private property before the agrarian disputes began.

We cannot suppose that the Leontines had any *ager publicus* acquired by conquest, nor are we entitled to presume that they had any at all, capable of being divided. Most probably the lots for the new citizens were to be provided out of private property. But unfortunately we are not told how, nor on what principles and conditions. Of what class of men were the new emigrants? Were they individuals altogether poor, having nothing but their hands to work with; or did they bring with them any amount of funds, to begin their settlement on the fertile and tempting plain of Leontini? (compare Thucyd. i, 27, and Plato de Legib. v, p. 744, A.) If the latter, we have no reason to imagine that they would be allowed to acquire their new lots gratuitously. Existing proprietors would be forced to sell at a fixed price, but not to yield their properties without compensation. I have already noticed, that to a small self-working proprietor, who had no slaves, it was almost essential that his land should be near the city; and provided this were insured, it might be a good bargain for a new resident having some money, but no land elsewhere, to come in and buy.

We have no means of answering these questions: but the few words of Thucydides do not present this measure as revolutionary, or as intended against the rich, or for the benefit of the poor. It was proposed, on public grounds, to strengthen the city by the acquisition of new citizens. This might be wise policy, in the close neighborhood of a doubtful and superior city, like Syracuse; though we cannot judge of the policy of the measure without knowing more. But most assuredly Mr. Mitford's representation can be noway justified from Thucydides: "Time and circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, since that *incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands*, which had been made, on the general establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities, the poor rested under their lot; but in Leontini, they were warm in project for a *fresh and equal partition*; and to strengthen themselves against the party of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree for associating a number of new citizens." (Mitford, H. G. ch. xviii, sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 23.)

I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Mitford has misrepresented the redivision of lands which took place after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty. That redivision had not been upon the principle of equal lots: it is not therefore correct to assert, as Mr. Mitford does, that the present movement at Leontini arose from the innovation made by time and circumstances in that equal division: as little is it correct to say, that the poor at Leontini now desired "a fresh and equal partition." Thucydides says not one word about equal partition. He puts forward the enrolment

and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it called Phokeia, together with a neighboring strong post called Brikinnies. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enrolment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse, thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.¹

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call; her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by the truce for one year; and even during that truce, she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of that truce, she sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of reëstablishing the Leontine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Grecian cities,

of new citizens as the substantive and primary resolution, actually taken by the Leontines; the redivision of the lands, as a measure consequent and subsidiary to this, and as yet existing only in project (ἐπενοίει). Mr. Mitford states the fresh and equal division to have been the real object of desire, and the enrolment of new citizens to have been proposed with a view to attain it. His representation is greatly at variance with that of Thucydides.

¹Justin (iv, 4) surrounds the Sicilian envoys at Athens with all the insignia of misery and humiliation, while addressing the Athenian assembly: "Sordidâ veste, capillo barbâque promissis, et omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam conquisito, concionem deformes adeunt."

especially with Lokri, which had hitherto stood
Athens; and his first addresses in Sicily appeared
success. His representations of danger from Syracu-
tion were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigento,
on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens, and
tated the pacification of Gela, had now disappeared
the other hand, the proceeding of Syracuse in return
was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by
that sympathy between democracies in different
universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined the
tine aristocracy to expel the Demos, just as the Athenians
combined with the aristocracy of Megara and Eretria
before, and had sold the Demos of those towns in return
birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck
of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; it
had become a part of Syracuse. All these were
so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination, that the
Syracusan, neighbors of Syracuse on the other side, feared
lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and slavery
soon overtake them. Agrigento, though with some
fear, was disposed from policy, and jealousy, to
second the views of Phæax. But when the Athenians
Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that town,
the other two, he found himself met by so strong
that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he
even to open his case at Selinus or Himera. He
crossed the interior of the island through the
Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brimontem
Leontine Demos were still maintaining a party
Having encouraged them to hold out by assisting
proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the evening he
struck upon some vessels conveying a body of soldiers
from Messênê to Lokri. The Lokrians had revolted from
Messênê after the pacification of Gela, by means of
tredition; but after holding it some time, they were
cut by a second revolution. Phæax, being upon his way
Lokri, passed by these vessels without any alarm.

¹ Thucyd. v, 4, 5.

The Leontine exiles at Brikinies, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely expelled. Nevertheless, Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phæax to that island, came the Peace of Nikias: the consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alkibiadēs carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and coöperation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Mélos was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens, pressing their entreaties for aid, which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighboring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and Eggesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connection. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced Eggesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.¹ Now the Eggestæans had allied themselves with Lachês ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily

¹ Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 82. The statement of Diodorus—that the Eggestæans applied not merely to Agrigentum but also to Syracuse—is highly improbable. The war which he mentions as having taken place some years before between Eggesta and Lilybæum (xi, 86) in 454 B.C., may probably have been a war between Eggesta and Selinus.

embrace the pretext for interference, considering that, ten years afterwards, she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage,¹ thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbors.

The Egæstæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C., at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Mēlos, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear, like the Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egæsta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egæsta, the Egæstæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.²

Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favorable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly,³ together

¹ Thucyd. vi, 34.

² Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 83.

³ Thucyd. vi, 6. ὧν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἑγεσταίων πολλὰ κίς λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο, etc.

Mr. Mitford takes no notice of all these previous debates, when he imputes to the Athenians hurry and pass on in the ultimate decision (ch. xviii, sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 30.)

with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadês, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous, and that a considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special envoys were despatched to Egesta, partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war, partly to make investigations on the spot and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves friendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egestæans; at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude them, on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphroditê on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.¹ They collected together all the gold and silver vessels, dishes, and goblets, of Egesta, which they farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind from the neighboring cities, Hellenic as well as Carthaginian. At each successive

¹ Thucyd. vi, 46. *ἰδίᾳ ξενίσσεις ποιοῦμενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν, τὰ τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρὰ συλλέξαντες, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς πόλεων καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων αἰτησάμενοι, ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἐστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα ἕκαστοι. Καὶ πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν φαινομένων, μεγάλῃν τὴν ἐκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριηρῶν Ἀθηναίοις παρῆχον, etc.*

Such loans of gold and silver plate betoken a remarkable degree of intimacy among the different cities.

entertainment, every Egestæan host exhibited all this large stock of plate as his own property, the same stock being transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance was thus created, of the large number of wealthy men in Egestæ; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by the fraud.¹ To complete the illusion, by resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after finishing their examination, and the Egestæan envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C.,² about three months after the capture of Mélos.

The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at Egestæ, and presented the sixty talents — one month's pay for a fleet of sixty triremes — as a small instalment out of the vast stock remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity of the Egestæans to perform their promise of defraying the cost of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens, — beyond all suspicion of being bribed, — overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed, and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed, would probably contribute still more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly, when the Eges

¹ Thucyd. vi, 46; Diodor. xii, 83.

² To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the representation of the lost comedy *Τριφάλης* of Aristophanes. Iberians were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus; seemingly, Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxiliaries talked of at this time by Alkibiadēs and the other prominent advisers of the expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily (Thucyd. vi, 90). The word *Τριφάλης* was a nickname (not difficult to understand) applied to Alkibiadēs, who was just now at the height of his importance, and therefore likely enough to be chosen as the butt of a comedy. See the few fragments remaining of the *Τριφάλης*, in Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* vol. ii, pp. 1162–1167.

æan envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which they had undergone, — when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was again depicted, — the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full powers, — Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Eggesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of reëstablishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable.¹ Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Eggesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiadês and those who had from the first advocated the expedition, as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias, who had opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith, and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he labored under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favor. Accordingly, his speech was probably hesitating and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his own declared repugnance.² But when the assembly broke up, he be-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 8; Diodor. xii, 83.

² Thucyd. vi, 8. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾗσθημένος ἀρχεῖν, etc. The reading ἀκούσιος appears better sustained by MSS., and intrinsically more suitable, than ἀκούσας, which latter word probably arose from the correction of some reader who was surprised that Nikias made in the second assembly a speech which properly belonged to the first, and who explained this by supposing that Nikias had not been present at the first assembly. That he was not present, however, is highly improbable. The matter, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have endeavored to supply one in the text.

came fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to avail himself of the next assembly, four days afterwards, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject; indeed, the question which he raised could not be put without illegality: the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample, both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydides. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

"Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name, indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there), that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as cooperating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt,

and have never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but Sicily is so distant, and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendancy; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the part of each to gain the favor of Lacedæmon, but imperial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonor: their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly-acquired strength for our own purposes, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily."

Nikias then continued, doubtless turning towards Alkibiadês: "If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests, looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command, as a means of making good his extravagances, do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own, and that this matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close to their leader in the assembly; and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by

the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the ruinous appetite for what is not within reach, in the conviction that few plans ever succeed from passionate desire ; many, from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the expedition ; maintaining undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egestæans to close the war against Selinus, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens.¹ Nor be

¹ Thucyd. vi, 9-14. Καὶ σὺ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεί σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαι τε τῆς πόλεως, καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθοῦ, ἐπιψήφισε, καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναίους, νομίσας, εἰ ὁρῶδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ' ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως κακῶς βουλευσαμένης λατρός ἂν γενέσθαι, etc.

I cannot concur in the remarks of Dr. Arnold, either on this passage or upon the parallel case of the renewed debate in the Athenian assembly, on the subject of the punishment to be inflicted on the Mitylenæans (see above, vol. vi, ch. i, p. 338, and Thucyd. iii, 36). It appears to me that Nikias was here asking the prytanis to do an illegal act, which might well expose him to accusation and punishment. Probably he *would* have been accused on this ground, if the decision of the second assembly had been different from what it actually turned out ; if they had reversed the decision of the former assembly, but only by a small majority.

The distinction taken by Dr. Arnold between what was *illegal* and what was merely *irregular*, was little marked at Athens : both were called *illegal*, τοὺς νόμους λύειν. The rules which the Athenian assembly, a sovereign assembly, laid down for its own debates and decisions, were just as much *laws* as those which it passed for the guidance of private citizens. The English House of Commons is not a sovereign assembly, but only a portion of the sovereign power : accordingly, the rules which it lays down for its debates are not *laws*, but orders of the House : a breach of these orders, therefore, in debating any particular subject, would not be illegal, but merely irregular or informal. The same was the case with the French Chamber of Deputies, prior to the revolution of February, 1848 : the rules which it laid down for its own proceedings were not laws, but simply *le règlement de la Chambre*. It is remarkable that the present National Assembly now sitting (March, 1849) has retained this expression, and adopted a *règlement* for its own business ; though it is in point of fact a sovereign assembly, and the rules which it sanctions are, properly speaking, *laws*.

Both in this case, and in the Mitylenæan debate, I think the Athenian prytanis committed an illegality. In the first case, every one is glad of the illegality, because it proved the salvation of so many Mitylenæan lives. In the second case, the illegality was productive of practical bad consequences, inasmuch as it seems to have brought about the immense extension of the scale upon which the expedition was projected. But there will occur in a few years a third incident, the condemnation of the six generals after the

thou afraid, prytanis (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to the decision of the assembly, seeing that breach of the law, in the presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous misjudgment."

Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made some impression, since it completely reopened the entire debate, in spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadēs rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition; for his dreams went farther than those of any man in Athens; not merely to the conquest of all Sicily, but also to that of Carthage and the Carthaginian empire. Opposed to Nikias, both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolus; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character; all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiadēs started up forthwith, his impatience breaking loose from the formalities of an exordium.

"Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of commander,—for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here,—and I count myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters with which he reproaches me are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid theory at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before, winning the first prize, coming

battle of Arginusæ, in which the prodigious importance of a strict observance of forms will appear painfully and conspicuously manifest.

in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honor to such exploits, but the power of the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their equal; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to speak to us, in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence of the prosperous, or else let him practice equal dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to some extent with others also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely, and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrongdoers, but as her own citizens and men who did her honor. It is this glory which I desire, and the pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought to the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians perished all at Mantinea on the fortune of one day: a peril so great though victorious, they have not even yet regained their belief in their own strength."

"Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, by suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and by my readiness to give them confidence and obtain their coöperation, not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine: but so long as I possess it in full vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own

¹ Thucyd. vi., 16, 17

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadês went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities, he said, were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous, indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident, nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they were not more desperate enemies now than they had been in former days: ¹ they might invade Atticâ by land whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? To be sure, *they* could bring no help to Attica in return; but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water; she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects, on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias

¹ Thucyd, vi, 17. Καὶ νῦν οὐτε ἀνέλπιστοί πο μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴτε καὶ πάνυ ἔρρωνται, etc.

The construction of ἀνέλπιστοι here is not certain: yet I cannot think that the meaning which Dr. Arnold and others assign to it is the most suitable. It rather seems to mean the same as in vii, 4, and vii, 47: "enemies beyond our hopes of being able to deal with."

was not less at variance with the temper, than with the policy of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rancour and conflict, instead of that steady accumulation and acquisition which had become engrafted upon her laws and habits, which could not be now renounced, even if bad in themselves without speedy destruction.¹

Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadēs to the debate. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several persons addressed the assembly on both sides; more, however, were addressed in favor of the expedition than against it. The Egestæans and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also those Athenians who had visited Egesta, again stood forward to protest what they would call the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after considerable debate the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon the dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious effort indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without success, that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prodigious hardships, to throw up the scheme altogether. At last, when they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be obliged to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronouncement of the people, he reminded them that the cities which were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were populous, free: well prepared in every way with hoplites, men, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horse, their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athenians had hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxos and Rhegium from their kindred with the Leontines. It was no use, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must be prodigiously great, for

¹ Thucyd. vi, 16-19.

not merely of maritime combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and insuring the importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers, a large stock of provisions in transports, and, above all, an abundant amount of money: for the funds promised by the Egæstæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing.¹ If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament, it is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I resign to him the command."²

The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardor and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which Nikias had laid before them of

¹ Thucyd. vi, 22.

² Thucyd. vi, 23. ὅπερ ἐγὼ φοβούμην, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δεῖν βουλεύσασθαι, ἐτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι (χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπους δύταρ), ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμᾶντων βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλῆς ἐκπλεῦσαι. Ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε συμπίσῃ πόλει βεβαίωτατα ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευομένοις σωτήρια· εἰ δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ δοκεῖ, παύειν αὐτῇ τὴν ἀρχήν.

risk and cost, but warmly extolled his frankness not less than sagacity, as the only means of making success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve everything which he asked with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech which Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. While his partisans seconded it as the best means of neutralizing the popular madness, his opponents — Alkibiades, the Egestæans, and the Leontines — caught at it with action, as realizing more than they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to propose. If Alkibiades had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect for Nikias — on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety, and favor with the gods — that his opposition to their favorite had really made them uneasy; and when he made the demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.¹

It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which his projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardor beyond all previous example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich as well as poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the prospect of gain, others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, and again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in a respectable armament. So overpowering was the popular enthusiasm in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, a man named Demostratus, coming forward as spokesman of the opposition, urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther delay, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as he was, yet being left without any alternative, he sadly resorted to the appeal; saying, that he would take farther coun-

¹ Plutarch Compare Nikias and Crassus, c. 3.

his colleagues, but that speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less than five thousand, Athenians and allies together. There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantinea, and to hire bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For three months, the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle, fatally interrupted, however, by an incident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Egestæans had promised: nor can we at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Upon the result of that mission to Egesta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue: and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so de

cisive in favor of the former, the party thus strengthened itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, as the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still surmount the renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, but became finally ratified. It was this long and frequent with opposition often repeated but always outreasoned, working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition is an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a clear view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the day along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for his personal character, and their reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced any conditions which he proposed proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated; thus casting so prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that the commixture would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to an indirect manœuvre of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only among a sad series of other mistakes, fatal to his country as to himself.

Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his skepticism as to reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite of Alkibiadès. His speech is not merely full of overweening confidence, as a manifestation of individual character, but of ruinous instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against the cause are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than

pedition itself, for the failure of which Alkibiades is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Periklēs had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus, we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiadēs, and the destructive principles which he lays down, that Athens must forever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force, as Nikias had truly observed, Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiadēs draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was himself recommending, is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the *Ægean* sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily, was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiadēs asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the preëxisting Athenian empire; to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in

Sicily, the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian,¹ and to not credit which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantinea,² although it had ended in complete failure; restoring the ascendancy of Sparta to the summit at which it had stood before the events of Sicily. There is in fact no speech in Thucydides so replete with misguiding, and fallacious counsels, as this harangue of Alcibiades.

As a man of action, Alcibiades was always brave, vigorous and full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was specially mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine enterprising temper into a temerity which overlooked all prudent calculation. The Athenians had now contracted the delusion that they, as lords of the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all islands; a belief which they had only acted upon, but openly professed, in their attack upon Sicily during the preceding autumn. As Sicily was an island, it was to fall naturally under this category of subjects; nor ought it to wonder, amidst the inaccurate geographical data current at that day, that they were ignorant how much larger Sicily was than the largest island in the Ægean. Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest to struggle for; they may judge from the fact, that the object was one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to all the preparations demanded by Nikias.⁴ Moreover, we shall presently see, that even the armament which was despatched conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenians

¹ Thucyd. vi, 1. οὐ πολλῷ τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον, etc.: compare

² Compare Plutarch, Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 804.

³ Thucyd. v, 99; vi, 1-6.

⁴ Thucyd. vi, 6. ἐπιμένοντες μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει, τῆς πάσης (ἡμῶν) ἄρξιν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυγχοῖς προσγεγενημένοις συμμάχοις.

Even in the speech of Alcibiades, the conquest of Sicily is alluded to, and that indirectly; rather as a favorable possibility, than as a result to be counted upon.

were rash and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant were the views of Alkibiadês, who looked even beyond Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. Nor was it merely ambition which he desired to gratify; he was not less eager for the immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned.¹

When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against Kleon, of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alkibiadês as here described, we shall see how much more forcibly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen before this volume is finished, that the vices of Alkibiadês, and the defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 15. Καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγήσαι τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχῆσαι χρήμασι τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. "Ὅν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσπῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἐς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας, etc.

Compare vi, 90. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 19; Nikias, c. 12). Plutarch sometimes speaks as if, not Alkibiadês alone (or at least in conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally, set out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as Sicily. In the speech which Alkibiadês made at Sparta after his banishment (Thucyd. vi, 90), he does indeed state this as the general purpose of the expedition. But it seems plain that he is here describing, to his countrymen generally, plans which were only fermenting in his own brain, as we may discern from a careful perusal of the first twenty chapters of the sixth book of Thucydides.

In the inaccurate *Oratio de Pace* ascribed to Andokidês (sect. 30), it is alleged that the Syracusans sent an embassy to Athens, a little before this expedition, entreating to be admitted as allies of the Athenians, and affirming that Syracuse would be a more valuable ally to Athens than Eggesta or Katana. This statement is wholly untrue.

CHAPTER LVIII.

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK
CUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL
IN SICILY.

FOR the two or three months immediately succeeding the resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, described in the last chapter, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. I have already mentioned that this resolution, long opposed by Nikias with a considerable minority, had been adopted — chiefly through the unforeseen working of which he intended as a counter-manceuvre — with a depth of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon an enlarged scale, surpassed all the anticipations of its promoters. The priests and circulators of oracles, and other accredited religious authorities, announced generally the favorable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result.¹ All classes in the city, rich and poor, — cultivators, traders, and seamen, old and young, embraced the project with ardor; as requiring a great effort, but promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandizement and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to choose by constraint and incur ill-will, as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided himself with arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as well as necessary for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a varied kind of sea-service. Among the trierarchs, or rich citizens, who took each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war, the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honor to be named, and vied with his comrades to equip his ship in the most finished state of equipment. The state

¹ Thucyd. viii, 1.

furnished both the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion, was different in every individual case, according to temper and circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness were universal: each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to the *thranitæ* or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:¹ and it seems that the seamen were not appointed specially to one ship, but were at liberty to accept these offers, and to serve in any ship they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known before in pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish, picked seamen were also required from subject-allies, and were bid for in the same way by the trierarchs.²

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had now elapsed since the Peace of Nikias, without any considerable warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh accumulations,³ and the triremes increased

¹ Thucyd. vi, 31. ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις, καὶ τὰλλα σημείους καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, etc.

Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain *ὑπηρεσίαις* to mean the *petty officers*, such as κυβερνήτης, κελευστής, etc. Göller and Poppo construe it to mean "*the servants of the sailors*." Neither of the two seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means "to the crews generally;" the word *ὑπηρεσία* being a perfectly general word comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before. To construe *ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις* as meaning "the crews generally, or the remaining crews, along with the *thranitæ*," is doubtless more or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction than either of the two senses which the commentators propose.

² Thucyd. vii, 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἐναγκαστοὶ ἐσθάντες, etc.

³ Thucyd. vi, 26. I do not trust the statement given in Æschinés De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidés, De Pace, sect. 8, that seven thousand talents were laid by as an accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the Peace of Nikias, and that four hundred triremes, or three hun-

in number, the military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. Hence the fleet no longer lagged together, while it surpassed in number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second year of the present war under Periklès, was incomparably superior even to that still more superior to all the rest, in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral; in picked men, universal armaments, ships as well as arms in the best condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was the confidence of success that many Athenians went prepared for trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock thus added to the public treasure, and to the sums placed in the hands of the generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of this was visible to the eye, contributing to heighten that general excitement of Athenian imagination which pervaded the whole city while preparations were going forward: a mingled feeling of pride, sympathy and patriotism, — a dash of uneasiness from reflection on the distant and unknown region wherein the fleet was engaged — yet an elate confidence in Athenian force, such as had never before been entertained.¹ We hear of Sokratès the philosopher

dred triremes, were newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to render them of all authority, except where they are confirmed by other testimony. Even if we admitted the oration ascribed to Andokidès as genuine, with all probability it is not.

But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that the three thousand talents at least must have been laid by, during the interval between the conclusion of the Peace of Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition in the acropolis; and that over and above this accumulated fund, there was in condition to discharge, out of the current receipts, various other expenses which it had borrowed during the previous war from the treasury of the temples, and seems to have had besides a surplus for docks and fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so paid in the opisthodomos, or back-chamber, of the Parthenon, for account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See Boeckh's *Corp. Inscr.* part ii, *Inscr. Att.* p. 117; also the *Staats-haushaltung der Athener* of the same author, p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the years between 421–415 B.C., to which year we cannot say.

- Thucyd. vi, 31; Diodor. xiii, 2, 3.

and Meton the astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine anticipation: the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. Nor is it impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general predominance of the various favorable religious signs and prophecies, there were also some unfavorable. Usually, on all public matters of risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite ways: those which turned out right were treasured up: the rest were at once forgotten, or never long remembered.¹

After between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

These Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well as of temples, near the most frequented porticos, at the intersection of cross ways, in the public agora. They were thus present to the eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious feelings of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood,² so that the companionship,

¹ Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately after the catastrophe at Syracuse, the Athenians were very angry with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii, 1).

² Cicero, Legg. ii, 11. "Melius Græci atque nostri; qui, ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos, *incolere* voluerunt."

How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sects. 15-46: compare Herodotus, v, 67; a striking

sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens, — political, social, commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover, the quadrangular fashion of these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermês, was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness of Pelasgian workmanship and was popular in Arcadia as well as peculiarly frequent in Athens.¹

About the end of May, 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidês affirms, and I incline to believe him, that there was but *one* which escaped unharmed.²

It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the feelings of a religion not his own: indeed, the sentiment with

story, as illustrated in this History, vol. iii, ch. ix, p. 34; also Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4-7; Livy, xxxviii, 43.

In an Inscription in Boeckh's Corp. Insc. (part ii, No. 190, p. 320) a list of the names of Prytaneis, appears, at the head of which list figures the name of Athênê Polias.

¹ Pausanias, i, 24, 3; iv, 33, 4; viii, 31, 4; viii, 48, 4; viii, 41, 4; Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller, Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl. Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermaeorum. Berlin, 1845.

² Thucyd. vi, 27. *δοσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων.... μίᾳ νυκτὶ οἱ πλείστοι περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα.*

Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single one was spared — *καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ἐν ὅπῃ πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν πατρῶαν οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.*

Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13) copy Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses the expression of Thucydides — *οἱ πλείστοι*. This expression is noway at variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the Oration of Andokidês; but I think that he is to be trusted as to this point.

Diodorus (xiii, 2) says that *all* the Hermæ were mutilated, not recognizing a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all *thrown down* (dejicerentur).

which, in the case of persons of different creeds, each regards the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other, is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can occasion any serious distress or excitement.¹ But if we take that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians,² noted in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the gods.³ If we could imagine

¹ It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth, *Hellen. Alterthümer*, vol. ii, sect. 65, pp. 191–196. While he denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during the subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language, you would suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking the smallest pains to show in what way it profoundly wounded the religious feeling of Athens.

Büttner (*Geschichte der politischen Heterieen zu Athen*, p. 65), though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.

² Pausanias, i, 17, 1; i, 24, 3; Harpokration v, 'Ερμῆ. See Sluiter, *Lectiones Andocidæ*, cap. 2.

Especially the *ἀγυριαὶ θεοπεταίαι* (Eurip. *Ion*. 187) were noted at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who protected the public streets, a function performed by Apollo Agneus, as well as by Hermes.

³ Herodot. viii, 144; Æschylus, *Pers.* 810; Æschyl. *Agam.* 339. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus: see the argument of the *Ἰλίου Πέποις* in Proclus, and Welcker, *Griechische Tragödien*, *Sopkokolet*, sect. 21, vol. i, p. 162. Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyses to the Egyptian statues and holy customs upon any other supposition than that of stark madness, *ἑμὴν μεγάλην*; Herod. iii, 37–38.

Tiræus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320–290 B.C.) represented

the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens, where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of every-day life; where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonored and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that the devastation was general, it would seem that the town had become as it were godless; that the streets, the market-place, the porticos, were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away with them alienated sentiments, wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and sympathizing. It was on the protection of the gods, that all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as well as others:¹ an extension and generalization of the feeling still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction, not simply a form of speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues, without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences and determining practical measures.

the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by the Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the god Hermes (Timæi Fragm. 103-104, ed. Didot; Longinus, de Sublim. iv, 3).

The etymological thread of connection, between the Hermæ and Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring after it divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly was it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 97; Plato, Legg. ix, pp. 871 b, 881 d. *ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρα*, etc. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363, c. 24, p. 404, c. 60; Plutarch, Solon, c. 24

Accordingly, they drew from the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city, and that the political constitution to which they were attached was in imminent danger of being subverted.¹

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.² It would doubtless have been so determined, had it been a mere undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object, just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of Adonis.³ The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not inconsiderable in number, whose names and final purpose were

¹ Dr. Thirlwall observes, in reference to the feeling at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ:—

“We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how they could have been associated together as they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiadēs, who were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as inseparable.” (Hist. Gr. ch. xxv, vol. iii, p. 394.)

This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall's history, indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have undertaken to depict the democracy of Athens. It might, however, have been stated far more strongly; for an Athenian citizen would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our *disjunction* of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his *association* of the two.

² Thucyd. vi, 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μείζονως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ οἰωνοῦ ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. “Hoc quum appareret non sine magni multorum consensione esse factam,” etc.

³ Plutarch, Alcibiad. c. 18; Pherekratēs, Fr. Inc. 84, ed. Meineke; Frag. ment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 358, also p. 1164; Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.

indeed unknown, but who had begun by committing sacrilege, a character flagrant and unheard of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where the material affords temptation to plunder, is a case to which we know no parallel: much more mutilation by wholesale, spread by one band at one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the persons concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partly made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and the other: to ruin Alkibiadēs, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen. Towards the latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus, and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,¹ prompting them to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great triumphs to Athens, rather than to be interrupted by the violent antipathies of intestine politics. Indeed the two objects were intimately connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise, while full of prospective consequences to Athens, was yet more pregnant with future power and wealth to Alkibiadēs himself. Such chances would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely sensitive in his

¹ Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vit. X, Orator.* p. 834 professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly contemporary. Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts, what cannot be true, that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact that no foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of Athens.

The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310–280 B.C.) ascribes the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we may believe the scholiast on Aristophanēs; who, however, is not very careful, since he tells us that *Thucydides* ascribed that act to Alkibiadēs and his friends; which is not true (Philochor. *Frag.* 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph. *Lysistr.*

religious conscience, and never hearty in his wish for going, a fact perfectly known to the enemy,¹ would hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of his character, and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.²

But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias, this calculation was not realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies; forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in the other part of their plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadēs.

Few men in Athens either had or deserved to have a greater number of enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiades; many of them being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence, and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seem to have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 34.

² See Thucyd. v, 45 v, 50; viii, 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 4.

Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery unparalleled a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people, it would have appeared to the ephors at Sparta, or to the 1 in every oligarchical city of Greece,—that it was their mount and imperative duty to detect and punish the authors long as these latter were walking about unknown and unpunished the temples were defiled by their presence, and the whole was accounted under the displeasure of the gods, who 1 inflict upon it heavy public misfortunes.¹ Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of private comfort were alike 1 appeased, until the offenders should be discovered and atone made by punishing or expelling them. Large rewards accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give information and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession might open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under the painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other 1 acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew, and more than he knew, about such incidents; while the exercise of any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, 1 and the argument of weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendered the critic himself a suspected man, “*metuunt dubitasse videri.*”

¹ See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii, Tetralog. i. l. 10).

Ἀσύμφορόν θ' ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε μισθὸν καὶ ἀναγνον ὄντα εἰς τὰ τεμένη θεῶν εἰσιόντα μαινεῖν τὴν ἀγγελίαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τε τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἀφορίαι γίνονται δυστυχεῖς θ' αἱ πράξεις καθίσταται Οἰκείαν οὖν χρὴ τὴν τιμωρίαν ἡγησάμενους, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὰ ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν καθαστῶν δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῆσαι.

Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83 and Sophoklēs, Tyrann. 26, 96, 170, as to the miseries which befell a country, so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute the soil, and until slain or expelled. See also Xenophon, Hiero, iv, 4, and Plato, Leg. 885-910, at the beginning and the end of the tenth book. Plato (ὑβρις) outrage against sacred objects as the highest and most evil of ὑβρις; deserving the severest punishment. He considers a person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or banished, as evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole population.

rake out and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an earnest zeal for the honor of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage. Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and inviting information from all witnesses, — citizens, metics, or even slaves, — respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have come within their cognizance,¹ but at the same time providing that informers who gave false depositions should be punished capitally.²

The Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action; while Diognêtus, Peisander, Chariklês, and others, were named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries, and public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.³ The first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in drunken frolic; and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses,⁴ by parties of revellers

¹ Thucyd. vi, 27.

² Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 20.

³ Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 36; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18.

⁴ Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet separated by a century.

In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen of good family — the Chevalier d'Etallonde and Chevalier de la Barre — were tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in aggravation of this offence they were charged with having sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was exceedingly doubtful; nevertheless, both were condemned to have their tongues cut out by the roots, to have their right hands cut off at the church gate, then to be tied to a post in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to the Parliament of Paris, and by them confirmed, was actually executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre — d'Etallonde having escaped — in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed to be decapitated before he was burnt; but at the same time with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices (Voltaire, *Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre*, Œuvres, vol. xlii, pp. 361–379, ed. Beuchot: also Voltaire, *Le Cri du Sang Innocent*, vol. xii, p. 133).

caricaturing and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. under this latter head that the first impeachment was put against Alkibiadès.

So fully were the preparations of the armament complete, that the trireme of Lamachus — who was doubtless diligent about the military details than either of his colleagues — was already moored in the outer harbor, and a public assembly was held for the departing officers,¹ who boldly laid before their countrymen an imposing account of force assembled, when Pythonikus rose to impeach Alkibiades, "Athenians," said he, "you are going to despatch this force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I a

I extract from this treatise a passage showing how — as in this matter of the Hermæ at Athens — the occurrence of one act of sacrilege, men's imagination, belief, and talk, to others, real or imaginary: —

"Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit secrètement cette trame, il arriva heureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont d'Abbeville, endommagé, et l'on soupçonna que des soldats ivres avoient commis une insolence impie.

"Malheureusement l'évêque d'Amiens, étant aussi évêque d'Arras, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une importance qu'elle ne méritait pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires: il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; et on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant plusieurs années entières. On disoit qu'il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui brûloit le crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties, et les perçoit à coups de couteaux. On assuroit qu'ils avoient répandu beaucoup de sang. On renouvela tous les calomnieux répanctes contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de France. Vous connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu'à quel point la populace portée à l'ignorance et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines.

"La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de gens. Chacun disoit ce qu'il avoit vu ou cru voir — ce qu'il avoit entendu entendre."

It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de la Barre was passed, not by the people, nor by any popular judicature, but by a court of professional judges sitting at Abbeville, and afterwards by the Parlement de Paris, the first tribunal of professional judges in France.

¹ Andokidès (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time minutely — "Ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ καὶ Λαμάχῳ καὶ τριηρῆς ἡ στρατηγὶς ἤδη ἐξώρμηται ἡ Λαμάχου· ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόδοκος εἶπεν, etc.

pared to show you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the profaners of the holy mysteries, in a private house. Pass a vote of impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose, if my statement prove untrue." While Alkibiadês strenuously denied the allegation, the prytanes — senators presiding over the assembly, according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten tribes — at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave — Andromachus by name — whom Pythonicus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the house of Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus, went through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what the mysteries were which he had seen, the test which Pythonikus had offered.¹

Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his enemies. Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, having put in evidence this irreverent proceeding, — probably in substance true, — enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. All had been done, they said, with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors; a purpose manifested by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular demeanor. Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the mutilation of the Hermæ, — for whatever else Alkibiadês may have done, of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined, — they calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from the recent sacrilege, their expectations were de-

¹ Andokid. de Myster. s. 11-13.

feated. The strenuous denial of Alkibiadēs, aided by his peculiar position as commander of the armament, as well as the reflection that the recent outrage tended rather to his favorite projects in Sicily, found general credence. The Athenians, enrolled to serve, manifested strong disposition to stand by the allies from Argos and Mantinea, who were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as the intended conqueror of Sicily, and were loth to be balked of this project. For these circumstances, his enemies, finding little disposition to come to the accusations which they preferred, were compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.¹

But Alkibiadēs saw full well the danger of having such a trial hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his accidental position at the moment. He exhorted the people to investigate the charges at once; he procured his anxiety to stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty — accepting the command only in case he should be acquitted — and insisting above all things on the mischief to the state in sending him on such an expedition with the charge undischarged, as well as on the hardship to himself, of being assailed by calumny during his absence, without power of defence. His appeals, just and reasonable in themselves, and urged with the vehemence of a man who felt that the question was one of death to his future prospects, were very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the trick of putting up speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alkibiadēs. The orator affected a tone of candor, deprecated the delay which was occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he was acquitted upon his trial forthwith, and proposed deferring the trial to a certain number of days after his return.² Such was the

¹ Thucyd. vi, 29. Isokratēs (Orat. xvi, De Bigis, sects. 7, 8) : these proceedings before the departure for Sicily, in a very different manner.

² Thucyd. vi, 29. Οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ, δεδιότες τὸ τε στράτευμα, μὴ εἰς ἡν ἤδη ἀγωνίζεται, ὃ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζεται, θεραπέων δτι δι' ἐπὶ Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνέειντες, οἱ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ χεῖν τὴν ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς βού-

nation ultimately adopted ; the supporters of Alkibiadēs probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to them leisure for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther accusation until he and the armament had departed.¹

μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἐμελλον ῥῶον αὐτοῦ ὑπόντος ποιεῖν, μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19.

¹ The account which Andokidēs gives of the first accusation against Alkibiadēs by Pythonikus, in the assembly, prior to the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidēs. But when Andokidēs goes on to say, that "in consequence of this information, Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death in their absence," (sect. 13,) this cannot be true. Alkibiadēs most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned at *that time*. If Alkibiadēs was not then tried, neither could the other persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in the same offence. My belief is that this information, having been first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadēs before the sailing of the fleet, was dropped entirely for that time, both against him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when the information of Andokidēs himself had satisfied the Athenians on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadēs, was founded, in part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus.

If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when Alkibiadēs was sent for and refused to come home. But we may well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidēs is as to the consequences of the information of Andromachus. He mentions Panætius as one of those who fled in consequence of that information, and were condemned in their absence: but Panætius appears afterwards, in the very same speech, as *not* having fled at that time (sects. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v. Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias, that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ. This is quite different from the statement of Andokidēs, and would

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armada not mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents to rendezvous at Korkyra. But the Athenian force alone was astounded to behold. There were one hundred triremes, sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement, while the remainder were employed as transports for the soldiers. There were also a hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from the general muster-roll, and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on shipboard, — or marines, — each with a panoply furnished by the state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on board Athenian ships.¹ The number of horsemen was small, but that all were conveyed in a single horse transport. But in addition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force in the armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak on the day appointed, when all the ships were gathered in Peiræus, for departure, the military force was marched out in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the appearance was that of a collective muster, like the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, brought thither by curiosity, were dazzled by the grandeur of the spectacle, the citizens accompanied by their families moved by deeper and more stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, were just starting on the longest and most enterprising enterprise which Athens had ever undertaken; against a power as extensive as well as powerful, known to none of them and leading into a sea of undefined possibilities; glory and profit on one side, but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas of doubt and danger became painfully present than they had been in any of the previous

lead us to suppose that Polystratus was one of those against whom he afterwards informed himself.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 43; vii, 57.

discussions ; and in spite of all the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the relatives now separating at the water's edge could not banish the dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the last time.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell — when all the soldiers were already on board, and the *keleustês* was on the point of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion — was peculiarly solemn and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained by sound of trumpet, both the crews in every ship and the spectators on shore followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the *pæan*. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the *epibatæ* made libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted *Peiræus* in single file, displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as far as *Ægina*.¹ Never in Grecian history was an invocation more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods ; never was the refusing nod of *Zeus* more stern or peremptory. All these details, given by *Thucydidês*, of the triumphant promise which now issued from *Peiræus*, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad issue which will hereafter be unfolded.

The fleet made straight for *Korkyra*, where the contingents of the maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found to comprise one hundred and thirty-four triremes with two Rhodian *pentekonteres* ; five thousand one hundred hoplites ; four hundred and eighty bowmen, eighty of them *Kretan* ; seven hundred Rhodian slingers ; and one hundred and twenty Megarian exiles serving as light troops. Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not less than five hundred ; besides which, there was a considerable number of private trading-ships, following it voluntarily for purposes of profit.² Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in advance to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would welcome the arrival of the armament ; and especially to give notice at *Egesta*,

¹ *Thucyd.* vi, 32 ; *Diodor.* xiii, 3.

² *Thucyd.* vi, 44

that the succor solicited was now on its way, requiring same time that the money promised by the Egesteans produced. Having then distributed by lot the armada three divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus, they crossed the Ionic gulf from the Iapygian promontory.

In their progress southward along the coast of Italy, they met with a very cold reception from the various cities. None would receive them within their walls, nor sell them provisions without. The utmost which they could obtain was, the liberty of taking moorings and of water; even thus much was denied to them both at Tarentum and Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, immediately on the strait, though the town-gate was still kept shut, they were more hospitably treated, that a market of provisions was opened to them, and they were allowed to encamp in the sacred grove of Artemis, not far from the walls. They here hauled to the ashore and took repose until the return of the three ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into negotiations with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavoring to induce them to aid the armament in reëstablishing the democracy of the Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegians would promise nothing more than neutrality, and would not take any course of policy which it might suit the other Greeks to adopt. Probably they, as well as the other Greeks, were astonished and intimidated by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave themselves open to the influence of the Athenians for the future, not without mistrust of the Athenian affected forwardness for the restoration of the Leontine democracy. Athenian generals, however, such a negative from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been friendly to Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the influence of Chalkidic sympathies.¹

It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Syracuse, about July 415 B.C., that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent of the

¹ Thucyd. vi, 44-46.

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against Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided the intelligence as mere idle rumor; others anticipated, at most, nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before.¹ No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state.²

Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public assembly — held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were starting from Peiræus — to impress such conviction on his countrymen, as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate

¹ Thucyd. vi, 32–35. Mr. Mitford observes: "It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydides makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration, since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 46). The democratical party now bore the sway," etc.

I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydides Mr. Mitford founds this conjecture, which appears to me pure fancy. He had spoken of the government as a democracy before, he continues to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered vituperative strain.

² Thucyd. vi, 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμελελήμεθα ἥδη, etc.

condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he dealt all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest assurance of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them to hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely in any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Athens, by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Her preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indisputable; not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, to the Sikels, and to the Peloponnesians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose resources and wealth would now be especially serviceable, and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, against a renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two hundred provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of Syracuse, from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic gulf from Sicily to Eubœa. They would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in coming to blows: the object of taking down the presumption of the Athenians, who had speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be

¹ Thucyd. vi, 34. "Ὁ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγὼ τε νομίζω ἐπικαίρον, ὅμως τὰ ξύνηθες ἡσυχον ἡκιστ' ἀν' ὀξείῳς πείθοισθε, δυνάμεις."

That "habitual quiescence" which Hermokratês here predicted of the countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless activity which Periklês and Nikias had carried even to excess, which Periklês and Nikias did of the Athenians (Thucyd. i, 144; vi, 7). Both of the governments were democratical. This serves as a lesson of caution respecting all predilections about all democracies; for it is certain that one differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to his countrymen really deserved, to the extent which his language implies.

deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return.¹

Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela, — then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily, — then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even angry debate arose upon his present speech.² Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistratês, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a more criminating tone, and must have exaggerated that which he characterized as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans, into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.³

¹ Thucyd. vi, 33–36.

² Thucyd. vi, 32–35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐριδίῃσαν, etc.

³ Thucyd. vi, 35. παρελθὼν δ' αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, δὲ δῆμον τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοῦδε, etc.

The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens — ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος. etc. (iv, 21.)

Neither δῆμον προστάτης nor δημαγωγός, denotes any express functions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold), at least in these places. It is possible that there may have been some Grecian town constitutions, in

"Every one¹ (said he), except only cowards and bad must wish that the Athenians *would* be fools enough here and put themselves into our power. The tales we have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, to alarm you; and I wonder at the folly of these alarmists in thinking that their machinations are not seen through.² You are too wise to take measure of the future from their report; you will rather judge from what able men, such as the Athenians, are likely to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed, I think they think themselves lucky that we, with our powerful cities, have come across to attack them. And if they *should* come, pretended, they will find Sicily a more formidable to Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, all this well enough, will mind their own business, in spite of the fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up which they have already tried often before, sometimes even more than on the present occasion, in order to terrify you, and themselves nominated to the chief posts.³ One of these fears they may even succeed, from our want of precaution

which there was an office bearing that title: but this is a point we cannot be affirmed. Nor would the words *δήμου προστάτης* always signify equal degree of power: the person so designated might have more power in one town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv, 67) it seems the oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the party had become the most influential men in the city. See also Peithias at Korkyra.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 36-40. I give the substance of what is ascribed to Athenagoras by Thucydides, without binding myself to the words.

² Thucyd. vi, 36. τοὺς δ' ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ περὶ τοιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἷός τις εἶναι.

³ Thucyd. vi, 38. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἱ τε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σφετερὰ αὐτῶν, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, σώζουσι, καὶ ἐνθύνουσι ἀνδρῶν οὔτε ἀν' ἐνόνενα, λογοποιούσιν. Οὗς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἡτοίμοις γε τοιοῖσδε, καὶ ἐν ταύτων κακοῦργοις, ἢ ἐργοῖς, καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἀρχειν. μέντοι μήποτε πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσασιν, etc.

hand. Such intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city; they condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort at present; by simple persuasion to you, by chastisement to these conspirators, and by watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you are yet incompetent. Or, do you wish not to be under equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell me! that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that the

¹ Thucyd. vi, 39. φήσιν τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ' ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἀρίστα βελτίστους. Ἐγὼ δὲ φημι, πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὀνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος· ἔπειτα, φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλευτῆσαι δ' ἂν βέλτιστά τοὺς ξυνετοὺς; κρίναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἀρίστα τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιεῖν.

Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων, "having the care of the public purse," as if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But it seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to the private property of these rich men, not to their functions as keepers of what was collected from taxation or tribute. Looking at a rich man from the point of view of the public, he is guardian of his own property until the necessities of the state require that he should spend more or less of it for the public defence or benefit: in the interim, he enjoys it as he pleases, but he will for his own interest take care that the property does not perish (compare vi, 9). This is the service which he renders, *quatenus, rich man*, to the state; he may also serve it in other ways, but that would be by means of his personal qualities; thus he may, for example, be intelligent as well as rich (*ξυνετὸς* as well as *πλούσιος*), and then he may serve the state as *counsellor*, the second of the two categories named by Athenagoras. What that orator is here negating is, the better title and superior fitness of the rich to exercise command, which was the claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to indicate what is their real position and service in a democracy; that they are to enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capital, of their wealth, subject to demands for public purposes when necessary, but not to expect command, unless they are personally competent. Properly speaking, that which he here affirms is true of the small lots of property taken in the mass, as well as of the large, and is one of the grounds of defence of private property against communism. But the rich man's property is an appreciable item to the state.

rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I at that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the wealth existing in the community, — intelligent best counsellors, — and the multitude, the best qualified in ing and deciding after such advice. In a democratic functions, one and all, find their proper place. But though imposing on the multitude a full participation in hazards, is not content even with an exorbitant share of public advantages, but grasps and monopolizes the whole itself.¹ This is just what you young and powerful are aiming at, though you will never be able to keep it permanently in a city such as Syracuse. Be taught by me, or at least by your views, and devote yourselves to the public advantage of the common city. Desist from practising, by reports such as these, upon the belief of men who know you too well to be deceived, even there be any truth in what you say, and if the worst should come, our city will repel them in a manner worthy of its reputation. She will not take you at your word, and our commanders, in order to put the yoke upon her own neck, will look for herself, construe your communications as they really mean, and, instead of suffering you to talk of her free government, will take effective precautions against taining it against you."

Immediately after this venement speech from Alcibiades, one of the strategoi who presided in the assembly in permitting no one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these few words: "We generals deprecate any change of personal vituperation, and trust that the present will not suffer themselves to be biased by it; we rather take care, in reference to the reports just com-

individually taken; moreover, he is perpetually raising unjust claims to political power, so that it becomes necessary to define how he is really entitled to.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 39. Ὁλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς παλαιῶσι, τῶν δ' ὀφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτηῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαν ἀφ' ἡμῶν οἱ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν.

that we be one and all in a condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. We generals shall take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions to neighboring cities, for procuring information and for other objects. We have, indeed, already busied ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we learn."

The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon at Athens, the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly to Hermokratês and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. Hermokratês has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming period almost constantly in the same position; while the political rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a leader of opposition, a function of course suspended under pressing danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, the men who got to real power and handled the force and treasures of the state, were chiefly of the rich families, often of oligarchical sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, such as Athenagoras and Kleon, the bad side of whose character is so constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all its forms, whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield personal powers, there are always abundant censors and critics, — some better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candor, wisdom, or rhetoric, — the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable importance, though

holding a function essentially inferior to that of the magistrate or general.

We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being push the city into war, is averse to it, even beyond limit; and denounces it as the interested policy of the cal party. This may show how little it was any const or policy on the part of the persons called demagogues, their city in unnecessary wars: a charge which has quently advanced against them, because it so happens t in the first half of the Peloponnesian war, discounte propositions of peace between Athens and Sparta. the harangue of Athenagoras that the oligarchical the usual promoters of war: a fact which we should expect, seeing that the rich and great, in most commu accounted the pursuit of military glory more conformal dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the asce Hermokratês was much increased by the invasion of nians, while Athenagoras does not again appear. The egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting th of Athens, though right in his judgment respecting political interest. But it is very unsafe to assume th will always pursue their true political interest, whe temptations of ambition or vanity intervene. Positiv tion was in this instance a surer guide than speculation founded upon the probable policy of Athens. But th putations advanced by Athenagoras against the c youth, of promoting military organization with a vie own separate interest, were not visionary, may be s analogous case of Argos, two or three years bef democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike a sive policy, had been persuaded to organize and train regiment of one thousand hoplites, chosen from the youth: within three years, this regiment subverted cratical constitution.¹ Now the persons, respecting signs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, w the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select t Argos.

¹ See above, in this volume, chap. lvi.

The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but the separate places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of Aristotle.

Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those of Hermokratès than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the danger, they were apprized by their scouts when the Athenian armament was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, and pushed their preparations with the utmost activity, distributing garrisons and sending envoys among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.¹ The halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.

The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian operations had been mainly grounded, it turned out that no more than thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, visited by severe taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from whence they had calculated on obtaining money, — for it appears that both Alkibiadès and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mis-trustful, — the generals now discussed their plan of action.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 45.

Nikias — availing himself of the fraudulent conduct part of the Egestæan allies, now become palpable — will circumscribe his range of operations within the rigorous limits of the vote which the Athenian assembly had passed. He proposes to sail at once against Selinus; then, formally to request the Egestæans to provide the means of maintaining the army at least, of maintaining those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this requisition would not be refused, he would only tarry long enough to obtain from the Selinians some tolerable terms of accommodation with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, to all the metropolises, this great display of Athenian naval force. And when opportunity would be ready to profit by any opportunity which accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island for speculative enterprises, all at the cost of Athens.¹

Against this scheme Alkibiadês protested, as narrow and disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been intrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all the other Sicilian Greeks, — especially Messênê, and to make both as harbor for their fleet and as base of their military operations, — to prevail upon them to coöperate against Syracuse and Selinus. With the same view, he recommended establishing alliances with the Sikels of the interior, in order to detach them as were subjects of Syracuse, as well as to insure a supply of provisions. As soon as it had been thus ascertained to what extent of foreign aid might be looked for, he would open an attack forthwith against Syracuse and Selinus; unless, indeed, the former should consent to reëstablish Leontini, and then come to terms with Egesta.²

Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, dissented from his colleagues. He advised, that they should proceed at once, without any delay, to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle before the walls. The Syracusans, he urged, were now in terror and half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, as

¹ Thucyd. vi, 47; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 14.

² Thucyd. vi, 48. Ὅπως ἤδη Συρακούσας καὶ Σελινόωντι ἐπέκεινται, μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἑγεσταίους συμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους ἔωσι κατοικίσειν.

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property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighboring lands, not yet removed within the walls, and might thus be seized for the subsistence of their army; ¹ while the deserted town and harbor of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival. If advantage were taken of this first impression to strike an instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist: but the longer such attack was delayed, the more this first impression of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary sentiment of indifference and even contempt, when the much-dreaded armament was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other Sicilian cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.²

But Lamachus found no favor with either of the other two, and being thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadês and Nikias, gave his support to that of the former, which was the mean term of the three. There can be no doubt — as far as it is becoming to pronounce respecting that which never reached execution — that the plan of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious; at first sight, indeed, the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the siege and capture of Syracuse, was the one enterprise indispensable towards the promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced, the more easily it would be accomplished: and its difficulties were in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary precautions upon which Alkibiadês insisted. Anything like delay tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed, of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to strengthen those who stood on the defensive, a point on which we shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of Lamachus, alike soldier-like and far-sighted, would probably

¹ Compare iv, 104, describing the surprise of Amphipolis by Brasidas
² Thucyd. vi, 49.

have been approved and executed either by Brasidas or by mosthenês; while the dilatory policy still advocated by Alkibiadês, even after the suggestion of Lamachus had been striven to show that if he was superior in military energy to his colleagues, he was not less inferior to the other. In when we find him talking of besieging Syracuse, *unless* the Sicilians would consent to the reëstablishment of Leontini, it is probable that he had not yet made up his mind peremptorily to besiege the city at all; a fact completely at variance with the unbounded hopes of conquest which he is reported as having conceived even at Athens. It is possible that he may have thought it impolitic to contradict too abruptly the tendencies of Alcibiades, who, anxious as he was chiefly to find some pretext for calling back his troops unharmed, might account the proposition of Lamachus too desperate even to be discussed. Unfortunately Alcibiades, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man in no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. He possessed, along with his own straightforward military career, the wealth and family ascendancy of either of his colleagues, and his achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have regarded Syracuse not as prisoners but as conquerors.

Alkibiadês, as soon as his plan had become adopted by the means of the approval of Lamachus, sailed across the straits in his own trireme from Rhegium to Messênê. Though admitted personally into the city, and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce them to conclude any alliance, or to add to the armament to anything beyond a market of provisions within the city walls. He accordingly returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues immediately departed with three triremes for Naxos. The Naxians cordially received them, and the vessel, which then steered southward along the coast of Sicily, arrived at Katana. In the latter place the leading men and the general sentiment were at this time favorable to Syracuse, so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled to sail farther southward and take their night-station at the mouth of the river Terias. On the ensuing day they made sail with their ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse.

while an advanced squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into the Great Harbor, south of the town, for the purpose of surveying on this side the city with its docks and fortifications, and for the farther purpose of proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the herald: "The Leontines now in Syracuse are hereby invited to come forth without apprehension and join their friends and benefactors, the Athenians." After this empty display, they returned back to Katana.¹

We may remark that this proceeding was completely at variance with the judicious recommendation of Lamachus. It tended to familiarize the Syracusans with the sight of the armament piece-meal, without any instant action, and thus to abate in their minds the terror-striking impression of its first arrival.

At Katana, Alkibiadês personally was admitted into the town, and allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had been at Messênê. Accident alone enabled him to carry his point, for the general opinion was averse to his propositions. While most of the citizens were in the assembly listening to his discourse, some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly guarded, broke it open and showed themselves in the market-place. The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to escape in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution accepting the alliance proposed by Alkibiadês.² The whole Athenian armament was now conducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was established as head-quarters. Intimation was farther received from a party at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, if the armament showed itself: accordingly, the whole armament proceeded thither, and took moorings off the shore, while a herald was sent up to the city. But the Kamarinæans declined to admit the army, and declared that they would abide by the existing treaty; which bound them to receive at any time one single ship, but no more, unless they themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were

¹ Thucyd. vi, 50.

² Polyænus (i, 40, 4) treats this acquisition of Katana as the result, not of accident, but of a preconcerted plot. I follow the account as given by Thucydides.

therefore obliged to return to Katana. Passing by both going and returning, they ascertained the falsehood port that the Syracusans were putting a naval force moreover, they landed near the city and ravaged some neighboring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and light troops appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued, before the invaders retired to their ships,¹ the first blood shed in this instant struggle, and again at variance with the advice of the Athenians.

Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They found the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, arrived from Athens, the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly, requiring Alkibiadês to come home and stand for various alleged matters of irreligion combined with other able purposes. A few other citizens specified by name were commanded to come along with him under the same charge. The trierarch of the Salaminian was especially directed to bring him only with the summons, without any guard or escort, so that he might return home in his own trireme.²

This summons, pregnant with momentous results to Athens and to her enemies, arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ, described a few pages back, and the inquiries made into the authorship of that deed, since the departure of Alkibiadês. The extensive and anxious sympathies connected with the event, and the large body of departing citizens, combined with the interest of the scene itself, had for the moment suspended the inquiries caused by that sacrilege; but it speedily revived, and the Athenians could not rest without finding out by whom the deed was done. Considerable rewards, one thousand and even ten thousand drachms, were proclaimed to informers; of whom not a few appeared, in addition to the slave Andromachus, mentioned. A metic named Teukrus had fled from Athens immediately after the event, to Megara, from whence he sent a messenger to the senate at Athens that he had himself been ascertained in the recent sacrilege concerning the mutilation of the Hermæ, and that if his life and property were guaranteed to him, he would come back and

¹ Thucyd. vi, 52.

² Thucyd.

information. A vote of the senate was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with himself, in the mock-celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, and eighteen different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the *Hermæ*. A woman named *Agaristê*, daughter of *Alkmæonidês*, — these names bespeak her great rank and family in the city, — deposed farther that *Alkibiadês*, *Axiochus*, and *Adeimantus*, had gone through a parody of the mysteries in a similar manner, in the house of *Charmidês*. And lastly *Lydus*, slave of a citizen named *Phereklês*, stated that the like scene had been enacted in the house of his master in the deme *Thêmakus*, giving the names of the parties present, one of whom — though asleep, and unconscious of what was passing — he stated to be *Leogoras*, the father of *Andokidês*.¹ Of the parties named in these different depositions, the greater number seem to have fled from the city at once; but all who remained were put into prison to stand future trial.² Those inform-

¹ *Andokidês de Mysteriis*, sects. 14, 15, 35. In reference to the deposition of *Agaristê*, *Andokidês* again includes *Alkibiadês* among those who fled into banishment in consequence of it. Unless we are to suppose another *Alkibiadês*, not the general in Sicily, this statement cannot be true. There was another *Alkibiadês*, of the deme *Phégus*: but *Andokidês* in mentioning him afterwards (sect. 65), specifies his deme. He was cousin of *Alkibiadês*, and was in exile at the same time with him (*Xenoph. Hellen.* i, 2, 13).

² *Andokidês* (sects. 13–34) affirms that some of the persons, accused by *Teukrus* as mutilators of the *Hermæ*, were put to death upon his deposition. But I contest his accuracy on this point. For *Thucydides* recognizes no one as having been put to death except those against whom *Andokidês* himself informed (see vi, 27, 53, 61). He dwells particularly upon the number of persons, and persons of excellent character, imprisoned on suspicion; but he mentions none as having been put to death except those against whom *Andokidês* gave testimony. He describes it as a great harshness, and as an extraordinary proof of the reigning excitement, that the Athenians should have detained so many persons upon suspicion, on the evidence of informers not entitled to credence. But he would not have specified this detention as extraordinary harshness, if the Athenians had gone so far as to put individuals to death upon the same evidence. Besides, to put these men to death would have defeated their own object, the full and entire disclosure of the plot and the conspirators. The ignorance in which they were of their internal enemies, was among the most agonizing

ers received the promised rewards, after some debate as parties entitled to receive the reward; for Pythonikus, the who had produced the slave Andromachus, pretended to claim, while Androkles, one of the senators, contended the senate collectively ought to receive¹ the money; a strain of tension, which we do not know how he justified. At last, however, at the time of the Panathenaic festival, Andromachus the slave received the first reward of ten thousand drachmas; Teukrus the metic, the second reward of one thousand drachmas.

A large number of citizens, many of them of the first class in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had been in exile. But the alarm, the agony, and the suspicion, in the minds of the people, went on increasing rather than diminishing. The information hitherto received had been all partial, and, with the exception of Agaristê, all the informants had been either slaves or metics, not citizens; while Teukrus, the only one among them who had stated anything respecting the mutilation of the king, did not profess to be a party concerned, or to know all the truth. The people had heard only a succession of disclosures all attesting a frequency of irreligious acts, calculated to excite and banish the local gods who protected their country and its constitution; all indicating that there were many powerful persons bent on prosecuting such designs, interpreted as treasons, and none communicating any full or satisfactory idea of the

of all their sentiments; and to put any prisoner to death until the king or believed themselves to have arrived, at the knowledge of which they would tend so far to bar their own chance of obtaining evidence: *ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς φετο, τὸ σαφές, καὶ δεῖνόν τι πρότερον εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἰσονται*, etc.

Wachsmuth says (p. 194): "The bloodthirsty dispositions of the Athenians had been excited by the previous murders: the greater the number of victims to be slaughtered, the better were the people pleased," etc. This is an inaccuracy quite in harmony with the general spirit of his narrative, which is contradicted, implicitly, by the very words of Thucydides which Wachsmuth cites in his note 108.

¹ Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 27-28. καὶ Ἀνδροκλῆς ἡ πρῶτος

² Andokid. de Myster. sect. 36. It seems that Diognētus, who was commissioner of inquiry at the time when Pythonikus presented information of the slave Andromachus, was himself among those denounced by Teukrus (And. de Mys. sects. 14, 15).

kopid plot, of the real conspirators, or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves, yet they knew not where to lay hands upon him. Amidst the gloomy terrors, political blended with religious, which distracted their minds, all the ancient stories of the last and worst oppressions of the Peisistratid despots, ninety-five years before, became again revived, and some new despots, they knew not who, seemed on the point of occupying the acropolis. To detect the real conspirators, was the only way of procuring respite from this melancholy paroxysm, for which purpose the people were willing to welcome questionable witnesses, and to imprison on suspicion citizens of the best character, until the truth could be ascertained.¹

The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and Chariklês, who acted as commissioners of investigation, furious and unprincipled politicians,² at that time professing exaggerated attachment to the democratical constitution, though we shall find both of them hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its subversion. These men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed indicated the band of Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with an ulterior design of speedily putting down the democracy; and they insisted on pressing their investigations until full discovery should be attained. And the sentiment of the people, collectively taken, responded to this stimulus; though individually, every man was so afraid of becoming himself the next victim arrested, that when the herald convoked the senate for the purpose of receiving informations, the crowd in the market-place straightway dispersed.

It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer appeared, Diokleidês, who professed to communicate some material facts connected with the mutilation of the Hermæ, affirming that the authors of it were three hundred in number. He recounted that, on the night on which that incident occurred, he

¹ Thucyd. vi, 53-60. οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτὰς, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ χρηστοῦς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὐρεῖν, ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν.....

.....δεινὸν ποιοῦμενοι, εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλευόντας σφὼν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἰσονται..

² And. kid. de Myst. sect. 36

started from Athens to go to the mines of Laureion; w had a slave working on hire, on whose account he was pay. It was full moon, and the night was so bright that his journey mistaking it for daybreak.¹ On reaching t læum of the temple of Dionysus, he saw a body of n three hundred in number descending from the Odeon the public theatre. Being alarmed at this unexpected concealed himself behind a pillar, from whence he had contemplate this body of men, who stood for some time c together, in groups of fifteen or twenty each, and then c the moon was so bright that he could discern the faces c them. As soon as they had dispersed, he pursued hi Laureion, from whence he returned next day, and lear surprise that during the night the Hermæ had been r also, that commissioners of inquiry had been named reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed for im Impressed at once with the belief that the nocturnal cro he had seen were authors of the deed, he happened s

¹ Plutarch (Alkib. c. 20) and Diodorus (xiii, 2) assert that this was glaringly false, since on the night in question it was *new moon*, at least, that the remark of Diodorus refers to the de Diokleidês, though he never mentions the name of the latter, ascribes the deposition referred to with many material variations s with Andokidês. Plutarch's observation certainly refers to whose deposition, he says, affirming that he had seen and distin persons in question by the light of the moon, on a night wher moon, shocked all sensible men, but produced no effect upon th of the people. Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterth. vol. ii, ch. v copies this remark from Plutarch.

I disbelieve altogether the assertion that it was *new moon* on Andokidês gives in great detail the deposition of Diokleidês, v wish to show that it was false and perfidiously got up. But mentions the fact that it was *new moon* on the night in question we read his report and his comments upon the deposition of D shall see that he never could have omitted such a means of dis whole tale, if the fact had been so (Andokid. de Myster. sects. sides, it requires very good positive evidence to make us b suborned informer, giving his deposition not long after on memorable nights that ever passed at Athens, would be so make particular reference to the circumstance that it was *full moon* (πανσεληνον), if it had really been *new moon*.

wards to see one of them, Euphémus, sitting in the workshop of a brazier, and took him aside to the neighboring temple of Hephaestus, where he mentioned in confidence that he had seen the party at work and could denounce them, but that he preferred being paid for silence, instead of giving information and incurring private enmities. Euphémus thanked him for the warning, desiring him to come next day to the house of Leogoras and his son Andokidês, where he would see them as well as the other parties concerned. Andokidês and the rest offered to him, under solemn covenant, the sum of two talents, or twelve thousand drachms thus overbidding the reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed by the senate to any truth-telling informer, with admission to a partnership in the benefits of their conspiracy, supposing that it should succeed. Upon his reply that he would consider the proposition, they desired him to meet them at the house of Kallias son of Têleklês, brother-in-law of Andokidês: which meeting accordingly took place, and a solemn bargain was concluded in the acropolis. Andokidês and his friends engaged to pay the two talents to Diokleidês at the beginning of the ensuing month, as the price of his silence. But since this engagement was never performed, Diokleidês came with his information to the senate.¹

Such — according to the report of Andokidês — was the story of this informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals, out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two senators actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty, among whom were Andokidês and many of his nearest relatives, his father Leogoras, his first or second cousins and brother-in-law, Charmidês, Taureas, Nisæus, Kallias son of Alkmæon, Phrynichus, Eukratês (brother of Nikias the commander in Sicily), and Kritias. But as there were a still greater number of names — assuming the total of three hundred to be correct — which Diokleidês was unable to specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus and Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to force them to disclose their accomplices; the psephism passed in the archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was unlawful to apply

¹ Andokid. de Myster. sects. 37-42.

the torture to any free Athenian, being first abrogated, not less than cruel, as this proposition was, the senate received it with favor. But Mantisheus and Aphepsion themselves as suppliants upon the altar in the senate pleaded so strenuously for their rights as citizens, to be put in bail and stand trial before the dikastery, that it was last granted.¹ No sooner had they provided their sure

¹ Considering the extreme alarm which then pervaded the mind, and their conviction that there were traitors among themselves, yet they could not identify, it is to be noted as remarkable that in the proposition of their commissioners for applying torture, they recollect that the Athenians admitted the principle of the torture mode of eliciting truth as well as of testing depositions, — for that it often to the testimony of slaves, — sometimes apparently metics. Their attachment to the established law, which forbade the application of it to citizens, must have been very great, to enable them to resist the great special and immediate temptation to apply it in the case of Mantisheus and Aphepsion, if only by way of exception.

The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons was taken down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognized, and nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe until the last century. I hope that the reader, after having gone through the painful narrative of the proceedings of the Athenians after the mutilation of the Hermae, will take the trouble to peruse by way of comparison the *Storia del Inquisitor*, by the eminent Alexander Manzoni, author of "I Promessi Sposi." This little volume, including a republication of Verri's "Osservazioni sulla Tortura," is full both of interest and instruction. It lays open the enormities committed at Milan in 1630, while the terrible pestilence was raging there, by the examining judges and the senate, in order to elicit evidence against certain suspected persons called *Untori*; that they were firmly believed by the whole population, with very few exceptions, to be causing and propagating the pestilence by means of certain charms which they applied to the doors and walls of houses. Manzoni, with simple, eloquent, and impressive detail, the incredible barbarities which the official lawyers at Milan, under the authority of the senate, inflicted by force of torture, evidence against several persons, of whom he mentions the names, committed this imaginary and impossible crime. The persons thus executed under horrible torments: the house of one of them, named Mora, was pulled down, and a pillar with an inscription upon the site, to commemorate the deed. This pillar, the *Colonna della Tortura*, remained standing in Milan until the close of the 18th century. The reader will understand, from Manzoni's narrative, the degree to which excitement and alarm can operate to poison and barbarize the

they broke their covenant, mounted their horses, and deserted to the enemy, without any regard to their sureties, who were exposed by law to the same trial and the same penalties as would have overtaken the offenders themselves. This sudden flight, together with the news that a Boeotian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, exasperated still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. The senate at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning all the remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by concert with the strategi, all the citizens were put under arms; those who dwelt in the city, mustering in the market-place; those in and near the long walls, in the Theseium; those in Peiræus, in the square called the Market-place of Hippodamus. Even the horsemen of the city were convoked by sound of trumpet in the sacred precinct of the Anakeion. The senate itself remained all night in the acropolis, except the prytanes, or fifty senators of the presiding tribe, who passed the night in the public building called the Tholus. Every man in Athens felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on the point of breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the foreigner, prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidês, who was hailed as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to dinner at the prytaneium.¹

Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more miserable was that of the prisoners confined; and worse, in every way, was still to be looked for, since the Athenians would know neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female relatives and children of Andokidês, and his companions, were by permission along with them in the prison,² aggravating by their tears and wailings the affliction of the scene, when Charmidês, one of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidês, as his cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary dis-

justice in a Christian city, without a taint of democracy, and with professional lawyers and judges to guide the whole procedure secretly, as compared with a pagan city, ultra-democratical, where judicial procedure as well as decision was all oral, public, and multitudinous

¹ Andokid. de Myst. sects. 41-46.

² Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorast. sect. 42.

closure of all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent persons, his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out of a feverish alarm not to be endured. "You know (he said) all that passed about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now bring destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father and upon all of us; while if you inform, whether you have been an actor in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself and us, and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city." Such instances on the part of Charmidês,¹ aided by the supplications of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidês to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the senate. "Euphilêtus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was present, but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all compliance. Presently, I broke my collar-bone, and injured my head, by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed; when Euphilêtus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe *Ægeis* have dedicated. Accordingly, they executed the project, while I was incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that I would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes, and you see that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury. When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party, Euphilêtus and Melêtus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I observed silence: to which I replied that it was not I, but their own crime, which had brought them into danger."

Having recounted this tale, in substance, to the senate, Andokidês tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in order that they might confirm his story that he was in his bed and unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ were mutilated. It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of

¹ Plutarch (*Alkib.* c. 21) states that the person who thus addressed himself to, and persuaded Andokidês, was named Timæus. From whom he got the latter name, we do not know.

slaves), and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what Andokidês affirmed. He delivered in twenty-two names of citizens as having been the mutilators of the Hermæ: eighteen of these names, including Euphilêtus and Melêtus, had already been specified in the information of Teukrus; the remaining four, were Panætius, Diakritus, Lysistratus, and Chæredêmus; all of whom fled, the instant their names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being seized. As soon as the senate heard the story of Andokidês, they proceeded to question Diokleidês over again; who confessed that he had given a false deposition, and begged for mercy, mentioning Alkibiadês the Phegusian—a relative of the commander in Sicily—and Amiantus, as having suborned him to the crime. Both of them fled immediately on this revelation; but Diokleidês was detained, sent before the dikastery for trial, and put to death.¹

The foregoing is the story which Andokidês, in the oration *De Mysteriis*, delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards, represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really did tell, certainly not that which his enemies represented him as having told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or afford any satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to have been prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord with the brief information of Thucydidês, who tells us that Andokidês impeached himself, along with others, as participant in the mutilation.² Among the accomplices against whom he informed, his enemies affirmed that his own nearest relatives were included, though this latter statement is denied by himself. We may be sure, therefore, that the tale which Andokidês really told was

¹ The narrative, which I have here given in substance, is to be found in Andokid. *de Myst.* sects. 48–66.

² Thucyd. vi, 60. Καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς τε καὶ ὁ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἄλλων μὴνέει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν, etc.

To the same effect, see the hostile oration of Lysias contra Andocidem, Or. vi, sects. 36, 37, 51: also Andokidês himself, *De Mysteriis*, sect. 71; *De Reditu*, sect. 7.

If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (*Vit.* x, Orator. p. 834), Andokidês had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken irregularity and damaging a statue.

something very different from what now stands in his
 But what it really was we cannot make out; nor should
 much even if it could be made out, since even at
 neither Thucydides nor other intelligent critics could
 how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ re-
 them always an unexplained mystery; though they
 Andokidēs the principal organizer.¹

That which is at once most important and most inco-
 is the effect produced by the revelations of Andokidēs
 false, on the public mind at Athens. He was a young
 rank and wealth in the city, belonging to the sacred
 the Kerykes, — said to trace his pedigree to the hero
 — and invested on a previous occasion with an import-
 command; whereas the preceding informers had been
 slaves. Moreover, he was making confession of his o-
 Hence the people received his communications with im-
 fidence. They were delighted to have got to the botto-
 terrible mystery: and the public mind subsided from its
 terrors into comparative tranquillity. The citizens aga-
 to think themselves in safety and to resume their habitu-
 dence in each other, while the hoplites everywhere
 were allowed to return to their homes.² All the prisone

¹ Thucyd. vi, 60. *ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται εἰς τῶν δεδομένων
 εἰδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνδεσμοτῶν τινός, εἰ-
 τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀμύνεται, εἰτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ εἰκάζεται· τὸ
 οὐδὲις οὐτε τότε οὐτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν δρασάντων.*

If the statement of Andokidēs in the *Oratio de Mysteriis* is
 deposition previously given by Tenkrus the metic must have
 one; though this man is commonly denounced among the lying
 (see the words of the comic writer Phrynichus ap. Plutarch, *All*

Thucydides refuses even to mention the name of Andokidēs
 presses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark
 as if he were afraid of giving offence to great Athenian fan-
 bitter feuds which it left behind at Athens, for years afterwards,
 in the two orations of Lysias and of Andokidēs. If the story
 be true, that Thucydides after his return from exile to Athens
 violent death (see *Biogr. Thucyd.* p. xvii, ed. Arnold), it would
 able that all his reserve did not protect him against private en-
 ring out of his historical assertions.

² Thucyd. vi, 60. *Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβ-
 ῶν σαφές, etc. . compare Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 67, 68*

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tody on suspicion, except those against whom Andokidēs informed, were forthwith released: those who had fled out of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as had already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a reward offered for their heads.¹ And though discerning men were not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal of divine protection.² Andokidēs himself was pardoned, and was for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude, so that his father Leogoras who had been among the parties imprisoned, ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for illegal proceedings towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous verdict from the dikastery.³ But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidēs was either banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this nefarious proceeding so well merited.⁴

¹ Andokid. de Myster. sect. 66; Thucyd. vi, 60; Philochorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot.

² Thucyd. vi, 60. *ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο*: compare Andokid. de Reditu. sect. 8.

³ See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are several circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this *γραφὴ παρανόμων*, which Andokidēs alleges that his father Leogoras brought against the senator Speusippus, before a dikastery of six thousand persons (a number very difficult to believe), out of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained two hundred votes; but if this trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe that it could have taken place until after the public mind was tranquillized by the disclosures of Andokidēs, especially as Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidēs immediately before those disclosures were given in.

⁴ See for evidence of these general positions respecting the circumstances

But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting Hermaë, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, soon again disturbed. There still remained the various profanations of the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not been investigated or brought to atonement; and these were sure to be pressed home, and worked with a factitious emotion of pious zeal, since the enemies of Alkibiadês were upon turning them to his ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none more profoundly or universally revered than the mysteries of Eleusis, originally entrusted to the goddess Démêtêr herself, in her visit to that place, to the other Eleusinian patriarch, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in their families.¹ Celebrated annually in the month of August or September, under the care of the basileus, or second archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still more powerfully by the initiation which they conferred, under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants. Even the divulging of the sacred words to the uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the Eleusinia, was accounted highly criminal: much more the actual performance of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial assembly. Moreover, the individuals who held the great sacred mysteries of Eleusis,—the hierophant, the daduch (torch-bearer), and the keryx, or herald,—which were transmitted by inheritance in the families of the molpidæ and other great families of antiquity and were personally insulted by such proceedings, and lost their own dignity at the same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name of Démêtêr and Persephone. The most appalling legends were current among the people, and repeated on proper occasions even by the

of Andokidês, the three Orations: *Andokidês de Mysteriis*, *Andokidês de Reditu Suo*, and *Lysias contra Andokidem*.

¹ Homer, *Hyman. Cerer.* 475. Compare the Epigram cited in *Eleusinia*, p. 47.

himself, respecting the divine judgments which always overlook such impious men.¹

When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated by Greeks not born in Athens and even by foreigners; we shall not wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.² It was about this same time³ that a prosecution was instituted against the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a reward was offered for his life.

Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the state

¹ Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myster. sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi, p. 490, Bekker; Athenæus, xii, p. 551), where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on unlucky and forbidden days, "in derision of our gods and our laws,"—ὡς καταγελῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων. The lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias had all miserably perished, while Kinêsias himself was living in wretched health and in a condition worse than death: τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τοῦτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄπερ οὗτος ἐξημαρτηκόσι.

The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias among their favorite subjects of derision and libel, and seem particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Græc.* (Strattis), vol. ii, p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.

² Lysias cont. Andokid. sects. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib. c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklès (Fragm. 58, Brunck.—*Œdip. Kolon.* 1058) respecting the value of the Eleusinian mysteries, are very striking: also Cicero, *Legg.* ii, 14.

Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging these mysteries (*Od.* iii, 2, 26), much more then of deriding them.

The reader will find the fullest information about these ceremonies in the *Eleusinia*, forming the first treatise in the work of Lobeck called *Aglaophamus*; and in the Dissertation called *Eleusinia*, in K. O. Müller's *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii, p. 242, seqq.

³ Diodor. xiii, 6

to the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and for punishment on the delinquents.¹ And the enemies of Alkibiadès, personal as well as political, found the opportunity favorable for reviving that charge against him which they had artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebration of these holy ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanor habitual with Alkibiadès, so glaringly at variance with the equal restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the mysteries did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in conjunction with the Bœotians, a purpose not easy to understand, and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole night in the sacred precinct of the Theseium. No enemy indeed appeared, either without or within; but the conspiracy had only been prevented from breaking out, so they imagined, by the recent inquiries and detection. Moreover, the party in Argos connected with Alkibiadès were just at this time suspected of a plot for the subversion of their own democracy, which still farther aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the oligarchical hostages which had been taken from that town a few months before,² in order that it might put these hostages to death, whenever it thought fit.

¹ We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadès from banishment (Thucyd. viii, 53)

² Thucyd. vi, 53-61.

Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical politics, as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the memorable impeachment, which, fortunately for our information, is recorded verbatim.

"Thessalus son of Kimon, of the deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached Alkibiadês son of Kleinias, of the deme Skambônida, as guilty of crime in regard to the two goddesses Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, in mimicking the mysteries, and exhibiting them to his companions in his own house, wearing the costume of the hierophant: applying to himself the name of hierophant; to Polytion, that of daduch; to Theodôrus that of herald, and addressing his remaining companions as mysts and epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian priests."¹

Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the accusers moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable or anti-constitutional projects: probably, however, these suspicions were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the command of the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was indispensable that a strong case should be made out: but the public was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης, Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσάγειλεν ᾠδικεῖν περὶ τῷ θεῷ, τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρη, ἀπομιμούμενον τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ αὐτοῦ, ἔχοντα στολὴν, ὡς ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερὰ, καὶ ὀνομάζοντα αὐτὸν μὲν ἱεροφάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δαδούχον, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον Φηγέα· τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπὸ τ' Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ὧν ἐξ Ἑλευσίνος.

was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care he taken, in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of judgment, or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was to seize his person, and had instructions to invite him to accompany the Salaminian home in his own trireme to avoid the hazard of offending the Argeian and Mantian serving in Sicily, or the army itself.¹

It was on the return of the Athenian army from the unsuccessful attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters that they found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived furnished with this grave requisition against the general. We may think that Alkibiadēs received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same trireme, communicating to him the state of the people, so that his resolution was speedily taken. To obey, he departed in his own trireme on the voyage along with the other persons accused, the Salaminian being in company; but as soon as they arrived at the coasting along Italy, he and his companions quitted the trireme and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadēs and the rest of the accused — one of whom² was his own cousin and namesake — were condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated; while the Eumolpidæ and the other Eleusini families pronounced him to be accursed by the gods, for his violation of the mysteries,³ and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead.

Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of his removal; and while he had come back, his condemnation

¹ Thucyd. vi, 61.

² Xenoph. Hellen.

³ Thucyd. vi, 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, Or. Andokid. sect. 42.

Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadēs to have joined the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the order to return home. But this is highly improbable. Considering what became immediately afterwards, we shall see good reason to think that he would have taken this step, had it been practicable.

though probable, could not be considered as certain. In considering the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadès, we have to remark, that the people were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed — at least there was fair reason for believing that he had committed — an act criminal in the estimation of every Greek; the divulgation and profanation of the mysteries. This act — alleged against him in the indictment very distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable or otherwise — was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally accounted guilty in public estimation, as an offence at once against the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety, by offending the two goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, and driving them to withdraw their favor and protection. The same demand for legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history, if instead of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the sacrament of the mass to have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the last century it would have been visited with something sharper than the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have befallen Alkibiadès at Athens, as we may see by the condemnation and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville, in 1766. The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,¹ down to a recent period, leaves no room for reproaching

¹ To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermès and by the profanation of the mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French Revolution.

I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on French criminal jurisprudence — *Jousse, Traité de la Justice Criminelle*, Paris, 1771, part iv, tit. 27, vol. iii, p. 672: —

“Du Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine. — Les Crimes de Leze Majesté Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu'on doit regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus exécrables. — La Majesté

the Athenians with excessive cruelty in their penal visitations against the religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished for comparative mildness of punishment, as we shall find various opportunities for remark.

Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alcibiades, we must consider, that this violation of the mystic which he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he really deserved punishment, if any one deserved it.

de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs manières. — 1. En niant l'existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de ceux qui attentent directement à la Divinité : comme quand on profane ou qu'on foule aux pieds les Hosties ; ou qu'on frappe les Images de Dieu dans le dessein de les détruire. C'est ce qu'on appelle *Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine au premier Chef*. — Again in the same work, part iv, tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. i p. 99 : —

— “ *La profanation des Sacramens et des Mystères de la Religion est une des plus exécrables. Tel est le crime de ceux qui emploient les choses à des usages communs et mauvais, en dérision des Mystères ; ceux qui profanent la sainte Eucharistie, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière ; ceux qui en mépris de la Religion, profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties, ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes : ceux qui, en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les profanent dans leurs débauches ; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images de Dieu, ou de la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints, en mépris de la Religion ; enfin, tous ceux qui commettent de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes sont des crimes de Leze-Majesté divine au premier chef, parce, qu'ils s'adressent immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de l'offenser.* ”

“ ... La peine du Sacrilège, par l'Ancien Testament, étoit celle de la lapidation. — Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches, suivant les circonstances du crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l'offense. Dans le sacrilège au premier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte Vierge, les Saints, v. g. à l'égard de ceux qui foulent aux pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la peine est le feu, l'amende honorable, et le poignard. Il en est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux en dérision de nos Mystères, s'en moquent et les contrefont dans leurs débauches ; ils doivent être punis de peine capitale, parceque ces crimes s'adressent immédiatement à la Divinité. ”

M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.

his enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely ; though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin with the mutilation of the Hermæ ; an act of new and unparalleled wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to political profit. Thus much is certain ; though we cannot be sure who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadês was one of the direct purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies, even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme, which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the absent general, has been already recounted. It is among the darkest chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice towards Alkibiadês ; but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided indeed by the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ, the Athenians condemned to death — after and by consequence of the deposition of Andokidês — a small number of men who may perhaps have been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty ; and whose death not only tranquillized comparatively the public mind, but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadês, they came to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted

for it, whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed it by perfidious means.¹

¹ The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various authors, as by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy to that which occurred after the mutilation of the Hermæ. But there are many differences, and all, so far as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.

1. The "hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants," the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons, — see Dr. Lingard's History of England, vol. xiii, ch. v, p. 88, — words, the like of which were less employed at Athens in reference to the Hermokopids, were less mendacious, and incredible, from the beginning. It started first as a fact: the whole of it was a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications, from Oates, Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.

At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot; the Hermokopids were conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that they were for other objects besides the mutilation of the Hermæ. At the same time no one knew what these objects were, nor who the conspirators were.

If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had been asked to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated plot implicating Andokidês and others, he would have found no credence. It was not until after the terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. Those implicated in that deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidês, as a witness, deserves but very little credit; yet it is impossible to degrade him to the same level as Teukrus or Diokleidês, much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We wonder that the people trusted him, and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should trust him. The witness whose testimony the prisoners under the Popish Plot were condemned on were even inferior to Teukrus and Diokleidês in presumptive credit.

The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in believing in a democratical constitution in danger, because the Hermæ had been mutilated. I have endeavored to show, that, looking to their religion, the thread of connection between these two ideas is perfectly clear. And why are we to quarrel with the Athenians because they took no guard, when a Lacedæmonian or a Boeotian force was actually on their frontier?

As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a moment to be put on a level with the condemnations in the Popish Plot. These

In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile Alkibiadēs afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed: "I shall show them that I am alive." He fully redeemed his word.¹

The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadēs was mischievous to Athens in several ways. It transferred to the

charges, at least there is strong presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons were convicted and punished for having done acts which they really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not, is another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.

The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even greater at Athens: but the cause of it was graver and more real, and the active injustice which it produced was far less than in England.

"I shall not detain the reader (says Dr. Lingard, *Hist. Engl.* xiii, p. 105) with a narrative of the partial trials and judicial murders of the unfortunate men, whose names had been inserted by Oates in his pretended discoveries. So violent was the excitement, so general the delusion created by the perjuries of the informer, that the voice of reason and the claims of justice were equally disregarded. Both judge and jury seemed to have no other object than to inflict vengeance on the supposed traitors. To speak in support of their witnesses, or to hint the improbability of the informations, required a strength of mind, a recklessness of consequences, which falls to the lot of few individuals: even the king himself, convinced as he was of the imposture, and contemptuously as he spoke of it in private, dared not exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the lives of the innocent."

It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a legislative body, and in their judicial character when the Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (ch. vi, pp. 231-241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts.

Both the English judicature on this occasion, and the Milanese judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note, were more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning prejudice, than the purely popular dikastery of Athens in this affair of the Hermæ, and of the other profanations.

¹ Pintarch, *Alkib.* c. 22.

enemy's camp an angry exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament, most of all probably the Argeians and Mantineians, and slackened their zeal in the cause.¹ And what was worst of all, it left the armament altogether under the paralyzing command of Nikias. For Lamachus, though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have had no real influence except in the field.

Nikias now proceeded to execute that scheme which he had first suggested, to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta, with the view of investigating the quarrel between the two as well as the financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the celebrated courtesan Laïs, then a very young girl.² Having handed over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of one hundred and twenty talents,³ and conducted the Athenian land-force across the centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel

¹ Thucyd. ii, 65. *τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν*, etc.

² The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad Philisti, Fragment. v.

³ Diodor. viii, 6; Thucyd. vi, 62. *Καὶ τὰνδράποδα ἀπέδοσαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα*. The word *ἀπέδοσαν* seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had Thucydides said *ἀπέδοντο*, it would have meant that they were put up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at least possible, and, in my judgment, more admissible than that proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.

If, however, we refer to Thucyd. vi, 88, with Duker's note, we shall see that *μεταπέμπειν* is sometimes, though rarely, used in the sense of *μεταπέμπεσθαι*. The case may perhaps be the same with *ἀπέδοσαν* for *ἀπέδοντο*.

town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his naval force.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing except the acquisition of Naxos and Katana as allies — unless we are to reckon the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxos and Katana, as Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great disappointment. What is still worse, in reference to the character of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the recent untried armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished; the invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out both hesitating and timorous,¹ and when he had disappeared out of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta, still more when he assailed in vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla, their minds underwent a reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, called upon their generals to lead to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry, informing himself as to the ground near the city, through some exiles serving along with him.²

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen, in his heart

¹ Thucyd. vi, 63; vii, 42.

² Thucyd. vi, 63; Diodor. xiii 6.

attached to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on guard with the other side, as bearer of a pretended message a situation from the friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many Athenian soldiers, so the message ran, were in the habit of passing the night within the walls, apart from their camp. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared and disperse the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, to open the gates, assailing the Athenians within, and setting on fire the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans, they added, were ready to coöperate in the plan now proposed.

This communication, reaching the Syracusan general at a moment when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive movement, found such incautious credence, that he sent back the messenger to Katana with cordial assent and a promise for a precise day. Accordingly, a day or two before the expected attack, the entire Syracusan force was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the river Symæthus, in the territory, within about eight miles of Katana. But Nikias, to whom the whole proceeding originated, choosing this as the best opportunity to put on shipboard his army, together with his Sicilian allies, sailed by night southward along the coast, round the island of Ortydia, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse. On the morning thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops upon the shore south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great Harbor, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus Olympius. Having broken down the neighboring walls, where the Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took a position protected by various embarrassing obstacles, — walls, trees, and standing water, besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his left wing; so that he could devote his own time for fighting, and was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of his ships on the shore, he raised a palisade work by cutting down the neighboring trees; and took precautions for his rear by throwing up a hasty wall of wood and stones touching the shore at the inner point of the harbor, Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive works, for the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb him. The Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre of

before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time in returning, the march back was a long one.¹ Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle forthwith; but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated, to take up their night-station on the other side of the Helôrine road, probably a road bordered on each side by walls.

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear division — in hollow square, with the baggage in the middle — was held in reserve near the camp, to lend aid where aid might be wanted; cavalry there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection; they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than twelve hundred in number; together with two hundred horsemen from Gela, twenty from Kamarina, about fifty bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites, though full of courage, had little training; and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their families; others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already begun, and took rank wherever they could.²

Thucydides, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of professional honor and disgrace, without any thought of the cause for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier's mind at the eve of action. Nikias adverted to the recognized military preëminence of chosen Argeians, Mantine-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 65, 66; Diodor. xiii, 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 13.

² Thucyd. vi, 67-69.

ians, and Athenians, as compared to the Syracusan leader who were full of belief in their own superiority, — striking confession of the deplorable change which wrought by his own delay, — but who would come short of conflict, from want of discipline.¹ Moreover, he reminded that they were far away from home, and that defeat would make them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a reverse as it would have been, was even desirable for her since it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters which will be found to sadden the closing of this history.

While the customary sacrifices were being performed, slingers and bowmen on both sides became engaged in fighting. But presently the trumpets sounded, and Nikias led his first division of hoplites to charge at once rapidly, but the Syracusans expected it. Judging from his previous backings they never imagined that he would be the first to give the charge; nor was it until they saw the Athenian line advancing towards them that they lifted their own arms and came forward to give the meeting. The battle was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time it continued hand to hand with undecided result. Thereupon to supervene a violent storm of rain, with thunder and lightning which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an ominous augury, while to the more practised Athenians it seemed a mere phenomenon of the season,² so that it farther astonished the Syracusans by the unabated courage

¹ Thucyd. vi, 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεῖ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμῶν· καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, φρονούσιν μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομένονσι δὲ οὐδ'· διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην μὴ ἔσσω ἔχειν.

This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb Compare πανδαμεῖ, πανομιλεῖ, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.

² Thucyd. vi, 70. Τοῖς δ' ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γινόμενα, καὶ περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστώτας, πολλὰ μείζω ἐκπλήξιν μὴ παρέχειν.

The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equal to eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be seen in chapter but one.

with which they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken, dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next, before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety behind the Helôrîne road.¹

So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate detachment to guard the neighboring temple and sacred precinct of the Olympian Zeus, wherein there was much deposited wealth, which they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from the dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost two hundred and fifty men, the Athenians fifty.²

On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies for burial, and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias reëmbarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters at Katana; though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbor in summer, the change of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he proposed to employ the interval

¹ Thucyd. vi, 70.

² Thucyd. vi, 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct, though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents.

Diodorus (xiii, 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x, 28, 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the treasures or the offerings, and left them still under the care of the Syracusan priests.

Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his position before he returned to Katana. But the language of Thucydides indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after the battle.

in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well as securing the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies. Numbers he calculated now on increasing by the access of cities after his recent victory, and to get together men of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which the favorable party who gave hopes of opening the gate. Such a correspondence had already been commenced on the departure of Alkibiadês: but it was the first act in which the departing general took on his country, to give proceedings to the philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Finally, these latter, watching their opportunity, rose in a rebellion at the arrival of Nikias, put to death their chief antagonist, held the town by force against the Athenians; who after a long delay of thirteen days, with scanty supplies, and stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into winter quarters.¹

The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement on the harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers, and to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. As to other results, the victory was barren; we may even say it was positively mischievous, since it imparted a momentary confidence which served as an excuse to Nikias for the three months' inaction which followed, and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414) was the most deplorable of all calamities to his army, and to himself. Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the subsequent events: at present, we have only to turn back to his opinions and recommendations. All the difficulties and

¹ Thucyd. vi. 71-74.

be surmounted in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking the expedition; but the Athenians, though unfortunately not allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their reality, and authorized him to demand whatever force was necessary to overcome them.¹ He had thus been allowed to bring with him a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well as every man at Athens:² upon the formidable cavalry of the Syracusans, Nikias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates. Yet, after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty, the existence of this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nikias himself with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression of his armament, giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their fortifications, and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere against Attica as well as to succor Sicily. It was the unhappy weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity became imminent: the consequence of which was,—to use an expression of the Corinthian envoy before the Peloponnesian war in censuring the dilatory policy of Sparta,—that never acting, yet always seeming about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single, at the moment of actual conflict.³

Great, indeed, must have been the disappointment of the Athe-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 21-26.

² Thucyd. vi, 20.

³ Thucyd. vi, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἕλλήνων, ὧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινα ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν ἀβέησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ διπλασιουμένην, καταλύοντες.

nians, when, after having sent forth in the month of June, an expedition of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted anything serious, nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent or disappointment against him.¹ And this is the more to be noted, since the re-

¹ *Δις χρόν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους*: "It is disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our own fault in making bad calculations at first." (Thucyd. vi, 21.)

This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens, prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover, such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was anxious to put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydides can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.

As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text,—that the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by his own previous speeches at Athens,—so it seems to have been forgotten by Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable passage, ii, 65, of Thucydides,—*ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνῶμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὐδὲ ἐπῆσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου ποσοστίας, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποιοῦν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν*. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:—

"Thucydides here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in two other places (vi, 31; vii, 42), namely, that the Athenian power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, *had not the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently supplied by the government at home*. The words *οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες* signify "not voting afterwards the needful supplies to their absent armament:" for Nikias was prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently the armament was allowed to be reduced

moval of Alkibiadēs afforded an inviting and even valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague in his room.

to great distress and weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it." Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation.

Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that these words do not signify "voting the needful supplies."

The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with ἐπιτέμπειν — παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἱπποὺς, χρήματα, etc., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive word for these particulars, meaning "supplies." The words really mean: "taking farther resolutions (after the expedition was gone) unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament." Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally, agreeing with βουλευματα, or some such word: indeed, we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used in the most general sense, for "what is suitable;" "what is advantageous or convenient:" γυμνάσω τὰ πρόσφορα — πρᾶσσεται τὰ πρόσφορα — τὰ πρόσφορ' ἤβξατ' — τὰ πρόσφορα δρώης ἄν — τὰ ταῦτα πρόσφορον. Euripid. Hippiol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Anl. 160, B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.

Thucydides appears to have in view the violent party contests which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament, especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadēs, which grew out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party acrimony was directed against Alkibiadēs exclusively, not against the expedition.

Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold's note, that *one of the causes* of the failure of the Athenian expedition in Sicily, was, that it was "insufficiently supplied by Athens." Of the two passages to which he refers in Thucydides (vi, 31; vii, 42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting forth the prodigious amount of force sent; the second says nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.

After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the autumn, the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the supplies *were sent*, as soon as they could be, and as soon as Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not the fault of the Athenians.

Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say, "that the armament *was allowed* to be reduced to great distress and weakness before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it." The second expedition was sent the moment that Nikias made known his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful appearances.

If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own soldiers in Sicily, though *their* disappointment must have been yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own army.¹ The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more instructive as we advance forward.

Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to nominate to the command; to reduce the number to three, conferring upon them at the same

It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of Thucydides, than to charge the Athenians with having starved their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is, the having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydides plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of Nikias and that of Demosthenês.

Thucydides is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that he conceived the mismanagement of the general as *the cause* of the failure of the armament, not as "one of two causes," as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a Spartan, of Gylippus, together with the effective influence which this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown by Nikias (vii, 42).

Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. liv, p. 464.

time fuller powers than had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them unfettered in the exercise of such powers; lastly, to enjoin upon these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command. Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica;¹ so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall of his army.

But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of fortifications at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, inclosing an additional space and covering both their inner and their outer city to the westward, reaching from the outer sea to the Great Harbor, across the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ, and stretching far enough westward to inclose the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in the field and confine them to their walls, he might, nevertheless, be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea without covering a great additional extent of ground.² Besides this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a regular fortification and garrison in the Olympieion or temple of Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct the convenient landing-places. All these precautions were useful to them; and we may even say that the new outlying fortification, inclosing the Temenites, proved their salvation in the coming siege, by so lengthening the circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to

¹ Thucyd. vi, 72, 73.

² Thucyd. vi, 75. *Ἐρείχουσιν δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρὸς τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς Ἐπιπολάς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι' ἐλασσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν, ἣν ἄρα σφάλλονται, etc.*

I reserve the general explanation of the topography of Syracuse for the next chapter, when the siege begins.

construct, that Gylippus had time to arrive before it was finished. But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance, to occupy and fortify the Euryálus, or the summit of the hill of Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never have made progress with their lines of circumvallation: but they did not think of it until too late, as we shall presently see.

Nevertheless it is important to remark, in reference to the general scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias had adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus, or if he had begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse in the summer or autumn of 415 B.C., instead of postponing them, as he actually did, to the spring of 414 B.C., he would have found none of these additional defences to contend against, and the line of circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter and easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, his winter's inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, that the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and burned the tents which they found standing, ravaging at the same time the neighboring fields.¹

Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted to address the public assembly.

Hermokratês began by denouncing the views, designs, and past history of Athens. He did not, he said, fear her power, provided the Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength. What he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyze all joint resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was to subjugate all Sicily,—that Leontini and

¹ Thucyd. vi, 75.

Egesta served merely as convenient pretences to put forward, — and that she could have no sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in slavery the Chalkidians in Euboea. It was, in truth, nothing else but an extension of the same scheme of rapacious ambition, whereby she had reduced her Ionian allies and kinsmen to their present wretched slavery, now threatened against Sicily. The Sicilians could not too speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred from one master to another, but autonomous Dorians from the centre of autonomy, Peloponnesus. It would be madness to forfeit this honorable position through jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves. Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbors of Syracuse, and would be the first victims if she were conquered. They might wish, from apprehension or envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse humbled, but this could not happen without endangering their own existence. They ought to do for her what they would have asked her to do if the Athenians had invaded Kamarina, instead of lending merely nominal aid, as they had hitherto done. Their former alliance with Athens was for purposes of mutual defence, not binding them to aid her in schemes of pure aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words to both parties, and leave Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily single-handed, was as unjust as it was dishonorable. If she came off victor in the struggle, she would take care that the Kamarinæans should be no gainers by such a policy. The state of affairs was so plain, that he (Hermokratês) could not pretend to enlighten them: but he solemnly appealed to their sentiments of common blood and lineage. The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother Dorians of Kamarina.¹

Euphêmus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in reference to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of Hermokratês. Though addressing a Dorian assembly, he did not fear to take his start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that Ionians were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling Athens, as an Ionian city, had looked about to

¹ Thucyd, vi, 77-80.

strengthen herself against the supremacy of her powerful neighbors in Peloponnesus. Finding herself after the death of the Persian king at the head of those Ionian Greeks who had just revolted from him, she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy to shake off the former ascendency of Sparta. Her empire was justified for her own safety against Sparta, as well as by the inferiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of Greek Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had gone on for reducing them to subjection, because they had made themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assuring herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire, and the same views now brought her to Sicily. She was prepared to show that the interests of Kamarina were in accordance with those of Athens. The main purpose of her expedition in Sicily was to prevent her Sicilian enemies from sending her Peloponnesian enemies, to accomplish which, powerful Peloponnesian allies were indispensable to her. To enfeeble or to lose her Sicilian allies would be folly: if she did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans employed on their own island. Hence her desire to reëstablish the independence of the Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the Chalcidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home, she wanted not but subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying, while in Sicily she required independent and efficient allies; so that her present conduct, which Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, sprang from one and the same root of public prudence. For that motive, Athens dealt differently with her dependencies according to the circumstances of each. Thus, she recognized the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and maintained friendly relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus; and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in Sicily.

No: it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinians and other Sicilians had really ground to fear. Syracuse was alarmed at the acquisition of imperial sway over the island of Sicily which she had already done towards the Leontines and Chalcidians, as she was prepared to do when the time came, against the Peloponnesians and others. It was under this apprehension that the

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næans had formerly invited Athens into Sicily: it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them; if they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter when exposed to the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbor, and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled the imputations which Hermokratês had cast upon Athens, but the Kamarinæans were not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It was for them to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece. He now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on an equal footing, jointly with Athens.¹

In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years before at the congress of Gela, to settle all Sicilian differences at home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens; who if she once got footing in Sicily, would never rest until she reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural, nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary Sicilian cities, especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were

¹ Thucyd. vi, 83-87.

those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence shows how little likely such hopes were to be realized, a fore how ill-advised the whole plan of interference in S — that the Athenian envoy could say to the Kamari the same strain as Nikias had spoken at Athens when c the wisdom of the expedition: "Such is the distance from Athens, and such the difficulty of guarding cities force and ample territory combined, that if we wished you Sicilians as subjects, we should be unable to do it only retain you as free and powerful allies."¹ What N at Athens to dissuade his countrymen from the enterpr. sincere conviction, Euphêmus repeated at Kamarina for pose of conciliating that city; probably, without be himself, yet the anticipation was not on that account the and reasonable.

The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, f mokratês and Euphêmus. Their inclinations carri towards the Athenians, yet not without a certain mis case Athens should prove completely successful. To Syracuseans, on the contrary, they entertained nothing bu ified apprehension, and jealousy of very ancient date; now their great fear was, of probable suffering, if the S succeeded against Athens without their coöperation. dilemma, they thought it safest to give an evasive a friendly sentiment towards both parties, but refusal either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach, v way the ultimate success might turn.²

For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kama was perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December, no human being could venture to predict how the struggl Nikias and the Syracuseans in the coming year would nor were the Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty take the extreme chances with either party. Matters

¹ Thucyd. vi, 86. ἡμεῖς μὲν γε οὐτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνάτοί μὴ μεθ'· καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασάμεθα, ἀδύνατοί κατασχεῖν, διὰ μὴ καὶ ἀπορία φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ παρασκευῇ ἡπειρωτῶδων,

This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the vi, 11.

² Thucy

a different aspect, indeed, in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to succeed, if, indeed, they had not already become conquerors of Syracuse; so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies, Lamachus had contended, was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to strike at the capital point at once, while the intimidating effect of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.¹

Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing. He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in his favor, — especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônîdês, — sending provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached, Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, reëstablishing that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.²

He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite coöperation from that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realized their promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained; why, we do not know; for we shall find the Carthaginians, six years hence, invading Sicily with prodigious forces; and if they entertained any such intentions, it would seem that the presence of Nikias in Sicily must have presented the most convenient moment for executing them. To the Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias sent orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first burst of spring.

¹ Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi, 91.

² Thucyd. vi, 88.

While such preparations were going on in Sicily portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediate battle near the Olympieion, and the retreat of Nikias quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to P to solicit reinforcements. Here, again, we are compelled to lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction. Had he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first day, it may be doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus at all; at any rate, they would not have been in time to produce decisive effects.¹ After exerting what they could upon the Italian Greeks in their voyage, the envoys reached Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises of speedy succor. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to accompany them to Sparta, and back their request for Lacedæmonian aid.

They found at the congress at Sparta another advantage, whom they could not reasonably have counted, Alkibiades. He had crossed over from Thurii to the Eleian port in Peloponnesus in a merchant-vessel,² and now ap

¹ Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 42.

² Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at Argos. This seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion of Thucydides that his friends at Argos had incurred grave suspicions of treason.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability, that Alkibiades went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to Thebes.

Isokratēs (De Bigis, Orat. xvi, s. 10) says that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, and set a demand for his person from the Argeians; so that Alkibiades was obliged to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. This whole statement is exceedingly loose and untrustworthy, carrying back the date of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the death of Alkibiades. But among all the vague sentences, that the Athenians banished him out of *all Greece* stands prominently. It could only banish him from the territory of Athens and her allies. If he went to Argos, as I have already said, seems to me very probable. Perhaps Plutarch copied the statement from this passage of Isokrates.

But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that Alkibiades went against his country, or went to Sparta, *upon compulsion*. The hostility to Athens, the disappointing result of the acquisition of Sicily committed before he left Sicily. Moreover, Thucydides represents him as unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because

Sparta on special invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much trouble before the battle of Mantinea. He now appeared, too, burning with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations, supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and inflamed the tardy good-will of the Spartan ephors into comparative decision and activity.¹ His harangue in the Spartan congress is given to us by Thucydîdês, who may possibly have heard it, as he was then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the mouth of Alkibiadês at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree; and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the substance, without professing to translate the words.

“First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your favor on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ my enemies as your agents, thus strengthening their hands, and dishonoring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite with the Argeians and Mantineians; nor ought you to be angry with me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan of democracy. My family were always opposed to the Pei-

of the Spartans; in fact, waiting for a safe-conduct and invitation from them. Thucydîdês mentions nothing about his going to Argos (vi, 88).

¹ Thucyd. vi, 88.

aristatid despots; and as all opposition to a reigning tyrant takes the name of The People, so from that time forth continued to act as leaders of the people.¹ Moreover, the existing constitution was a democracy, so that I had nothing to obey, though I did my best to maintain a moderate political conduct in the midst of the reigning license. It was not my family, but others, who in former times as well as now led the people into the worst courses, those same men who were now in exile. I always acted as leader, not of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that constitution which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom, and which was found already existing.² For as to democracy, all we of common sense well knew its real character. Pericles had better reason than any one else to rail against it, if he could say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by our enemies.

"So much as to myself personally: I shall now tell you about the business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens was first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks; next, the Italians; afterwards, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire, and then on Carthage herself. If all or most of this succeeded, we then intended to attack Peloponnesus. We intended to bring into play the entire power of the Sicilian and Italian fleets, besides large numbers of Iberian and other warlike bar-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 89. *Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεὶ ποτε διάφοροί ἔσμεν ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι ὄχλος ὠνόμασται· καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου μένειν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους.*

It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always to tyrants, or despots, and had been particularly opposed to the tyrants, whom they in fact put down. In tracing his tendencies, therefore, to this source, Alkibiadēs took the best means of causing them before a Lacedæmonian audience.

² Thucyd. vi, 89. *ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ τυράντου προέστημεν, δικαίᾳ στήνῃ μεγίστῃ ἡ πόλις ἔτυχεν καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτῃ οὖσα, καὶ ὅπερ τοῦτο συνδιασώζειν ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγγνώσκομεν οἱ φερόμενοι καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἂν χειρόν, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμοῦ οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· καὶ τὸ μετισταναίαι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδωκεν εἶναι, ὅμῳ πολέμῳ προσκαθήμενων.*

cenaries, together with many new triremes built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force ; and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows it best ; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can hinder them. If, indeed, the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they might hold out ; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot, beaten as they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate ; and the danger which I have described will be soon upon you.

“ It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily, — it is for the safety of Peloponnesus, — that I now urge you to send across, forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers ; and what I consider still more important than an army, a Spartan general to take the supreme command. Moreover, you must also carry on declared and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica :¹ that is the contingency which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt the working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of their profits from judicial fines as well as of their landed revenue, and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.

“ None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her

¹ The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i. 122).

enemies, I who once passed for a patriot.¹ Nor ought mistrust my assurances, as coming from the reckless pas-
 exile. The worst enemies of Athens are not those w-
 open war like you, but those who drive her best fri-
 hostility. I loved my country,² while I was secure as
 I love her no more, now that I am wronged. In fact
 conceive myself to be assailing a country still mine; I
 trying to win back a country now lost to me. The re-
 is not he, who, having unjustly lost his country, acqu-
 patience, but he whose ardor makes him try every
 regain her.

“Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any
 danger or suffering; the more harm I did you forme-
 enemy, the more good I can now do you as a friend. I
 all, do not shrink back from instant operations both in
 in Attica, upon which so much depends. You will
 down the power of Athens, present as well as future;
 dwell yourselves in safety; and you will become the
 undivided Hellas, by free consent and without force.”³

Enormous consequences turned upon this speech
 masterly in reference to the purpose and the audac-
 infamous as an indication of the character of the speak-
 contents became known at Athens, as they probab-
 enemies of Alkibiadēs would be supplied with a just
 their most violent political attacks. That imputation
 had taken so much pains to fasten upon him, citing in
 alike his profligate expenditure, overbearing insolence
 sion of the religious ceremonies of the state,⁴—that
 the democracy in his heart, submitted to it only from
 and was watching for the first safe opportunity of su-
 —appears here in his own language as matter of a

¹ Thucyd. vi, 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἄξιῳ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν, φιλόπολις ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν ἐγκρατ-

² Thucyd. vi, 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικεῖν εἶχε ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ' ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὐσαν ἐτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὐσαν ἀνακτῶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὁρᾷ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπὶ, ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς ἐπιθυμῇ πειραθῆ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.

³ Thucyd. vi, 89-92.

⁴ Thucyd.

boast. The sentence of condemnation against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who at the time had deprecated it; and the people would be more firmly persuaded than before of the reality of the association between irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadês, but those to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy. Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.¹ He takes credit in his speech for moderation, as opposed to the standing license of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to extravagance, and which Athenians of all parties would have listened to with astonishment. Such license as that of Alkibiadês had never been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the democracy towards foreign conquest, combined with their imperfect apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their empire could be permanently maintained, which he stimulated up to the highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies of unworthy manœuvres, and even of gross political wickedness, if they were authors or accomplices — as seems probable of some — in the mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadês and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last chapter but one of this History.

If, then, that portion of the speech of Alkibiadês, wherein he

¹ See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 89, *ῥᾶν τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὥς νῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσοῦμενός τις φέρεται*, and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this History, chap. lxii.

touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we follow the following portion in which he professes to describe the poses of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated even by himself and his immediate friends, is probable; that they were contemplated by the Athenians by the armament, or by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The hesitancy and timid movements of the armament — during eight months after arriving at Rhegium — recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadês, oppose the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly when known at Athens, conspire to prove that their motives were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse. They counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they could find; and that those who sailed from Athens with large fleets for a brilliant and easy conquest were soon taught to see things with different eyes. If Alkibiadês had himself come to Athens the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech to Sparta, there can be no doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of Lamachus, or rather would have originated it. We find him, indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens, announcing the determination to sail, holding out hopes that by means of conquests in Sicily, Athens might become mistress of a large empire. But this is there put as an alternative and as a favorability, is noticed only in one place, without expansion or amplification, and shows that the speaker did not reckon upon any such expectations prevalent among his hearers. He could not have ventured to promise, in his discourse, the results which he afterwards talked of at Sparta — had been actually contemplated, — Sicily, Italy, Carthage, mercenaries, etc., all ending in a blockading fleet large enough to gird round Peloponnesus.¹ Had he put forth such pretensions in charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against him, they probably have been believed by every one. His speech, though it has passed with some as a fragment of truth,

¹ Thucyd. vi, 12-17.

history, is in truth little better than a gigantic romance dressed up to alarm his audience.¹

Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out against Athens. But the Peace of Nikias and the alliance succeeding it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly. For this reason — as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians — the ephors could not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the deed that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. His flaming picture of the danger impending, — brought home to their own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all witnesses, — overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadēs to Sparta thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending chiefs of Greece: "*Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.*"² He had not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.

The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring, they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians for operations as speedily as the case admitted.³ We do not know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.

² Lucan, Pharsal. iv, 819.

³ Thucyd. vi, 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii, 7.

of his superior acquaintance with the circumstances (and Sicilian Greeks; since his father Kleandridas, been banished from Sparta fourteen years before the sian war for taking Athenian bribes, had been domi citizen at Thurii.¹ Gylippus desired the Corinthi immediately two triremes for him to Asinê, in the gulf, and to prepare as many others as their docks c

CHAPTER LIX.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SY
NIKIAS, DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDI
DEMOSTHENES, AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GEN

THE Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired were put in motion in the early spring, even before the the reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the des of Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syra recently garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the garrison, and laid waste the neighboring fields, they r landed again for similar purposes at the mouth of Terias, and then, after an insignificant skirmish, Katana. An expedition into the interior of the cured for them the alliance of the Sikel town of Ken the cavalry being now arrived from Athens, they p operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received f two hundred and fifty horsemen fully equipped, for w were to be procured in Sicily,² thirty horse-bowme

¹ Thucyd. vi, 104.

² Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even for into Attica and Central Greece, Sophoklês, *Œd. Kolon.* 312:

γυναιχ' ὄρω
Στείχουσιν ἡμῖν, ὕσσον, Αἰγυαίας ἐπὶ
Πῶλον βεβῶσαν.

If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses wer great size.

hundred talents in money. He was not long in furnishing them with horses from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also received some farther cavalry, so that he was presently able to muster six hundred and fifty cavalry in all.¹

Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side, apprized of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now thought it necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which overhung their outer city.

Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and outer city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original settlement founded by Archias, and within which the modern city is at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting great difficulties of landing, and by a sea-wall; so that on these sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side, beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft now called Santa Bonagiá, or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep, that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower ground, situated between it and the inner city, or Ortygia, seems at this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either, but was employed (and probably had been employed even from the first settlement in the island), partly for religious processions, games, and other multitudinous ceremonies; partly for the burial of the dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its purpose.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 95-98.

To the northwest of the outer city wall, in the direct port called Trogilus, stood an unfortified suburb which became enlarged into the distinct walled town of Tyre of the southern part of the same outer city wall, near west of the outer city itself, stood another suburb, known and fortified as Neapolis, but deriving its name year 415 B.C., from having within it the statue and ground of Apollo Temenitês,¹ which stood a little way ascent of the hill of Epipolæ, and stretching from the southward in the direction of the Great Harbor. Between two suburbs lay a broad open space, the ground rising acclivity from Achradina to the westward, and diminishing breadth as it rose higher, until at length it ended in a conical mound, called in modern times the Belvedere. This acclivity formed the eastern ascent of the long ridge of ground called Epipolæ. It was a triangle upon a plane, of which Achradina was the base: to the north and to the south, it was suddenly broken off by lines of cliff (forming the sides of the triangle), about fifteen feet high, and quite precipitous, except in some few places made for convenient ascent. From the western point of the triangle, the descent was easy and gradual—two or three special mounds, or cliffs—towards the interior of which was visible from this outer slope.

According to the warfare of that time, Nikias, could have surrounded Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off its supplies by land, and at the same time blockading the harbor. Now looking at the inner and outer city as above described, at the moment when he first reached Sicily, we see that he was defeating the Syracusans and driving them within the city, which would be of course the first part of the plan he might have carried his blockading wall in a direction nearly from the innermost point of the cleft of San Giovanni between the city wall and the Temenitês so as to

¹ At the neighboring city of Gela, also, a little without the walls, stood a large brazen statue of Apollo; of so much sanctity, and so much veneration, that the Carthaginians in their invasion of the island, after the siege of Syracuse by Nikias, carried it away with them, and transported it to Tyre (Diodor. xiii, 108).

Great Harbor at a spot not far westward of the junction of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have landed in the Great Harbor, and executed the same wall, beginning from the opposite end. Or he might have preferred to construct two blockading walls, one for each city separately: a short wall would have sufficed in front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a separate wall might have been carried to shut up the outer city, across the unfortified space constituting the Nekropolis, so as to end not in the Great Harbor, but in the coast of the Nekropolis opposite to Ortygia. Such were the possibilities of the case at the time when Nikias first reached Rhegium. But during the many months of inaction which he had allowed, the Syracusans had barred out both these possibilities, and had greatly augmented the difficulties of his intended enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering both their inner and their outer city,—stretching across the whole front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbor to the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia,—and expanding westward so as to include within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês, with the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name of the Temenite Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of lengthening the line indispensable for the besiegers to make their wall a good blockade.¹ After it was finished, Nikias could not begin his blockade from the side of the Great Harbor, since he would have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbor at a point farther removed from Ortygia.

Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of Epipolæ, the necessity so created for carrying on operations much higher up on the slope, gave to the summit of that eminence a greater importance than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless furnished with good local information by the exiles, seems to

¹ Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι, τούτῳ πρὸς τε τῇ πόλει, τὴν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιήσάμενοι, τείχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολᾶς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δὲ ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείσχιστοι ὦσιν, ἣν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.

have made this discovery earlier than the Syracusan generals, who—having been occupied in augmenting their defences on another point, where they were yet more vulnerable—did not make it until immediately before the opening of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that they proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low mead on the left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, and probably final distribution of forces for the approaching struggle, a chosen regiment of six hundred hoplites was placed under the orders of an Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as garrison of Epipolæ, as well as to be in constant readiness wherever they might be wanted.¹ These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the various approaches to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow.

But before they had yet left their muster, to march to the summit, intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already in possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place not far from a place called Leon, or the Lion, which was only six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed their hoplites, and placed their fleet in safety under cover of a palisade across the narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before the Syracusans had any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites immediately moved forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from the northeast, by the side towards Megara and farthest removed from Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called Euryalus, near the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded the slope of Epipolæ beneath them, and the town of Syracuse to the eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracusans, who broke up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But as the road by which they had to march, approaching Euryalus from the southwest, was circuitous, and hardly less than three English miles in length, they had the mortification of seeing that the Athenians were already masters of the position; and when they hastened up to retake it, the rapid pace had so

¹ Thucyd. vi, 96.

disordered their ranks, that the Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss, Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while the Athenians remained masters of the high ground of Euryalus, as well as of the upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.¹

This was a most important advantage; indeed, seemingly essential to the successful prosecution of the siege. It was gained by a plan both well laid and well executed, grounded upon the omission of the Syracusans to occupy a post of which they did not at first perceive the importance, and which in fact only acquired its preëminent importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon a favorable accident which could not have been reasonably expected to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less upon this favorable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of the high ground above Epipolæ. Had they taken this precaution, the effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely difficult, if not completely frustrated.

On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, which the enemy did not accept. They then withdrew the Athenian troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort on the high ground called Labdalum, near the western end of the upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, so as to leave the army unincumbered in its motions. The Athenian cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias descended from Labda-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 97.

lum to a new position called Sykê, lower down on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, a walled inclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward towards the sea at Trogius, southward towards the Great Harbor. This Circle appears to have covered a considerable space, and was farther protected by an outwork in front covering an area of one thousand square feet.¹ Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians executed this construction,² the Syracusans marched their forces out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side in battle order, the Syracusan generals were so struck with their manifest superiority in soldierlike array, as compared with the disorderly trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers back into the city without venturing to engage; merely leaving a body of horse to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain them to keep in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however, were here brought for the first time into effective combat. With the aid of one tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan horse, drove them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This is the only occasion on which we read of the Athenian cavalry being brought into conflict; though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry the great reason for his prolonged inaction.

Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his blockading operations; first completing the Circle,³ then beginning

¹ Thucyd. vi, 97. *ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵνα περ καθεζόμενοι εἰείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους.*

² The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: see some examples, Thucyd. v, 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 18.

³ Dr. Arnold, in his note on Thucyd. vi, 98, says that the Circle is spoken of, in one passage of Thucydides, as if it had *never been completed*. I construe this one passage differently from him (vii, 2, 4) — *τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν θάλασσαν*: where I think *τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου* is equivalent to *ἐτέρῳ τοῦ κύκλου*, as plainly appears from the accompanying mention of Trogius and the northern sea. I am persuaded that the Circle was finished; and Dr. Arnold himself indicates two passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been completed.

his wall of circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle towards Trogilus: for which purpose a portion of his forces were employed in bringing stones and wood, and depositing them in proper places along the intended line. So strongly did Hermokratēs feel the inferiority of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he discouraged any fresh general action, and proposed to construct a counter-wall, or cross-wall, traversing the space along which the Athenian circumvallation must necessarily be continued so as to impede its farther progress. A tenable counter-wall, if they could get time to carry it sufficiently far to a defensible terminus, would completely defeat the intent of the besiegers: but even if Nikias should interrupt the work by his attacks, the Syracusans calculated on being able to provide a sufficient force to repel them, during the short time necessary for hastily constructing the palisade, or front outwork. Such palisade would serve them as a temporary defence, while they finished the more elaborate cross-wall behind it, and would, even at the worst, compel Nikias to suspend all his proceedings and employ his whole force to dislodge them.¹

¹ Thucyd. vi, 99. Ὑποτειχίζειν δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι (τοῖς Συρακουσίοις) ἢ ἐκείνοι (the Athenians) ἐμελλον ἄξιν τὸ τεῖχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλήσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβηθηοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπένειν αὐτοὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ φθάνειν ἂν τοῖς σταυροῖς προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους: ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν πανομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι.

The Scholiast here explains τὰς ἐφόδους to mean τὰ βάσιμα; adding ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ ἐπιβαθῆναι δυνάμενα, διὰ τὸ τελματώδες εἶναι τὸ χώριον. Though he is here followed by the best commentators, I cannot think that his explanation is correct. He evidently supposes that this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was built — as we shall see presently that the second counter-work was — across the marsh, or low ground between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. "The ground being generally marshy (τελματώδες) there were only a few places where it could be crossed." But I conceive this supposition to be erroneous. The first counter-wall of the Syracusans was carried, as it seems to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the Athenian circle and the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan newly-erected advanced wall, inclosing the Temenitēs. This was all hard, firm ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any point: there might perhaps be some roughness here and there, but they would be mere exceptions to the general character of the ground.

It appears to me that τὰς ἐφόδους means simply, "the attacks of the

Accordingly, they took their start from the postern-gate near the grove of Apollo Temenitês; a gate in the new wall, erected four or five months before, to enlarge the fortified space of the city. From this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than the Athenian circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. The nautical population from Ortygia could be employed in this enterprise, since the city was still completely undisturbed by sea, and mistress of the great harbor, the Athenian fleet not having yet moved from Thapsus. Besides this active crowd of workmen, the sacred olive-trees in the Temenite grove were cut down to serve as materials; and by such efforts the work was presently finished to a sufficient distance for traversing and intercepting the blockading wall intended to come southward from the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank; while it was defended in front by a stockade and topped with wooden towers for discharge of missiles. One tribe of hoplites was left to defend it, while the crowd of Syracusans who had either been employed on the work or on guard, returned back to the city.

During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent to interrupt them.¹ Employed as he seems to have been on the Circle, and on the wall branching out from his Circle northward, he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle

Athenians," without intending to denote any special assailable points; *προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους*, means "to get beforehand with the attacks," (see Thucyd. i, 57, v, 30.) This is in fact the more usual meaning of *ἐφόδος* (compare vii, 5; vii, 43; i, 6; v, 35; vi, 63), "attack, approach, visit," etc. There are doubtless other passages in which it means, "the way or road through which the attack was made:" in one of these, however (vii, 51), all the best editors now read *ἐσόδου* instead of *ἐφόδου*.

It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word *ἐφόδοι*: see Dr. Arnold, Memoir on the Map of Syracuse, Appendix to his ed. of Thucyd. vol. iii, p 271.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 100.

only partially guarded. Moreover, by such delay, he was enabled to prosecute his own part of the circumvallation without hindrance, and to watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall with advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time when he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying the aqueducts, which supplied the city, partially at least, with water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with confidence, both by the completion of their counter-wall, which seemed an effective bar to the besiegers, and by his inaction. The tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance: instead of occupying the wall, tents were erected behind it to shelter them from the midday sun; while some even permitted themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls. Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently prepared an assault for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites, with some light troops clothed in panoplies for the occasion, were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to attack the stockade and counter-wall; while the main Athenian force marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus; half towards the city walls, to prevent any succor from coming out of the gates, half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the stockade and the counter-wall, feebly defended by its guards; who, taken by surprise, abandoned their post and fled along behind their wall to enter the city by the Temenite postern-gate. Before all of them could get in, however, both the pursuing three hundred, and the Athenian division which marched straight to that point, had partially come up with them: so that some of these assailants even forced their way along with them through the gate into the interior of the Temenite city wall. Here, however, the Syracusan strength within was too much for them: these foremost Athenians and Argeians were thrust out again with loss. But the general movement of the Athenians had been completely triumphant. They pulled down the counter-wall, plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use of their own circumvallation.

As the recent Syracusan counter-work had been carried to the

brink of the southern cliff, which rendered it unusable as a flank, Nikias was warned of the necessity of becoming master of this cliff, so as to deprive them of this resource. Accordingly, without staying to finish his blockading wall, he left the Circle southward, across Epipolæ, he left the Circle under a guard, and marched at once to take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the blockading wall was intended to reach it. This possession of the southern cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive work, whereby he accomplished two objects. First, he prevented the Syracusans from again employing the cliff as a flank, and he built a second counter-wall.¹ Next, he acquired the means of forming a safe and easy road of communication between the high ground of Epipolæ and the low marshy ground beneath the divided Epipolæ from the Great Harbor, and across the Athenian wall of circumvallation must necessarily be

¹ Thucyd. vi, 101. Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχισαν οἱ ναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔλους, ὃς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτης ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν λιμένων θρα, καὶ ἥπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγένετο καταβάσι διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἔλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα.

I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου, which are not clear, and have been variously construed. Gœller, in his first edition, had construed them as ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as if the fortification now begun was continuous and in actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition, he seems to relinquish this opinion, and to translate them ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου, as if the fortification now begun was continuous with the Circle, which he believes not to have been thus construed, the words would imply, "starting from the Circle as a point of operations." Agreeing with Dr. Arnold in his conception of the words, I incline, in construing the words, to proceed upon the same principle as in two or three passages in Thucyd. i, 7; i, 46; i, 99; vi, 64 — πόλεις διὰ τὴν ληστείαν ἐπιπολὶ ἀντισχοῦσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης, ὡς ἐκείνησαν. . . . Ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιΐτιδι τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος, Ἐφύρη. In this passage ἀπὸ is used in the same sense as we find ἀποθεν, iv, 125, sig- nifying "from, at some distance from;" but not implying any accompanying motion, or proceeding from, either literal or metaphorical.

"The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from the cliff above the marsh," etc.

carried. As his troops would have to carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above, partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent ready mutual assistance. The intermediate space between the Circle and the fortified point of the cliff, was for the time left with an unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to it, as was in fact afterwards done, and this portion of wall was in the end completed. The Circle though isolated, was strong enough for the time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately garrisoned.

By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying a second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh between the southern cliff of the Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still at Thapsus. Across that marsh — and seemingly as far as the river Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier — they resolved to carry a palisade work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their circumvallation. They so pressed the prosecution of this new cross palisade, beginning from the lower portion of their own city walls, and stretching in a southwesterly direction across the low ground as far as the river Anapus, that, by the time the new Athenian fortification on the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle was completed also, and a stockade with a ditch seemed to shut out the besiegers from reaching the Great Harbor.

Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and bravery. Descending unexpectedly, one morning before day-break, from his fort on the cliff of Epipolæ into the low ground beneath, — and providing his troops with planks and broad gates to bridge over the marsh where it was scarcely passable, — he contrived to reach and surprise the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were at the same time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbor, so as to divert the attention of the enemy, and get on the rear of the new palisade work. But before the fleet could arrive, the

palisade and ditch had been carried, and its defenders driven off. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to sustain them, and retake it, so that a general action now ensued, in the low ground between the cliff of Epipolæ, the harbor, and the river Anapus. The superior discipline of the Athenians proved successful: the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge. Flushed with victory, the Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen body of three hundred hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into disorder, so that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, put them to flight, and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus, who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardor carried him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch with very few followers, before the remaining troops could follow him. He was here attacked and slain,¹ in single combat with a horseman named Kalikratês: but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers came up, and had only just time to snatch and carry off his dead body, with which they crossed the bridge and retreated behind the Anapus. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right wing: a victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.²

Meanwhile the visible disorder and temporary flight of the Athenian right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left to reinforce it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, which had fled into the town. They again came forth to renew the contest; while their generals attempted a diversion by sending out a detachment from the northwestern gates of the city to attack the Athenian circle on the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this

¹ Thucyd. vi, 102; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus erroneously places the battle, in which Lamachus was slain, *after* the arrival of Gylippus (xiii, 8).

² Thucyd. vi, 102

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Circle lay completely apart and at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to find the garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by surprise. Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of succeeding. They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork in front, and the Circle itself, probably stripped of part of its garrison to reinforce the combatants in the lower ground, was only saved by the presence of mind and resource of Nikias, who was lying ill within it. He directed the attendants immediately to set fire to a quantity of wood which lay, together with the battering engines of the army, in front of the circle-wall, so that the flames prevented all farther advance on the part of the assailants, and forced them to retreat. The same flames also served as a signal to the Athenians engaged in the battle beneath, who immediately sent reinforcements to the relief of their general; while at the same time the Athenian fleet, just arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great Harbor. This last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, drew off their whole attention to the defence of their city, so that both their combatants from the field and their detachment from the Circle were brought back within the walls.¹

Had the recent attempt on the Circle succeeded, carrying with it the death or capture of Nikias, and combined with the death of Lamachus in the field on that same day, it would have greatly brightened the prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have arrested the farther progress of the siege, from the want of an authorized commander. But in spite of such imminent hazard, the actual result of the day left the Athenians completely victorious, and the Syracusans more discouraged than ever. What materially contributed to their discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbor, wherein it was henceforward permanently established, in coöperation with the army in a station near the left bank of the Anapus.

Both the army and the fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ,

¹ Thucyd. vi, 102.

and stretching across the lower marshy ground to the Harbor. The distance between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an English mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, at suitable intervals, inclosing a space of considerable breadth, doubtless not only in part, since it served afterwards, with the help of the citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence for the whole army. The Syracusans could not interrupt this project, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the middle of the Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put into condition to defy a second surprise.

But not only were they thus compelled to look on as hindering the blockading wall towards the Harbor. It was for the first time, that they began to taste the real restrictions and privations of a siege.¹ Down to this moment, their communications with the Anapus and the country beyond, as well as the sides of the Great Harbor, had been open and unimpeded; whereas now, the arrival of the Athenian fleet, and the position of the Athenian army, had cut them off from both. Little or no fresh supplies of provision could reach them, without the hazard of capture from the hostile ships. On the sides of the Epipolæ, where the northern cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable passages of ascent, they had before been cut off by the Athenian army and fleet; and a portion of the wall, which even now to have been left at Thapsus: so that not much remained open, except a portion, especially the northern part, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this outlet the besieged made use for their numerous cavalry, doubtless availed themselves of for the purpose of excursions and of bringing in supplies. These routes, both longer and more circuitous for such purposes than the direct road near the Great Harbor and the Helôrine road: more

¹ Thucyd. vi, 103. *ολα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ πολιορκουμένων*, etc.

² Diodorus, however, is wrong in stating (xiii, 7) that the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the *polichne* surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These places were always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the whole of the siege (vii, 4, 37).

to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryálus, and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately for himself and his army, he omitted this easy but capital precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be approaching.

In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the blockading line, they soon desist from this and turn their attention to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans carried their two first counter-works. In attacking the second counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from Thapsus into the Great Harbor, with a view to its coöperation. After clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbor, should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther reason, that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to the last, and was found open, at least the greater part of it, by Gylippus.

While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the prospects of the Athenians were better than ever, promising certain and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating through the neighboring cities all represented them as in the full tide of success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonteres also arrived from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover, abundant supplies were furnished from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation, a necessity which was openly and abundantly canvassed

within the city itself. The ill-success of Hermokratês colleagues had caused them to be recently displaced from functions as generals, to which Herakleidês, Euklês, and were appointed. But this change did not give them cause to hazard a fresh battle, while the temper of the city, during period of forced inaction, was melancholy in the extreme. several propositions for surrender, perhaps unofficial, yet sincerely sincere, were made to Nikias, nothing definitive was agreed upon as to the terms.¹ Had the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present distress would have excited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could have counted with advantage; but the democratical character of the government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.

We must take particular note of these propositions in order to understand the conduct of Nikias during the present interval. He had been from the beginning in secret communication with a party in Syracuse;² who, though neither numerous nor powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more and more influential than ever they had been before. To them he received constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the point of surrendering, and could not hold out. And as the tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such an impression in his mind, so he allowed himself to be betrayed into a fatal languor and security, and a farther prosecution of the besieging operations. The consequences of the death of Lamachus now became manifest. From the time of the departure from Katana down to the time in which that gallant officer perished,—a period seen to last about three months, from about March to June 414,—the operations of the siege had been conducted with great as well as unremitting perseverance, and the building-works, especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Greeks with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this vigorous march disappears and is exchanged for inactivity and apathy. The wall across the low ground near

¹ Thucyd. vi, 103. *πάλιν ἐλέγετο πρὸς τε ἐκείνους καὶ πλείους πόλιν.*

² Thucyd. vii, 56.

³ Thucyd.

might have been expected to proceed more rapidly, because the Athenian position generally was much stronger, the chance of opposition from the Syracusans was much lessened, and the fleet had been brought into the Great Harbor to coöperate. Yet in fact it seems to have proceeded more slowly; Nikias builds it at first as a double wall, though it would have been practicable to complete the whole line of blockade with a single wall before the arrival of Gylippus, and afterwards, if necessary, to have doubled it either wholly or partially, instead of employing so much time in completing this one portion that Gylippus arrived before it was finished, scarcely less than two months after the death of Lamachus. Both the besiegers and their commander now seem to consider success as certain, without any chance of effective interruption from within, still less from without; so that they may take their time over the work, without caring whether the ultimate consummation comes a month sooner or later.

Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops, Nikias could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations, had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto, we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which possibly could happen. But a great part of what passes for caution in his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament, aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal complaint. If he wasted in indolence the first six months after his arrival in Sicily, and turned to inadequate account the present two months of triumphant position before Syracuse, both these mistakes arose from the same cause; from reluctance to act except under the pressure and stimulus of some obvious necessity. Accordingly, he was always behindhand with events; but when necessity became terrible, so as to subdue the energies of other men, then did he come forward and display unwonted vigor, as we shall see in the following chapter. But now, relieved from all urgency of apparent danger, and misled by the delusive hopes held out through his correspondence in the town, combined with the atmosphere of success which exhilarated his own armament, Nikias fancied the surrender of Syracuse inevitable, and became, for one brief moment preceding his calamitous end, not merely

sanguine, but even careless and presumptuous in the e
Nothing short of this presumption could have let in his c
ing enemy, Gylippus.¹

That officer — named by the Lacedæmonians comman
Sicily, at the winter-meeting which Alkibiadēs had ad
at Sparta — had employed himself in getting together fo
the purpose of the expedition. But the Lacedæmonians,
so far stimulated by the representations of the Athenian
to promise aid, were not forward to perform the promise.
the Corinthians, decidedly the most hearty of all in be
Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in the month of June, G
was still at Leukas, with his armament not quite ready
To embark in a squadron for Sicily, against the numer
excellent Athenian fleet now acting there, was a ser
tempting to any one, and demanding both personal dar
devotion. Moreover, every vessel from Sicily, between
and June 414 B.C., brought intelligence of progressive suc
the part of Nikias and Lamachus, thus rendering the p
of Corinthian auxiliaries still more discouraging.

At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of th
of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of it
tant consequences in forwarding the operations of the b
Great as those consequences were, they were still farthe
gerated by report. It was confidently affirmed, by m
after messenger, that the wall of circumvallation had be
pleted, and that Syracuse was now invested on all sides.
Gylippus and the Corinthians were so far misled as to
this to be the fact, and despaired, in consequence, of be
to render any effective aid against the Athenians in Sici
as there still remained hopes of being able to preserve th
cities in Italy, Gylippus thought it important to pass ove
at once with his own little squadron of four sail, two

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

² Thucyd. vi, 104. *ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγέλαι ἐφοίτων δεινὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφρευμέναι, ὥς ἤδη παντελῶς ὑποτετειχισμένοι αἱ Συράκουσαι ἐν Συκελίας οὐκ ἐτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίας ἀνὰ Σικελίας περιποιῆσαι, etc.* Compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

It will be seen from Thucydides, that Gylippus heard this nev
was yet at Leukas.

monians and two Corinthians, and the Corinthian captain Pythên; leaving the Corinthian main squadron to follow as soon as it was ready. Intending then to act only in Italy, Gylippus did not fear falling in with the Athenian fleet. He first sailed to Tarentum, friendly and warm in his cause. From hence he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, exiled from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying to profit by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, and finding nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward, until he came opposite to the Terinaean gulf near the southeastern cape of Italy. Here a violent gust of wind off the land overtook him, exposed his vessels to the greatest dangers, and drove him out to sea, until at length, standing in a northerly direction, he was fortunate enough to find shelter again at Tarentum.¹ But

¹ Thucyd. vi, 104. Ἄρας (Γύλιππος) παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ ἀρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τερριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ μέγας, κατὰ βορέαν ἑστηκὼς ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα Τάραντι προσμίσγει.

Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ βορέαν ἑστηκὼς as if they agreed with ὃς ἢ ἀνέμος, I cannot but think that these words really agree with Γύλιππος. Gylippus is overtaken by this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing southward along the eastern shore of what is now called Calabria Ultra: "setting his ship towards the north or *standing to the north* (to use the English nautical phrase), he is carried out to sea, from whence, after great difficulties, he again gets into Tarentum." If Gylippus was carried out to sea when in this position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he would naturally lay his course northward. What is meant by the words κατὰ βορέαν ἑστηκὼς, as applied to the wind, I confess I do not understand; nor do the critics throw much light upon it. Whenever a point of the compass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it always seems to mean the point *from whence* the wind blows. Now, that κατὰ βορέαν ἑστηκὼς, means "a wind which blows steadily from the north," as the commentators affirm, I cannot believe without better authority than they produce. Moreover, Gylippus could never have laid his course for Tarentum, if there had been a strong wind in this direction; while such a wind would have forwarded him to Lokri, the very place whither he wanted to go. The mention of the Terinaean gulf is certainly embarrassing. If the words are right (which perhaps may be doubted), the explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the best which can be offered. Perhaps, indeed, — for though improbable, this is not wholly impossible, — Thucydides may himself have committed a geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinaean gulf to be on the east side of Calabria.

such was the damage which his ships had sustained was forced to remain here while they were hauled as refitted.¹

So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether farther progress. For the Thurians had sent intimating visit as well as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias; treating with contempt the idea of four triremes to attack the powerful Athenian fleet. In the present phase of his character, Nikias sympathized with the tenor of the message, and overlooked the gravity of what was announced. He despised Gylippus as a mere privateer, and would he even take the precaution of sending four of his numerous fleet to watch and intercept the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships at Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learned, to his great astonishment, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior, by the Euryalus and the heights of Epipolæ. He then deliberated whether he should take the chance of running his ships into the harbor of Syracuse, despite the watch of the Athenian fleet, or whether he should sail through the strait of Himera at the north of Sicily, and from thence leave his fleet to cross the island and relieve Syracuse by land, he resolved on the latter course, and passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether unguarded. After touching both at Rhegium and Messênê, he arrived safely at Himera. Even at Himera there was no Athenian naval force; though Nikias had sent thither four Athenian triremes, after he had been informed that Gylippus had reached Lokri, rather from excess of caution, than because he thought it necessary. But this squadron reached Rhegium too late: Gylippus had already passed the strait; and fortune, smiting his enemy with a sudden blow, landed him unopposed on the fatal soil of Sicily.

The blindness of Nikias would indeed appear unaccountable were it not that we shall have worse yet to recount. I will relate his misjudgment fully, and to be sensible that

¹ Thucyd. vi, 104.

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making him responsible for results which could not have been foreseen, we have only to turn back to what had been said six months before by the exile Alkibiadês at Sparta: "Send forthwith an army to Sicily (he exhorted the Lacedæmonians); but *send at the same time, what will be yet more valuable than an army, a Spartan to take the supreme command.*" It was in fulfilment of this recommendation, the wisdom of which will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And had he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of his presence, carrying the great name of Sparta, and full assurance of Spartan intervention to come, not to mention his great personal ability, would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged. Yet Nikias — having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his reaching the island — disdains even this most easy precaution, and neglects him as a freebooter of no significance. Such neglect too is the more surprising, since the well-known philo-Laconian tendencies of Nikias would have led us to expect, that he would overvalue rather than undervalue the imposing ascendancy of the Spartan name.

Gylippus, on arriving at Himera, as commander named by Sparta, and announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met with a hearty welcome. The Himereans agreed to aid him with a body of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels. On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of the Sikel tribes in the interior, he received equally favorable assurances; so that he was enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force. The interest of Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince Archonidês, a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain more of their aid, and facilitated his march across the island. He was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse at the head of seven hundred hoplites from his own vessels, seamen and epibataë taken together; one thousand hoplites and light troops, with one hundred horse, from Himera, some horse and light troops from Selinus and Gela, and one thousand Sikels.¹ With

¹ Thucyd. vii, 1.

these forces, some of whom joined him on the march, Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ above Syracuse, and capturing the Sikel fort of Ietæ in his way, experiencing any other opposition.

His arrival was all but too late, and might have been too late, had not the Corinthian admiral Goggylus given chase a little before him. The Corinthian fleet of twelve under Erasinidês — having started from Leukas late in the day, but as soon as it was ready — was now on the coast of Syracuse. But Goggylus had been detained at Leukas by an accident, so that he did not depart until after all the others. When he reached Syracuse the soonest; probably striking a direct course across the sea, and favored by weather. He entered into the harbor of Syracuse, escaping the Athenian fleet whose watch doubtless partook of the general negligence in besieging operations.¹

The arrival of Goggylus at that moment was an unspeakable moment, and was in fact nothing less than the salvation of the city. Among all the causes of despondency in the Syracusan mind, there was none more powerful than the fact that they had not as yet heard of any relief, or of any active intervention in their favor, from Plata. Their discouragement increasing from day to day, and the change of propositions with Nikias becoming more and more matters had at last so ripened that a public assembly was about to be held to sanction a definitive capitulation. At this critical juncture that Goggylus arrived, appearing before Gylippus reached Himera. He was the first to announce that both the Corinthian fleet and a Spartan commander were now actually on their voyage, and might be expected to bring intelligence which filled the Syracusans with confidence and with renewed courage. They instantly threw aside the idea of capitulation, and resolved to hold out to the last.

It was not long before they received intimation that the fleet had reached Himera, which Goggylus at his arrival had announced, and was raising an army to march across for

¹ Thucyd. vii, 2-7

² Thucyd. vi, 103 vii, 2. Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

After the interval necessary for his preparations and for his march, probably not less than between a fortnight and three weeks, they learned that he was approaching Syracuse by the way of Euryálus and Epipolæ. He was presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryálus; the same way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring, when they commenced the siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ, the whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and accompany him into the city.¹

Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on the part of Nikias. After this instant, the besiegers pass from incontestable superiority in the field, and apparent certainty of prospective capture of the city, to a state of inferiority, not only excluding all hope of capture, but even sinking, step by step, into absolute ruin. Yet Nikias had remained with his eyes shut and his hands tied, not making the least effort to obstruct so fatal a consummation. After having despised Gylippus, in his voyage along the coast of Italy, as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises him not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was taken unawares, as he really appears to have been,² the fault was altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well known to him beforehand. He must have learned from the four ships which he sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in passing through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore have been well aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of Syracuse by an army from the interior; and his correspondence among the Sikel tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment going on at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached that place without either troops or arms; that he had to obtain forces not merely from Himera, but also from

¹ Thucyd. vii, 2.

² Thucyd. vii, 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλφειοδίωξ τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων, etc.

Selinus and Gela, as well as to sound the Sikel town them friendly; lastly, that he had to march all across partly through hostile territory, it is impossible to interval than a fortnight or three weeks between his Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther, Nikias learned, through his intelligence in the interior of Sy important revolution which had taken place in Syracu through the arrival of Goggylus, even before the Gylippus in Sicily was known. He was apprized, moment, that he had to take measures, not only again obstinate hostility within the town, but against a fre enemy without. Lastly, that enemy had first to marc Sicily, during which march he might have been emba perhaps defeated,¹ and could then approach Syrac one road, over the high ground of Euryâlus in th rear, through passes few in number, easy to defen Nikias had himself first approached, and through wh only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias passes unoccupied and undefended; he takes not a precaution; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it a broad and free plain.

If we are amazed at the insolent carelessness Nikias disdained the commonest precautions for r foreknown approach, by sea, of an enemy formidable handed, what are we to say of that unaccountable blir led him to neglect the same enemy when coming at t relieving army; and to omit the most obvious mean in a crisis upon which his future fate turned? Homer designated such neglect as a temporary delirium inf fearful inspiration of Atê: the historian has no such name to give, and can only note it as a sad and suit to the calamities too nearly at hand.

At the moment when the fortunate Spartan auxili

¹ Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii, : nians, at a moment when they had become much weaker now, had influence enough among the Sikel tribes to raise o march of a corps coming from the interior to the help of f auxiliary corps was defeated and nearly destroyed in its m

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allowed to march quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of circumvallation, between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, eight stadia long, was all but completed: a few yards only of the end close to the harbor were wanting. But Gylippus cared not to interrupt its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew, what Nikias, unhappily, never felt and never lived to learn, the immense advantage of turning to active account that first impression and full tide of confidence which his arrival had just infused into the Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them, when he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and marched up to the lines of the Athenians. Amazed as they were, and struck dumb by his unexpected arrival, they too formed in battle order, and awaited his approach. His first proceeding marked how much the odds of the game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five days' armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects and withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply to this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much *he* felt, as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he might have a better field for his cavalry, Nikias declined to follow him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications.¹ This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field. It was a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse, a tacit admission that the Athenians could hope for nothing better in the end than the humiliating offer which the herald had just made to them. So it seems to have been felt by both parties; for from this time forward, the Syracusans become and continue aggressors, the Athenians remaining always on the defensive, except for one brief instant after the arrival of Demosthenês.

After drawing off his troops and keeping them encamped for that night on the Temenite cliff, seemingly within the added fortified inclosure of Syracuse, Gylippus brought them out *again* the next morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian

¹ Thucyd. vii, 3.

lines, as if about to attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus engaged, he sent a detachment to surprise the fort of Labdalum, which was not within view of their lines. The enterprise was completely successful. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword; while the Syracusans gained another unexpected advantage during the day, by the capture of one of the Athenian triremes which was watching their harbor. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by immediately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from the outer city wall in a northwesterly direction aslant up the slope of Epipolæ; so as to traverse the intended line of the Athenian circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render blockade impossible. He availed himself, for this purpose, of stones laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall, between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, which was now just finished, so as to leave their troops disposable for action on the higher ground. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire. This part of the wall was now heightened, and the Athenians took charge of it themselves, distributing their allies along the remainder.¹

These attacks, however, appear to have been chiefly intended as diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the Syracusans in the field, unless he chose to relinquish all hope of ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And, indeed, he seems actually to have relinquished such hope, even thus early after he had seemed certain master of the city. For he now undertook a measure altogether new; highly important in itself, but indicating an altered scheme of policy. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium, — the rocky promontory which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the Great Harbor, immediately south of the point of Ortygia, — and to make it a secure main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had been hitherto

¹ Thucyd. vii, 4.

stationed in close neighborhood of the land-force, in a fortified position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. From such a station in the interior of the harbor, it was difficult for the Athenian triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them, of watching the two ports of Syracuse—one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia to the mainland—so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or ingress of ships from without, and of insuring the unobstructed admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to the side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution of the blockade had become impossible.¹

Three forts, one of considerable size and two subsidiary, were erected on the sea-board of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station for triremes as well as for ships of burden. Though the situation was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also serious disadvantages; being destitute of any spring of water, such as the memorable fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island of Ortygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the crews of the ships had to range a considerable distance, exposed to surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship's crew. As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves and the numerous foreigners who served in their navy became disposed to steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection

¹ Thucyd. vii, 4.

in which it had set sail fifteen months before, from the Peiræus.

The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, withdrawing the Athenian forces, left Gylippus unopposed in his prosecution of his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened by the manifest decline of hope which it implied. Deimachos brought out his Syracusans in battle-array, planting them in the Athenian lines; but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he took advantage of what he considered a favorable opportunity to make the attack himself; but he was so hemmed in by various walls — the Athenian front on one side, the Syracusan front or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now in course of construction on the third — that his cavalry and darters had no space to operate. Finally, the Syracusan hoplites, having to fight without auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back with loss, the Goggylus being among the slain.¹ On the next day Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this defeat upon himself. It was all owing to his mistake, he publicly confessed; he had made choice of a confined space wherein neither his cavalry nor darters could avail. He would presently give them a better opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to rely on their inbred superiority, as Dorians and Peloponnesians, against these Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly, after no long time, he again brought them to battle; taking care, however, to keep in the open space, and to confine the extremity of the walls and fortifications.

On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the combat, but he did not go out into the open space to meet him. He probably was discouraged by the result of the recent action; but there was another and more pressing motive. The counter-wall on which the Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of completing the Athenian line of circumvallation, so that it was impossible for Nikias to attack without delay, unless he formed some farther hope of successful siege. Nor could he, in spite of altered fortune, irrevocably shut them out from such hope, without one struggle more. Bo-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

therefore ranged in battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope of Epipolæ; Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the action between the hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigor, that they completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed so far as to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong enough to storm and carry the new-built wall.¹

Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes, under Erasinidês, which Nikias had vainly endeavored to intercept. He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the new-comers had had the good luck to avoid them.

Erasinidês and his division lent their hands to the execution of a work which completed the scheme of defence for the city. Gylippus took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from the high ground of Euryalus; a step which Hermokratês had not thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a new fort on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence; a long

¹ Thucyd. vii, 5, 6.

single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built high ground of Epipolæ, at the other extremity, a wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended whole length, by the permanent detachments occupying several fortified positions or encampments. Just ment of these positions was occupied by native Syracusans by Sicilian Greeks; a third, by other allies. So improved and systematic scheme of defence which Thucydippus first projected, and which he brought to the present moment: a scheme, the full value of which was appreciated when we come to describe the proceedings of the second Athenian armament under Demosthenês.

Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed safety to infuse into them projects of retaliation against the Athenians, who had brought them so near to ruin. They began to build ships in the harbor, and to put their seamen under the hopes of qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own element; while Gylippus himself went from city to city to visit the various cities of the island, and to solicit farther reinforcements, naval as well as military. He also foreseen that Nikias on his part would probably demand of Athens, envoys, Syracusan as well as Corinthian, were sent to Peloponnesus, to urge the necessity of forwarding troops, even in merchant vessels, if no triremes could be found to convey them.² Should no reinforcements reach

¹ Thucyd. vii, 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἱ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες ὅντων καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐπέπλευσαν αἱ ἐπόλοιποι δώδεκα (ἤρχε δὲ ὁ δὴς Κορινθίος), καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακούσιν ἐν μέτρῳ τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους.

These words of Thucydides are very obscure, and have been explained by different commentators in different ways. The explanation here given does not, so far as I know, coincide with any of the others. I am inclined to think that it is the most plausible, and the only one. Compare the Memoir of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (vol. iii, p. 273), and the notes of Poppe and Gôller. Dr. Arnold is so little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested to him, that he thinks some words must have dropped out.

² Thucyd. vii, 7.

camp, the Syracusans well knew that its efficiency must diminish by every month's delay, while their own strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with their increased prospects of success.

If this double conviction was present to sustain the ardor of the Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp, now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement except through their ships and their command of the sea. Nikias saw that if Gylippus should return with any considerable additional force, even the attack upon him by land would become too powerful to resist, besides the increasing disorganization of his fleet. He became fully convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin. As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that his position in the harbor had become useless as well as dangerous, and that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenés would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias, who was afraid, moreover, of the blame which it would bring down upon him at home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either reinforcements or instructions to return.

It was now, indeed, the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could not even hope for an answer before midwinter, nor for reinforcements, if such were to be sent, until the ensuing spring was far advanced. Nevertheless, he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to vigilant precautions for safety during the interval, precautions which, as the result will show, were within a hair's breadth of proving insufficient. But as it was of the last importance to him to make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his position, he resolved to transmit a written despatch; not trusting to the oral statement of a messenger, who might be wanting either in courage, in presence of mind, or in competent expression, to impress the full and sad truth upon a reluctant audience.¹ Accordingly he sent home a despatch, which

¹ Thucyd. vii, 8

seems to have reached Athens about the end of No-
was read formally in the public assembly by the sec-
city. Preserved by Thucydides verbatim, it stands
most interesting remnants of antiquity, and well deserv-
translation.

"Our previous proceedings have been already made
you, Athenians, in many other despatches;¹ but
crisis is such as to require your deliberation more
when you shall have heard the situation in which
After we had overcome in many engagements the
against whom we were sent, and had built the fort
which we now occupy, there came upon us the Lacedæ-
monians, with an army partly Peloponnesian, partly
Him too we defeated, in the first action; but in the
we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry and darters
to retire within our lines. And thus the superior numbers
of our enemies has compelled us to suspend our circum-
vallation; remain inactive; indeed, we cannot employ in the
full force which we possess, since a portion of our
troops are necessarily required for the protection of our walls.
The enemy have carried out a single intersecting
line beyond our line of circumvallation, so that we can-
not continue the latter to completion, unless we have force

¹ Thucyd. vii, 9. *ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς*. The
word *ἐπιστολαῖς*, which I use to translate *ἐπιστολαῖς*, is not inapplicable to oral
written messages, and thus retains the ambiguity involved
for *ἐπιστολαῖς*, though usually implying, does not necessarily
communications.

The words of Thucydides (vii, 8) may certainly be construed
Nicias had never on any previous occasion sent a written
message to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands them, though
hesitation (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvi, vol. iii, p. 418). At the same time
they are reconcilable with the supposition that Nicias may
have sent written despatches, though much shorter than the
details and particulars to be supplied by the officer who carried
them.

Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr.
Thirlwall stands: "Nicias had used the precaution of frequently send-
ing in writing, with an exact account of every transaction."
(vol. iv, p. 100.)

Certainly, the statement of Thucydides does not imply

attack and storm their counter-wall. And things have come to such a pass, that we, who profess to besiege others, are ourselves rather the party besieged, by land at least, since the cavalry leave us scarce any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy have sent envoys to Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while Gylippus in person is going round the Sicilian cities, trying to stir up to action such of them as are now neutral, and to get, from the rest, additional naval and military supplies. For it is their determination, as I understand, not merely to assail our lines on shore with their land-force, but also to attack us by sea with their ships.

“Be not shocked when I tell you, that they intend to become aggressors even at sea. They know well, that our fleet was at first in high condition, with dry ships¹ and excellent crews; but now the ships have rotted, from remaining too long at sea, and the crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships ashore to refit, since the enemy’s fleet, equal or superior in numbers, always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in constant practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. Moreover, they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can; for they are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others; while to us, who are obliged to retain all our fleet on guard, nothing less than prodigious superiority of number could insure the like facility. And were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no longer be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with difficulty close under their walls.

“Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away from various causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves, desert, now that our superiority is gone, and that we have come to equal chances with our enemy; while the foreigners whom we pressed into our service, make off straight to some of the neighboring cities; and those who came, tempted by high

¹ It seems, that in Greek ship-building, moist and unseasoned wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into the proper shape (Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.* v, 7, 4).

pay, under the idea of enriching themselves by tr than of fighting, now that they find the enemy in full to cope with us by sea as well as by land, either go as professed deserters, or get away as they can amid area of Sicily.¹ Nay, there are even some, who, while

¹ Thucyd. vii, 13. Καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματίζεισθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ δὲ παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἀπομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται ἢ Σικελία.

All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of the *ἀπομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται*: but I cannot think that any is successful. There are even some who despair of success and wish to change *ἀπομολίας* by conjecture; see the citations in the note.

But surely the literal sense of the words is here both clear and instructive: "Some of them depart under pretence (or professing) to be deserters to the enemy." All the commentators reject this because they say, it is absurd to talk of a man's announcing that he intends to desert to the enemy, and giving that as a reason for quitting the camp. Such is not, in my judgment, the meaning of *προφάσει* here. It does not denote what a man said *before* he departed from the Athenian camp, he would of course say nothing of his intentions; but the color which he would put upon his conduct *after* he had passed the Syracusan lines. He would present himself to them as a deserter, and as a cause; he would profess anxiety to take part in the defence of Syracuse, pretend to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion over Sicily, recollected, that all or most of these deserters were men who had been subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over to the Syracusans would naturally recommend themselves by making professions of friendship, even though they did not really feel any such thing; the reason was, that the Athenian service had now become irksome, and dangerous; and the easiest manner of getting away from it was to pass over as a deserter to Syracuse.

Nikias distinguishes these men from others, "who got away from Syracuse, could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily." They would of course keep their intention of departing secret, until they had got away into some Sicilian town; but when once there, they would make a profession of any feeling which they did not entertain. If they were asked anything, they would tell the plain truth, that they were making their escape from a position which now gave them more trouble than profit.

It appears to me that the words *ἐπ' ἀπομολίας προφάσει* are used in this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of Nikias.

here on their own account, bribe the trierarchs to accept Hykkarian slaves as substitutes, and thus destroy the strict discipline of our marine. And you know as well as I, that no crew ever continues long in perfect condition, and that the first class of seamen, who set the ship in motion, and maintain the uniformity of the oar-stroke, is but a small fraction of the whole number.

"Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of your tempers to govern, nor can I provide supplementary recruits elsewhere, as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him. We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxos and Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength. And if our enemy gain but one farther point,—if the Italian cities, from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us, under the impression of our present bad condition, with no reinforcement arriving from you,—we shall be starved out, and he will bring the war to triumphant close, even without a battle.

"Pleasanter news than these I could easily have found to send you; but assuredly nothing so useful, seeing that the full knowledge of the state of affairs here is essential to your deliberations. Moreover, I thought it even the safer policy to tell you the truth without disguise, understanding as I do your real dispositions, that you never listen willingly to any but the most favorable assurances, yet are angry in the end if they turn to unfavorable results. Be thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have not even strength to contend

Even before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian envoy at Sparta affirms that the Athenians cannot depend upon their seamen standing true to them, since their navy was manned with hired foreign seamen rather than with natives—*ὡνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία* (Thucyd. i, 121). The statement of Nikias proves that this remark was to a great extent well founded.

against our present difficulties. You must either come home, or you must send us a second army, land-force and naval, not inferior to that which is now here, together with considerable supply of money. You must farther send me to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from stones in the kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this in your hands, for while my health lasted I did you good service in various military commands. But whatever you do it at the first opening of spring, without any delay, new succors which the enemy is getting together in Sicily soon be here, and those which are to come from Peloponnese though they will be longer in arriving, yet, if you do not watch, will either elude or forestall you as they have already done."¹

Such was the memorable despatch of Nikias, which he brought to the public assembly of Athens about the end of or beginning of December, 414 B.C., brought by him and strengthened its effect by their own oral communication. He answered all such inquiries as were put to them.² It is much to be regretted that Thucydides does not give us the details of the debate which so gloomy a revelation called forth. He tells us merely the result: the Athenians resolved to send for the second portion of the alternative put by Nikias, not to send for the present armament home, but to reinforce it with a second powerful armament, both of land and naval force, for the execution of the same objects. But they declined his offer of request, and insisted on continuing him in command. They gave the vote, however, to name Menander and Euthydemos, already in the army before Syracuse, joint commanders with him, in order to assist him in his laborious duty. They sent Eurymedon speedily, about the winter solstice, with a fleet of ten triremes to Syracuse, carrying one hundred talents of silver, together with assurances of coming to the relief of the suffering army. And they resolved to equip a new and more formidable force, under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, to be sent as reinforcement in the earliest months of the spring.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 11-15.

² Th

was directed to employ himself actively in getting this larger force ready.¹

This letter of Nikias — so authentic, so full of matter, and so characteristic of the manners of the time — suggests several serious reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people. As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament, and treating the fact as notorious that even the best naval force could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time, what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily, before commencing the siege of Syracuse? When he announces that the arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something bordering on ruin, the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether he had done his best to anticipate, and what precautions he had himself taken to prevent, the coming of the Spartan general. To which the answer must be, that, so far from anticipating the arrival of new enemies as a possible danger, he had almost invited them from abroad by his delay, and that he had taken no precautions at all against them, though forewarned and having sufficient means at his disposal. The desertion and demoralization of his naval force, doubtless but too real, was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence of this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement of that unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery, numbered among his difficulties. For it would be in-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 16. There is here a doubt as to the reading, between one hundred and twenty talents, or twenty talents.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and other commentators in thinking that the money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger sum of the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to deserve the preference. Besides, Diodorus states that Eurymedon took out with him one hundred and forty talents: his authority, indeed, does not count for much, but it counts for something, in coincidence with a certain force of intrinsic probability (Diodor. xiii, 8).

On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum, such as twenty talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the armament.

justice to this unfortunate army not to recognize th acquiesced patiently in prolonged inaction, because th directed it, and next did their duty most gallantly in tions of the siege, down to the death of Lamachus.

If even with our imperfect knowledge of the ca complained of by Nikias be distinctly traceable t remissness and oversight, much more must this conv been felt by intelligent Athenians, both in the camp city, as we shall see by the conduct of Demosthenês¹ be related. Let us conceive the series of despatches Nikias himself alludes, as having been transmitted their commencement. We must recollect that the was originally sent from Athens with hopes of the n character, and with a consciousness of extraordinary to be rewarded with commensurate triumphs. For s the despatches of the general disclose nothing but either abortive or inglorious; adorned, indeed, by victory, but accompanied by an intimation that he m the spring, and that reinforcements must be sent to he can undertake the really serious enterprise. disappointment occasioned by this news at Athens been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition was con and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and 414 B.C., become cheering. The siege of Syracuse as proceeding successfully, and at length, about July as being on the point of coming to a triumphant close a Spartan adventurer, named Gylippus, making his the Ionian sea with a force too contemptible to be no denly, without any intermediate step to smoothe th comes a despatch announcing that this adventurer into Syracuse at the head of a powerful army, s Athenians are thrown upon the defensive, without p ceeding with the siege. This is followed, after a by the gloomy and almost desperate communication lated.

When we thus look at the despatch, not merely singly, but as falling in series with its antecedents

¹ Thucyd. vii, 42.

effect which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians, would be a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed by historians of Greece to the Athenian people, that they are represented as fickle, ungrateful, and irritable, by standing habit; as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing better than demagogic excitements, we naturally expect that the blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury. Yet what is the actual resolution taken in consequence of his despatch, after the full and free debate of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of blame or displeasure is proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been individual speakers who criticized him as he deserved. To suppose the contrary, would be to think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly. But the general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. The people positively refuse to relieve him from the command, though he himself solicits it in a manner sincere and even touching. So great is the value which they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him.

It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias, on more than one previous occasion, but especially on this, betrays an incapacity of appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one of the least creditable manifestations of their political history. But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects of the Athenian character were very different from what historians commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes once embarked upon: instead of ingratitude for services actually rendered, we find credit given for ser-

vices which an officer ought to have rendered, but has
of angry captiousness, we discover an indulgence not
erous, but even culpable, in the midst of disappoint
humiliation : instead of a public assembly, wherein, a
monly depicted, the criminative orators were omni
could bring to condemnation any unsuccessful gener
meritorious ; we see that even grave and well-founded
make no impression upon the people in opposition
lished personal esteem ; and personal esteem for a m
only was no demagogue, but in every respect the op
demagogue : an oligarch by taste, sentiment, and po
yielded to the democracy nothing more than sincere
coupled with gentleness and munificence in his priv
If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capit
which discredit the military career of Nikias, he woul
irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was *his* ho
countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, as
with those causes which attracted confidence to Nikias
family and position, his wealth dexterously expended
incorruptibility against bribes, and even comparative
personal ambition, his personal courage combined wit
for caution, his decorous private life and ultra-religi
All this assemblage of negative merits, and decent
life, in a citizen whose station might have enabled
with the insolence of Alkibiadês, placed Nikias on
basis of public esteem than the mere power of accus
in the public assembly or the dikastery could hav
entitled him to have the most indulgent construction
his short-comings, and spread a fatal varnish over
incompetence for all grave and responsible command

The incident now before us is one of the most inst
history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, a
causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian de
as a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which
to impute to the person called a demagogue. Ha
have been for Athens had she now had Kleon pr
other demagogue of equal power, at that public ass
took the melancholy resolution of sending fresh fo
and continuing Nikias in the command ! The cas

which the accusatory eloquence of the demagogue was especially called for, to expose the real past mismanagement of Nikias, to break down that undeserved confidence in his ability and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or routine, to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much more he would do if continued.¹ Unluckily for Athens, she had now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive resolution ever passed in the Pnyx.

What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad misjudgment; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even *that* was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover, there was at that time a confusion, — between the narrow objects connected with Leontini and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realized through the siege of Syracuse, — which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises of Egesta had been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself, perseverance in employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of

¹ Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before the despatch of Nikias reached them; but that they had been prevented by certain men *who were* envious (φθόνῳ) of the glory and good fortune of Nikias.

No judgment can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case than this, facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself.

Demosthenês was not sufficient to avert. Those who conduct of the Athenian people on this occasion, will be exposed to repeat against them the charge of fickleness was one of the standing reproaches against democracy. The take here arose from the very opposite quality; from being called obtuseness, or inability to get clear of two which had become deeply engraven on their minds Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias.

A little more of this alleged fickleness—or easy past associations and impressibility to actual circumstances would have been at the present juncture a tutelary Athens. She would then have appreciated more increased hazards thickening around her both in Sicily and home. War with Sparta, though not yet actually begun, had become impending and inevitable. Even in the winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favorably to the recommendation of Alkibiadês¹ that they should establish a post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet induced themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many particulars, subsisted in name, and they hesitated to break it open because they knew that the breach of peace had begun on their side at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; at this fault their capital misfortune at Sphakteria.² Athens had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of Lacedæmonian territory, in spite of much solicitation from Argos. But her reserve on this point gave way in the present summer, probably at the time when her success in taking Syracuse appeared certain. The Lacedæmonians invaded and plundered the Argeian territory, thirty ships and remes were sent to aid in its defence, under Pythodôros and his colleagues. This armament disembarked on the east coast of Laconia near Prasîæ and committed devastations: an act of hostility—coming in addition to the marauding of the garrison of Pylos, and to the refusal of peace at Athens—satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the

¹ Thucyd. vi, 93.

² Th

been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they might with a safe conscience recommence the war.¹

Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from Syracuse; envoys from Nikias on the one part, from Gylippus and the Syracusans on the other; each urgently calling for farther support. The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their claims at Sparta; nor was Alkibiadēs again wanting, to renew his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of this impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with vigor. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent resolution of Athens; which not only created an imperative necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to Syracuse, and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.²

¹ Thucyd. vi, 105; vii, 18.

² Thucyd. vii, 18.

CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES
ATHENS AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTIVE
ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY.

THE Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as by itself, but becomes absorbed in the general war throughout Greece. Never was any winter so actively employed in military preparations, as the 414-413 B.C., the months immediately preceding Thucydides terms the nineteenth spring of the Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning of the war.¹ While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes to even in midwinter, Demosthenes exerted himself all to get together the second armament for early spring; other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnese to the station of Naupaktus, to prevent any Corinthian armaments from sailing out of the Corinthian gulf. Agis, on the latter, the Corinthians on their side prepared twenty triremes, to serve as a convoy to the transports carrying hoplites.² In Corinth, Sikyon, and Boeotia, as well as in Lacedaemon, levies of hoplites were going on for the autumn. At Syracuse, at the same time that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. Lastly, Gylippus was exerting not less activity in stirring up all Sicily to take a part in the coming year's struggle.

From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest spring, embarked a force of six hundred Lacedaemonians — Helots and Neodamodes — under the Spartan Eurydamidas, three hundred Boeotian hoplites under the Theban Nikon, with the Thespian Hegesandrus. They were to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê in Libya, and from there make their way along the African coast to Sicily. At the same time a body of seven hundred hoplites under Alexarchus

¹ Diodor. xiii, 8.² Thuc.

Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful neighbors,¹ departed from the northwest of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the Corinthian gulf for Sicily, the Corinthian triremes watching them until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus.

These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of all was the reinvasion of Attica at the same time by the great force of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis son of Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The plain in the neighborhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means of executing it, was completed during the present summer, and a garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself. Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range called Parnês, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens, near the termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive view of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on which it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the walls of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point for excursions over Attica, and for communication with Bœotia; while the road from Athens to Orôpus, the main communication with Eubœa, passed through the gorge immediately under it.²

We read with amazement, and the contemporary world saw with yet greater amazement, that while this important work was actually going on, and while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its pressure with redoubled force upon Athens, at that very moment,³ the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes under Chariklês to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also the great armament which they had resolved

¹ Thucyd. vii, 19-58. Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες.

² Thucyd. vii, 19-28, with Dr. Arnold's note.

³ Thucyd. vii, 20. ἡμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ, etc. Compare Isokratês, Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 102, p. 236, Bekk.

upon under Demosthenês, to push offensive operations upon Syracuse. The force under the latter general consisted of Athenian and five Chian triremes; of twelve hundred hoplites of the best class, chosen from the citizen army, with a considerable number of hoplites besides, from allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged seven hundred peltasts from Thrace, of the tribe called the Cardians; these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenês had to do without them.¹ Chariklês having gone forward to a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined and inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established a strong post on the island of Kythêra to encourage among the Helots. From hence Chariklês returned to Argos, while Demosthenês conducted his army to Peloponnesus to Korkyra.² On the Eleian coast, he transported carrying hoplites to Syracuse, though the winter was ashore: from thence he proceeded to Zakynthus and from whence he engaged some additional hoplites, at Anactorium, in order to procure darters and slingers from the Corinthians. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon with his fleet, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the winter with a large pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now to act as colleague of Demosthenês in the command.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 20-27.

² Thucyd.

³ Thucyd. vii, 31. "Οὐτε δ' αὐτῷ (Demosthenês) περὶ ταῦτα Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαντᾷ, ὅς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος τὰ χρήματα ἀγύρει, τὴν δ' ἀπεπέμφθη, καὶ ἀγγέλλει, etc.

The meaning of this passage appears quite unambiguous, that Eurymedon had been sent to Sicily in the winter, to carry the sum of one hundred and twenty talents to Nikias, and was now on his return (see Thucyd. vii, 31). Nor is it without some astonishment that I read in Mr. Mitford's *Anactorium*, Demosthenês found Eurymedon *collecting provisions*, etc. Mr. Mitford then says in a note (quoting the Scholias to Thucyd. vii, 31): "τὸν δὲ χειμῶνα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συντείνοντα αὐτοῖς, Schol.): "The only occasion on which Thucydides uses the term *χρήματα* in a general sense. Smith has translated accordingly: but the Latin word *pecunia* which does not express the sense intended here," (ch. xviii, p. 118.)

There cannot be the least doubt that the Latin is here right. The article makes the point quite certain, even if it were true that Thucydides sometimes uses the word *χρήματα* to mean

brought by Eurymedon from Sicily was in every way discouraging. Yet the two admirals were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes from their fleet to reinforce Konon at Naupaktus, who was not strong enough alone to contend against the Corinthian fleet which watched him from the opposite coast. To make good this diminution, Eurymedon went forward to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from the Korkyraeans fifteen fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites, while Demosthenês was getting together the Akarnanian darters and slingers.¹

Eurymedon not only brought back word of the distressed condition of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, but had also learned, during his way back, their heavy additional loss by the capture of the fort at Plemmyrium. Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when Demosthenês quitted Peiræus. He returned with fresh reinforcements from the interior, and with redoubled ardor for decisive operations against Nikias before aid could arrive from Athens. It was his first care, in conjunction with Hermokratês, to inspire the Syracusans with courage for fighting the Athenians on shipboard. Such was the acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendancy of the two leaders: "The Athenians (said Hermokratês to his countrymen) have not been always eminent at sea as they now are: they were once landsmen like you, and more than you, they were only forced on shipboard by the Persian invasion. The only way to deal with bold men like them, is to show a front bolder still. *They* have often by their audacity daunted enemies of greater real force than themselves, and they must now be taught that others can play the same game with them. Go right at them before they expect it; and you will gain more by thus surprising and intimidating them, than you will suffer by their superior science." Such lessons, addressed to men already in the tide of success, were presently efficacious, and a naval attack was resolved.²

general." I doubt still more whether he ever uses *ἀγν* in the sense of "collecting."

¹ Thucyd. vii, 31.

² Thucyd. vii, 21. Among the topics of encouragement dwelt upon by Hermokratês, it is remarkable that he makes no mention of that which the

The town of Syracuse had two ports, one on each island of Ortygia. The lesser port — as it was wards, the Portus Lakkus — lay northward of Ortygia that island and the low ground or Nekropolis near the other lay on the opposite side of the isthmus within the Great Harbor. Both of them, it appeared, were protected against attack from without, by piles and stakes driven into the bottom in front of them. But the lesser port was the more secure of the two, and the principal docks of the city were situated within it; the Syracusan fleet, eight hundred ships strong, being distributed between them. The entire fleet was stationed under the fort of Plemmyrium, opposite to the southern point of Ortygia.

Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to surprise the Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained the naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched the land-force secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round the bank of the Anapus, to the neighborhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out, at one and the same signal, from both the ports. Fifty triremes out of the lesser port, thirty-five out of the Great Harbor. Both squadrons tried to round the southern point of Ortygia, as to unite and to attack the enemy at Plemmyrium. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused, fought man sixty ships; with twenty-five of which, they met the five Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbor. The other thirty-five they encountered the forty-five of the lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the harbor. In the former of these two actions the Syracusans were the first victors; in the second also, the Syracusans forced their way into the mouth of the Great Harbor, and their comrades. But being little accustomed to sea-fighting, they presently fell into complete confusion, partly from the effect of their unexpected success: so that the Athenians, from the first shock, attacked them anew and compelled them; sinking or disabling eleven ships, of three

the sequel proved to be the most important of all, the confusion of the harbor, which rendered Athenian ships and tactics unavail-

crews were made prisoners, the rest being mostly slain.¹ Three Athenian triremes were destroyed also.

But this victory, itself not easily won, was more than counter-balanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water's edge to watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly guarded, and little suspecting the presence of their enemy on the land side. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked the forts at daybreak, taking the garrison completely by surprise, and captured them after a feeble resistance; first the greatest and most important fort, next the two smaller. The garrison sought safety as they could, on board the transports and vessels of burden at the station, and rowed across the Great Harbor to the land-camp of Nikias on the other side. Those who fled from the greater fort, which was the first taken, ran some risk from the Syracusan triremes, which were at that moment victorious at sea. But by the time that the two lesser forts were taken, the Athenian fleet had regained its superiority, so that there was no danger of similar pursuit in the crossing of the Great Harbor.

This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain, and many made prisoners, in the assault, but there were vast stores of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the fort; partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property of the trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it there as in the place of greatest security. The sails of not less than forty triremes were also found there, and three triremes which had been dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three forts to be pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.²

Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians at a time when their situation could ill bear it, the collateral damage and peril growing out of the capture of Plemmyrium was yet more serious, besides the alarm and discouragement which it spread

¹ Thucy. vii, 23; Diod. xiii, 9; Plut. Nikias, c. 20. ² Thucy. vii, 23, 24.

among the army. The Syracusans were now masters of the harbor on both sides, so that not a single ship could enter without a convoy and a battle. What was of more moment, the Athenian fleet was now forced to take station between fortified lines of its own land-force, and was thus crisscrossed in a small space in the innermost portion of the Great Harbor between the city-wall and the river Anapus; the Syracusans masters everywhere else, with full communication by sea and posts all round, hemming in the Athenian position and by land.

To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the battle proved every way encouraging; not merely the valuable acquisition of Plemmyrium, but even from the Athenian point of view, which had indeed turned out to be a defeat, though promised at first to be a victory, had they not thrown the victory into confusion by their own disorder. It removed all suspicion of Athenian nautical superiority; while their position was much improved by having acquired the command of the harbor, that they began even to assume the mastery of the sea. They detached a squadron of twelve triremes from Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some merchant ships coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. There was no longer any doubt of an enemy at sea, that these vessels had been coming without convoy, and were for the most part captured by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. In touch with the shore on their return, they took aboard a company of Thebans who had made their way thither in a transport. They were fortunate enough to escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached to lie in wait for them near Plemmyrium, the loss of one ship, however, including her crew.¹

One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward with envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the result of the capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate, if possible, the operations against Attica, in order that reinforcements might be sent from thence. At the same time envoys went from Syracuse — not merely Syracusan

¹ Thucyd. vii, 25.

Corinthians and Lacedæmonians — to visit the cities in the interior of Sicily. They made known everywhere the prodigious improvement in Syracusan affairs arising from the gain of Plemmyrium, as well as the insignificant character of the recent naval defeat. They strenuously pleaded for farther aid to Syracuse without delay, since there were now the best hopes of being able to crush the Athenians in the harbor completely, before the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach them.¹

While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great Harbor was the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any comprehensive single battle. Since the loss of Plemmyrium, the Athenian naval station was in the northwest interior corner of that harbor, adjoining the fortified lines occupied by their land-army. It was inclosed and protected by a row of posts or stakes stuck in the bottom and standing out of the water.² The Syracusans on their side had also planted a stockade in front of the interior port of Ortygia, to defend their ships, their ship-houses, and their docks within. As the two stations were not far apart, each party watched for opportunities of occasional attack or annoyance by missile weapons to the other; and daily skirmishes of this sort took place, in which on the whole the Athenians seem to have had the advantage. They even formed the plan of breaking through the outworks of the Syracusan dockyard, and burning the ships within. They brought up a ship of the largest size, with wooden towers and side defences, against the line of posts fronting the dockyard, and tried to force the entrance, either by means of divers, who sawed them through at the bottom, or by boat-crews, who fastened ropes round them and thus unfixed or plucked them out. All this was done under cover of the great vessel with its towers manned by light-armed, who exchanged showers of missiles with the Syracusan bowmen on the top of the ship-houses, and prevented the latter from coming near enough to interrupt the operation. The Athenians contrived thus to remove many of the posts planted, even the most dangerous among them, those which did not reach to the surface of the water, and which therefore a ship approaching could not see. But they gained little by it, since the Syracusans

¹ Thucyd. vii, 25.

² Thucyd. vii, 38.

were able to plant others in their room. On the
ous damage was done, either to the dockyard or
within. . And the state of affairs in the Great Har
stantially unaltered, during all the time that the
absent on their Sicilian tour, probably three week

These envoys had found themselves almost eve
received. The prospects of Syracuse were now s
and those of Nikias with his present force so ut
that the waverers thought it time to declare them
the Greek cities in Sicily, except Agrigentum, v
remained neutral (and of course except Naxos
resolved on aiding the winning cause. From K
five hundred hoplites, four hundred darters, and
bowmen; from Gela, five triremes, four hundre
two hundred horsemen. Besides these, an ad
from the other cities was collected, to march to
body across the interior of the island, under the
envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme
by Nikias, who was rendered more vigilant by the
perate condition of his affairs, than he had been
the cross march of Gylippus. At his instance, th
Kentoripes and Halikyæi, allies of Athens, were
to attack the approaching enemy. They planned
buscade, set upon them unawares, and dispersed
loss of eight hundred men. All the envoys w
except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaini
fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse.²

This reverse — which seems to have happened
when Demosthenês with his armament were at E
way to Syracuse — so greatly dismayed and mor
cusans, that Gylippus thought it advisable to post
attack which he intended to have made immediat
forcement arriving.³ The delay of these few days
less than the salvation of the Athenian army.

It was not until Demosthenês was approaching
two or three days' sail of Syracuse, that the attack
on without farther delay. Preparation in every

¹ Thucyd. vii, 25.

² Thucyd. vii, 32, 33.

made for it long before, especially for the most effective employment of the naval force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical manœuvre, and of the causes upon which that superiority depended. The Athenian trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction: its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact and collision, the prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among the able seamen of Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against an enemy's vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to pass by it, then, by the excellence and exactness of their rowing, turned swiftly round, altered their direction and came back before the enemy could alter his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him, or backed their ship stern foremost, until the opportunity was found for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his, against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oar-blades without. In such manœuvres the Athenians were unrivalled: but none such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room, which rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a harbor of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies, and with all the shore, except their own lines, in possession of those enemies: so that they could not pull round from want of space, nor could they back water, because they durst not come near shore. In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by straightforward collision, prow against prow; a process which not only shut out all their superior manœuvring, but was unsuited to the build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under the advice of the able Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the construction of their triremes to meet the special exigency of the case, disregarding all idea of what had been generally looked upon as good nautical manœuvring.¹ Instead of the long, thin, hollow, and

¹ Thucyd. vii, 36. τῇ δὲ πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσῃ εἶναι

sharp, advancing beak, striking the enemy consid-
 the water-level, and therefore doing less damage, th
 the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solid,
 the elevation of the projecting beak: so that it be
 much calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush
 all the opposing part of the enemy's ship, not far abo
 What were called the epôtids, "ear-caps," or nozzl
 forwards to the right and left of the beak, were ma
 thick, and sustained by under-beams let in to the hu
 In the Attic build, the beak stood forward very pr
 the epôtids on each side of it were kept back, serv
 purpose as what are called catheads, in modern ships
 anchors are suspended: but in the Corinthian build,
 jected less, and the epôtids more, so that they ser
 the enemy: instead of having one single beak, th
 ship might be said to have three nozzles.¹ The Syri
 on the narrowness of the space, for shutting out
 evolutions, and bringing the contest to nothing
 straightforward collision; in which the weaker ve
 broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rend
 ageable.

Having completed these arrangements, their li

τὸ ἀντίπρωρον ξυγκρούσαι, μάλιστα ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι· αὐτῷ σῆχειν, etc.

Diodor. xiii, 10.

¹ Compare Thucyd. vii, 34-36; Diodor. xiii, 10; Eurip. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppo, and Didot, on the *procydides*.

It appears as if the *ἀντηρίδες* or sustaining beams were now provided for the first time, in order to strengthen the e it fit to drive in collision against the enemy. The words w employs to describe the position of these *ἀντηρίδες*, are to nor do I think that any of the commentators clear them

It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowe their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water, which Thu mention.

A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarm- prived of her beak (Athenæus, xii, p. 535). Lysander rea of the Athenian triremes captured at Ægospotami to gra return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 8).

marched out under Gylippus to threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while the cavalry and the garrison of the Olympieion marched up to the other side. The Athenians were putting themselves in position to defend their walls from what seemed to be a land attack, when they saw the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, sailing out from its dock prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, and went out of their palisaded station, seventy-five triremes in number, to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off, however, in desultory and indecisive skirmish, with trifling advantage to the Syracusans, who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried to invite the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to force on a close and general action.¹

It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action, at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into the harbor, by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenês was now at hand, prudence counselled this reserve. Nikias himself, too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have been outvoted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and Euthydemus, who were anxious to show what they could do without Demosthenês, and took their stand upon Athenian maritime honor, which peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered.²

Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet Nikias foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway encouraged by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused every trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained, and even took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade, about two hundred feet apart. The prows of these vessels were provided with dolphins, or beams lifted up on high and armed at the end with massive heads of

¹ Thucyd. vii, 37, 38.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii, 10) represents the battle as having been brought on against the wish and intention of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference of opinion among the commanders.

iron, which could be so let fall as to crush any ship any Athenian trireme which might be hard-pressed, be enabled to get through this opening where no entrance was low, and choose her own time for sailing out again. When these arrangements were completed, and at dawn of next day, the Syracusans reappeared, with demonstrations both of land force and naval force. The Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, were spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmish. At length the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city bringing on any general or close combat. The Athenians, regarding this retirement of the enemy as evidence of weakness and unwillingness to fight,² and supposing the end, retired on their side within their own ships, barked, and separated to get their dinners at length, tasted no food that day.

But ere they had been long ashore, they were again met by the Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack order. This was a manoeuvre suggested by the Coriambus, the ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance the Athenian admirals had sent back an urgent request to the Athenian authorities, that an abundant stock of provisions might be brought down to the sea-shore, and sale be rendered so that no time should be lost, when the fleet returned, taking a hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. The fleet, after a short but sufficient interval allowed, thus close at hand, was brought back unexpectedly to the enemy's station. Confounded at the sight, the Athenians forced themselves again on board, most of them without freshment, and in the midst of murmurs and disorder, retiring out of their station, the indecisive skirmish

¹ Thucyd. vii, 41. *αἱ κεραῖαι δελφινόφοροι*: compare Fragment vi, of the comedy of the poet Pherekrates, Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Græc.* vol. ii, p. 258, and the Schol. to Soph. *Equit.* 759.

² Thucyd. vii, 40. *Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακροῖσθαι, etc.*

³ Thucyd. vii, 40.

menced, and continued for some time, until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they resolved to begin of themselves, and make the action close as well as general. Accordingly, the word of command was given, and they rowed forward to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans. By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better enabled to insure a straightforward collision of prow against prow, excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the enemy : at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realize this plan, and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of many of the Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive ; while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and shot darts in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time, found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing Syracusans ; two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory, pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy implements on board, one of them being captured with all her crew. The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete : seven Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.¹

Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have been no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans now felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, and contemplated nothing less than the complete destruction of their enemies in the harbor. The generals were already concerting measures for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging armament, now full of nothing but

¹ Thucyd. vii, 41.

discouragement. The mere stoppage of supplies, Syracusans were masters of the mouth of the harbor to starve it out in no long time, if they maintained superiority at sea. All their calculations were sure, ever, and the hopes of the Athenians for the timely entry of Demosthenês and Eurymedon with the fleet into the Great Harbor; which seems to have taken every day, or on the second day, after the recent important were the consequences which turned upon the postponement of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the delay of their reinforcing army from the interior. So did the party think, at that moment, that it would have been a calamity to Athens, if Demosthenês had *not* arrived, if the ruin of the first armament had been actually before the coming of the second!

Demosthenês, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra, had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands on the coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard three hundred and fifty Messapian darters, through the mediation of the native prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on farther to Metapontum, already friendly to Athens, he was there reinforced with two thousand darters, with which addition he sailed on to Thurium, where he found himself cordially welcomed; for the party was in full ascendancy, having recently got the better of vehement dissension, and passed a sentence of banishment against their opponents.² They not only took a formal acknowledgment of the same friends and the same enemies, but equipped a regiment of seven hundred and thirty-three darters to accompany Demosthenês there long enough to pass his troops in review, and to ascertain the completeness of each division. After having held a council on the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his army through the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Achroas, which divided it from Kroton. He was here met by the Thurians, who forbade the access to their territory; he then marched down the river to the sea-shore, got on

¹ Thucyd. vii, 42.

² Thucyc

pursued his voyage southward along the coast of Italy, touching at the various towns, all except the hostile Lokri.¹

His entry into the harbor of Syracuse,² accomplished in the most ostentatious trim, with decorations and musical accompaniments, was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force than critical in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary forces, together, he conducted seventy-three triremes, five thousand hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every description, — archers, slingers, darters, etc., with other requisites for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and were struck with dismay as well as wonder.³ That Athens could be rash enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia was in course of being fortified, was a fact out of all reasonable probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. And probably the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on his way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament.

On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea ; and they displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus ; the Syracusans not venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion.

But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power, so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs, and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, and disheartened by previous defeat, but also weakened in a terrible degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the low ground where they were encamped.⁴

¹ Thucyd. vii, 35.

² Thucyl. vii, 42.

³ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21.

⁴ Thucyd. vii, 47-50.

He saw that the Syracusans were strong in mult extended fortifications, a leader of great ability, and lief that theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he the position of Athens at home, and her need of all against enemies within sight of her own walls. But he came penetrated with the deplorable effects which from the mistake of Nikias, in wasting irreparable precious time, and frittering away the first terror-striction of his splendid armament. All these considerations terminated Demosthenès to act, without a moment's delay the impression produced by his arrival was yet united to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If he fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise home with his armament forthwith.¹

By means of the Athenian lines, he had possessed the southernmost portion of the slope of Epipolæ. But the slope from east to west, immediately in front or to his position, stretched the counter-wall built by the beginning at the city wall on the lowest ground, and first in a northwesterly, next in a westerly direction, the fort on the upper ground near the cliff, where the Euryalus down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans, were on the north side of this counter-wall, the Athenians on the south side. It was a complete barrier, nor could he stir a step without making himself it: towards which end there were only two possibilities either to storm it in front, or to turn it from its west by marching round up to the Euryalus. He began by the first method; but the wall was abundantly manfully defended; his battering machines were all repulsed.² There then remained only the second method, the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the height of the Euryalus behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it

But the march necessary for this purpose, first, of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts

¹ Thucyd. vii, 42.

ascending to the Euryalus by a narrow and winding path, was so difficult, that even Demosthenēs, naturally sanguine, despaired of being able to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to command within the lines),¹ conducting hoplites and light troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary for establishing a fortified post; lastly, giving orders that every man should carry with him provisions for five days.

Fortune so far favored him, that not only all these preliminary arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable distance, then following various roads to the right, arrived at the Euryalus, or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a year and a half before — and Gylippus in coming from the interior of the island about ten months before — had passed, in order to get to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground, assailed it completely by surprise, and captured it after a feeble resistance. Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind the long continuous wall,² on the declivity of Epipolæ, as well as to a

¹ Thucyd. vii, 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenēs took with him ten thousand hoplites, and ten thousand light troops, numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii, 11).

Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Nikias was extremely averse to the attack on Epipolæ: Thucydidēs notices nothing of the kind, and the assertion seems improbable.

² Thucyd. vii, 42, 43. Καὶ (Demosthenēs) ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτείχισαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀπλοῦν τε θύει, καὶ ἐπικρατῆσαι τις τῶν τε Ἐπικολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ

chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites, Hermokratês,¹ who formed a night-watch, or bivouac regiment hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenes' Athenian vanguard charging impetuously forward, back in disorder upon the fortified positions in their rear. Gylippus and the Syracusan troops advancing upon these positions, were at first carried back by the same movement.

So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been beyond all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort of the Syracusan position, but also of the e

στρατοπέδον, ῥαδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθῇ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομείναι αὐτὸ
ἡπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ.

vii, 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν πρὸς
ἀναβάστας, etc.

Dr. Arnold and Göller both interpret this description of the fort. In their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold's Appendix, p. 27, they state immediately that the Syracusan counter-wall had crossed the line, had evacuated his circle and works on the slope of Epipolæ retired down exclusively into the lower ground below. Dr. Arnold is of the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxvi, pp. 432-43).

This appears to me unauthorized and incorrect. What motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy a position so important and so advantageous? If he had once relinquished the slope of Epipolæ, he would occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern cliff, Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care that he should never have mounted that cliff; nor could he ever have got near to the cliff. The moment when the Athenians did at last abandon their position on the slope of Epipolæ (τὰ ἄνω τεῖχη) is specially marked afterwards, vii, 60: it was at the last moment of desperate service of all was needed for the final maritime battle in the straits. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) misinterprets this passage, in my judgment, in the direct sense of it.

The words of Thucydides, vii, 42 — ἐλὲν ἐπικρατήσασθαι τὴν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὐτῆς τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου — are conceived by M. Firmin Didot, in the note to his translation, as indicating the Athenian circle, and their partially completed line of circumvallation on the slope of Epipolæ. It means the ground higher up than the fort which they had partially occupied at first while building the fort of Laus, which they had been substantially masters until the arrival of Gylippus, who had now converted it into a camp or στρατόπεδον of the

¹ Diodor. xiii, 11.

their counter-wall which rested upon that fort ; the counter-wall was no longer defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan side of it, so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the fort, made no resistance, and fled. Some of the Athenians even began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall, an operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened to Demosthenès a communication with the southern side of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was already carried, if he could only have maintained himself in his actual position, even without advancing farther, and if he could have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we cannot say. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a firm array. Unfortunately, however, their ardor of pursuit — as it constantly happened with Grecian hoplites — disturbed the regularity of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the shock of the Bæotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. The Bæotians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind, still under the impression of success, ignorant of what had passed in front, and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in their rear.

In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamor and confusion wherein there was neither command nor obedience, nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians, thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for enemies, and slain. The Syracusans and Bæotians, shouting aloud and pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost Athenians, and both

armies thus grouped into knots which only distinguished each other by mutual demand of the watchword. This test also soon failed, since each party got acquainted with the watchword of the other, especially that of the Athenians, among whom the confusion was the greatest, became well known to the Syracusans, who kept together in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the pæan or war-shout on both sides was remarkable. The Dorians in the Athenian army — from Argos, Korkyra, and other places — raised a pæan not distinguishable from that of the Syracusans; accordingly, their shout struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by the same roads which they had ascended; but these roads were found too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into the plain below, many — especially the new-comers belonging to the armament of Demosthenês — lost their way through ignorance, and were cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter within their own lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than that of men, from the throwing away of shields by those soldiers who leaped the cliff.¹

The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the Bœotians had first withstood and first repelled the enemy. By this unexpected and overwhelming victory, their feelings were restored to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the arrival of Demosthenês. Again now masters of the field, they again indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylipus went in person with this commission to the various cities of Sicily, while Sikanus with fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood to be wavering, and in a political crisis.²

¹ Thucyd. vii, 44; 45.

² Thucyd. vii, 46. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) states that the number of

During this absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to mourn the recent reverse, and to discuss the exigencies of their untoward position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement and weariness; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but dishonor. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only made Demosthenês more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to strike one decisive blow; the chances of war had turned out against him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. The season was yet favorable for the voyage (it seems to have been the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was idle, he added, to waste more time and money in staying to carry on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue, especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against the garrison of Dekeleia.¹

This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that their present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, though he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless to be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become known to the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and secrecy,² as such a resolution ought to

slain was two thousand. Diodorus gives it at two thousand five hundred (xiii, 11). Thucydides does not state it at all.

These two authors probably both copied from some common authority, not Thucydides; perhaps Philistus.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 47.

² Thucyd. vii, 48. 'Ο δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὰ σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ' ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφισομένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολέμοις καταγγέλτους γίνεσθαι λαθεῖν γὰρ αὐν, ὅποτε βούλονται, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῶ ἤττον.

It seems probable that some of the taxiarchs and trierarchs were present at this deliberation, as we find in another case afterwards, c. 60. Possibly, Demosthenês might even desire that they *should* be present, as witnesses

be. But furthermore, he (Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would never consent to carry out the armament, without specific authority from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never tolerate a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at Athens, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by those who had been at Syracuse and cognizant of the actual facts, but by hearers who would learn all that they knew from the speeches of criminative orators. Even the citizens, serving, though now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home, would alter their tone when they were safe at the public assembly; and would turn round to denounce the generals as having been bribed to bring away the army. From his own personal feelings, he knew too well the temper of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger of thus standing out under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful. He would incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.¹ He recollected too, he added, that if *their* affairs were like those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For in a year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans great cost, in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping outlying posts; so that they had already spent two thousand talents besides heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in this course longer; yet the suspension of their aid would at once alienate their allies, and leave them helplessly at the cost of the war — to which Demosthenês had alluded as the price for returning home — could be much better borne by them, while a little farther pressure would utterly break down

respecting the feeling of the army; and also as supporters, it came afterwards to be debated in the public assembly at Athens, this fact that the words *ἐμφανῶς μετὰ πολλῶν* seem to allude.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 48. *Οὐκοῦν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε, ἐπιστάμενος τὰ φύσεις, ἐπὶ αἰσχρᾷ γε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκῳ ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δὲ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν, ἰδίᾳ.*

The situation of the last word *ἰδίᾳ* in this sentence is perplexing: it can hardly be construed except either with *ἀπολέσθαι* or *ὑπὲρ* for Nikias could not run any risk of perishing *separately* by the enemy, unless we are to ascribe to him an absurd rhodomontade as a sign to his character. Compare Plutarch Nikias, c. 22.

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accusans. He (Nikias) therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the siege;¹ the more so, as their fleet had now become unquestionably the superior.

Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon protested in the strongest language against the proposition of Nikias. Especially they treated the plan of remaining in the Great Harbor as fraught with ruin, and insisted, at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment's delay. Even admitting, for argument, the scruples of Nikias against abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great Harbor to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above all, of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which condemned them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At all events to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbor, such was the pressing requisition of Demosthenês and Eurymedon.²

But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He insisted on remaining as they were; and it appears that Menander and Euthydemus³—colleagues named by the assembly at home, before the departure of the second armament—must have voted under the influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side. Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit, on a point of such transcendent importance.

It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the harbor, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. Throughout the army, hope of success appears

¹ Thucyd. vii, 48. *τρίβειν οὖν ἐφ' ἡρῆναι προσκαθμένους*, etc.

² Thucyd. vii, 49. *Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο—τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἐφ' ἡρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστα ἦδη καὶ μὴ μέλλειν ἐξανίστασθαι. Καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἐπηγόρευεν.*

³ Thucyd. vii, 69; Diodor. xiii, 12.

to have vanished, while anxiety for return had been. The opinions of Demosthenês and Eurymedon were well known, and orders for retreat were expected came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, whole of this fatal interval; which plunged the army into the abyss of ruin, instead of mere failure in their aggressive.

So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that historians gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he revealed. Even Thucydides thinks that he was misinformed in Syracuse with whom he had always kept up correspondence, seemingly apart from his colleagues. Still he urged him, by special messages, not to go away, and told him that Syracuse could not possibly go on long. Fully trusting these intimations, he could not bring himself to fight against them; and he therefore hung back from day to day, refused to pronounce the decisive word.¹

Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so credible as his guilty fatuity — for we can call it by that name, seeing that it involved all the brave men and the city in one common ruin with himself — at the present crisis. How can we suppose him to have really believed that the Sicilians, now in the flood-tide of success, and when he had gone forth to procure additional forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war? Childish as such credulity is, we are nevertheless compelled to admit it as real.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 48. Ἡ ἐπιστάμενος, τῷ μὲν ἐργῶν φότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνείχετο, τῷ δ' ἐμὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν.

The insignificance of the party in Syracuse which corresponds to Nikias may be reasonably inferred from Thucyd. vii, 55. part of those Leontines who had been incorporated into the citizenship (Diodor. xiii, 18).

Polyænus (i, 43, 1) has a tale respecting a revolt of the slaves (οἰκέται) at Syracuse during the Athenian siege, under a leader, sikratês, a revolt suppressed by the stratagem of Hermokrates. Numerous attempts of this sort took place at Syracuse during the war, is by no means improbable. In fact, it is difficult to see how the numerous predial slaves were kept in order during the long and dangerous siege, prior to the coming of Gylippus.

extent as to counterbalance all the pressing motives for departure, motives enforced by discerning colleagues as well as by the complaints of the army, and brought home to his own observation by the experience of the late naval defeat. At any rate, it served as an excuse for that fatal weakness of his character which made him incapable of taking resolutions founded on prospective calculations, and chained him to his actual position until he was driven to act by imminent necessity.

But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which counts for much in dictating his hesitation. The other generals think with satisfaction of going back to their country and rescuing the force which yet remained, even under circumstances of disappointment and failure. Not so Nikias: he knows too well the reception which he had deserved, and which might possibly be in store for him. Avowedly, indeed, he anticipates reproach from the Athenians against the generals, but only unmerited reproach, on the special ground of bringing away the army without orders from home; adding some harsh criticisms upon the injustice of the popular judgment and the perfidy of his own soldiers. But in the first place, we may remark, that Demosthenês and Eurymedon, though as much responsible as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice; or, if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. The mistakes of the people in regard to him had always been those of indulgence, over-estimate, and over-constancy. But Nikias foresaw too well that he would have more to answer for at Athens than the simple fact of sanctioning retreat under existing circumstances. He could not but remember the pride and sanguine hopes under which he had originally conducted the expedition out of Peiræus, contrasted with the miserable sequel and ignominious close, even if the account had been now closed, without worse. He could not but be conscious, more or less, how much of all this was owing to his own misjudgment; and under such impressions, the idea of meeting the free criticisms and scrutiny of his fellow-citizens — even putting aside the chance of judicial trial — must have been insupportably humiliating. To Nikias, — a perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under an

incurable disease,—life at Athens had neither chance left. Hence, as much as from any other reason, he withheld the order for departure; clinging to some unforeseen boon of fortune might yet turn up to the idlest delusions from correspondents in the Syracuse.¹

Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ and Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. The late unsuccessful at Agrigentum, where the philo-Syracusan had been sent into banishment before his arrival; brought with him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks with those Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Sicily in the early spring, and who had made their way first along the coast of Africa, and then across to Sicily. The increase of strength immediately determined the Sicilians to resume the aggressive both by land and by sea. The Sicilians, as they saw the new allies marching in overland, produced a deeper despondency, combined with bitterness, as they had not adopted the proposition of departing after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenês first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction and sickness, had farther weakened their strength, and now again pressed the resolution for immediate departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about the possibility of success, were dissipated by the arrival of the new allies. He did he venture to persist in his former peremptory refusal, though even now he seems to have assented against his private conviction.³ He however insisted, with good reason, that a public vote should be taken on the occasion, but

¹ Thucyd. vii, 49. Ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, δκνος ἐνεγένετο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἔπειθε.

The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is justifying: "Nicias, seu pudore male actæ rei, seu metu destitutus seu impellente fato, manere contendit." (Justin, iv, 5.)

² This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. Thucyd. p. 100) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of Epipolæ and the subsequent eclipse.

³ Thucyd. vii, 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἐπειθε. Diodor. xiii, 12. Ὁ Νικίας ἡγαγέσθη συγχωρήσαι,

should be circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that the armament was on the point of coming away, with orders to forward no farther supplies.¹

This plan was proceeding successfully: the ships were made ready, much of the property of the army had already been conveyed aboard without awakening the suspicion of the enemy, the signal would have been hoisted on the ensuing morning, and within a few hours this fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbor, with comparatively small loss,² when the gods themselves — I speak in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp — interfered to forbid its departure. On the very night before, the 27th August, 413 B.C., which was full moon, the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent, impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine prohibition against departure until a certain time should have elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made known their wish for postponement to Nikias and his colleagues; but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was more deeply affected than any one else. He consulted the prophets, who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over.³ And Nikias took upon himself to announce, that until after the inter-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 60.

² Diodor. xiii, 12. *Οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεῦη ἐκείθεν, etc.* Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23.

³ The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413 B.C., from twenty-seven minutes past nine to thirty-four minutes past ten P.M. (Wurm De Ponderib. Græcor. sect. xciv, p. 184), speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily.

Thucydides states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the prophets, to tarry *thrice nine days* (vii, 50). Diodorus says *three days*. Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on *three days*, while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

I follow the statement of Thucydides: there is no reason to believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets prescribed.

The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising (Polyb. ix, 19).

val indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or proposition on the subject.

The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus made his own, was a sentence of death to the Athenian army, yet it went along with the general feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even Demosthenês, though if he had commanded alone, he might have tried to overrule it, found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus, himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the religious meaning of events, it was a decision decidedly wrong; that is, wrong according to the canonical principles of divination. To men planning escape, or any other operation requiring silence and secrecy, an eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was, he affirmed, an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians even more willing and forward in quitting the harbor. We are told, too, that Nikias had recently lost by death Stilbidês, the ablest prophet in his service, and that he was thus forced to have recourse to prophets of inferior ability.¹ His piety left no means untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, sacrifice, and expiatory ceremonies, continued until the necessity of actual conflict arrived.²

The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended, consequence of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however, that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered, and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy army.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22; Diodor. xiii, 12; Thucyd. vii, 50. Stilbidês was eminent in his profession of a prophet: see Aristophan. Pac. 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and Philochorus in the Scholia.

Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31).

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.

What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and victorious, put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to interpret the fact, which speedily came to their knowledge, that the Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, and had only been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbor, and never to permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly, Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several days: he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, seventy-six triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval station. The Athenian fleet, eighty-six triremes strong, sailed out to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place. The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans first beat the centre division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy's left, forgot those narrow limits of the harbor which were at every turn the ruin of the Athenian mariner, neared the land too much, and was pinned up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore.

Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. Most of them were forced ashore or grounded on points without those limits; upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water's edge, in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as well as to assist the Syracusan seamen in hauling off the ships as prizes. His march, however, was so hurried and disorderly, that the Tyrrhenian troops, on guard at the flank of the Athenian station, sallied out against them as they approached, beat the foremost of them, and drove them away from the shore into the marsh called Lysimeleia. More Syracusan troops came to their aid; but the Athenians also, anxious above all things for the protection of their ships, came forth in greater numbers; and a general battle ensued in which the latter were victorious. Though they

did not inflict much loss upon the enemy, yet they saved most of their own triremes which had been driven ashore, together with the crews, and carried them into the naval station. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian fleet would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still complete, and eighteen triremes were lost, all their crews being slain. This was probably the division of Eurymedon, which having been driven ashore in the recess of Daskon, was too far off from the Athenian station to receive any land assistance. As the Athenians were hauling in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last effort to destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind happened to be favorable. But the Athenians found means to prevent her approach, and to extinguish the flames.¹

Here was a complete victory gained over Athens on her own element, gained with inferior numbers, gained even over the fresh and yet formidable fleet recently brought by Demosthenês. It told but too plainly on which side the superiority now lay, how well the Syracusans had organized their naval strength for the specialties of their own harbor, how ruinous had been the folly of Nikias in retaining his excellent seamen imprisoned within that petty and unwholesome lake, where land and water alike did the work of their enemies. It not only disheartened the Athenians, but belied all their past experience, and utterly confounded them. Sickness of the whole enterprise, and repentance for having undertaken it, now became uppermost in their minds: yet it is remarkable that we hear of no complaints against Nikias separately.² But repentance came too late. The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their victory, sailed round the harbor in triumph as again their own,³ and already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit.

Nor were they insensible how vastly the scope of the contest

¹ Thucyd. vii, 52, 53; Diodor. xiii, 13.

² Thucyd. vii, 55. *Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυρίας ἦσαν, καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολλὰ δὲ μείζων ἐπὶ τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετὰ μελός.*

³ Thucyd. vii, 56. *Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τὸν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς, etc.* This elate and visible manifestation of feeling ought not to pass unnoticed, as an evidence of Grecian character.

was now widened, and the value of the stake before them enhanced. It was not merely to rescue their own city from siege, nor even to repel and destroy the besieging army, that they were now contending. It was to extinguish the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half of Greece from dependence; for Athens could never be expected to survive so terrific a loss as that of the entire double armament before Syracuse.¹ The Syracusans exulted in the thought that this great achievement would be theirs, that their city was the field, and their navy the chief instrument of victory: a lasting source of glory to them, not merely in the eyes of contemporaries, but even in those of posterity. Their pride swelled when they reflected on the Pan-Hellenic importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired, and when they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors who were now fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryalus and Plemmyrium. With the exception of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants so many and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners. Greeks, continental and insular, Ionic, Doric, and Æolic, autonomous and dependent, volunteers and mercenaries, from Miletus and Chios in the east to Selinus in the west, were all here to be found; and not merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians, and Iapygians. If the Lacædemonians, Corinthians, and Bœotians were fighting on the side of Syracuse, the Argeians and Mantineians, not to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her. The jumble of kinship among the combatants on both sides, as well as the cross action of different local antipathies, is put in lively antithesis by Thucydides.² But amidst so vast an assembled number, of which they were the chiefs, the paymasters, and the centre of combination, the Syracusans might well feel a sense of personal aggrandizement, and a consciousness of the great blow which they were about to strike, sufficient to exalt them for the time above the level even of their great Dorian chiefs in Peloponnesus.

It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close up the mouth of the Great Harbor, which was nearly one mile

¹ Thucyd. vii, 56.

² Thucyd. vii, 57, 58.

broad, with vessels of every description, triremes etc., anchored in an oblique direction, and cha
They at the same time prepared their naval force
zeal for the desperate struggle which they knew
They then awaited the efforts of the Athenians
their proceedings with sadness and anxiety.

Nikias and his colleagues called together the p
to deliberate what was to be done. As they had
remaining, and had counter-ordered their farther
instant and desperate effort was indispensable
point in debate was, whether they should burn
retire by land, or make a fresh maritime exertion
the harbor. Such had been the impression left by
fight, that many in the camp leaned to the forme
the generals resolved upon first trying the latter
all their combinations to give to it the greatest
They now evacuated the upper portion of their li
higher ground of Epipolæ, and even on the low
portion as was nearest to the southern cliff; conf
to a limited fortified space close to the shore, j
their sick, their wounded, and their stores; in o
necessity for a large garrison to defend them,
nearly their whole force disposable for sea-serv
made ready every trireme in the station, which c
ever so imperfectly seaworthy, constraining e
serve aboard them, without distinction of age, 1
The triremes were manned with double crews of
as well as bowmen and darters, the latter mos
while the hoplites, stationed at the prow with or
enemy as quickly as possible, were furnished
irons to detain the enemy's ship immediately s
of collision, in order that it might not be wi
collision repeated, with all its injurious effects
strength and massiveness of the Syracusan e
consultation was held with the steersmen as to
manœuvres of every trireme, nor was any p
which the scanty means at hand allowed. I

¹ Thucyd. vii, 59; Diodor. xiii, 14.

² Plu

impossibility of obtaining new provisions, every man was anxious to hurry on the struggle.¹ But Nikias, as he mustered them on the shore immediately before going aboard, saw but too plainly that it was the mere stress of desperation which impelled them; that the elasticity, the disciplined confidence, the maritime pride, habitual to the Athenians on shipboard, was extinct, or dimly and faintly burning.

He did his best to revive them, by exhortations unusually emphatic and impressive. "Recollect (he said) that you too, not less than the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any of you can ever hope to see his country again. Yield not to despair like raw recruits after a first defeat; you, Athenians and allies, familiar with the unexpected revolutions of war, will hope now for the fair turn of fortune, and fight with a spirit worthy of the great force which you see here around you. We generals have now made effective provision against our two great disadvantages, the narrow circuit of the harbor, and the thickness of the enemy's prows.² Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced upon us by the enemy, a land-battle on shipboard.³ It will be for you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is no friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on the deck, as soon as you have the enemy's trireme in contact, keep him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your courage, in spite of this sad failure in our means, and subversion of our tactics. You are better defended on deck above, and you have more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such of you, as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the valuable privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in the navy of Athens. Though

¹ Thucyd. vii, 60.

² Thucyd. vii, 62. *Α δὲ ἄρωγὰ ἐνειδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λ' ἡμενος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι, etc.

³ Thucyd. vii, 62. *Ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἡναγκάσμεθα, ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι, μήτε ἐκείνους ἔαν, ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται.

not really citizens, you have been reputed and to you have acquired our dialect, you have copied and have thus enjoyed the admiration, the imposing security, arising from our great empire.¹ Part of you freely in the benefits of that empire, do not now be like Sicilians and Corinthians whom you have so often such of you as *are* Athenians, I again remind you has neither fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to now here. Unless you are now victorious, her home will find her defenceless; and our country become slaves to Sparta, as you will to Syracuse every man of you, that you now going aboard her at Athens, — her hoplites, her ships, her entire remain her splendid name.² Bear up then and conquer, with his best mettle, in this one last struggle, for Athens yourselves, and on an occasion which will never repeat.

If, in translating the despatch written home ten years by Nikias to the people of Athens, we were compelled that the greater part of it was the bitterest condemnation.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 63. Τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ δέομαι, μὴ ἐκπεπληχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν..... ἐκεῖνοι ἐνθυμείσθαι, ὥς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, οἱ τῶς Ἀθηναίων μενοὶ καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὑμῶν, τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστῇ τῇ μίμῃ, ἐθανυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἐς τε τὸ φοβερόν τοις ὑπὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλεῖον, μετείχετε, ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνον ἐκ ἀρχῆς ὄντες, δικαίως αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδετε, etc.

Dr. Arnold (together with Göller and Poppe), follow in explaining these words as having particular reference to Athenian naval service. But I cannot think this correct. That service — who were freemen, but yet not citizens of Athens designated; partly metics, doubtless, but partly also citizens and dependent allies, — the *ξένοι ναυβάται* alluded to by Thucyd. by Periklēs at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (143) as the *ὠνητὴ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία* of Athens. Were numerous foreign seamen in the warlike navy of Athens, of great consideration as well as profit from the service, — themselves off for Athenian citizens when they really were.

Thucyd. vii, 64. Ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις, καὶ τὰ Ἀθηναίων.....

own previous policy as commander, so we are here carried back, when we find him striving to palliate the ruinous effects of that confined space of water which paralyzed the Athenian seamen, to his own obstinate improvidence in forbidding the egress of the fleet when insisted on by Demosthenês. His hearers probably were too much absorbed with the terrible present, to revert to irremediable mistakes of the past. Immediately on the conclusion of his touching address, the order was given to go aboard, and the seamen took their places. But when the triremes were fully manned, and the trierarchs, after superintending the embarkation, were themselves about to enter and push off, the agony of Nikias was too great to be repressed. Feeling more keenly than any man the intensity of this last death-struggle, and the serious, but inevitable, shortcomings of the armament in its present condition, he still thought that he had not said enough for the occasion. He now renewed his appeal personally to the trierarchs, all of them citizens of rank and wealth at Athens. They were all familiarly known to him, and he addressed himself to every man separately by his own name, his father's name, and his tribe, adjuring him by the deepest and most solemn motives which could touch the human feelings. Some he reminded of their own previous glories, others of the achievements of illustrious ancestors, imploring them not to dishonor or betray these precious titles: to all alike he recalled the charm of their beloved country, with its full political freedom and its unconstrained license of individual agency to every man: to all alike he appealed in the names of their wives, their children, and their paternal gods. He cared not for being suspected of trenching upon the common places of rhetoric: he caught at every topic which could touch the inmost affections, awaken the inbred patriotism, and rekindle the abated courage of the officers, whom he was sending forth to this desperate venture. He at length constrained himself to leave off, still fancying in his anxiety that he ought to say more, and proceeded to marshal the land-force for the defence of the lines, as well as along the shore, where they might render as much service and as much encouragement as possible to the combatants on shipboard.¹

¹ See the striking chapter of Thucyd. vii, 69. Even the tame style of Diodorus (xiii, 15) becomes animated in describing this scene.

Very different was the spirit prevalent, and very burning words uttered, on the seaboard of the Syracuse as the leaders were mustering their men immediately before the battle. They had been apprized of the grapple about to be employed by the Athenians, and had given them in part by stretching hides along their bows. Their "iron hand" might slip off without acquiring a preparatory movements even within the Athenian ranks perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the fleet out with a prefatory harangue. He complimented them on their achievements which they had already performed down the naval power of Athens, so long held inviolable, reminded them that the sally of their enemies was an effort of despair, seeking nothing but escape, under no confidence in themselves, and under the necessity of setting aside all their own tactics in order to copy feeble tactics of the Syracusans.² He called upon them to recollect the purposes which the invaders had brought with them to Syracuse, to inflict with resentful hand the finishing blow on this half-ruined armament, and to taste the delicious revenge.³

The Syracusan fleet — seventy-six triremes strong at the last battle — was the first to put off from shore. The Corinthians in the centre, Sikanus and Agathinus at the wings. A certain proportion of them were placed at the mouth of the harbor, in order to guard the entrance. The rest were distributed around the harbor in order to prevent the Athenians from different sides as soon as they should appear. Moreover, the surface of the harbor swarmed with the Syracusans, in many of which embarked

² Thucyd. vii, 65.

³ Thucyd.

² Thucyd. vii, 68. *πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην . . . καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντιοῦσιν τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιοῦσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι ἐγγενησόμενον ἡμῖν, καὶ (τὸ λεγόμενον) εἶναι.*

This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manly

teers, sons of the best families in the city;¹ boats of no mean service during the battle, saving or destroying the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships, as well as annoying the fighting Athenian triremes. The day was one sacred to Hêraklês at Syracuse; and the prophets announced that the god would insure victory to the Syracusans, provided they stood on the defensive, and did not begin the attack.² Moreover, the entire shore round the harbor, except the Athenian station and its immediate neighborhood, was crowded with Syracusan soldiers and spectators; while the walls of Ortygia, immediately overhanging the water, were lined with the feeble population of the city, the old men, women, and children. From the Athenian station presently came forth one hundred and ten triremes, under Demosthenês, Menander, and Euthydêmus, with the customary pæan, its tone probably partaking of the general sadness of the camp. They steered across direct to the mouth of the harbor, beholding on all sides the armed enemies ranged along the shore, as well as the unarmed multitudes who were imprecating the vengeance of the gods upon their heads; while for them there was no sympathy, except among the fellow-sufferers within their own lines. Inside of this narrow basin, rather more than five English miles in circuit, one hundred and ninety-four ships of war, each manned with more than two hundred men, were about to join battle, in the presence of countless masses around, all with palpitating hearts, and near enough both to see and hear; the most picturesque battle — if we could abstract our minds from its terrible interest

¹ Diodorus, xiii, 14. Plutarch has a similar statement, in reference to the previous battle: but I think he must have confused one battle with the other, for his account can hardly be made to harmonize with Thucydides (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24).

It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had probably read the description of the battles in the Great Harbor of Syracuse, contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we had his account before us, even than Thucydides; since he was probably at this time in Syracuse, and was perhaps actually engaged.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24, 25. Timæus reckoned the aid of Hêraklês as having been one of the great causes of Syracusan victory over the Athenians. He gave several reasons why the god was provoked against the Athenians: see Timæus, Fragm. 104, ed. Didot.

— probably in history, without smoke or other intervention, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily, a sensified realization of those *naumachiae* which the Romans used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, to the admiration of the people.

The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion where a narrow opening — perhaps closed by a mole — had been left for merchant-vessels. Their first impulse broke through the Syracusan squadron defending the entrance; the Athenians were already attempting to sever its connecting bands from the enemy from all sides crowded in upon them and desist. Presently the battle became general, and the vessels were distributed in various parts of the harbor. On both sides a fierce and desperate courage was displayed, even as had been shown on any of the former occasions. As the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone conspicuous, so was seconded by zeal on the part of the rowers and obedience to the voice of the *keleustês*. As the missiles of the bowmen, slingers, and throwers on the deck, hurled against the enemy; next, was heard the loud clashing of two impinging metallic fronts, resounding all about the harbor. When the vessels were thus once in contact, they were not allowed to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then ensued between the hoplites in each, trying respectively to board the enemy's deck. It was not always, however, that the vessels had their own single and special enemy: sometime

¹ The destructive impact of these metallic masses at the close of war, as well as the *periplus* practised by a lighter ship against a heavier, is strikingly illustrated by a passage in the Life of Lucullus, where a naval engagement between the Roman fleet and Neoptolemus the admiral of Mithridates, is described. The Roman fleet, on board a Rhodian quinquereme, commanded by Decimus Brutus, a Rhodian pilot; while Neoptolemus was approaching the Roman fleet, heavier, and driving forward to a direct collision: upon seeing this, he evaded the blow, rowed rapidly round, and struck the enemy's rear. . . . *δείσας ὁ Δαμαγόρας τὸ βάρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, καὶ τὴν τοῦ χαλκώματος, οὐκ ἐτόλμησε συμπεσεῖν ἀντίπρῳς, ἀλλὰ περιαγωγῆς ἀποστρέψας ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ πρύμναν ὤσασθαι. καὶ ταῦτα τῆς νέως ἐδέξατο τὴν πληγὴν ἀβλαβῇ γενομένην, αἰσθόμενος ὡς αὐτῇ τῆς νέως μέρεσι προσπεσοῦσαν.* — Plutarch, Lucull.

two or three enemies to contend with at once, sometimes she fell aboard of one unsought, and became entangled. After a certain time, the fight still obstinately continuing, all sort of battle order became lost; the skill of the steersman was of little avail, and the voice of the *keleustês* was drowned amidst the universal din and mingled cries from victors as well as vanquished. On both sides emulous exhortations were poured forth, together with reproach and sarcasm addressed to any ship which appeared flinching from the contest; though *factitus stimulus* of this sort was indeed but little needed.

Such was the heroic courage on both sides, that for a long time victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbor was a scene of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Syracusans, sometimes Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. At one and the same time, every variety of human emotion might be witnessed; according as attention was turned towards a victorious or a defeated ship. It was among the spectators in the Athenian station above all, whose entire life and liberty were staked in the combat, that this emotion might be seen exaggerated into agony, and overpassing the excitement even of the combatants themselves.¹ Those among them who looked towards a portion of the harbor where their friends seemed winning, were full of joy and thanksgiving to the gods: such of their neighbors who contemplated an Athenian ship in difficulty, gave vent to their feelings in shrieks and lamentation; while a third group, with their eyes fixed on some portion of the combat still disputed, were plunged in all the agitations of doubt, manifested even in the tremulous swing of their bodies, as hope or fear alternately predominated. During all the time that the combat remained undecided, the Athenians ashore were distracted by all these manifold varieties of intense sympathy. But at length the moment came, after a long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favor of the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening, redoubled their shouts as well as their efforts, and pushed them all back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes, abandoning farther resistance, were thrust ashore like shipwrecked

¹ Thucyd. vii, 71.

vessels in or near their own station ; a few being before they could arrive there. The diverse sympathies among the Athenians in the station itself exchanged for one unanimous shriek of agony and the boldest of them rushed to rescue the ships and the pursuit, others to man their walls in case of attack many were even paralyzed at the sight, and absent thoughts of their own irretrievable ruin. Their souls less still farther subdued by the wild and enthusiastic burst forth in maddening shouts from the hostile camp in the harbor, in response to their own victorious command on board.

Such was the close of this awful, heart-stirring combat. The modern historian strives in vain to give the impression of it which appears in the condensed phrases of Thucydides. We find in his description generally, and of this battle beyond all others, an abundance of human emotion which has now passed into literary proceedings. The Greeks who fight, like the Spartans, look on, are not soldiers withdrawn from the city, but specialized as well as hardened by long professions of citizens with all the passions, instincts, sympathies of citizens in rows of domestic as well as political life. More so in military population in ancient times had an intense kind in the result of the struggle ; which was of consequence to them, if not of life and death, at least of the happiness and misery. Hence the strong light of the Homeric exhibition of undisguised impulse, the personal motive and suffering, which pervades the military descriptions of Thucydides. When we read the most vehement words which he employs to depict the camp under this fearful trial, we must recollect that it was not only men whose all was at stake, but that it was over citizens full of impressibility, sensitive and brave Greeks ; and, indeed, the most sensitive and brave Greeks. To repress all manifestations of strong emotion was considered in ancient times essential to the dignified character.

Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the

has imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as one hundred and ten to seventy-six triremes, that they fought with courage not less heroic, and that the action was on their own element, we might have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn battle, with equal loss on both sides. But we may observe, 1. The number of one hundred and ten triremes was formed by including some hardly seaworthy.¹ 2. The crews were composed partly of men not used to sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters, especially, were for this reason unhandy with their missiles.² 3. Though the water had been hitherto the element favorable to Athens, yet her superiority in this respect was declining, and her enemies approaching nearer to her, even in the open sea. But the narrow dimensions of the harbor would have nullified her superiority at all times, and placed her even at great disadvantage, — without the means of twisting and turning her triremes so as to strike only at a vulnerable point of the enemy, — compared with the thick, heavy, straightforward butting of the Syracusans; like a nimble pugilist of light weight contending, in a very confined ring, against superior weight and muscle.³ For the mere land-fight on shipboard, Athenians had not only no advantage, but had on the contrary the odds against them. 4. The Syracusans enjoyed great advantage from having nearly the whole harbor lined round with their soldiers and friends; not simply from the force of encouraging sympathy, no

¹ Thucyd. vii, 60. τὰς ναῦς ἀπάσας ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἀπλοῦτεραι.

² Thucyd. vii, 60. πάντα τινα ἐσβιβάζοντες πληρῶσαι — ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ὁπῶσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι. Compare also the speech of Gylippus, c. 67.

³ The language of Theokritus, in describing the pugilistic contest between Pollux and the Bebrykian Amykus, is not inapplicable to the position of the Athenian ships and seamen when cramped up in this harbor (Idyll. xxii, 91): —

.....ἐκ δ' ἐτέρωθεν

Ἦρωες κρατερὸν Πολυδεῦκεα θαρσύνεσκον,

Δειδιότες μὴ πῶς μιν ἐπιβρίσας δαμάσειεν,

Χώρῳ ἐνὶ στείνῳ, Τιτύῳ ἐναλίγκιος ἀνὴρ.

Compare Virgil's picture of Entellus and Darès, *Æneid*, v, 430.

mean auxiliary, but because any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an Athenian, found protection on the shore, and could return to the fight at leisure; while an Athenian in the same predicament had no escape. 5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless rendered great service in this battle, as they had done in the preceding, though Thucydides does not again mention them. 6. Lastly, both in the Athenian and Syracusan characters, the pressure of necessity was less potent as a stimulus to action, than hopeful confidence and elation, with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting. In the character of some other races, the Jews for instance, the comparative force of these motives appears to be the other way.

About sixty Athenian triremes, little more than half of the fleet which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible conflict. The Syracusans on their part had suffered severely; only fifty triremes remaining out of seventy-six. The triumph with which, nevertheless, on returning to the city, they erected their trophy, and the exultation which reigned among the vast crowds encircling the harbor, was beyond all measure or precedent. Its clamorous manifestations were doubtless but too well heard in the neighboring camp of the Athenians, and increased, if anything could increase, the soul-subduing extremity of distress which paralyzed the vanquished. So utterly did the pressure of suffering, anticipated as well as actual, benumb their minds and extinguish their most sacred associations, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a truce to bury the dead. This obligation, usually so serious and imperative upon the survivors after a battle, now passed unheeded amidst the sorrow, terror, and despair, of the living man for himself.

Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals, to their honor be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat, Demosthenes proposed to Nikias that at daybreak the ensuing morning they should man all the remaining ships — even no more in number than the Syracusan — and make a fresh attempt to break out of the harbor. To this Nikias agreed, and he proceeded to try their influence in getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit of the seamen broken that nothing could prevail upon them to go again on shipboard.

would hear of nothing but attempting to escape by land.¹ Preparations were therefore made for commencing their march in the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open, and, had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even yet have been saved.² But there occurred one more mistake, one farther postponement, which cut off the last hopes of this gallant and fated remnant.

The Syracusan Hermokratês, fully anticipating that the Athenians would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat, because of the mischief which they might do if established in any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus and the military authorities to send out forthwith, and block up the principal roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off. Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought it wholly unexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy which now pervaded the city, in consequence of the recent victory, still farther magnified by the circumstance that the day was sacred to Hêraklês, — so wild the jollity, the feasting, the intoxication, the congratulations, amidst men rewarding themselves after their recent effort and triumph, and amidst the necessary care for the wounded, — that an order to arm and march out would have been as little listened to as the order to go on shipboard was by the desponding Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next morning, Hermokratês resorted to a stratagem in order to delay the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough to make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed them as messengers from the private correspondents of Nikias in Syracuse, who had sent to warn him, they affirmed, not to decamp during the night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and occupied the roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning after adequate preparation.³

This fraud — the same as the Athenians had themselves practised two years before,⁴ in order to tempt the Syracusans to

¹ Thucyd. vii, 72.

² Thucyd. vii, 73; Diodor. xiii, 18.

³ Diodor. xiii, 18.

⁴ Thucyd. vi, 64

march out against Katana — was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the information was believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenês been in command alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so easily duped; for granting the accuracy of the fact asserted, it was not the less obvious that the difficulties, instead of being diminished, would be increased tenfold on the following day. We have seen, however, on more than one previous occasion, how fatally Nikias was misled by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians at Syracuse. An excuse for inaction was always congenial to his character; and the present recommendation, moreover, fell in but too happily with the temper of the army, now benumbed with depression and terror, like those unfortunate soldiers, in the Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were yielding to the lethargy of extreme cold on the snows of Armenia, and whom Xenophon vainly tried to arouse.¹ Having remained over that night, the generals determined also to stay the next day, — in order that the army might carry away with them as much of their baggage as possible, — sending forward a messenger to the Sikels in the interior to request that they would meet the army, and bring with them a supply of provisions.² Gylippus and Hermokratês had thus ample time, on the following day, to send out forces and occupy all the positions convenient for obstructing the Athenian march. They at the same time towed into Syracuse as prizes all the Athenian triremes which had been driven ashore in the recent battle, and which now lay like worthless hulks, unguarded and unheeded,³ seemingly even those within the station itself.

It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that Nikias and Demosthenês put their army in motion to attempt retreat. The camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the prevalence of marsh fever; but since the recent battle the number of wounded men, and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered it yet more pitiable. Forty thousand miserable men — so prodigious was the total, including all ranks and functions — now set forth to quit it, on a march of which few could hope to see the end; like the pouring forth of the population of a

¹ Xenophon. *Anab.* iv, 5, 15, 19; v, 8, 15.

² Thucyd. vii, 77

³ Thucyd. vii, 74

large city starved out by blockade. Many had little or no provisions to carry, so low had the stock become reduced; but of those who had, every man carried his own, even the horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left without slaves, by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be trusted. But neither such melancholy equality of suffering, nor the number of sufferers, counted for much in the way of alleviation. A downcast stupor and sense of abasement possessed every man; the more intolerable, when they recollected the exit of the armament from Peiræus two years before, with prayers, and solemn pæans, and all the splendid dreams of conquest, set against the humiliation of the closing scene now before them, without a single trireme left out of two prodigious fleets.

But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that the full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then that the necessity first became proclaimed, which no one probably spoke out beforehand, of leaving behind not merely the unburied bodies, but also the sick and the wounded. The scenes of woe which marked this hour passed endurance or description. The departing soldier sorrowed and shuddered with the sentiment of an unperformed duty, as he turned from the unburied bodies of the slain; but far more terrible was the trial, when he had to tear himself from the living sufferers, who implored their comrades, with wailings of agony and distraction, not to abandon them. Appealing to all the claims of pious friendship, they clung round their knees, and even crawled along the line of march until their strength failed. The silent dejection of the previous day was now exchanged for universal tears and groans, and clamorous outbursts of sorrow, amidst which the army could not without the utmost difficulty be disengaged and put in motion.

After such heart-rending scenes, it might seem that their cup of bitterness was exhausted; but worse was yet in store, and the terrors of the future dictated a struggle against all the miseries of past and present. The generals did their best to keep up some sense of order as well as courage; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest personal sufferers of all,

from his incurable complaint, he was seen everywhere in the ranks marshalling the troops, heartening up their dejection, and addressing them with a voice louder, more strenuous, and more commanding than was his wont.

“Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are now: others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. Be not too much humiliated, either with your defeats or with your present unmerited hardships. I too, having no advantage over any of you in strength,—nay, you see the condition to which I have been brought by my disease,—and accustomed even to superior splendor and good fortune in private as well as public life, I too am plunged in the same peril with the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless, my conduct has been constantly pious towards the gods as well as just and blameless towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the future is yet sanguine, at the same time that our actual misfortunes do not appall me in proportion to their intrinsic magnitude.¹ Perhaps,

¹ Thucyd. vii, 77. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιῆσθαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. Ἄνθ' ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπίς δμως θρασεία τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι. Τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ λωφῆσαιαν· ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχεται, καὶ εἰ τῷ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀρκοῦντως ἤδη τετιμωρημεθα.

I have translated the words οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν, and the sentence of which they form a part, differently from what has been hitherto sanctioned by the commentators, who construe κατ' ἀξίαν as meaning “according to our desert,” understand the words αἱ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν as bearing the same sense with the words ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις some lines before; and likewise construe οὐ, not with φοβοῦσι, but with κατ' ἀξίαν, assigning to φοβοῦσι an affirmative sense. They translate: “Quare, *quamvis nostra fortuna prorsus afflictâ videatur* (these words have no parallel in the original) *rerum tamen futurarum spes est audax: sed clades, quas nullo nostro merito accepimus, nos jam terrent. At fortasse cessabunt,*” etc. M. Didot translates: “Aussi j'ai un ferme espoir dans l'avenir, *malgré l'effroi que des malheurs non mérités nous causent.*” Dr. Arnold passes the sentence over without notice.

This manner of translating appears to me not less unsuitable in reference to the spirit and thread of the harangue, than awkward as regards the individual words. Looking to the spirit of the harangue, the object of encouraging the dejected soldiers would hardly be much answered by repeating—what in fact had been glanced at in a manner sufficient and becoming, before—that “the unmerited reverses terrified either Nikias or the soldiers.” Then as to the words; the expressions ἀνθ' ὧν, δμως, μὲν, and δὲ, seem to me to denote, not only that the two halves of the sentence apply

indeed, they may from this time forward abate ; for our enemies have had their full swing of good fortune, and if, at the moment of our starting, we were under the jealous wrath of any of the

both of them to Nikias, but that the first half of the sentence is in harmony, not in opposition, with the second. Matthiæ (in my judgment, erroneously) refers (Gr. Gr. § 623) *δμως* to some words which have preceded ; I think that *δμως* contributes to hold together the first and the second affirmation of the sentence. Now the Latin translation refers the first half of the sentence to Nikias, and the last half to the soldiers whom he addresses ; while the translation of M. Didot, by means of the word *malgré*, for which there is nothing corresponding in the Greek, puts the second half in antithesis to the first.

I cannot but think that *οὐ* ought to be construed with *φοβοῦσι*, and that the words *κατ' ἀξίαν* do not bear the meaning assigned to them by the translators. *Ἀξίαν* not only means, "desert, merit, the title to that which a man has earned by his conduct," as in the previous phrase *παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν*, but it also means, "price, value, title to be cared for, capacity of exciting more or less desire or aversion," in which last sense it is predicated as an attribute, not only of moral beings, but of other objects besides. Thus Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikom. iii, 11) : *ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων, μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἢ δὲ οὐκ ἔχων ἀξίας* : *ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος*, etc. Again, *ibid.* iii, 5. *Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα, ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὥς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ, καὶ ὥς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος*. Again, *ibid.* iv, 2. *Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐχ εὐνυπερβλήτον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος*. Again, *ibid.* viii, 14. *Ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας*. Compare also *ib.* viii, 13.

Xenophon, *Cyrop.* viii, 4, 32. *τὸ γὰρ πολλὰ δοκοῦντα ἔχειν μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῆς οὐσίας φαίνεσθαι· ὠφελοῦντα τοὺς φίλους, ἀνελευθερίαν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ περιάπτειν*. Compare Xenophon, *Memorab.* ii, 5, 2. *ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων, εἰσὶν ἀξίαι* ; also *ibid.* i, 6, 11, and Isokratēs, *cont. Lochit.* Or. xx, s. 8.

The words *κατ' ἀξίαν* in Thucydides appear to me to bear the same meaning as in these passages of Xenophon and Aristotle, "in proportion to their value," or to their real magnitude. If we so construe them, the words *ἀνθ' ὧν*, *δμως μὲν*, and *δὲ*, all fall into their proper order : the whole sentence after *ἀνθ' ὧν* applies to Nikias personally, is a corollary from what he had asserted before, and forms a suitable point in an harangue for encouraging his dispirited soldiers : "Look how *I* bear up, who have as much cause for mourning as any of you. I have behaved well both towards gods and towards men : in return for which, I am comparatively comfortable both as to the future and as to the present : as to the future, I have strong

gods, we have already undergone chastisement amply sufficient. Other people before us have invaded foreign lands, and after having done what was competent to human power, have suffered what was within the limit of human endurance. We too may reasonably hope henceforward to have the offended god dealing with us more mildly, for we are now objects fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy.¹ Look, moreover, at your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that guard you against excessive despair, and recollect that, wherever you may sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; nor is there any other city in

hopes; at the same time that, as to the present, I am not overwhelmed by the present misfortunes in proportion to their prodigious intensity."

This is the precise thing for a man of resolution to say upon so terrible an occasion.

The particle *ὅ* has its appropriate meaning, *αὶ δὲ ἐνυφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ὕψιν δὲ φόβοις*; "and the present distresses, though they do appall me, do not appall me *assuredly* in proportion to their actual magnitude." Lastly, the particle *καὶ* (in the succeeding phrase, *τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ λωφῆσαιεν*) does not fit on to the preceding passage as usually construed: accordingly the Latin translator, as well as M. Didot, leave it out, and translate: "At fortasse cessabunt." "Mais peut être vont ils cesser." It ought to be translated: "And perhaps they may *even* abate," which implies that what had been asserted in the preceding sentence is here intended not to be contradicted, but to be carried forward and strengthened: see Kühner, Griech. Gramm. sects. 725-728. Such would not be the case as the sentence is usually construed.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἰκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχησαι, καὶ εἰ τῷ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα· ἤλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινες ἤδη ἐφ' ἐτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἐπαθον. Καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τὰ τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἡπιώτερα εἶξιν· οἰκτον γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου.

This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man or any nation who was preëminently powerful, fortunate, or prosperous. Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and promise with which his armament had started from Peiræus, now believed that this had provoked the jealousy some of the gods, and brought about the misfortunes in Sicily. He comforts his soldiers by saying that the enemy is now at the same dangerous pinnacle of exaltation, whilst they have exhausted the sad effects of divine jealousy.

Compare the story of Amasis and Polykratès in Herodotus (iii, 3' the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus Æmilius by F (Vit. Paul. Æmil. c. 36).

Sicily that can either repulse your attack or expel you if you choose to stay. Be careful yourselves to keep your march firm and orderly, every man of you with this conviction, that whatever spot he may be forced to fight in, that spot is his country and his fortress, and must be kept by victorious effort. As our provisions are very scanty, we shall hasten on night and day alike; and so soon as you reach any friendly village of the Sikels, who still remain constant to us from hatred to Syracuse, then consider yourselves in security. We have sent forward to apprise them, and intreat them to meet us with supplies. Once more, soldiers, recollect that to act like brave men is now a matter of necessity to you, and that if you falter, there is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if you now get clear of your enemies, such of you as are not Athenians will again enjoy the sight of home, while such of you as *are* Athenians will live to renovate the great power of our city, fallen though it now be. *It is men that make a city; not walls, nor ships without men.*"¹

The efforts of both commanders were in full harmony with these strenuous words. The army was distributed into two divisions; the hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by Demosthenês. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river, which they found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage, however, without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a march of about five miles, under the delay arising from the harassing of the enemy's cavalry and light troops. Encamping for that night on an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest dawn, and halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted village on a plain. They were in hopes of finding some provisions in the houses, and were even under the necessity of carrying along with them some water from this spot; there being none to be found farther on. As their intended line of march had now become evident, the Syracusans profited by this halt to get

¹ Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τεῖχῃ, οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν τεναί.

on before them, and to occupy in force a position on the road, called the Akraean cliff. Here the road, ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each side by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade across the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground on each side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence of the Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in the face of overwhelming attacks from the enemy's cavalry and light troops. They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their camp of the night before.¹

Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their food was all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry. Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akraean cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous and obstinate efforts to force this inexpugnable position, but all their struggles were vain, while they suffered miserably from the missiles of the troops above. Amidst all the discouragement of this repulse, they were yet farther disheartened by storms of thunder and lightning, which occurred during the time, and which they construed as portents significant of their impending ruin.²

This fact strikingly illustrates both the change which the last two years had wrought in the contending parties, and the degree to which such religious interpretations of phenomena depended for their efficacy on predisposing temper, gloomy or cheerful. In the first battle between Nikias and the Syracusans, near the Great Harbor, some months before the siege was begun, a similar thunder-storm had taken place: on that occasion the Athenian soldiers had continued the battle unmoved, treating it as a natural event belonging to the season, and such indifference on their part

¹ Thucyd. vii, 78.

² Thucyd. vii, 79. ὅς' ὦν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ἡθύμουν, καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ἐλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι.

had still farther imposed upon the alarmed Syracusans.¹ Now, both the self-confidence and the religious impression had changed sides.

Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back a short space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by sending a detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This, however, they prevented, effecting their retreat into the open plain, where they passed the night, and on the ensuing day attempted once more the hopeless march over the Akraean cliff. But they were not allowed even to advance so far as the pass and the barricade. They were so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank and rear, that, in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could not accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Extenuated by fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they were compelled to spend a third miserable night in the same fatal plain.

As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their camp, Nikias and Demosthenês took counsel. They saw plainly that the route which they had originally projected, over the Akraean cliff into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become impracticable, and that their unhappy troops would be still less in condition to force it on the morrow than they had been on the day preceding. Accordingly, they resolved to make off during the night, leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south of Syracuse, on the southeastern coast of Sicily, or a river still farther on, called the Erineus, — they might march up the right bank of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly, they broke up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; in spite of which, the front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and made considerable advance. By daybreak this division reached the southeastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse, and fell into the track of the Helôrîne road, which they pursued until they arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here,

¹ Thucyd. vi, 70.

however, they found a Syracusan detachment blocking them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up the fth Nikias pass it without forcing his way through there straightforward to the Erineus, which he crossed day, and encamped his troops on some high ground side.¹

Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march day unobstructed by the enemy; and he thought of his troops as fast as possible, in order to arrive at a place of safety and subsistence, without concerning his rear division under Demosthenês. That division, of the army, started both later and in great unaccountable panics and darkness made them possibly miss their way, so that Demosthenês, with all his troops together, made little progress, and fell much behind. He was overtaken by the Syracusans during the night, before he reached the Kakyparis,² and at a

¹ Thucyd. vii, 80-82.

² Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 280, copied by Gôller) says that the division of Demosthenês reached and passed the Kakyparis and was captured between the Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the text of Thucyd. vii, 80, 81, do not sustain this. The division of Demosthenês advanced from the beginning, and gained during the early part of the march, before daybreak; but that the disorder of the division of Demosthenês was the result of the delay: see c. 81 — *ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε συνεταράχθησαν*, etc. Demosthenês, therefore, says, that "at daybreak they arrived at the Kakyparis" (*ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν θάλατταν*, c. 80,) this cannot be true of Demosthenês. If the former arrived there at daybreak, he must have come to the same point till some time after daybreak, and must have been beforehand with Demosthenês when he reached the Kakyparis, and considerably more beforehand when he reached the Erineus. Over, we are expressly told that Nikias did not wait for the rear division, but he thought it for the best to get on as fast as possible with the front division.

It appears to me that the words *ἀφικνοῦνται*, etc. (c. 80) are understood both of Nikias and Demosthenês, but that the word *αὐτοῖς*, two or three lines behind: "the Athenians reached the sea," no attention being at that moment paid between the front and the rear divisions. The Athenians improperly, to reach the sea, at the time when the rear division reached it.

the foremost division was nearly six miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus.

When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had made off in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful surmises, however, were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth in rapid pursuit, until they overtook the rear division, which they immediately began to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenês had been tardy before, and his division disorganized: but he was now compelled to turn and defend himself against an indefatigable enemy, who presently got before him and thus stopped him altogether. Their numerous light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides and without intermission; employing nothing but missiles, however, and taking care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate division were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, and if possible to get forward, they found themselves inclosed in a walled olive-ground, through the middle of which the road passed; a farm bearing the name, and probably once the property, of Polyzêlus, brother of the despot Gelon.¹ Entangled and huddled up in this inclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face of an enemy was found impossible, they were now overwhelmed with hostile missiles from the walls on all sides.² Though unable to get at the en-

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

² Thucyd. vii, 81. Καὶ τότε γινὼς (sc. Demosthenês) τοὺς Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προῦχρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦνται τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτοὺς τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἐς τι χώριον, ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἐνθεν τε καὶ ἐνθεν, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περιστάδον.

I translate ὁδὸς δὲ ἐνθεν τε καὶ ἐνθεν differently from Dr. Arnold, from Mitford, and from others. These words are commonly understood to mean that this walled plantation was bordered by two roads, one on each side. Certainly the words *might* have that signification; but I think they also may have the signification (compare ii, 76) which I have given in the text, and which seems more plausible. It certainly is very improbable that the Athenians should have gone out of the road, in order to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they were fully aware that there was no safety for them except in getting away. If we suppose that the plantation lay exactly in the road, the word ἀνειληθέντες becomes perfectly explicable, on which

amy, and deprived even of the resources of an ac-
 endured incessant harassing for the greater part
 out refreshment or repose, and with the number
 continually increasing; until at length the remain-
 unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. In
 condition, Gylippus sent to them a herald with
 inviting all the islanders among them to come for
 and promising them freedom if they did so. To
 some cities, yet not many, — a fact much to their
 themselves of this offer and surrendered. Pres-
 larger negotiation was opened, which ended by the
 capitulating upon terms, and giving up their
 and the Syracusans engaged that the lives of all
 that is, that none should be put to death either by
 intolerable bonds, or by starvation. Having all
 they were forthwith conveyed away as prisoners
 six thousand in number. It is a remarkable
 and opulent circumstances of many among these
 when we are told that the money which they had
 at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient to
 of four shields.¹ Disdaining either to surrender
 stipulation for himself personally, Demosthenes
 of killing himself with his own sword the moment
 ulation was concluded; but his intention was
 was carried off a disarmed prisoner by the Syra-

I do not think that Dr. Arnold's comment is satisfactory
 the troops from the rear into the hither opening, which
 could not get out by the farther opening, would naturally
 and *huddling* inside. A road which passed right through
 entering at one side and coming out at the other, might
 ἐνθ' ἐν τε καὶ ἐνθ' ἐν. Compare Dr. Arnold's Remarks on
 cuse, vol. iii, p. 281; as well as his note on vii, 81.

I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for
 reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered
 from seeing beforehand distinctly the nature of the incline
 were hastening, and therefore prevented any precaution
 such as that of forbidding too many troops from entering.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thucyd. vii, 82.

² This statement depends upon the very good authority
 rary Syracusan, Philistus: see Pausanias, i, 29, 9; Philo-
 Didot.

On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprized him of the capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also. He demanded leave to send a horseman for the purpose of verifying the statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition to Gylippus, that his army should be permitted to return home, on condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made; one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were rejected; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to the same terms for his division as Demosthenês. Accordingly, the Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could until night. It was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion the Syracusans were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp, they raised the pæan, or war-shout; thus showing that they were on the lookout, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the arms which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of three hundred Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, apart from the rest, forced their way through the posts of the Syracusans. These men got safely away, and nothing but the want of guides prevented them from escaping altogether.¹

During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed by Nikias was exemplary; his sick and feeble frame was made to bear up, and even to hearten up stronger men, against the extremity of hardship, exhausting the last fragment of hope or even possibility. It was now the sixth day of the retreat, — six days² of constant privation, suffering, and endurance of attack, — yet Nikias early in the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply imbedded between lofty banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished, in spite of renewed and inces-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 83.

² Plutarch (Nikias, c. 27) says *eight* days, inaccurately.

same attacks all the way, from the Syracusan camp got to the river before the Athenians, occupying the high banks near it. Here the res- un- happy fugitives at length gave way; when the river, their strength, their patience, their spirit, and for the future, were all extinct. Tormented with and compelled by the attacks of the cavalry to compact mass, they rushed into the ford all at down and tumbling over each other in the un- ve drink. Many thus perished from being pushed points of the spears, or lost their footing among articles of baggage, and were thus borne down. Meanwhile, the Syracusans from above poured upon mass showers of missiles, while the Peloponnesians descended into the river, came to close quarters and slew considerable numbers. So violent, never thirst of the Athenians, that all other suffering order to taste relief by drinking. And even wounded were heaped in the river, — when the water and turbid with blood, as well as thick with the dead — still, the new-comers pushed their way in with voracity.²

Wretched, helpless, and demoralized as the Nicias could think no farther of resistance. He rendered himself to Gylippus, to be dealt with at that general and of the Lacedæmonians,³ even that the slaughter of the defenceless soldiers in. Accordingly, Gylippus gave orders that no more but that the rest should be secured as captives slain before this order was understood; but of the almost all were made captive, very few escaped the detachment of three hundred, who had been night, having seemingly not known whither to go.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 85. See Dr. Arnold's note.

² Thucyd. vii, 84. ἐβαλλον ἀνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλοὺς ἀσμεένους, καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποταμῷ παρασσωμένους.

³ Thucyd. vii, 85, 86; Philistus, Fragm. 46, ed. Didot

and brought in by troops sent forth for the purpose.¹ The triumph of the Syracusans was in every way complete; they hung the trees on the banks of the Asinarus with Athenian panoplies as trophy, and carried back their prisoners in joyous procession to the city.

The number of prisoners thus made, is not positively specified by Thucydides, as in the case of the division of Demosthenes, which had capitulated and laid down their arms in a mass within the walls of the olive-ground. Of the captives from the division of Nikias, the larger proportion were seized by private individuals, and fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number obtained for the state being comparatively small, seemingly not more than one thousand.² The various Sicilian towns became soon full of these prisoners, sold as slaves for private account.

Not less than forty thousand persons in the aggregate had started from the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days before. Of these probably many, either wounded or otherwise incompetent even when the march began, soon found themselves unable to keep up, and were left behind to perish. Each of the six days was a day of hard fighting and annoyance from an indefatigable crowd of light troops, with little, and at last seemingly nothing, to eat. The number was thus successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling, so that the six thousand taken with Demosthenes, and perhaps three thousand or four thousand captured with Nikias, formed the melancholy remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad to learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and get to Katana, where also those who afterwards ran away from their slavery under private masters, found a refuge.³ These fugitive

¹ Thucyd. vii, 85; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

² Thucydides states, roughly, and without pretending to exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives brought to Syracuse under public supervision, was not less than seven thousand — ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ἑξήκοντες, ἀκριβεῖς μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξεικεῖν, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσονες ἑπτακισχιλίων (vii, 87). As the number taken with Demosthenes was six thousand (vii, 82), this leaves one thousand as having been obtained from the division of Nikias.

³ Thucyd. vii, 85. πολλοὶ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραύτικα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον. The word παραύτικα means, during the retreat.

Athenians served as auxiliaries to repel the attack upon Katana.¹

It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons whom she sent forth in two such splendid divisions to Sicily. They were carried as prisoners to Syracuse, fewer yet than the other prisoners, in the stone-quarries of Syracuse there were several, partly on the southern descent towards the Nekropolis, or from the higher level of Aehradina, — partly in the suburb of Neapolis, under the southern cliff of Epipolæ. In — deep hollows of confined space, with precipitous open at the top to the sky — the miserable captives plunged, lying huddled one upon another, with no protection or convenience. For subsistence, they had only a ration of one pint of wheaten bread, — half of a slave, — with no more than half a pint of wine. They were not preserved from the pangs either of hunger or cold. Moreover, the heat of the midday sun, alternating with the autumn nights, was alike afflicting and distressing. The wants of life having all to be performed without relief, the filth and stench presently became insupportable. Sick and wounded even at the moment of arrival they speedily died; and happiest was he who died before becoming an unconscious corpse, which the Syracusans were in trouble to remove, to distress and infect the city. In this condition and treatment they remained for several months, ably serving as a spectacle for the triumphant Athenians, with their wives and children, to come upon, and to congratulate themselves on their freedom from sufferings similar in kind at least, if not in degree. At that time the novelty of the spectacle had worn off, and it must have become a den of abomination and detestable even to the citizens themselves. Accordingly they removed all the surviving prisoners, except the

¹ Lysias pro Polystrato. Orat. xx, sects. 26-28, c. 6,

and the few Italian or Sicilian Greeks among them. All those so removed were sold for slaves;¹ while the dead bodies were probably at the same time taken away, and the prison rendered somewhat less loathsome. What became of the remaining prisoners, we are not told; it may be presumed that those who could survive so great an extremity of suffering might after a certain time be allowed to get back to Athens on ransom. Perhaps some of them may have obtained their release; as was the case, we are told, with several of those who had been sold to private masters, by the elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of their demeanor. The dramas of Euripidês were so peculiarly popular throughout all Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by heart considerable portions of them, won the affections of their masters. Some even of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to have procured for themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and hospitality during their flight. Euripidês, we are informed, lived to receive the thanks of several among these unhappy sufferers, after their return to Athens.² I cannot refrain from mentioning this story, though I fear its trustworthiness as matter of fact is much inferior to its pathos and interest.

Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês, not merely the Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement simply, without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion advocated by Hermokratês.³ But Gylippus, then in

¹ Thucyd. vii, 87. Diodorus (xiii, 20-32) gives two long orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly, in discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old citizen, named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is made to advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is introduced as the orator recommending harshness and revenge.

From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not know; but his whole account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy.

One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the prisoners received each two *chaenikes* of barley-meal, instead of two *kotylæ*; the *chaenix* being four times as much as the *kotylê* (Diodor. xiii, 19).

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 29; Diodor. xiii, 33. The reader will see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian prisoners whom they took in Sicily, in Diodor. xiii, 111.

³ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28; Diodor. xiii, 19.

full ascendancy and an object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a reward to himself to be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to Sparta. To achieve this would have earned for him signal honor in the eyes of his countrymen; for while Demosthenês, from his success at Pylos, was their hated enemy, Nikias had always shown himself their friend as far as an Athenian could do so. It was to him that they owed the release of their prisoners taken at Sphakteria; and he had calculated upon this obligation when he surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus, and not to the Syracusans.

In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him themselves, and prevailed on the other allies to do the same. They were afraid that the wealth of Nikias would always procure for him the means of escaping from imprisonment, so as to do them farther injury, and they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias during the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of the way, being apprehensive that, if tortured by their political opponents, he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various influences prevailed, and Nikias as well as Demosthenês was ordered to be put to death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the discontent of Gylippus. Hermokratês vainly opposed the resolution, but perceiving that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a private intimation before the discussion closed; and procured for them, through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own hands. Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to the view of the Syracusan citizens;¹ while the day on which the final capture of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be celebrated as an annual festival, under the title of the *Asinaria*, on the twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month *Karneius*.²

¹ Thucyd. vii, 86; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. The statement which Plutarch here cites from Timæus respecting the intervention of Hermokratês, is not in any substantial contradiction with Philistus and Thucydides. The word *κλειυσθέντας* seems decidedly preferable to *καταλευσθέντας*, in the text of Plutarch.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. Though Plutarch says that the month *Karneius* is "that which the Athenians call *Metageitnion*," yet it is not safe to

Such was the close of the expedition, or rather of the two expeditions, undertaken by Athens against Syracuse. Never in Grecian history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and so full of promise and confidence, been turned out; never in Grecian history had ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and unexpected, been witnessed.¹ Its consequences were felt from one end of the Grecian world to the other, as will appear in the coming chapters.

The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had been throughout lofty and unshaken; after his death it was exchanged for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his colleague Demosthenês was engraved, on the funereal pillar erected to commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias explains by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced himself as a military man by his voluntary surrender, which Demosthenês had disdained.²

affirm that the day of the slaughter of the Asinarus was the 16th of the Attic month Metageitnion. We know that the civil months of different cities seldom or never exactly coincided. See the remarks of Franz on this point, in his comment on the valuable Inscriptions of Tauromenium, Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 5640, part xxxii, sect 3, p. 640.

The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less than twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse, which occurred on the 27th of August, that is, about Sept. 21. Mr. Fynes Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 413 B.C.) seems to me to compress too much the interval between the eclipse and the retreat; considering that that interval included two great battles, with a certain delay before, between, and after.

The *μερόπωρον* noticed by Thucyd. vii, 79, suits with Sept. 21: compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 87.

² Pausan. i, 29, 9; Philist. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.

Justin erroneously says that Demosthenês actually did kill himself, rather than submit to surrender, before the surrender of Nikias; who, he says, did not choose to follow the example:—

“Demosthenês, amisso exercitu, a captivitate gladio et voluntariâ morte se vindicat: Nicias autem, ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo, ut sibi consuleret, admonitus, cladem suorum auxit dedecore captivitatis.” (Justin, iv, 5.)

Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is an excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so good a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those facts.

It seems certain, even from Thucydides, that Nikias, in surrendering himself to Gylippus, thought that he had considerable chance of saving his life;

The opinion of Thucydides deserves special notice of this judgment of his countrymen. While he says nothing about Demosthenes, beyond the fact of his execution, he refers to Nikias a few words of marked commendation. "Such, or nearly such, (he says,) was why Nikias was put to death; though he assuredly the Greeks of my time, least deserved to come to so much of ill-fortune, considering his exact performance of duties to the divinity."¹

If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, judging his personal conduct in one scale against his

Plutarch too so interprets the proceeding, and condemns it. He sees his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, near the end of the speech, and could not have thought the same for himself: the fact of Nikias's suicide appears to me certain, on the authority of Philistides, who does not notice it.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 86. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτην ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἥμιστά δὲ ἄξιός ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο καταβύθισται, διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἐπιτιμήν.

So stood the text of Thucydides, until various recent editions, on the authority of some MSS., to διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτιμήν.

Though Dr. Arnold and some of the best critics prefer the latter reading, I confess it seems to me that the former is the Greek vein of thought, as well as more conformable to the character of Nikias.

A man's good or bad fortune, depending on the favor or disfavour of the gods towards him, was understood to be determined directly by his piety and religious observances, rather than by his personal merits. See passages in Isokrates de Permutation. Orat. xv, sec. 1; and Nikomach. c. 5, p. 854, though undoubtedly the two ideas were often extent together. Men might differ about the virtue of Nikias, but it was an incontestable fact; and his "good fortune" also, in connection with the Sicilian expedition, was recognized by men like Aristotle. Aristotle probably had no very lofty opinion of his virtue (Thucydides contrasts between the remarkable piety of Nikias, and the ill-fortune which marked the close of his life, was very likely the case generally, and was a natural circumstance for the comparison. Whereas if we read, in the passage, πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν. Nikias becomes both less special and more disproportionate. Even Thucydides (as far as we can infer from other evidence) would be inclined to bestow upon him; more, in fact, commendation even of Perikles.

ing on the other, the remark of Thucydides would be natural and intelligible. But the general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives of thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests of his country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His private merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with the discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must stand or fall.

Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of Nikias? We are compelled to say, that if his personal suffering could possibly be regarded in the light of an atonement, or set in an equation against the mischief brought by himself both on his army and his country, it would not be greater than his deserts. I shall not here repeat the separate points in his conduct which justify this view, and which have been set forth as they have occurred, in the preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias, and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last few days in Sicily, it is not the less incontestable, that, first, the failure of the enterprise, next, the destruction of the armament, is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. Sometimes petty trifling, sometimes apathy and inaction, sometimes presumptuous neglect, sometimes obstinate blindness even to urgent and obvious necessities, one or other of these his sad mental defects, will be found operative at every step, whereby this fated armament sinks down from exuberant efficiency into the last depth of aggregate ruin and individual misery. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed, not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with the reality of his proceedings. The man whose flagrant incompetency brought such wholesale ruin upon two fine armaments intrusted to his command, upon the Athenian maritime empire, and ultimately upon Athens herself, must appear on the tablets of history under the severest condemnation, even though his personal virtues had been loftier than those of Nikias.

And yet our great historian, after devoting two immortal books to this expedition, after setting forth emphatically both the glory of its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic genius parallel to the *Cedipus Tyrannus* of Sophoklès, when he

comes to recount the melancholy end of the two, and no words to spare for Demosthenès, — far the ablest of the two, who perished by no fault of his own, — but reposed to strew on the grave of Nikias, the author of the — “What a pity! Such a respectable and religious

Thucydides is here the more instructive, because he represents the sentiment of the general Athenian people during his lifetime. They could not bear mistrust, to dismiss, or to do without, so respectable a citizen. The private qualities of Nikias were not entitled him to the most indulgent construction of his short-comings, but also insured to him credit for his military competence altogether disproportionate. When we find Thucydides, after narrating so much of mismanagement on the grand scale, still kept fixed on the private morality and decorum of Nikias, constituted the main feature of his character, we can see that the Athenian people originally came both to over-estimate an unfortunate leader, and continued over-estimating his cautious fidelity even after glaring proof of his incapacity in the political history of Athens did the people make a mistake in placing their confidence.

In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgment, it is apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on the influence of demagogic influences. Mankind being usually composed of governable material, or as instruments for the use of their rulers, and decorating their rulers, whatever renders them difficult to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the list of vices. Nor can it be denied that this was a real cause: clever criminating speakers often passed for something above their real worth; though useful as a protection against worse, they soon led the people into measures impolitic or unjust. To grant, to the cause of misjudgment here indicated, more practical efficiency than history will fairly sanction, is one among others more mischievous. Never at Athens, by mere force of demagogic qualities, was a measure of esteem at once so exaggerated and combined with so much power of injuring his fellow

anti-demagogic Nikias. The man who, over and above his shabby manoeuvre about the expedition against Sphakteria, and his improvident sacrifice of Athenian interests in the alliance with Sparta, ended by inflicting on his country that cruel wound which destroyed so many of her citizens as well as her maritime empire, was not a leather-seller of impudent and criminative eloquence, but a man of ancient family and hereditary wealth, munificent and affable, having credit not merely for the largesses which he bestowed, but also for all the insolences, which as a rich man he might have committed, but did not commit, — free from all pecuniary corruption, — a brave man, and above all, an ultra-religious man, believed therefore to stand high in the favor of the gods, and to be fortunate. Such was the esteem which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities purely personal and negative with eminent station, that they presumed the higher aptitudes of command,¹ and presumed them, unhappily, after proof that they did not exist, — after proof that what they had supposed to be caution was only apathy and mental weakness. No demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people so deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias. Now it was against the overweening ascendancy of such decorous and pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural bar and corrective. Performing the functions of a constitutional opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure whereby blunders and shortcomings might be arrested in time. How insufficient was the check which it provided, — even at Athens, where every one denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess, — the history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony.

¹ A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus (Hist. i, 49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias, much more than those of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch compares the latter : —

“Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes : ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed claritas natalium, et metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut quod segnitia fuit, sapientia vocaretur. Dum vigeat ætas, militari laude apud Germanias floruit : proconsul, Africam moderate ; jam senior, citeriorem Hispaniam, pari justitiâ continuit. Major privato vi-
sus, dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.”

CHAPTER LXI.

FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN
SICILY, DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY
FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

In the preceding chapter we followed to its end the united armament of Nikias and Demosthenes to the harbor and lastly in the neighborhood of Syracuse end of September, 413 B.C.

The first impression which we derive from that narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly chiefly for the number of gallant Athenians who perished, partly also for the Syracusan victors, the months before on the verge of apparent ruin. The direct and collateral effects of the catastrophe throughout yet more momentous than those within the island occurred.

I have already mentioned that even at the time Demosthenes with his powerful armament left Sicily, the hostilities of the Peloponnesian war at Athens herself had been already recommenced. The Spartan king Agis ravaging Attica, but the first step of fortifying Dekeleia, for the abode of a garrison, was in course of completion. That fortress begun about the middle of March, was probably in June in a situation to shelter its garrison, which was reinforced periodically furnished, and relieving constantly, from all the different states of the confederacy, by the permanent command of king Agis himself.

And now began that incessant marauding of the Peloponnesians — destined to last for nine years until the fall of Athens — partially contemplated even at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, and recently enforced, with increased violence of its disastrous effects, by the virulent and cruel exile Alkibiades.¹ The earlier invasions of At-

¹ Thucyd. i, 122-142; vi. 90.

temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty as from the extraordinary vigor which Agis displayed in his operations. His excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable slaves, or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great numbers; more than twenty thousand of them soon disappeared in this way. So terrible a loss of income, both to proprietors of land and to employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that island had previously come over land from Oropus, but as that road was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, they were now of necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy's privateers.¹ In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them to keep watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were either on the battlements or at the various military stations in the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the condition of something like a military post.² Moreover, the rich citizens of the state, who

¹ Thucyd. viii, 4. About the extensive ruin caused by the Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias, Or. vii, *De Oleâ Sacrà*, sects. 6, 7.

An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh's *Corp. Inscr.* (part ii, No. 93, p. 132), gives some hint how landlords and tenants met this inevitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The deme *Æxôneis* lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a fixed rent of one hundred and forty drachmæ; but if an invading enemy shall drive him out or injure his farm, the deme is to receive one half of the year's produce, in place of the year's rent.

² Thucyd. vii, 28, 29.

served as horsemen, shared in the general hardship on for daily duty in order to restrain at least, since not entirely prevent, the excursions of the garrison their efficiency was, however, soon impaired by their horses on the hard and stony soil.¹

Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, so pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state the immense expense incurred in fitting out the two armaments for Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulated treasure of the treasury during the interval since the Peace of Nicias, that the attacks from Dekeleia, not only imposed a great additional cost, but at the same time cutting up the means of revenue brought the finances of Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had hitherto been taxed, instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she now required from them payment of a duty of five per cent. on all exports by sea.² How this new principle of assessment worked we have unfortunately no information. To collect the tax and take precautions against evasion, an Athenian officer must have been required in each allied city, a task difficult to understand how Athens could have effected at once novel, extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers, when we come to see how much her land forces, her payers, as well as her naval force, became enfeebled by the close even of the actual year.³

¹ Thucyd. vii, 27.

² Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:—

“Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid up for the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that time in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the dependent states; the arbitrary power by which it was imposed being ably execrated, though the burden itself was comparatively light.”

This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent assertions which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire of Athens, that its system of extortion and oppression ruinous to the subject states.

I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that it was the heaviest tax then known in the world; and that “it caused much discontent among the subject commonwealths.” The latter

Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against the enemy at Deceleia. These Thracian peltasts, thirteen hundred in number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with Demosthenês to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country, with instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly, Diitrephês, putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part of the strait, from whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the neighborhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen, lay in wait near a temple of Hermês about two miles distant, and fell upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians, dwelling in the centre of Bœotia, not far from Thebes, and at a considerable distance from the sea, such an assault was not less unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble, in some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses and even the temples plundered, but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst for blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle, etc. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been assembled, and masa-

indeed be sufficiently probable, if it be true that the tax ever came into operation; but we are not entitled to affirm it.

Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire. And the fact that Thucydides does not notice it as an additional cause of discontent among the allies, is one reason for such doubts.

ered them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed who had not been seen in Greece since the days recounted with horror and sympathy throughout communities, though Mykaléssus was in itself a catastrophe of first-rate magnitude.¹

The succor brought from Thebes, by Mykaléssus, arrived unhappily only in time to avenge, but not to save the inhabitants. The Thracians were already retiring, and the Athenians, which they could carry away, when the boeotarch overtook them, both with cavalry and hoplites, and put to death some greedy plunderers who tarried in the town. He compelled them to relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore; not without a battle, from these peltasts, who had a peculiar way of fighting, which disconcerted the Thebans. But when they arrived at the shore, the Athenian ships did not think it safe to close, so that not less than two hundred and fifty Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;² and the commander, Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.

Meanwhile, the important station of Naupaktus on the Corinthian gulf again became the theatre of a great battle. It will be recollected that this was the scene of the most remarkable victories gained by the Athenian admiral Pericles, in the second year of the Peloponnesian war,³ where the superiority of Athens over her enemies, as to sea power, and the admiral, had been so transcendently manifested. The state of affairs had now considerably changed. While the Athenians had fallen off since the days of Phormion, the Corinthians had improved: Ariston, and other skilful Corinthian

¹ Thucyd. vii, 29, 30, 31. I conceive that *ὅση οὐ μὲν* is the correct reading, and not *ὅση μεγάλη*, in reference to Mykaléssus. *ἐπὶ μεγέθει*, in c. 31, refer to the size of the city.

The reading is, however, disputed among critics. It is the language of Thucydides that the catastrophe at Mykaléssus found impression throughout Greece.

² Thucyd. vii, 30; Pausanias, i, 23, 3. Compare the fragment of the Isthmian Games. *Ἡρώς*, vol. ii, p. 1069.

See above, vol. vi, ch. xlix, p. 196, of this History.

not attempting to copy Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,¹ at Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match for twenty-five Corinthian; but the Athenian admiral of this year, Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen triremes with ten others,—out of the best of their fleet, at a time when they had certainly none to spare,—on the ground that the Corinthian fleet opposite, of twenty-five sail, was about to assume the offensive against him.²

Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon, with some fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes thirty-three. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes. They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of the coast, or bay, in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and feeble beaks, while it was favorable to the solid bows and thick epôtids, or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on their side, yet not advancing far enough out to sea to admit of the manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian side, not

¹ See the preceding chapter.

² Thucyd. vii, 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii, 88, 89.

one trireme became absolutely water-logged, but much damaged, by straightforward collision with that of the enemy, that they became almost useless back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far that they maintained their station, while the Corinthians ventured to renew the fight: moreover, both the winds set towards the northern shore, so that the floating and dead bodies came into possession of the Athenians. The Athenians thought itself entitled to erect a trophy, but the victory lay on the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The reputed maritime superiority of Athens, felt by both parties to have sustained a diminution, assuredly would have been the impression of Pericles, had he been alive to witness it.¹

This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we know, a short time before the arrival of Demosthenes at Athens, about the close of the month of May. We can see that the Athenians most anxiously expected news from Sicily, with some account of victories obtained in Sicily, for having sent him away at a moment when his services were most cruelly wanted at home. Perhaps they may even have had hopes of the near capture of Syracuse, as a means of relieving their crippled finances. Their disappointment was more bitter when they came to receive, towards the middle or beginning of July, despatches announcing the success of Demosthenes in his attempt upon Epipolæ, and the extinction of all hope that Syracuse could ever be captured. These despatches, we may perhaps doubt whether they subsequently reached Athens. The generals would have been during the month of indecision immediately sent to Demosthenes, who was pressing for retreat, and Nicias would have been. They might possibly, however, write immediately, without any resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent for the aid of further supplies of provisions, but this was a most favorable opportunity; for closely afterwards followed the blockade and the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbour, and the mere absence of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 34.

affairs in Sicily were proceeding badly ; but the closing series of calamities, down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge indirectly ; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes, partly through individual soldiers of their own armament who escaped.

According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop and began to converse about it, as upon a theme which must of course be uppermost in every one's mind.

The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of uncertified rumors for the disturbance of the public tranquillity, and even put to the torture.¹ How much of this improbable tale may be true, we cannot determine ; but we may easily believe that neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenês in Sicily during the months of July and August. Presently came individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the defeat and found a passage home ; so that the bad news was but too fully confirmed. But the Athenians were long before they could bring themselves to believe, even upon the testimony of these fugitives, how entire had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments, without even a feeble remnant left to console them.²

As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest affliction, dismay, and terror. Over and above the extent of private mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread nearly the whole city, there prevailed utter despair as to the public safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty, her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 30. He gives the story without much confidence, Ἀθηναίους δὲ φασί, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 1.

her hoplites as well as of her seamen had perished without leaving their like behind, and her maritime power was irretrievably damaged; while her enemies, so animated by feelings of exuberant confidence and farther strengthened by the accession of their new allies. In these melancholy months — October, November, December — the Athenians expected nothing less than a vigorous attack by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and Sicilian forces, with the aid of their own revolted allies, an attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.¹

Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of light on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to them to find pleasure on the chief speakers who had recommended the disastrous expedition, or on those prophets and oracles who had promised them the divine blessing.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 1. Πάντα δὲ παντάχῃθεν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίειν.

² Thucyd. viii, 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγνώσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν μαθεῖσθαι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἐκπλοῦν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοῖς ἔμελλεν.

From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydides represents the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by the vote, as debarring themselves from the right of complaining of the result. They had stood forward prominently to advise the step. It was in their own opinion. The adviser of any important measure is himself morally responsible for its justice, usefulness, and success. He very properly incurs disgrace, more or less according to the results. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the adviser a responsibility not merely *moral*, but even *legal*, responsibility; a responsibility under other circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens.

It must be admitted, however, to have been hard upon the advisers of this expedition, that — from the total destruction of the generals nor soldiers returning — they were not enabled to see the ruin had arisen from faults in the execution, not in the advice. The speaker in the Oration of Lysias — *περὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς* (Or. xviii, sect. 2) — attempts to transfer the blame upon the advisers of the expedition, a manifest injustice.

Demosthenes (in the Oration De Coronâ, c. 73) gives a noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully assumes as a political speaker and adviser; responsibility for success and understanding the premonitory signs of coming evil.

After this first burst both of grief and anger, however, they began gradually to look their actual situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers would doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them how much had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years before, when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers not less overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of despair revived in their bosoms; they resolved to get together, as speedily as they could, both ships and money, — to keep watch over their allies, especially Eubœa, — and to defend themselves to the last. A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies, and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to require. The propositions of these probûli were for the most part adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in an Athenian assembly, springing out of that pressure and alarm of the moment which silenced all criticism.¹ Among other economies, the Athenians abridged the costly splendor of their choric and liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison which they had established on the Laconian coast; they at the same time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and fortified Cape Sunium, in order to protect their numerous transport ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.²

countrymen warning beforehand: *ιδεῖν τὰ πρῶγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθῆσαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις*. This is the just view of the subject; and, applying the measure proposed by Demosthenês, the Athenians had ample ground to be displeased with their orators.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 1. *πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεῖς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὁ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν*; compare Xenoph. Mem. iii, 5, 5.

² Thucyd. viii, 1–4. About the functions of this Board of Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in Thucydides: *τῶν τὲ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἐλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ἢ προβουλεύουσιν*. *Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεῖς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὁ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν*.

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: "That is, no measure was to be submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by this council of elders." And such is the general view of the commentators.

• No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in the word

While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and aggressive scheming against her. So vast an event as the destruction of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity; it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies, subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was sealed, and

Πρόβουλοι. It is, indeed, conceivable that persons so denominated might be invested with such a control; but we cannot infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will the passages in Aristotle's *Politics*, wherein the word *Πρόβουλοι* occurs, authorize any inference with respect to this Board in the special case of Athens (*Aristotel. Politic.* iv, 11, 9; iv, 12, 8; vi, 5, 10-13).

The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens, being named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar pressure and discouragement. During such a state of feeling, there was little necessity for throwing additional obstacles in the way of new propositions to be made to the people. It was rather of importance to *encourage* the suggestion of new measures, from men of sense and experience. A Board destined merely for control and hindrance, would have been mischievous instead of useful under the reigning melancholy at Athens.

The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, like all the other magistracies of the state, and was not reconstituted after their deposition.

I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the functions of this Board of *Probuli* now constituted, from the proceedings of the *Probulus* in *Aristophanis Lysistrata*, as is done by Wachsmuth (*Hellenische Alterthumskunde*, i, 2, p. 198), and by Wattenbach (*De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione*, pp. 17-21, Berlin 1842).

Schömann (*Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor.* v, xii, p. 181) says of these *Πρόβουλοι*. "*Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse.*" I do not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether he means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members were annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from it. I think that the Board lasted until the time of the Four Hundred, which would be about a year and a half after its first institution

that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for operations both by land and sea to be then commenced; all these allies being prepared to do their best, in hopes that this effort would be the last required from them, and the most richly rewarded. A fleet of one hundred triremes was directed to be prepared against the spring; fifty of these being imposed in equal proportion on the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Bœotians; fifteen on Corinth, fifteen on the Phocians and Lokrians; ten on the Arcadians, with Pellênê and Sikyon; ten on Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê. It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built and launched during the interval between September and March.¹ The same large hopes, which had worked upon men's minds at the beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of the Peloponnesians;² the rather as that powerful force from Sicily, which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.³

From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his circuit, he visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac gulf, and levied large contributions on the neighboring Cœtæans, in reprisal for the plunder which they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.⁴

It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the inhabitants of Eubœa—probably of Chalkis and Eretria—applied to him, entreating his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which he readily promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of three hundred Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to

¹ Thucyd. viii, 2, 3. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἐποιούντο, etc.; compare also c. 4—παρεσκευάζοντε τὴν ναυπηγίαν, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 5. ὧτων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου: compare ii, 7.

³ Thucyd. viii, 2: compare ii, 7; iii, 86.

⁴ Thucyd. viii, 3

be despatched across to the island as harmost permanently at his disposal, with full liberty of the Spartan king at Dekeleia was more influential authorities at home, so that the disaffected allies dressed themselves in preference to him. It was envoys from Lesbos visited him for this purpose. was their claim enforced by the Bœotians (their Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten triremes provided Agis would send ten others, that he postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to do as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,² without the authorities at Sparta.

The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa latter, was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. not the worst. At the same time that these two negotiating with Agis, envoys from Chios, the first of all Athenian allies, had gone to Sparta purpose. The government of Chios,—an oligarchy distinguished for its prudent management and cautions risks,—considering Athens to be now on the verge in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in for achieving independence.³

Besides these three great allies, whose example was sure to be followed by others, Athens was of being assailed by other enemies yet more unequal Persian satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernes and Artabazus. No sooner was the Athenian disaster known at the court of Susa, than the Great King ordered these two satraps the tribute due from the Asiatic coast; for which they had always stood enrolled records, though it had never been actually levied complete establishment of the Athenian empire. realize this tribute, for which the satraps were then was to detach the towns from Athens, and break

¹ Thucyd. viii, 5.

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³ Thucyd. viii, 5. Ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐπὶ (Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς πόλεις, οὓς δι'

for which purpose Tissaphernes sent an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in Asia; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man of the ship's crews.¹ He farther hoped by means of this aid to reduce Amorgès the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who was established in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that Amorgès should be either brought prisoner to Susa or slain.

At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras, two Grecian exiles in the service of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character from that satrap, whose government² comprehended the coast lands north of Æolis, from the Euxine and Propontis, to the northeast corner of the Elæatic gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and realize the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernes as the medium of alliance between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose between them, one striving to attract the projected expedition to Chios, the other to the Hellespont:³ for which latter purpose, Kalligeitus

Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πρᾶσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησε. Τοῖς τε οὖν φόροις μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομμεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, etc.

I have already discussed this important passage at some length, in its bearing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years before this time between Athens and Persia. See the note to volume v, chap. xlv, pp. 337-339, of this History.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 29. Καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφὴν, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβοῦλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, etc.

² The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as Antandrus and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii, 108).

³ Thucyd. viii, 6.

had brought twenty-five talents, which he ten payment in part.

From all quarters, new enemies were thus spr Athens in the hour of her distress, and the Lac only to choose which they would prefer ; a choi were much guided by the exile Alkibiadês. It his family friend Endius was at this moment one ephors ; while his personal enemy king Agiês, Timæa he carried on an intrigue,¹ was absent Dekeleia. Knowing well the great power an Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously exhorted the Spar devote their first attention to that island. A Phrynis, being sent thither to examine wheth alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was no triremes strong : upon which the Lacedæmoni alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to se sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now r dæmonian ports — probably at Gythium — wer diately to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melan to have been now midwinter ; but Alkibiadês, Chian envoys, insisted on the necessity of prom that the Athenians should detect the intrigue. E quake just then intervening, was construed by an index of divine displeasure, so that they w sending either the same commander or the san deus was named to supersede Melanchridas, w were directed to be equipped, so as to be res early spring along with the larger fleet from C

As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan c sent to Corinth — in compliance with the pressir Chian envoys — to transport across the istimu thian to the Saronic gulf, the thirty-nine tri Corinthian port of Lechæum. It was at firs off all, at one and the same time, to Chios, ever had been equipping for the assistance of Lesbc

¹ Thucyd. viii, 6-12 ; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23, 2 Alkibiad. c. 3.

geitus declined any concern with Chios, and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money which he had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios, under Chalkideus; next, to Lesbos, under Alkamenês; lastly, to the Hellespont, under Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low was the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic gulf, where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its numbers and of its movements.¹

Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across to Kenchreæ, when a fresh delay arose to obstruct their departure. The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching; nor would they consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded, though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were compelled thus to act; but they knew that the Chian people were in general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, nor did they feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some manifestation of support from Peloponnesus, which had been so much delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in their present state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to open revolt. But during the Isthmian festival, to which they were invited along with other Greeks, they discovered farther evidences of the plot which was going

¹ Thucyd. viii, 8.

on, and resolved to keep strict watch on the men now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting that they intended to second the revolting party in Chios.

Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadrons from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês, a number of Athenian ships watched them as they came to the shore, and tried to tempt them farther out to sea to fight them. Alkamenês, however, desirous of avoiding a fight, thought it best to return back; upon which they returned to Peiræus, mistrusting the fidelity of the triremes which formed part of their fleet. Reappearing with a larger squadron of thirty-seven triremes, Alkamenês, who had again begun his voyage northward, southward, and attacked him near the uninhabited Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and Isthmus. Here he gained a victory, captured one of his ships, disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês and the ships were run ashore, where on the

¹ Thucyd. viii, 10. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἰσθμια ἐγένετο (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ) ἐθεωρουν ἐς αὐτά· καὶ κατάδηλα μὲν ἦν τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη.

The language of Thucydides in this passage deserves notice. The Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore contrary to what would be expected among Greeks to have a festival present with their theory, or solemn sacrifice, at the Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydides, when he mentions that they were invited, is right to add the explanation — ἐπηγγέλθησαν, "they had been invited;" "for the festival truce had been formally proclaimed." That the heralds who proclaimed the truce should come to a state in hostility with Corinth, was something of a special notice: otherwise, Thucydides would never have mentioned it while to mention the proclamation, it being the uniform custom.

We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival taken place since the resumption of the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out the herald's proclamation had not yet been renewed. At the Isthmian festival, there was probably greater reluctance because that festival was in its origin half Athenian, and half Peloponnesian, established, or revived after interruption, by Theseus. The theory enjoyed a προεδρία, or privileged place, at the Isthmian festival. Thucyd. c. 25; Argument. ad Pindar. Isthm. Schol.

ponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend them. So inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert spot, that they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart. Nor was it without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the instances of king Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could be found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at a neighboring islet.¹

The Spartan ephors had directed Alkamenês, at the moment of his departure from Kenchræa, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês might leave Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the defeat and death of Alkamenês at Peiræum. Besides the discouragement arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia, the ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach Chios before the defeat at Peiræum became public, it might be passed off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities, through his personal connection with the leading men, who would repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To these arguments, Alkibiadês added an appeal to the personal vanity of Endius; whom he instigated to assume for himself the glory of liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance, instead of leaving this enterprise to king Agis.¹

By these arguments—assisted doubtless by his personal influence, since his advice respecting Gylippus and respecting Dekeleia had turned out so successful—Alkibiadês obtained the consent of the Spartan ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in

¹ Thucyd. viii, 11.

² Thucyd. viii, 12.

the five triremes to Chios. Nothing less than ascendancy could have extorted from men both ward, a determination apparently so rash, yet, appearance, admirably conceived, and of the high Had the Chians waited for the fleet now blocked their revolt would at least have been long delay might not have occurred at all: the accomplishment by the little squadron of Alkibiadês was the proof of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and was ultimately even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict wounds upon his country!

There was, indeed, little danger in crossing Ionia, with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her destitute condition had no fleet there, and although Alkibiadês was detached with eight triremes from the fleet off Peiræum, to pursue Chalkidæus and Alkibiades, their departure was known, he was far behind, and returned without success. To keep their voyage detained the boats and vessels which they met, they captured them, until they reached Korykus in a mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were then visited by their leading partisans from Chios, who invited them to sail thither at once before their arrival could be expected. Accordingly, they reached the town of Chios on the coast of the island, immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent—to the astonishment and dismay of the oligarchical plotters who had invited them. In the absence of these latter, the council was found justified in that Alkibiadês was admitted without delay, and in his case. Suppressing all mention of the defeat, he represented his squadron as the foremost of a large fleet actually at sea and approaching, and affirmed that Chios was now helpless by sea as well as by land, incapable of any farther hold upon her allies. Under these circumstances while the population were yet under their first impression of alarm, the oligarchical council took the resolution. The example was followed by Erythræ.

wards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from Chios. The Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the continent; on which latter, however, a portion of their town, called Polichnê, was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of attack from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the Chians and Erythræans also actively employed themselves in fortifying their towns and preparing for war.¹

In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other allies of Athens, — Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis, etc. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may observe first, that Athens did not systematically interfere to impose her own democratical government upon her allies; next, that the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor the proposition of revolting from her acceptable to the general population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia; and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of its own population, a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, partly by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian force approaching.² Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves have determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was now ruined, and

¹ Thucyd. viii, 14.

² Thucyd. viii, 9. Αἴτιον δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι ξυνειδότες, τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν, πρὶν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι προσδεχόμενοι ἦξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον.

Also viii, 14. 'Ο δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεύς.....προφυγενόμενοι τῶν συμπρασσόντων Χίων τισί, καὶ κελευόντων καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς Χίοις. Καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει· τοῖς δὲ ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο ὥστε βουλὴν τε τυχεῖν ξυλληγομένην, καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆες πολλὰι προσπλέουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν Πειραίῃ νεῶν οὐ δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χίοι, καὶ αὐθις Ἐρυθραῖοι, Ἀθηναῖοι.

her power to protect, not less than her power to end.¹ The envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied Chios to Sparta, so that the Chian government, the misfortunes of Athens had only the effect of aggressions and pretensions of their former foreign whom Athens had protected them for the last fifty years. It may well doubt, therefore, whether this prudent policy looked upon the change as on the whole advantageous. Athens had no motive to stand by Athens in her misfortune. Her policy seemed now to advise a timely union with the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained by her allies, as I have before observed, was more positive. It was favorable rather than otherwise of the general population, to whom she caused no wrong or oppression; but averse, to a certain extent, of their leading men, since she wounded the offended that love of town autonomy which was the Grecian political mind.

The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled Athens with dismay. It was the most fearful stroke as the heaviest aggravation, of their fallen condition. As there was every reason to apprehend that the first and greatest among the allies would be soon lost. The Athenians had no fleet or force even to reconquest: but they now felt the full importance of one thousand talents, which Perikles had set aside a year of the war against the special emergency of approaching Peiræus. The penalty of death had been enacted against any one who should propose to devote the money to other purpose; and, in spite of severe financial distress, remained untouched for twenty years. Now, when the special contingency foreseen had not yet arisen, to come to such an extremity, that the only chance of the remaining empire was by the appropriation of the money, a unanimous vote was accordingly passed to enact, by law, or standing order, against proposing

¹ See the remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 24, at the end of the Chian government.

of appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this money to present necessities.¹

By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbor, and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum; out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was despatched immediately to Ionia; followed, after a short interval, by Thrasyklês, with twelve others. At the same time, the seven Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated, while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardor to get ready thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation, since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first lamentably inadequate. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos,—on the continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ is on the northern,—in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make a hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. Upon this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy, the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; by the help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, the town was laid altogether open to the satrap; who, moreover, came himself shortly afterwards to complete the work.²

Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês

¹ Thucyd. viii, 15.

² Thucyd. viii, 16.

now took advantage of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus. He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all the continental allies of Athens, by his own resources and those of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order that the glory of the exploit might be insured to Endius, and not to Agis. Accordingly, he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had been remanned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Miletus, where he possessed established connections among the leading men, and had already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt, Alkibiadês prevailed on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learned his movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and were forced to take up a station on the neighboring island of Ladê. So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, opposite to Samos, in order to hear the result and to render aid if required. A message from Chalkideus apprized them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgês, the Persian ally of Athens at Iasus, was on his way at the head of an army; upon which they returned to Chios, but were unexpectedly seen in the way — off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon — and pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite of this check, however, the Chians came out again with fresh ships and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back to Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from Athens.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii, 17-19.

It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and the Great King, and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the neighboring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an agreement so eminently dishonorable as well as disadvantageous to the Greeks.—

“The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions: The king shall possess whatever territories and cities he himself had, or his predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an enemy by the king.”¹

As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was handed over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected and placed a garrison within it.² If fully carried out, indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean, but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia, and the full ground which had once been covered by Xerxes.³ Besides this monstrous stipulation, the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it, on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for the payment of their armament, which was their great motive for courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of the new

¹ Thucyd. viii, 18.

² Thucyd. viii, 84–109.

³ Thucyd. viii, 44.

source of mischief now opening upon the Asia Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, first as representative and executive agent and mistress, of the confederacy of Delos against what evils Athens had hitherto protected presently see, what is partially disclosed in this manner in which Sparta realized her promise of autonomy on each separate Grecian state.

The great stress of the war had now been transferred to the Asiatic side of the Ægean sea. The empire had anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would be an easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defeats at Milêtus, she showed an unexpected energy for the remainder. Her great and capital station, from the beginning to the end of the war, was Samos; and which now happened, insuring the fidelity of the alliance, was a condition indispensable to her power in the struggle in Ionia.

We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the war, since its reconquest by the Athenians after 479 B.C.: but we now find it under the government of the *Geôtori*, the proprietors of land, as at the rule of Gelon. It cannot be doubted that the people were disposed to follow the example of the Chian revolt from Athens, while the people at Samos, were averse to such a change. Under this state of civil war the Chian oligarchy had themselves conspired with the Athenians and constrain their *Demos* by surprise into revolt, with the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But the recent warning, forestalled the designs of the oligarchy, which rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian ships which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy was completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle, two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred taken prisoner. This revolution secured — and probably not a more democratical revolution could have secured, un-

state of Hellenic affairs — the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately recognized the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and divided among themselves the property of such of the *geōmori* as were slain or banished: ¹ the remainder were deprived of all political privileges, and were even forbidden to intermarry with any of the families of the remaining citizens.² We may fairly suspect that this latter prohibition is

¹ Thucyd. viii, 21. 'Εγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς, μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἱ ἐνυχον ἐν τρισὶ νανοῖ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ἐς διακοσίους μὲν τινὰς τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες, καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διώκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμέροισι μετεδίδουσιν οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδενός, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ' ἀγαγεῖσθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἐνι τοῦ δήμου ἐξήν.

² Thucyd. viii, 21. The dispositions and plans of the "higher people" at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford, and implied by Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians.

Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 191): "Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed than all others since their reduction on their former revolt, were *proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending their condition*. The lower people, *having intelligence of their design*, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them," etc. etc. etc.

"The massacre and robbery were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent administration of the affairs of their island; which, since the last rebellion, had been kept *under the immediate control of the Athenian government*."

To call this a *massacre* is perversion of language. It was an insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the "higher people" were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by their conspiracy — which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact — to introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that the "lower people" were bound to sit still and see this done? And what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection; which inevitably became bloody, because the "higher people" were a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell on the followers of the

only the retaliation of a similar exclusion which when in power, had enforced to maintain the puri

geōmori. Thucydides specifies only the number of the selves, who were persons of individual importance.

I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford for the government of Samos at this time. He seems to consider it, yet under great immediate control from Athens: the "higher people" in a state of severe depression, from to relieve themselves by the aid of the Peloponnesian arm

But if he means by the expression, "*under the Athenian government*," that there was any Athenian government at Samos, the account here given by Thucydides distinctly conflict was between two intestine parties, "the higher people." The only Athenians who took part in it were 1 triremes, and even they were there by accident (*οἱ ἐτυχ* as a regular garrison. Samos was under an indigenous government was a subject and tributary ally of Athens, like all the other islands, with the exception of Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi, 85). At the Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous state. Mitford is pleased to call "rewarding massacre and slaughter" of a party orator rather than of an historian.

But was the government of Samos, immediately before the contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language carries to my mind a full conviction that it was oligarchical, a despotic aristocracy, called The Geōmori. Dr. Thirlwall's candid and equitable narrative of this event forms a supplement to that of Mr. Mitford, is of a different opinion. He thinks that democratical government had been established at Samos when it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. His government continued democratical during the first years of the war, he conceives to be proved by the hostility of the Anææ, whom he looks upon as oligarchical refugees. Agreeing in Mr. Mitford's view of the peculiarly depressed state of the "higher people" at Samos at this later time, he never thinks they were not actually in possession of the government as the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the people were also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to regain a measure of power under different forms, and probably by inclination to revive its ancient pretensions on the first opportunity. *it had not yet advanced beyond this point, may be regarded otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt.* On the other hand, it is no less clear, that the state of the island, such as to excite a high degree of mutual jealousy, and the Athenians. to whom the loss of the island at this j

blood. What they had enacted as a privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.

been almost irreparable." (Hist. of Gr. ch. xxvii, vol. iii, p. 477, 2d edit.) Manso (Sparta, book iv, vol. ii, p. 266) is of the same opinion.

Surely, the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none of the allies of Athens — not even Chios, the most powerful of all — revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadēs, after securing Chios, considered Milētus to be next in order of importance, and had, moreover, peculiar connections with the leading men there (viii, 17); so that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Milētus, being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication with Tissaphernēs, for which reason he might naturally deem it of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover, not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidēs, having come across the Ægean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of central station (viii, 16). These circumstances combined with the known reluctance of the Samian demos, or commonalty, are surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr. Thirlwall's inference, that the government was *not* oligarchical.

We have no information how or when the oligarchical government at Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anæa, so actively hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a democratical government at Samos (iv, 75), is not in itself improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid of the enemies of Athens.

Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the passages of Thucydides, viii, 21, 63, 73, it is impossible without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now in the hands of the oligarchy, or *geōmori*, and that the Demos rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The natural sense of the words *ἐπανάστασις*, *ἐπανάσταται*, is that of *insurrection against an established government*: it does not mean, "a violent attack by one party upon another;" still less does it mean, "an attack made by a party in possession of the government;" which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr. Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian revolt from Athens — Thucyd. i, 115 (after Thucydides has stated that the Athe-

On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian

nians established a democratical government, he next says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary force) — *καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν, καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν πλείστων*, etc. Again, v, 23 — about the apprehended insurrection of the Helots against the Spartans — *ἦν δὲ ἡ δούλεια ἐπανίστηται*: compare Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv, 18, p. 444; Herodot. iii, 39-120. So also *δυνατοὶ* is among the words which Thucydides uses for an oligarchical party, either in government or in what may be called *opposition* (i, 24; v, 4). But it is not conceivable to me that Thucydides would have employed the words *ἡ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς* — if the Demos had at that time been actually in the government.

Again, viii, 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party under Peisander *αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προὔτρεψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται*. Here the motive of the previous *ἐπανάστασις* is clearly noted; it was in order that they might *not be under an oligarchical government*: for I agree with Krüger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense prevents our construing it, "in order that their democratical government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon them," which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall's view were just.

Lastly, vii, 73, we have *οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὐθις* — *ἐγένοντο τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται, καὶ ἐμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δῆμῳ ὄντι ἐπιθῆσεσθαι*. Surely these words — *οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος* — "those who having risen in arms against the wealthy and powerful, were now a demos, or a democracy," must imply, *that the persons against whom the rising had taken place had been a governing oligarchy*. Surely, also, the words *μεταβαλλόμενοι αὐθις*, can mean nothing else except to point out the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical government, and constituted a democratical government. On the second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on the first occasion, the established government was already democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely persons making use of the powers of a democratical government to do violence to rich citizens, all this antithesis completely vanishes.

On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos, at the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical, like that of Chios itself.

fleet at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian squadron under Hippoklês at Naupaktus.¹ The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to Ionia as admiral-in-chief: but it was some time before he could depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, followed by six more afterwards.²

Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen triremes under a Lacedæmonian pericækus named Deiniadas, to procure the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of Athens. A land force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian, partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at this time divided into at least five separate city governments; Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east, Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments were oligarchical or democratical we do not know, but the Athenian kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after

Nor do I see any difficulty in believing this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the oligarchy became established there. So long as the island performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely to interfere during the seven years of peace intervening between the years 421-414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her apprehensions. The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally with the internal affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to have been much exaggerated.

The Samian oligarchy, or geômoni, dispossessed of the government on this occasion, were restored by Lysander after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war, — Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 6, — where they are called *ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται*.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 13.

² Thucyd. viii, 20-23.

its revolt sixteen years before, must have long ago disappeared.¹ The Chian fleet first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed forward to Mitylênê, and succeeded in obtaining that important town also.²

Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town, and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he had, moreover, failed in an attack upon Eræ.³ But he had since been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos, partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê—the largest town in that island—very shortly after its revolt, they sailed straight into the harbor when no one expected them, seized the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and some hoplites aboard. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learned the recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was here also joined by three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens, and having armed the population, sent them land together with his own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that place, whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast. But in spite of all his ende

¹ See the earlier part of this History, vol. vi, ch. i, pp. 257, 258.

² Thucyd. viii, 22.

³ Thucyd.

Methymna as well as Eresus and all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was obliged to return with his forces to Chios. The land troops which had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective homes.¹

The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ, which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore; the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of being built, being not yet sufficiently

¹ Thucyd. viii, 23. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζὸς, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἵεναι.

Dr. Arnold and Göller suppose that these soldiers had been carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative. The land-force *marched along* by land to Klazomenæ and Kymê (ὁ πεζὸς ὅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παρῆει ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης. Thucydidēs does not say that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymê, prepared to march forward, after that island should have been conquered, to the Hellespont.

Haacke is right, I think, in referring the words ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζὸς to what had been stated in c. 17; that Alkibiadēs and Chalkideus, on first arriving with the Peloponnesian five triremes at Chios, disembarked on that island their Peloponnesian seamen and armed them as hoplites for land-forces; taking aboard fresh crews of seamen from the island. The motive to make this exchange was, the great superiority of bravery, in heavy armor and stand-up fighting, of Peloponnesians as compared with Chians or Asiatic Greeks (see Xenoph. Hell. iii, 2, 17). These foot-soldiers taken from the Peloponnesian ships are the same as those spoken of in c. 22: ὁ πεζὸς ὅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζὸς.

Farther, these troops are again mentioned in c. 24, as οἱ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι, where Dr. Arnold again speaks of them in his note incorrectly. He says: "The Peloponnesians who came with Chalkideus must have been too few to offer any effectual resistance to one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, being only the *epibatæ* of five ships." The fact is that they were not merely the *epibatæ*, but the *entire crews*, of five ships; comprising probably from eight hundred to one thousand men (ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοῦς ναύτας ὀπλίσαντες ἐν Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσι, c. 17), since there were a remnant of five hundred left of them, after some months' operations and a serious defeat (viii, 32).

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which maintained its sober judgment throughout a career of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, in proportion as it advanced in power." He adds, that the step of revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece, and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse, that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end, and undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydides doubtless includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandizement: a censure not undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.

The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the island began to declare in favor of reunion with Athens. The Chian government were forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition, by seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklês, and Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, some of them employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there were aboard one thousand Athenians, and fifteen hundred Argeians. Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms, were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected a disembarkation, in conjunction with those

Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπόρθησαν. Χίοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὧν ἐγὼ θορόμην, ἐδδαιμονήσαντες ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσα ἐπεδίδον ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον, τόσῃ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, etc.

viii, 45. Οἱ Χίοι... πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.

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town of Teichiussa on that gulf. Alkibiadēs strenuously urged him to lend immediate aid to the Milēsiāns, so as to prevent the construction of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would be extinguished. Accordingly, he prepared to sail thither the next morning: but, during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to abandon their position near Milētus and return to Samos with their wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramēnēs with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders, indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting that the maritime honor of Athens would be tarnished by retiring before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, opposed with so much emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his colleagues to retire. The fleet, he said, had not come prepared for fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations against Milētus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidēs bestows much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, which was forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat, demanded to be conveyed home.¹

On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the gulf of Iasus to Milētus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and leaving their masts, sails, and rigging — as was usual when going into action — at Teichiussa. Finding Milētus already relieved of the enemy, they stayed there only one day, in order to reinforce themselves with the twenty-five triremes which Chalkidēus had originally brought thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at Ladē, and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgēs, Tissaphernēs persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be

¹ Thucyd. viii, 27, 27.

Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by surprise;¹ though strong in situation and fortifications, and defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of signal advantage, from the abundant plunder which it distributed among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnês, father of Amorgês. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or twenty Attic drachmæ, and along with Amorgês himself, who had been taken alive, and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa. The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ, in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.²

The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets, and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave notice for the future,—partly at the instigation of Alkibiadês, of which more hereafter,—that he could not continue so high a rate of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa; and that, until such instructions came, he should give only half a drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim, until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at which the men were paid,—a miserable jealousy, which marks the low character of many of

¹ Phrynichus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced by the Athenians,—by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical conspirators,—on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed Amorgês on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus (Thucyd. viii, 54).

Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milêtus, the ignorance of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgês mistook the Peloponnesian ships for Athenian.

² Thucyd. viii, 28.

these Spartan officers, — but the Syracusan Hermokratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire drachma continued.¹ For the present, however, the seamen were in good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay, but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;² while Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival of so large a fleet. Nevertheless, the Athenians on their side were also reinforced by thirty-five fresh triremes, which reached Samos under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. The Athenian fleet from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior operations.

Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment, we read with amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than one hundred and four triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed, the total number which she had sent out, putting together the separate squadrons, had been one hundred and twenty-eight.³ So energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.

The Athenians resolved to employ thirty triremes in making a landing, and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being

¹ Thucyd. viii, 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter which the words of Thucydidês do not enable us to make out. None of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some alteration or omission of words: nor do any of the explanations given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Göller, or of Poppo and Hermann.

² Thucyd. viii, 36.

³ Thucyd. viii, 30; compare Dr. Arnold's note.

drawn among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to the command. The other seventy-four triremes, remaining masters of the sea, made descents near Milêtus, and in vain tried to provoke the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbor. It was some time before Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command, being engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes, — ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian, — he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed to Klazomenæ, recently retransferred from the continent to the neighboring islet. He here — in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian general of the district — enjoined the Klazomenians again to break with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm, from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days, destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then réjoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by the storms, frequent in the month of November.¹

Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus, — at the head of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of five hundred of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the sea with Chalkideus, and since served as hoplites, — had reached Erythræ and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to Lesbos; but he experi-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 31, 32.

enced from them the same reluctance as from the Corinthians, a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian triremes for any such purpose, an act of direct insubordination in a Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milætus, carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræ by means of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead of pursuing his voyage to Milætus, he therefore returned on the next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned out to be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their liberation.¹

The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet, under Strombichidês — thirty triremes, accompanied by some triremes carrying hoplites — had its station on the southern side of the same headland. Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone forward the next day towards Milætus, would have fallen in with the superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm, which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going northward. Descriing three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty in making their own harbor, while the three foremost Athenian ships were wrecked on the neighboring shore, all the crews either perishing or becoming prisoners.² The rest of the Athenian fleet found shelter in the harbor of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland, under the lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræ.

As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos, from which island they commenced their operations of

¹ Thucyd. viii, 32, 33.

² Thucyd. viii, 33 34

invading Chios and establishing in it a permanent garrison. Having transported their land-force across from Delphin, a strong maritime site called Delphin projecting cape having a sheltered harbor on the east from the city of Chios.¹ They bestowed great pains in fortifying this post, both on the land and the sea, a thing which process they were scarcely interrupted by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his garrison. The war arose not merely from the discouragement of the Chians, but from the political dissension which now reigned in Chios. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced in favour of Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and his remaining partisans were so numerous, that the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing what to do in spite of numerous messages sent to Milætus, and representing the urgent peril to which Chios among all the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed. Pedaritus adhered to his parting menaces, and refused to listen to the indignant Pedaritus sent to prefer complaints against Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile the fortress advanced so near towards completion, that Chios felt from it as much as Athens suffered from Delos. The farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea, this wealthy island — chiefly foreigners acquired, but more numerous than in any other Grecian island — were emboldened by the manifest superiority of position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and not merely from their flight, but from the valour and aid which they gave to the enemy was increased.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 34-38. *Δελφίνιον — λιμένας ἔχον*

That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion for their operations, and as the immediate scene of last year's operations in Chios, — was only repeating what they had once done in the Peloponnese what they again did afterwards (c. 100). I do not feel surprised at this. Dobree and Dr. Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphin was the post of the city of Chios.

² Thucyd. viii, 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see Theopompus and Nymphodorus in Athenæus, vi, p. 204.

tress of the island increased every day, nor could anything relieve it except succor from without, which Astyochus still withheld.

That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force on the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laconian party; the chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.¹ Dorieus and his squadron, crossing the Ægean in its southern latitude, had arrived safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by Tissaphernês from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.² Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half should cruise near the Triopian cape to intercept the trading vessels from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. On the morrow the attack was renewed, — but additional defences had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships captured near Triopium had come in to help, — so that the Athenians were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the sea against the seventy-four Athenian triremes at Samos, though his fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty acquired at Iasus was uncon-

That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local legend, connected with the Chapel of the *Kind-hearted Hero* (*Ἡρώς ἐνυφύου*) at Chios.

Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was universal and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.

¹ See the life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionysius of Halikarnassus, c. i, p. 453, Reisk., and in Plutarch, Vit. x, Orat. p. 835.

² Thucyd. viii, 35-109.

sumed; the Milésians were zealous in the co while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to tolerable regularity, though at the reduced rate above.¹

Though the Peloponnesians had yet no ground such as they soon came to have — against the larity of payment, still, the powerful fleet now at the commanders with a new tone of confidence became ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty. Alcibiades and Alcibiadês, when first landing at Milæus, with scanty armament, had submitted. Accordingly Alcibiades, after his arrival at Milêtus, and even before Alcibiades Theramenês, — whose functions had expired with Alcibiades over the fleet, — insisted on a fresh treaty which was agreed on, to the following effect: —

“Convention and alliance is concluded, on the part of the Persians, between the Lacedæmonians, with their king, Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not attack or injure any territory which belongs to Darius, or has belonged to his fathers; nor shall they raise any tribute from any of his subjects. Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack the Lacedæmonians or their allies. Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the king, or the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians, they shall each meet, as much as may be, the wishes expressed. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens. Neither party shall bring the war to a close, without the consent of the other. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may have sent for, and which may be employed in any of the cities parties to this convention shall not hinder the territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to use with their best power. And if any one within the territory, or within the territory subject to him

¹ Thucyd. viii, 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδόδετο ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως.

² Thucyd. viii, 37. Καὶ ἢν τις τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ βασιλεὺς ἄρχῃ, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ ἢ τὰ κωλύτω καὶ ἀμνύντω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

The distinction here drawn between the king's territory and the territory subject to him.

Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them, and lend his best defensive aid."

Looked at with the eyes of Pan-Hellenic patriotism, this second treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects, nor did it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by implication, the same undiminished extent of the king's dominion, as it had stood when at its maximum under his predecessors; the same undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs; the same unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage home, in a small boat, no one knew how.¹

Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the urgent solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and, in spite of his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own army to lend an ear to them, when a new incident happened which gave him at least a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A Peloponnesian squadron of twenty-seven triremes under the command of Antisthenês, having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic or close of 412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them; then afterwards, from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and thus ultimately reached Kaunus at the southeastern extremity of Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and

over which the king holds empire, deserves notice. By the former phrase, is understood, I presume, the continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and peculiar (Herodot. i, 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the plenitude of their power.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 38. ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλῃτι ἀφανίζεται.

Timagoras had caused to be equipped, having come over for that purpose a year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenes was instructed first to get to Milêtus and put himself in concert with the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these triremes, or another squadron of equal force under Klearchus, to the Hellespont, for the purpose of coöperating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached to Astyochus as advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians. These men were not only directed to review the state of affairs at Milêtus, and exercise control coördinate with Astyochus, but even empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion; and to appoint Antisthenês in his place.¹

No sooner had Astyochus learned at Milêtus the arrival of Antisthenês at Kaunus, than he postponed all idea of lending aid to Chios, and sailed immediately to secure his junction with the twenty-seven new triremes as well as with the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half-ruined by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus; where the inhabitants strenuously urged him to go forward at once, even without disembarking his men, in order that he might surprise an Athenian squadron of twenty triremes under Charminus; which had been despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenês. Charminus, having his station at Symê, was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast, to watch, though he had not been able to keep back, the Peloponnesian fleet just arrived at Kaunus. In this position he was found by the far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, the approach of which he did not at all expect. But the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed it, that Charminus, seeing at first only a few ships apart from the rest, mistook them for the smaller squadron of new-comers. Attacking the triremes thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage, dis-

¹Thucyd.viii, 39. Καὶ εἰρητο αὐτοῖς, ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους τῶν τε ἑλλήων ξυνεπιμελεῖσθαι, ἧ μέλλει ἀρίστα εἶξιν, etc.

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abling ~~these~~ and damaging several others. But presently the dispersed vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round him, so that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping, first to the island called Teutlussa, next to Halikarnassus. He did not effect his escape without the loss of six ships; while the victorious Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island of Symê, returned to Knidus, where the entire fleet, including the twenty-seven triremes newly arrived, was now united.¹ The Athenians in Samos — whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes which will be explained in the ensuing chapter — had kept no watch on the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprized of the defeat of Charminus. They then sailed down to Symê, took up the sails and rigging belonging to that squadron, which had been there deposited, and then, after an attack upon Loryma, carried back their whole fleet, probably including the remnant of the squadron of Charminus, to Samos.²

Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of ninety-four triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That satrap — now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which also more in the coming chapter — had of late become slack in the Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen, during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same time full of promises, paralyzing all their operations by assurances that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês the future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed dis-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 42.

² Thucyd. viii, 43. This defeat of Charminus is made the subject of a jest by Aristophanês, *Thesmophor.* 810, with the note of Paulmier.

pleasure at his past conduct, but even protested against the two conventions concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Boeotia, were acknowledged as subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all prospect of Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms, a proposition which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation as to depart without settling anything.¹

His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors. Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided between three separate city governments, as it had been at the epoch of the Homeric Catalogue,—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three, dates only from two or three years after the period which we have now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island, the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population of which, intimidated by a force of ninety-four triremes, and altogether uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which had no defences, and fled to the mountains.² All the three Rhodian towns, destitute of

¹ Thucyd. viii, 43.

² Thucyd. viii, 44. Οἱ δ' ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐπικηρυκενομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, etc.

...Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτῃ, ναοὶ τέσσαρα καὶ ἑννεήκοντα, ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτακίστου οὐσίας τῆς πόλεως, etc.

We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among the

fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly frightened, into the step of revolting from Athens and allying themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep due military watch, arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and presently returned to the former island, leaving detachments at Chalkê and Kôs to harass the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks.

The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of thirty-two talents, and adopted the island as the main station for their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change of place by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, and their desire to be more out of his reach.¹ But what we cannot so easily explain, is, that they remained on the island without any movement or military action, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for the space of no less than eighty days; that is, from about the middle of January to the end of March 411 B.C. While their powerful fleet of ninety-four triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was thus lying idle, their allies in Chios were known to be suffering severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid:² moreover, the promise of sending to coöperate with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont, remained unperformed.³ We may impute such extreme military slackness mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, paralyzed their energies by assurances that the Phœnician fleet was actually on its way to aid them, and insured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed per-

dependent allies of Athens, that the general population of the allied city manifests no previous discontent, nor any spontaneous disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the island — those who, if the government was democratical, formed the oligarchical minority, but who formed the government itself, if oligarchical — conspire and bring in the Peloponnesian force, unknown to the body of the citizens, and thus leave to the latter no free choice. The real feeling towards Athens on the part of the body of the citizens is one of simple acquiescence, with little attachment on the one hand, yet no hatred, or sense of practical suffering, on the other.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 44: compare c. 57.

² Thucyd. viii, 39.

³ Thucyd. viii, 40-55.


sonally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus, the general-in-chief, took his share in this corrupt bargain, against which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.¹ Such prolonged inaction of the armament, at the moment of its greatest force, was thus not simply the fruit of honest mistake, like the tardiness of Nikias in Sicily, but proceeded from the dishonesty and personal avidity of the Peloponnesian officers.


I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption — even in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery — among the leading Greeks of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world. The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private, — and the quiet repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory epithets implying such assumed virtue, — are so far from being borne out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money themselves. Of course, it is not meant that this was true of all of them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission of political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be disguised even from themselves, far less would they be above the vices, always more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride, power-seeking, party-antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, etc. And if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against delinquents,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 45. Suggestions of Alkibiadês to Tissaphernês — *Καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πείσαι, ὥστε ξυγχωρῆσαι τὰ ὅσα ἐαυτῷ, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τούτων δὲ, Ἑρμοκράτης ἠναντιοῦτο μόνος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑμπαντος ξυμμαχικοῦ.*

About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50.


and certainty of trial before judges identified in interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to provide; in a manner not always wise, still less always effectual, but assuredly justified, in the amplest manner, by the urgency and prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up to scorn as demagogues and *sycophants*. Had these Peloponnesian generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been some chance of their being tried and punished; though even at Athens the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political clubs and other sinister artifices, was much greater than it ought to have been. So little is it consistent with the truth, however often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too easy, and judicial condemnation too frequent. When the judicial precautions provided at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the evil, they will be found imperfect, indeed, both in the scheme and in the working, but certainly neither uncalled for nor over-severe.







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
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





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HISTORY OF GREECE

BY

GEORGE GROTE, Esq.

VOL. VIII.


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PREFACE TO VOL. VIII.

I HAD hoped to be able, in this Volume, to carry the history of Greece down as far as the battle of Knidus ; but I find myself disappointed.


A greater space than I anticipated has been necessary, not merely to do justice to the closing events of the Peloponnesian war, especially the memorable scenes at Athens after the battle of Arginusæ, but also to explain my views both respecting the Sophists and respecting Sokratês.

It has been hitherto common to treat the sophists as corruptors of the Greek mind, and to set forth the fact of such corruption, increasing as we descend downwards from the great invasion of Xerxês, as historically certified. Dissenting as I do from former authors, and believing that Grecian history has been greatly misconceived, on both these points, I have been forced to discuss the evidences, and exhibit the reasons for my own way of thinking, at considerable length.

To Sokratês I have devoted one entire Chapter. No smaller space would have sufficed to lay before the reader any tolerable picture of that illustrious man, the rarest intellectual phenomenon of ancient times, and originator of the most powerful scientific impulse which the Greek mind ever underwent.

G. G.

London, February, 1850.



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
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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXII.

TWENTY-FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.—OLIGARCHY OF FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

ABOUT a year elapsed between the catastrophe of the Athenians near Syracuse and the victory which they gained over the Milesians, on landing near Milétus (from September 413 B.C., to September 412 B.C.). After the first of those two events, the complete ruin of Athens had appeared both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic had been her rally, that, at the time of the second, she was found again carrying on a tolerable struggle, though with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system, against enemies both bolder and more numerous than ever. Nor is there any reason to doubt that her foreign affairs might have gone on thus improving, had they not been endangered at this critical moment by the treason of a fraction of her own citizens, bringing her again to the brink of ruin, from which she was only rescued by the incompetence of her enemies.

That treason took its first rise from the exile Alkibiadês. I have already recounted how this man, alike unprincipled and energetic, had thrown himself with his characteristic ardor into the service of Sparta, and had indicated to her the best means

of aiding Syracuse, of inflicting positive injury upon Athens, and lastly, of provoking revolt among the Ionic allies of the latter. It was by his boldness and personal connections in Ionia that the revolt of Chios and Miletus had been determined.

In the course of a few months, however, he had greatly lost the confidence of the Spartans. The revolt of the Asiatic dependencies of Athens had not been accomplished so easily and rapidly as he had predicted; Chalkideus, the Spartan commander with whom he had acted was defeated and slain near Miletus; the ephor Endius, by whom he was chiefly protected, retained his office only for one year, and was succeeded by other ephors,¹ just about the end of September, or beginning of October, when the Athenians gained their second victory near Miletus, and were on the point of blocking up the town; while his personal enemy king Agis still remained to persecute him. Moreover, there was in the character of this remarkable man something so essentially selfish, vain, and treacherous, that no one could ever rely upon his faithful coöperation. And as soon as any reverse occurred, that very energy and ability, which seldom failed him, made those with whom he acted the more ready to explain the mischance, by supposing that he had betrayed them.

It was thus that, after the defeat of Miletus, king Agis was enabled to discredit Alkibiadês as a traitor to Sparta; upon which the new ephors sent out at once an order to the general Astyochus, to put him to death.² Alkibiadês had now an opportunity of tasting the difference between Spartan and Athenian procedure. Though his enemies at Athens were numerous and virulent, with all the advantage, so unspeakable in political warfare, of being able to raise the cry of irreligion against him, yet the utmost which they could obtain was that he should be summoned home to take his trial before the dikastery. At Sparta, without any positive ground of crimination, and without any idea of judicial trial, his enemies procure an order that he shall be put to death.

Alkibiadês, however, got intimation of the order in time to

¹ See Thucyd. v, 36.

² Thucyd. viii, 45. Καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστυόχον ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνων ὥστ' ἀποκτείνειν (ἦν γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἀγιδί ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἀλλῶς ἀπίστος ἐφαίνετο), etc.

retire to Tissaphernês. Probably he was forewarned by Astyochus himself, not ignorant that so monstrous a deed would greatly alienate the Chians and Milêsians, nor foreseeing the full mischief which his desertion would bring upon Sparta. With that flexibility of character which enabled him at once to master and take up a new position, Alkibiadês soon found means to insinuate himself into the confidence of the satrap. He began now to play a game neither Spartan nor Athenian, but Persian and anti-Hellenic: a game of duplicity to which Tissaphernês himself was spontaneously disposed, but to which the intervention of a dexterous Grecian negotiator was indispensable. It was by no means the interest of the Great King, Alkibiadês urged, to lend such effective aid to either of the contending parties as would enable it to crush the other: he ought neither to bring up the Phenician fleet to the aid of the Lacedæmonians, nor to furnish that abundant pay which would procure for them indefinite levies of new Grecian force. He ought so to feed and prolong the war, as to make each party an instrument of exhaustion and impoverishment against the other, and thus himself to rise on the ruins of both: first to break down the Athenian empire by means of the Peloponnesians, and afterwards to expel the Peloponnesians themselves; which might be effected with little trouble if they were weakened by a protracted previous struggle.¹

Thus far Alkibiadês gave advice, as a Persian counsellor, not unsuitable to the policy of the court of Susa. But he seldom gave advice without some view to his own profit, ambition, or antipathies. Cast off unceremoniously by the Lacedæmonians, he was now driven to seek restoration in his own country. To accomplish this object, it was necessary not only that he should preserve her from being altogether ruined, but that he should present himself to the Athenians as one who could, if restored, divert the aid of Tissaphernês from Lacedæmon to Athens. Accordingly, he farther suggested to the satrap, that while it was essential to his interest not to permit land power and maritime power to be united in the same hands, whether Lacedæmonian or Athenian, it would nevertheless be found easier to

¹ Thucyd. viii, 45, 46.

arrange matters with the empire and pretensions of Athens than with those of Lacedæmon. The former, he argued, neither sought nor professed any other object than the subjection of her own maritime dependencies, in return for which she would willingly leave all the Asiatic Greeks in the hands of the Great King; while the latter, forswearing all idea of empire, and professing ostentatiously to aim at the universal enfranchisement of every Grecian city, could not with the smallest consistency conspire to deprive the Asiatic Greeks of the same privilege. This view appeared to be countenanced by the objection which Theramenês and many of the Peloponnesian officers had taken to the first convention concluded by Chalkideus and Alkibiadês with Tissaphernês: objections afterwards renewed by Lichas even against the second modified convention of Theramenês, and accompanied with an indignant protest against the idea of surrendering to the Great King all the territory which had been ever possessed by his predecessors.¹

All these latter arguments, whereby Alkibiadês professed to create in the mind of the satrap a preference for Athens, were either futile or founded on false assumptions. For on the one hand, even Lichas never refused to concur in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; while on the other hand, the empire of Athens, so long as she retained any empire, was pretty sure to be more formidable to Persia than any efforts undertaken by Sparta under the disinterested pretence of liberating generally the Grecian cities. Nor did Tissaphernês at all lend himself to any such positive impression; though he felt strongly the force of the negative recommendations of Alkibiadês, that he should do no more for the Peloponnesians than was sufficient to feed the war, without insuring to them either a speedy or a decisive success: or rather, this duplicity was so congenial to his Oriental mind, that there was no need of Alkibiadês to recommend it. The real use of the Athenian exile, was to assist the satrap in carrying it into execution; and to provide for him those plausible pretences and justifications, which he was to issue as a substitute for effective supplies of men and money. Established along with Tissaphernês at Magnesia, — the same place which had been

¹ Thucyd. viii, 46-52.

occupied about fifty years before by another Athenian exile, equally unprincipled, and yet abler, Themistoklēs, — Alkibiadēs served as interpreter of his views in all his conversations with the Greeks, and appeared to be thoroughly in his confidence: an appearance of which he took advantage to pass himself off falsely upon the Athenians at Samos, as having the power of turning Persian wealth to the aid of Athens.

The first payment made by Tissaphernēs, immediately after the capture of Iasus and of the revolted Amorgēs, to the Peloponnesians at Milētus, was at the rate of one drachma per head. But notice was given that for the future it would be reduced one half, and for this reduction Alkibiadēs undertook to furnish a reason. The Athenians, he urged, gave no more than half a drachma; not because they could not afford more, but because, from their long experience of nautical affairs, they had found that higher pay spoiled the discipline of the seamen by leading them into excesses and over-indulgence, as well as by inducing too ready leave of absence to be granted, in confidence that the high pay would induce them to return when called for.¹ As he probably never expected that such subterfuges, employed at a moment when Athens was so poor that she could not even pay the half drachma per head, would carry conviction to any one, so he induced Tissaphernēs to strengthen their effect by individual bribes to the generals and trierarchs: a mode of argument which was found effectual in silencing the complaints of all, with the single exception of the Syracusan Hermokratēs. In regard to other Grecian cities who sent to ask pecuniary aid, and especially Chios, Alkibiadēs spoke out with less reserve. They had been hitherto compelled to contribute to Athens, he said, and now that they had shaken off this payment, they must not shrink from imposing upon themselves equal or even greater burdens in their own defence. Nor was it anything less, he added, than sheer impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Greece, if they required

¹ Thucyd. viii, 45. Οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπουσιν, ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ἡμέρειαν ἢ ἄν προσοφειλόμενον μισθόν.

This passage is both doubtful in the text and difficult in the translation. Among the many different explanations given by the commentators, I adopt that of Dr. Arnold as the least unsatisfactory, though without any confidence that it is right.

a foreign military force for their protection, to require at the same time that others should furnish the means of paying it.¹ At the same time, however, he intimated, — by way of keeping up hopes for the future, — that Tissaphernês was at present carrying on the war at his own cost; but if hereafter remittances should arrive from Susa, the full rate of pay would be resumed, with the addition of aid to the Grecian cities in any other way which could be reasonably asked. To this promise was added an assurance that the Phœnician fleet was now under equipment, and would shortly be brought up to their aid, so as to give them a superiority which would render resistance hopeless: an assurance not merely deceitful but mischievous, since it was employed to dissuade them from all immediate action, and to paralyze their navy during its moments of fullest vigor and efficiency. Even the reduced rate of pay was furnished so irregularly, and the Peloponnesian force kept so starved, that the duplicity of the satrap became obvious to every one, and was only carried through by his bribery to the officers.²

While Alkibiadês, as the confidential agent and interpreter of Tissaphernês, was carrying on this anti-Peloponnesian policy through the autumn and winter of 412–411 B.C., — partly during the stay of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, partly after it had moved to Knidus and Rhodes, — he was at the same time opening correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. His breach with the Peloponnesians, as well as his ostensible position in the service of Tissaphernês, were facts well known among the Athenian armament; and his scheme was, to procure both restoration and renewed power in his native city, by representing himself as competent to bring over to her the aid and alliance of Persia, through his ascendancy over the mind of the satrap. His hos-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 45. *Τὰς δὲ πόλεις δεομένας χρημάτων ἀπῆλασεν, αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνηου, ὡς οἱ μὲν Χίοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἶεν, πλουσιώτατοι οὐτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρία δὲ ὁμῶς σωζόμενοι ἀξιούσι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασι ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν.*

² Thucyd. viii, 46. *Τὴν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἶα· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας ναὺς φάσκων ἤξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ἐφθειρε τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀφείλετο, γενομένην καὶ πᾶν ἰσχυρὰν, τὰ τε ἄλλα, καταφανέστερον ἢ ὅστε λαμβάνειν, οὐ προθύμως ξυνοπολέμει.*

tility to the democracy, however, was so generally known, that he despaired of accomplishing his return, unless he could connect it with an oligarchical revolution ; which, moreover, was not less gratifying to his sentiment of vengeance for the past, than to his ambition for the future. Accordingly, he sent over a private message to the officers and trierarchs at Samos, several of them doubtless his personal friends, desiring to be remembered to the "best men" in the armament,¹ such was one of the standing phrases by which oligarchical men knew and described each other ; and intimating his anxious wish to come again as a citizen among them, bringing with him Tissaphernês as their ally. But he would do this only on condition of the formation of an oligarchical government ; nor would he ever again set foot amidst the odious democracy to whom he owed his banishment.²

Such was the first originating germ of that temporary calamity, which so nearly brought Athens to absolute ruin, called the Oligarchy of Four Hundred : a suggestion from the same exile who had already so deeply wounded his country by sending Gylippus to Syracuse, and the Lacedæmonian garrison to Dekeleia. As yet, no man in Samos had thought of a revolution ; but the moment that the idea was thus started, the trierarchs and wealthy men in the armament caught at it with avidity. To subvert the democracy for their own profit, and to be rewarded for doing so with the treasures of Persia as a means of carrying on the war against the Peloponnesians, was an extent of good fortune greater than they could possibly have hoped. Amidst the exhaustion of the public treasure at Athens, and the loss of tribute from her dependencies, it was now the private proprietors, and most of all, the wealthy proprietors, upon whom the cost of military operations fell : from which burden they here saw the prospect of relief, coupled with increased chance of victory. Elate with so tempting a promise, a deputation of them crossed over from Samos to the mainland to converse personally with Alkibiadês,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 47. Τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου προσπέμφαντος λόγους ἐς τοὺς δυνατωτάτους αὐτῶν (Ἀθηναίων) ἄνδρας, ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἐπ' ὀλιγαρχία βούλεται, καὶ οὐ πονηρία οὐδὲ δημοκρατία τῇ ἐαυτὸν ἐκβαλοῦση, κατελθὼν, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 47.

who again renewed his assurances in person, that he would bring not only Tissaphernês, but the Great King himself, into active alliance and coöperation with Athens, provided they would put down the Athenian democracy, which he affirmed that the king could not possibly trust.¹ He doubtless did not omit to set forth the other side of the alternative; that, if the proposition were refused, Persian aid would be thrown heartily into the scale of the Peloponnesians, in which case, there was no longer any hope of safety for Athens.

On the return of the deputation with these fresh assurances, the oligarchical men in Samos came together, both in greater number and with redoubled ardor, to take their measures for subverting the democracy. They even ventured to speak of the project openly among the mass of the armament, who listened to it with nothing but aversion, but who were silenced at least, though not satisfied, by being told that the Persian treasury would be thrown open to them on condition, and only on condition, that they would relinquish their democracy. Such was at this time the indispensable need of foreign money for the purposes of the war, such was the certainty of ruin, if the Persian treasure went to the aid of the enemy, that the most democratical Athenian might well hesitate when the alternative was thus laid before him. The oligarchical conspirators, however, knew well that they had the feeling of the armament altogether against them, that the best which they could expect from it was a reluctant acquiescence, and that they must accomplish the revolution by their own hands and management. They formed themselves into a political confederacy, or *hetæria*, for the purpose of discussing the best measures towards their end. It was resolved to send a deputation to Athens, with Peisander² at the head, to

¹ Thucyd. viii, 48.

² It is asserted in an Oration of Lysias (Orat. xxv, *Δήμου Καταλύσεως Ἀπολογία*, c. 3, p. 766, Reisk.) that Phrynichus and Peisander embarked in this oligarchical conspiracy for the purpose of getting clear of previous crimes committed under the democracy. But there is nothing to countenance this assertion, and the narrative of Thucydides gives quite a different color to their behavior.

Peisander was now serving with the armament at Samos; moreover, his forwardness and energy—presently to be described—in taking the formid

make known the new prospects, and to put the standing oligarchical clubs, or hetæries, into active coöperation for the purpose of violently breaking up the democracy, and farther to establish oligarchical governments in all the remaining dependencies of Athens. They imagined that these dependencies would be thus induced to remain faithful to her, perhaps even that some of those which had already revolted might come back to their allegiance, when once she should be relieved from her democracy, and placed under the rule of her "best and most virtuous citizens."

Hitherto, the bargain tendered for acceptance had been, subversion of the Athenian democracy and restoration of Alkibiadês, on one hand, against hearty coöperation, and a free supply of gold from Persia, on the other. But what security was there that such bargain would be realized, or that when the first part should have been brought to pass, the second would follow? There was absolutely no security except the word of Alkibiadês, — very little to be trusted, even when promising what was in his own power to perform, as we may recollect from his memorable dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, — and on the present occasion, vouching for something in itself extravagant and preposterous. For what reasonable motive could be imagined to make the Great King shape his foreign policy according to the interests of Alkibiadês, or to inspire him with such lively interest in the substitution of oligarchy for democracy at Athens? This was a question which the oligarchical conspirators at Samos not only never troubled themselves to raise, but which they had every motive to suppress. The suggestion of Alkibiadês coincided fully with their political interest and ambition. Their object was to put down the democracy, and get possession of the

able initiative of putting down the Athenian democracy, is to me quite sufficient evidence that the taunts of the comic writers against his cowardice are unfounded. Xenophon in the *Symposion* repeats this taunt (ii, 14) which also appears in Aristophanês, Eupolis, Plato Comicus, and others see the passages collected in Meineke, *Histor. Critic. Comicor. Græcorum* vol. i, p. 178, etc.

Modern writers on Grecian history often repeat such bitter jests as if they were so much genuine and trustworthy evidence against the person labelled

government for themselves ; and the promise of Persian gold, if they could get it accredited, was inestimable as a stepping-stone towards this goal, whether it afterwards turned out to be a delusion or not. The probability is, that having a strong interest in believing it themselves, and a still stronger interest in making others believe it, they talked each other into a sincere persuasion. Without adverting to this fact, we should be at a loss to understand how the word of such a man as Alkibiadês, on such a matter, could be so implicitly accepted as to set in motion a whole train of novel and momentous events.

There was one man, and one man alone, so far as we know, who ventured openly to call it in question. This was Phrynichus, one of the generals of the fleet, who had recently given valuable counsel after the victory of Milêtus ; a clear-sighted and sagacious man, but personally hostile to Alkibiadês, and thoroughly seeing through his character and projects. Though Phrynichus was afterwards one of the chief organizers of the oligarchical movement, when it became detached from, and hostile to Alkibiadês, yet under the actual circumstances he discountenanced it altogether.¹ Alkibiadês, he said, had no attachment to oligarchical government rather than to democratical ; nor could he be relied on for standing by it after it should have been set up. His only purpose was, to make use of the oligarchical conspiracy now forming, for his own restoration ; which, if brought to pass, could not fail to introduce political discord into the camp, the greatest misfortune that could at present happen. As to the Persian king, it was unreasonable to expect that he would put himself out of his way to aid the Athenians, his old enemies, in whom he had no confidence, while he had the Peloponnesians present as allies, with a good naval force and powerful cities in his own territory, from whom he had never experienced either insult or annoyance. Moreover, the dependencies of Athens — upon whom it was now proposed to confer simultaneously with Athens herself, the blessing of oligarchical government — would

¹ Phrynichus is affirmed, in an Oration of Lysias, to have been originally poor, keeping sheep in the country part of Attica ; then, to have resided in the city, and practised what was called *sycophancy*, or false and vexatious accusation before the dikastery and the public assembly, (Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 3, p. 674, Reisk.)

receive that boon with indifference. Those who had already revolted would not come back, those who yet remained faithful would not be the more inclined to remain so longer. Their object would be to obtain autonomy, either under oligarchy or democracy, as the case might be. Assuredly, they would not expect better treatment from an oligarchical government at Athens, than from a democratical; for they knew that those self-styled "good and virtuous" men, who would form the oligarchy, were, as ministers of democracy, the chief advisers and instigators of the people to iniquitous deeds, most commonly for nothing but their own individual profit. From an Athenian oligarchy, the citizens of these dependencies had nothing to expect but violent executions without any judicial trial; but under democracy, they could obtain shelter and the means of appeal while their persecutors were liable to restraint and chastisement from the people and the popular dikasteries. Such, Phrynichus affirmed on his own personal knowledge, was the genuine feeling among the dependencies of Athens.¹ Having thus shown the calculations of the conspirators — as to Alkibiadēs, as to Perikles and as to the allied dependencies — to be all illusory, Phrynichus concluded by entering his decided protest against adopting the propositions of Alkibiadēs.

But in this protest, borne out afterwards by the result, he stood nearly alone. The tide of opinion, among the oligarchical con-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 48. Τὰς τε συμμαχίδας πόλεις, αἷς ὑπεσχησθαι δὴ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δημοκρατήσονται, εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη ὅτι μᾶλλον σφίσι οὐδ' αἱ ὑφεστηκυῖαι προσχωρήσονται, οὐδ' αἱ ὑπάρχοντες βεβαιότεραι ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ βουλήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς μετ' ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ κρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον, ἢ μετ' ὁποτέρου ἂν τύχῃσι τούτων ἐλευθέρῃν. Τούτους τε καλοὺς λόγους ἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς δὲ ταῖς ἐσηγητῶν τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὡς σθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις εἶναι, καὶ ἄκριτοι δὲ καὶ βιαίτερον ἔπαινον, τὸν τε δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκ σωφρονιστῆν. Καὶ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπιστάταις πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτοὺς εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσι.

In taking the comparison between oligarchy and democracy in there is hardly any evidence more important than this passage: a test to the comparative merit of democracy, pronounced by an oligarchical conspirator, and sanctioned by an historian himself unfriendly to the dem-

ators, ran so furiously the other way, that it was resolved to despatch Peisander and others immediately to Athens to consummate the oligarchical revolution as well as the recall of Alkibiadês; and at the same time to propose to the people their new intended ally, Tissaphernês.

Phrynichus knew well what would be the consequence to himself — if this consummation were brought about, as he foresaw that it probably would be — from the vengeance of his enemy Alkibiadês against his recent opposition. Satisfied that the latter would destroy him, he took measures for destroying Alkibiadês beforehand, even by a treasonable communication to the Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus at Milêtus, to whom he sent a secret account of the intrigues which the Athenian exile was carrying on at Samos to the prejudice of the Peloponnesians, prefaced with an awkward apology for this sacrifice of the interests of his country to the necessity of protecting himself against a personal enemy. But Phrynichus was imperfectly informed of the real character of the Spartan commander, or of his relations with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês. Not merely was the latter now at Magnesia, under the protection of the satrap, and out of the power of the Lacedæmonians, but Astyochus, a traitor to his duty through the gold of Tissaphernês, went up thither to show the letter of Phrynichus to the very person whom it was intended to expose. Alkibiadês forthwith sent intelligence to the generals and officers at Samos, of the step taken by Phrynichus, and pressed them to put him to death.

The life of Phrynichus now hung by a thread, and was probably preserved only by that respect for judicial formalities so deeply rooted in the Athenian character. In the extremity of danger, he resorted to a still more subtle artifice to save himself. He despatched a second letter to Astyochus, complaining of the violation of confidence in regard to the former, but at the same time intimating that he was now willing to betray to the Lacedæmonians the camp and armament at Samos. He invited Astyochus to come and attack the place, which was as yet unfortified, explaining minutely in what manner the attack could be best conducted. And he concluded by saying that this, as well as every other means of defence, must be pardoned to one whose life was in danger from a personal enemy. Foreseeing that Astyochus

would betray this letter as he had betrayed the former, Phrynichus waited a proper time, and then revealed to the camp the intention of the enemy to make an attack, as if it had reached him by private information. He insisted on the necessity of immediate precautions, and himself, as general, superintended the work of fortification, which was soon completed. Presently arrived a letter from Alkibiadês, communicating to the army that Phrynichus had betrayed them, and that the Peloponnesians were on the point of making an attack. But this letter, arriving after the precautions taken by order of Phrynichus himself had been already completed, was construed as a mere trick on the part of Alkibiadês himself, through his acquaintance with the intentions of the Peloponnesians, to raise a charge of treasonable correspondence against his personal enemy. The impression thus made by his second letter effaced the taint which had been left upon Phrynichus by the first, insomuch that the latter stood exculpated on both charges.¹

But Phrynichus, though successful in extricating himself, failed thoroughly in his manœuvre against the influence and life of Alkibiadês; in whose favor the oligarchical movement not only went on, but was transferred from Samos to Athens. On arriving at the latter place, Peisander and his companions laid before the public assembly the projects which had been conceived by the oligarchs at Samos. The people were invited to restore Alkibiadês and renounce their democratical constitution; return for which, they were assured of obtaining the Persian king as an ally, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians.² Violent was the storm which these propositions raised in the public

¹ Thucyd. viii, 50, 51.

² In the speech made by Theramênês (the Athenian) during the oligarchy of Thirty, seven years afterwards, it is affirmed that the Athenian people voted the adoption of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, from being told that the *Lacedæmonians* would never trust a democracy (Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii, 3, 45).

This is thoroughly incorrect, a specimen of the loose assertion of speakers in regard to facts even not very long past. At the moment when Theramênês said this, the question, what political constitution at Athens the *Lacedæmonians* would please to tolerate, was all-important to the Athenians. Theramênês transfers the feelings of the present to the incidents of the past.

sembly. Many speakers rose in animated defence of the democracy; few, if any, distinctly against it. The opponents of Alkibiadês indignantly denounced the mischief of restoring him, in violation of the laws, and in reversal of a judicial sentence, while the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, the sacred families connected with the Eleusinian mysteries which Alkibiadês had violated, entered their solemn protest on religious grounds to the same effect. Against all these vehement opponents, whose impassioned invectives obtained the full sympathy of the assembly, Peisander had but one simple reply. He called them forward successively by name, and put to each the question: "What hope have you of salvation for the city, when the Peloponnesians have a naval force against us fully equal to ours, together with a greater number of allied cities, and when the king as well as Tissaphernês are supplying them with money, while we have no money left? What hope have you of salvation, unless we can persuade the king to come over to our side?" The answer was a melancholy negative, or perhaps not less melancholy silence. "Well, then, rejoined Peisander, that object cannot possibly be attained, unless we conduct our political affairs for the future in a more moderate way, and put the powers of government more in the hands of a few, and unless we recall Alkibiadês, the only man now living who is competent to do the business. Under present circumstances, we surely shall not lay greater stress upon our political constitution than upon the salvation of the city; the rather as what we now enact may be hereafter modified, if it be found not to answer."

Against the proposed oligarchical change, the repugnance of the assembly was alike angry and unanimous. But they were silenced by the imperious necessity of the case, as the armament at Samos had been before; and admitting the alternative laid down by Peisander, as I have observed already, the most democratical citizen might be embarrassed as to his vote. Whether any speaker, like Phrynichus at Samos, arraigned the fallacy of the alternative, and called upon Peisander for some guarantee, better than mere asseveration, of the benefits to come, we are not informed. But the general vote of the assembly, reluctant and only passed in the hope of future change, sanctioned his recom-

mendation.¹ He and ten other envoys, invested with full powers of negotiating with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês, were despatched to Ionia immediately. Peisander at the same time obtained from the assembly a vote deposing Phrynichus from his command; under the accusation of having traitorously caused the loss of Iasus and the capture of Amorgês, after the battle of Milêtus, but from the real certainty that he would prove an insuperable bar to all negotiations with Alkibiadês. Phrynichus, with his colleague Skironidês, being thus displaced, Leon and Diomedon were sent to Samos as commanders in their stead; an appointment of which, as will be presently seen, Peisander was far from anticipating the consequences.

Before his departure for Asia, he took a step yet more important. He was well aware that the recent vote — a result of fear inspired by the war, representing a sentiment utterly at variance with that of the assembly, and only procured as the price of Persian aid against a foreign enemy — would never pass into a reality by the spontaneous act of the people themselves. It was, indeed, indispensable as a first step; partly as an authority to himself, partly also as a confession of the temporary weakness of the democracy, and as a sanction and encouragement for the oligarchical forces to show themselves. But the second step yet remained to be performed; that of calling these forces into energetic action, organizing an amount of violence sufficient to extort from the people actual submission in addition to verbal acquiescence, and thus, as it were, tying down the patier while the process of emasculation was being consummated. Peisander visited all the various political clubs, conspiracies, &

¹ Thucyd. viii, 54. 'Ο δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφερε περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἰς ἄλλην σωτηρίαν, δέισας, καὶ ἅμα ἐλπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται ἐνέδωκε.

"Atheniensibus, imminente periculo belli, major salutis quam dignitas cura fuit. Itaque, permittente populo, imperium ad Senatum transfertur (Justin, v, 3).

Justin is correct, so far as this vote goes: but he takes no notice of change of matters afterwards, when the establishment of the Four Hundred was consummated *without* the promised benefit of Persian alliance, and simple terrorism.

hetæries, which were habitual and notorious at Athens; associations, bound together by oath, among the wealthy citizens, partly for purposes of amusement, but chiefly pledging the members to stand by each other in objects of political ambition, in judicial trials, in accusation or defence of official men after the period of office had expired, in carrying points through the public assembly, etc. Among these clubs were distributed most of "the best citizens, the good and honorable men, the elegant men, the well known, the temperate, the honest and moderate men,"¹ etc., to employ that complimentary phraseology by which wealthy and anti-popular politicians have chosen to designate each other, in ancient as well as in modern times. And though there were doubtless individuals among them who deserved these appellations in their best sense, yet the general character of the clubs was not the less exclusive and oligarchical. In the details of political life, they had different partialities as well as different antipathies, and were oftener in opposition than in coöperation with each other. But they furnished, when taken together, a formidable anti-popular force; generally either in abeyance or disseminated in the accomplishment of smaller political measures and separate personal successes; but capable, at a special crisis, of being evoked, organized, and put in conjoint attack, for the subversion of the democracy. Such was the important movement now initiated by Peisander. He visited separately each of these clubs, put them into communication with each other, and exhorted them all to joint aggressive action against their common enemy the democracy, at a moment when it was already intimidated and might be finally overthrown.²

¹ Οἱ βέλτιστοι, οἱ καλοκάγαδοι, οἱ χαριέντες, οἱ γνώριμοι, οἱ σώφρονες, etc. : le parti honnête et modéré, etc.

² About these *ξυνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*, political and judicial associations, see above, in this History, vol. iv, ch. xxxvii, pp. 399, 400; vol. vi, ch. li. pp. 290, 291: see also Hermann Büttner, *Geschichte der politischen Hetærien zu Athen*. pp. 75, 79, Leipsic, 1840.

There seem to have been similar political clubs or associations at Carthage, exercising much influence, and holding perpetual banquets as a means of largess to the poor, Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 2; Livy, xxxiii, 46; xxxiv, 61; compare Kluge, ad Aristotle. De Polit. Carthag. pp. 46-127, Wratisl. 1824

The like political associations were both of long duration among the

Having taken other necessary measures towards the same purpose, Peisander left Athens with his colleagues to enter upon his

nobility of Rome, and of much influence for political objects as well as judicial success: "coitiones (compare Cicero pro Cluentio, c. 54, s. 148) honorum adipiscendorum causâ factæ, factiones, sodalitates." The incident described in Livy (ix. 26) is remarkable. The senate, suspecting the character and proceedings of these clubs, appointed the dictator Mænius (in 312 B.C.) as commissioner with full power to investigate and deal with them. But such was the power of the clubs, in a case where they had a common interest and acted in coöperation (as was equally the fact under Peisander at Athens), that they completely frustrated the inquiry, and went on as before. "*Nec diutius, ut fit, quam dum recens erat, questio per clara nomina reorum viguit: inde labi coepit ad viliora capita, donec coitionibus factionibusque, adversus quas comparata erat, oppressa est.*" (Livy. ix, 26.) Compare Dio. Cass. xxxvii, 57, about the *τραπικὰ* of the Triumvirs at Rome. Quintus Cicero (de Petition. Consulat. c. 5) says to his brother, the orator: "Quod si satis grati homines essent, hæc omnia (i. e. all the *subsidia* necessary for success in his coming election) tibi parata esse debebant, sicut parata esse confido. Nam hoc biennio quatuor *sodalitates* civium ad ambitionem gratiosissimorum tibi obligasti. . . . Horum in causis ad te deferundis *quidam eorum sodales tibi receperint, et confirmarint*, scio; nam in terfui."

See Th. Mommsen, *De Collegiis et Sodaliciis Romanorum*, Kiel, 1843, ch. iii, sects. 5, 6, 7; also the Dissertation of Wunder, inserted in the *Onomasticon Tullianum* of Orelli and Baier, in the last volume of their edition of Cicero, pp. 200-210, ad *Ind. Legum; Lex Licinia de Sodalitiis*.

As an example of these clubs or conspiracies for mutual support in *ἐν νόμοις ἐπὶ δίκαις* (not including *ἀρχαίς*, so far as we can make out), we may cite the association called *οἱ Εἰκαδεῖς*, made known to us by an Inscription recently discovered in Attica, and published first in Dr. Wordsworth *Athens and Attica*, p. 223; next in Ross, *Die Deme von Attica*, Preface p. v. These *Εἰκαδεῖς* are an association, the members of which are bound to each other by a common oath, as well as by a curse which the mythic hero of the association, Eikadeus, is supposed to have imprecated (*ἐναντί τῇ ἡρᾷ ἣν Εἰκαδεὺς ἐπηράσατο*); they possess common property, and it was held contrary to the oath for any of the members to enter into a pecunia process against the *κοινόν*: compare analogous obligations among the Roman *Sodales*, Mommsen, p. 4. Some members had violated their obligation upon this point: Polyxenus had attacked them at law for false witness, and the general body of the *Eikadeis* pass a vote of thanks to him for so doing, and choose three of their members to assist him in the cause before the *dikastery* (*οἱ τινες συναγωνιῶνται τῷ ἐπεσκημένῳ τοῖς μάρτυσι*): compare the *τραπικὰ* alluded to in Demosthenês (cont. Theokrin. c. 11, p. 1335 assisting Theokrinês before the *dikastery*, and intimidating the witness

negotiation with Tissaphernês. But the coöperation and aggressive movement of the clubs which he had originated was prosecuted with increased ardor during his absence, and even fell into hands more organizing and effective than his own. The rhetorical teacher Antiphon, of the deme Rhamnus, took it in hand especially, acquired the confidence of the clubs, and drew the plan of campaign against the democracy. He was a man estimable in private life, and not open to pecuniary corruption: in other respects, of præ eminent ability,—in contrivance, judgment, speech, and action. The profession to which he belonged, generally unpopular among the democracy, excluding him from taking rank as a speaker either in the public assembly or the dikastery: for a rhetorical teacher, contending in either of them against a private speaker, to repeat a remark already once made, was considered to stand at the same unfair advantage, as a fencing-master fighting a duel with a gentleman would be held to stand in modern times. Thus debarred himself from the showy celebrity of Athenian political life, Antiphon became only the more consummate, as a master of advice, calculation, scheming, and rhetorical composition,¹ to assist the celebrity of others; insomuch that

The Guilds in the European cities during the Middle Ages, usually sworn to by every member, and called *conjuraciones Amicitie*, bear in many respects a resemblance to these *ἐννομόσεις*; though the judicial proceedings in the mediæval cities, being so much less popular than at Athens, narrowed their range of interference in this direction: their political importance, however, was quite equal. (See Wilda, *Das Gilden Wesen des Mittelalters*, Abschn. ii, p. 167, etc.)

"Omnes autem ad Amicitiam pertinentes villæ per fidem et sacramentum firmaverunt, quod unus subveniat alteri tanquam fratri suo in utili et honesto," (ib. p. 148.)

¹ The person described by Krito, in the *Euthydêmus* of Plato (c. 31, p. 305, C.), as having censured Sokratês for conversing with Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus, is presented exactly like Antiphon in Thucydides: *ἡκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ· οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαλεῖν αὐτὸν φασὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, νῆ τὸν Δία, καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινὸς λόγους ἐντιθέναι.*

Heindorf thinks that Isokratês is here meant: Groen van Prinsterer talks of Lysias; Winkelmann, of Thrasymachus. The description would fit Antiphon as well as either of these three: though Stallbaum may perhaps be right in supposing no particular individual to have been in the mind of Plato.

his silent assistance in political and judicial debates, as a sort of chamber-counsel, was highly appreciated and largely paid. Now such were precisely the talents required for the present occasion ; while Antiphon, who hated the democracy for having hitherto kept him in the shade, gladly bent his full talents towards its subversion.

Such was the man to whom Peisander, in departing, chiefly confided the task of organizing the anti-popular clubs, for the consummation of the revolution already in immediate prospect. His chief auxiliary was Theramenês, another Athenian, now first named, of eminent ability and cunning. His father (either natural or by adoption), Agnon, was one of the probûli, and had formerly been founder of Amphipolis. Even Phrynichus — whose sagacity we have already had occasion to appreciate, and who, from hatred towards Alkibiadês, had pronounced himself decidedly against the oligarchical movement at Samos — became zealous in forwarding the movement at Athens, after his dismissal from the command. He brought to the side of Antiphon and Theramenês a contriving head not inferior to theirs, coupled with daring and audacity even superior. Under such skilful leaders the anti-popular force of Athens was organized with a deep skill and directed with a dexterous wickedness, never before witnessed in Greece.

At the time when Peisander and the other envoys reached Ionia, seemingly about the end of January or beginning of February 411 B.C., the Peloponnesian fleet had already quitted Mitus and gone to Knidus and Rhodes, on which latter island Lysander and Diomedon made some hasty descents, from the neighboring island of Chalkê. At the same time the Athenian armament on Chios was making progress in the siege of that place and the construction of the neighboring fort at Delphinium. Pedarctus, the Lacedæmonian governor of the island, had sent pressing messages to solicit aid from the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, but no aid arrived ; and he therefore resolved to attempt a ger

Οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι, whom Xenophon specifies as being so eminently useful to a person engaged in a lawsuit, are probably the persons who knew how to address the dikastery effectively in support of his case (Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 51).

sally and attack upon the Athenians with his whole force, foreign as well as Chian. Though at first he obtained some success, the battle ended in his complete defeat and death, with great slaughter of the Chian troops, and with the loss of many whose shields were captured in the pursuit.¹ The Chians, now reduced to greater straits than before, and beginning to suffer severely from famine, were only enabled to hold out by a partial reinforcement soon afterwards obtained from the Peloponnesian guardships at Milêtus. A Spartan named Leon, who had come out in the vessel of Antisthenês as one of the epibatæ, or marines, conducted this reinforcing squadron of twelve triremes, chiefly Thurian and Syracusan, succeeding Pedaritus in the general command of the island.²

It was while Chios seemed thus likely to be recovered by Athens — and while the superior Peloponnesian fleet was paralyzed at Rhodes by Persian intrigues and bribes — that Peisander arrived in Ionia to open his negotiations with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês. He was enabled to announce that the subversion of the democracy at Athens was already begun, and would soon be consummated: and he now required the price which had been promised in exchange, Persian alliance and aid to Athens against

¹ Thucyd. viii, 55, 56.

² Thucyd. viii, 61. ἐνυχον δὲ ἐπὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυόχου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου Λέοντρά τε ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην, ὃς Ἀντισθένει ἐπιβάτης ξυνέπλει, τοῦτον κεκομισμένοι μετὰ τὸν Πεδάριτον θάνατον ἄρχοντα, etc.

I do not see why the word ἐπιβάτης should not be construed here, as elsewhere, in its ordinary sense of *miles classarius*. The commentators, see the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller start difficulties which seem to me of little importance; and they imagine divers new meanings, for none of which any authority is produced. We ought not to wonder that a common *miles classarius*, or marine, being a Spartan citizen, should be appointed commander at Chios, when, a few chapters afterwards, we find Thrasybulus at Samos promoted, from being a common hoplite in the ranks, to be one of the Athenian generals (viii. 73).

The like remark may be made on the passage cited from Xenophon (Hellenic. i. 3, 17), about Hegesandridas — ἐπιβάτης ὢν Μινδάρου, where also the commentators reject the common meaning (see Schneider's note in the Addenda to his edition of 1791, p. 97). The participle ὢν in that passage must be considered as an inaccurate substitute for γεγενημένος, since Mindarus was dead at the time. Hegesandridas had been among the epibatæ of Mindarus, and was now in command of a squadron on the coast of Thrace.

the Peloponnesians. But Alkibiadēs knew well that he had promised what he had not the least chance of being able to perform. The satrap had appeared to follow his advice,—or had rather followed his own inclination, employing Alkibiadēs as an instrument and auxiliary,—in the endeavor to wear out both parties, and to keep them nearly on an equality until each should ruin the other. But he was no way disposed to identify himself with the cause of Athens, and to break decidedly with the Peloponnesians, especially at a moment when their fleet was both the greater of the two, and in occupation of an island close to his own satrapy. Accordingly Alkibiadēs, when summoned by the Athenian envoys to perform his engagement, found himself in a dilemma from which he could only escape by one of his characteristic manœuvres.

Receiving the envoys himself in conjunction with Tissaphernēs, and speaking on behalf of the latter, he pushed his demands to an extent which he knew that the Athenians would never concede, in order that the rupture might seem to be on their side, and not on his. First, he required the whole of Ionia to be conceded to the Great King; next, all the neighboring islands, with some other items besides.¹ Large as these requisitions were, comprehending the cession of Lesbos and Samos as well as Chios, and replacing the Persian monarchy in the condition in which it had stood in 496 B.C., before the Ionic revolt, Peisander and his colleagues granted them all: so that Alkibiadēs was on the point of seeing his deception exposed and frustrated. At last, he bethought himself of a fresh demand, which touched Athenian pride, as well as Athenian safety, in the tenderest place. He required that the Persian king should be held free to build ships of war in unlimited number, and to keep them sailing along the coast as he might think fit, through all these new portions of territory. After the immense concessions already made, the envoys not only rejected this fresh demand at once, but resented it as an insult, which exposed the real drift and purpose

¹ Thucyd. viii, 56. Ἰωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν ἡξίουν δίδοσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν νήσων τε ἐπικειμένους καὶ ἄλλα, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντιούμενων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, etc.

What this *et cetera* comprehended, we cannot divine. The demand was certainly ample enough without it.

of Alkibiadēs. Not merely did it cancel the boasted treaty, called the Peace of Kallias, concluded about forty years before between Athens and Persia, and limiting the Persian ships of war to the sea eastward of Phasēlis, but it extinguished the maritime empire of Athens, and compromised the security of all the coasts and islands of the Ægean. To see Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, etc., in possession of Persia, was sufficiently painful; but if there came to be powerful Persian fleets on these islands it would be the certain precursor and means of farther conquests to the westward, and would revive the aggressive dispositions of the Great King, as they had stood at the beginning of the reign of Xerxes. Peisander and his comrades, abruptly breaking off the debate, returned to Samos; indignant at the discovery, which they now made for the first time, that Alkibiadēs had juggled them from the outset, and was imposing conditions which he knew to be inadmissible.¹ They still appear, however, to have thought that Alkibiadēs acted thus, not because he *could* not, but because he *would* not, bring about the alliance under discussion.² They suspected him of playing false with the oligarchical movement which he had himself instigated, and of projecting the accomplishment of his own restoration, coupled with the alliance of Tissaphernēs, into the bosom of the democracy which he had begun by denouncing. Such was the light in which they presented his conduct, venting their disappointment in invectives against his duplicity, and in asseverations that he was after all unsuitable for a place in oligarchical society. Such declarations,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 56. ναῦς ἤξιον ἔαν βασιλέα ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν, ὅπῃ ἂν καὶ δοῖται ἂν βούληται.

In my judgment *ἐαυτοῦ* is decidedly the proper reading here, not *ἐαντῶν*. I agree in this respect with Dr. Arnold, Bekker, and Gölher.

In a former volume of this History, I have shown reasons for believing, in opposition to Mitford, Dahlmann, and others, that the treaty called by the name of Kallias, and sometimes miscalled by the name of Kimon, was a real fact and not a boastful fiction: see vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 340.

The note of Dr. Arnold, though generally just, gives an inadequate representation of the strong reasons of Athens for rejecting and reventing this third demand.

² Thucyd. viii, 63. Καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κοινολογούμενοι ἐσκέψαντο, Ἀλκιβιάδην μὲν, ἐπεὶ δὴ περ οὐ βούλεται, ἔαν (καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔλθειν), etc.

circulated at Samos, to account for their unexpected failure in realizing the hopes which they had raised, created among the armament an impression that Alkibiadês was really favorable to the democracy, at the same time leaving unabated the prestige of his unbounded ascendancy over Tissaphernês and the Great King. We shall presently see the effects resulting from this belief.

Immediately after the rupture of the negotiations, however, the satrap took a step well calculated to destroy the hopes of the Athenians altogether, so far as Persian aid was concerned. Though persisting in his policy of lending no decisive assistance to either party and of merely prolonging the war so as to enfeeble both, he yet began to fear that he was pushing matters too far against the Peloponnesians, who had now been two months inactive at Rhodes, with their large fleet hauled ashore. He had no treaty with them actually in force, since Lichas had disallowed the two previous conventions; nor had he furnished them with pay or maintenance. His bribes to the officers had hitherto kept the armament quiet; yet we do not distinctly see how so large a body of men found subsistence.¹ He was now, however, apprized that they could find subsistence no longer, and that they would probably desert, or commit depredations on the coast of his satrapy, or perhaps be driven to hasten on a general action with the Athenians, under desperate circumstances. Under such apprehensions he felt compelled to put himself again in communication with them, to furnish them with pay, and to conclude with them a third convention, the proposition of which he had refused to entertain at Knidus. He therefore went to Kaunus, invited the Peloponnesian leaders to Milêtus, and concluded with them near that town a treaty to the following effect:—

“In this thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephorship of Alexippidas at Lacedæmon, a convention is hereby concluded by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, with Tiss

¹ Thucyd. vii, 44–57. In two parallel cases, one in Chios, the other in Korkyra, the seamen of an unpaid armament found subsistence by hiring themselves out for agricultural labor. But this was only during the summer (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1; vi, 2, 37), while the stay of the Peloponnesians at Rhodes was from January to March.

phernês and Hieramênês and the sons of Pharnakês, respecting the affairs of the king and of the Lacedæmonians and their allies. The territory of the king, as much of it as is in Asia, shall belong to the king. Let the king determine as he chooses respecting his own territory. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not approach the king's territory with any mischievous purpose, nor shall the king approach that of the Lacedæmonians and their allies with any like purpose. If any one among the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall approach the king's territory with mischievous purpose, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall hinder him: if any one from the king's territory shall approach the Lacedæmonians or their allies with mischievous purpose, the king shall hinder him. Tissaphernês shall provide pay and maintenance, for the fleet now present, at the rate already stipulated, until the king's fleet shall arrive; after that, it shall be at the option of the Lacedæmonians to maintain their own fleet, if they think fit; or, if they prefer, Tissaphernês shall furnish maintenance, and at the close of the war the Lacedæmonians shall repay to him what they have received. After the king's fleet shall have arrived, the two fleets shall carry on war conjointly, in such manner as shall seem good to Tissaphernês and the Lacedæmonians and their allies. If they choose to close the war with the Athenians, they shall close it only by joint consent."¹

In comparing this third convention with the two preceding, we find that nothing is now stipulated as to any territory except the continent of Asia; which is insured unreservedly to the king, of course with all the Greek residents planted upon it. But by a diplomatic finesse, the terms of the treaty imply that this is not *all* the territory which the king is entitled to claim, though nothing is covenanted as to any remainder.² Next, this third treaty includes Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnakês, with his satrapy of Daskylium, and Hieramenês, with his district, the extent and position of which we do not know; while in the former

¹ Thucyd. viii, 58.

² Thucyd. viii, 58. *χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστὶ, βασιλέως εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς αὐτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται.*

treaties no other satrap except Tissaphernês had been concerned. We must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet included those twenty-seven triremes, which had been brought across by Kalligeitus expressly for the aid of Pharnabazus ; and therefore that the latter now naturally became a party to the general operations. Thirdly, we here find, for the first time, formal announcement of a Persian fleet about to be brought up as auxiliary to the Peloponnesians. This was a promise which the satrap now set forth more plainly than before, to amuse them, and to abate the mistrust which they had begun to conceive of his sincerity. It served the temporary purpose of restraining them from any immediate act of despair hostile to his interests, which was all that he looked for. While he renewed his payments, therefore, for the moment, he affected to busy himself in orders and preparations for the fleet from Phenicia.¹

The Peloponnesian fleet was now ordered to move from Rhodes. Before it quitted that island, however, envoys came thither from Eretria and from Orôpus ; which latter place, a dependency on the northeastern frontier of Attica, though protected by an Athenian garrison, had recently been surprised and captured by the Bœotians. The loss of Orôpus much increased the facilities for the revolt of Eubœa ; and these envoys came to entreat aid from the Peloponnesian fleet, to second that island in that design. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, felt themselves under prior obligation to relieve the sufferers at Chios, towards which island they first bent their course. But they had scarcely passed the Triopian cape, when they saw the Athenian squadron from Chalkê dogging their motions. Though there was no wish on either side for a general battle, yet they saw evidently that the Athenians would not permit them to pass by Samos, and get to the relief of Chios, without one. Renouncing, therefore, the project of relieving Chios, they again concentrated their force at Milêtus, while the Athenian fleet was also again united at Samos.² It was about the end of March 411 B.C., that the two fleets were thus replaced in the station which they had occupied four months previously.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 59.

² Thucyd. viii, 61

After the breach with Alkibiadês, and still more after this manifest reconciliation of Tissaphernês with the Peloponnesians, Peisander and the oligarchical conspirators at Samos had to reconsider their plan of action. They would not have begun the movement at first, had they not been instigated by Alkibiadês, and furnished by him with the treacherous delusion of Persian alliance to cheat and paralyze the people. They had, indeed, motives enough, from their own personal ambition, to originate it of themselves, apart from Alkibiadês; but without the hopes — equally useful for their purpose, whether false or true — connected with his name, they would have had no chance of achieving the first step. Now, however, that first step had been achieved, before the delusive expectation of Persian gold was dissipated. The Athenian people had been familiarized with the idea of a subversion of their constitution, in consideration of a certain price: it remained to extort from them at the point of the sword, without paying the price, what they had thus consented to sell.¹ Moreover, the leaders of the scheme felt themselves already compromised, so that they could not recede with safety. They had set in motion their partisans at Athens, where the system of murderous intimidation, though the news had not as yet reached Samos, was already in full swing: so that they felt constrained to persevere, as the only chance of preservation to themselves. At the same time, all that faint pretence of public benefit, in the shape of Persian alliance, which had been originally attached to it, and which might have been conceived to enlist in the scheme some timid patriots, was now entirely withdrawn; and nothing remained except a naked, selfish, and unscrupulous scheme of ambition, not only ruining the freedom of Athens at home, but crippling and imperiling her before the foreign enemy, at a moment when her entire strength was scarcely adequate to the contest. The conspirators resolved to persevere, at all hazards, both in breaking down the constitution and in carrying on the foreign war. Most of them being rich men, they were con-

¹ See Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 8. He cites this revolution as an instance of one begun by deceit and afterwards consummated by force: *ολον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες, τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους· φενάσμεναι δὲ, κατὰ χεῖν ἐπειρῶντο τὴν πολίτειαν.*

tent, Thucydides observes, to defray the cost out of their own purses, now that they were contending, not for their country, but for their own power and profit.¹

They lost no time in proceeding to execution, immediately after returning to Samos from the abortive conference with Alkibiades. While they despatched Peisander with five of the envoys back to Athens, to consummate what was already in progress there, and the remaining five to oligarchize the dependent allies, they organized all their partisan force in the armament, and began to take measures for putting down the democracy in Samos itself. That democracy had been the product of a forcible revolution, effected about ten months before, by the aid of three Athenian triremes. It had since preserved Samos from revolting like Chios: it was now the means of preserving the democracy at Athens itself. The partisans of Peisander, finding it an invincible obstacle to their views, contrived to gain over a party of the leading Samians now in authority under it. Three hundred of these latter, a portion of those who ten months before had risen in arms to put down the preëxisting oligarchy, now enlisted as conspirators along with the Athenian oligarchs, to put down the Samian democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves. The new alliance was attested and cemented, according to genuine oligarchical practice, by a murder without judicial trial, or an assassination, for which a suitable victim was at hand. The Athenian Hyperbolus, who had been ostracized some years before by the coalition of Nikias and Alkibiades, together with their respective partisans, — ostracized as Thucydides tells us, not from any fear of his power and over-ascendent influence, but from his low character, and from his being a disgrace to the city, and thus ostracized by an abuse of the institution, — was now resident at Samos. As he was not a Samian, and had, moreover, been in banishment during the last five or six years, he could have had no power either in the island or the armament, and therefore his death served no prospecti-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 63. Αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἡ δὴ καὶ κινδυνεύ-
τας, ὁρᾶν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθῆσεται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου
ἀντέχειν, καὶ ἐσφένειν αὐτοὺς προθύμως χρήματα καὶ ἦν τι ἄλλο δέη, ὡς οὐ
ἄλλοις ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταλαιπωροῦντας.

purpose. But he represented the demagogic and accusatory eloquence of the democracy, the check upon official delinquency; so that he served as a common object of antipathy to Athenian and Samian oligarchs. Some of the Athenian partisans, headed by Charminus, one of the generals, in concert with the Samian conspirators, seized Hyperbolus and put him to death, seemingly with some other victims at the same time.¹

But though these joint assassinations served as a pledge to each section of the conspirators for the fidelity of the other, in respect to farther operations, they at the same time gave warning to opponents. Those leading men at Samos who remained attached to the democracy, looking abroad for defence against the coming attack, made earnest appeal to Leon and Diomedon, the two generals most recently arrived from Athens in substitution for Phrynichus and Skironidês, — men sincerely devoted to the democracy, and adverse to all oligarchical change, as well as to the trierarch Thrasyllus, to Thrasybulus, son of Lykus, then serving as an hoplite, and to many others of the pronounced democrats and patriots in the Athenian armament. They made appeal not simply in behalf of their own personal safety and of their own democracy, now threatened by conspirators of whom a portion were Athenians, but also on grounds of public interest to Athens; since, if Samos became oligarchized, its sympathy with the Athenian democracy and its fidelity to the alliance would be at an end. At this moment the most recent events which had occurred at Athens, presently to be told, were not

¹ Thucyd. viii, 73. Καὶ Ὑπέρβολόν τε τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ ἀσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ Χαρμίνου τε ἐνδὲς τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τινῶν τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων, πίστιν δίδοντες αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἄλλα μετὰ αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, τοῖς τε πλείοσιν ὠρμηγὸ ἐπιτίθεσθαι.

I presume that the words, ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, must mean that other persons were assassinated along with Hyperbolus.

The incorrect manner in which Mr. Mitford recounts these proceedings at Samos has been properly commented on by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 30). It is the more surprising, since the phrase μετὰ Χαρμίνου, which Mr. Mitford has misunderstood, is explained in a special note of Duker.

known, and the democracy was considered as still subsisting there.¹

To stand by the assailed democracy of Samos, and to preserve the island itself, now the mainstay of the shattered Athenian empire, were motives more than sufficient to awaken the Athenian leaders thus solicited. Commencing a personal canvass among the soldiers and seamen, and invoking their interference to avert the overthrow of the Samian democracy, they found the general sentiment decidedly in their favor, but most of all, among the *parali*, or crew of the consecrated public trireme, called the *paralus*. These men were the picked seamen of the state,—each of them not merely a freeman, but a full Athenian citizen, receiving higher pay than the ordinary seamen, and known as devoted to the democratical constitution, with an active repugnance to oligarchy itself as well as to everything which scented of it.² The vigilance of Leon and Diomedon on the defensive side, counteracted the machinations of their colleague Charminus, along with the conspirators, and provided for the Samian democracy faithful auxiliaries constantly ready for action. Presently the conspirators made a violent attack to overthrow the government; but though they chose their own moment and opportunity they still found themselves thoroughly worsted in the struggle especially through the energetic aid of the *parali*. Thirty of their number were slain in the contest, and three of the most guilty afterwards condemned to banishment. The victorious party took no farther revenge, even upon the remainder of the three hundred conspirators, granted a general amnesty, and did their best to reestablish constitutional and harmonious working of the democracy.³

¹ Thucyd. viii, 73, 74. οὐκ ἤξιουν περιδεῖν αὐτοὺς σφῆς τε διαφθαρέναι καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίοις ἄλλοτριωθεῖσαν, etc.

....οὐ γὰρ ᾔδεσάν πω τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἄρχοντας, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 73. καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Παράλους, ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐλευθέρους πάντας ἐν τῇ νηὶ πλέοντας, καὶ ἀεὶ δὴ ποτε ὀλίγα· καὶ μὴ παρούσης ἐπικειμένους.

Peitholaus called the *paralus* *ρόπαλον* τοῦ δήμου, "the club, staff mace of the people." (Aristotel. Rhetoric. iii, 3.)

³ Thucyd. viii, 73. Καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τινὰς ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακοτρὶς δὲ τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους φυγῇ ἐξημίωσαν· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοὶ δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ξυνοπολίτευσαν.

Chæreas, an Athenian trierarch, who had been forward in the contest, was sent in the *paralus* itself to Athens, to make communication of what had occurred. But this democratical crew, on reaching their native city, instead of being received with that welcome which they doubtless expected, found a state of things not less odious than surprising. The democracy of Athens had been subverted: instead of the senate of Five Hundred, and the assembled people, an oligarchy of Four Hundred self-installed persons were enthroned with sovereign authority in the senate-house. The first order of the Four Hundred, on hearing that the *paralus* had entered Peiræus, was to imprison two or three of the crew, and to remove all the rest from their own privileged trireme aboard a common trireme, with orders to depart forthwith and to cruise near Eubœa. The commander, Chæreas, found means to escape, and returned back to Samos to tell the unwelcome news.¹

The steps, whereby this oligarchy of Four Hundred had been gradually raised up to their new power, must be taken up from the time when Peisander quitted Athens, — after having obtained the vote of the public assembly authorizing him to treat with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês, — and after having set on foot a joint organization and conspiracy of all the anti-popular clubs, which fell under the management especially of Antiphon and Theramenês, afterwards aided by Phrynichus. All the members of that Board of Elders called *Probûli*, who had been named after the defeat in Sicily, with Agnon, father of Theramenês, at their head,² — together with many other leading citizens, some of whom had been counted among the firmest friends of the democracy, joined the conspiracy; while the oligarchical and the neutral rich came into it with ardor; so that a body of partisans was formed both numerous and well provided with money. Antiphon did not attempt to bring them together, or to make any public demonstration, armed or unarmed, for the purpose of overawing the actual authorities. He permitted the sen

¹ Thucyd. viii, 74.

² Thucyd. viii, 1. About the countenance which *all* these *probûli* lent to the conspiracy, see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*. iii, 18, 2.

Respecting the activity of Agnon, as one of the *probûli*, in the same cause, see *Lysias*, *Orat.* xii, cont. *Eratosthen.* c. 11, p. 426, Reisk. sect. 66.

ate and the public assembly to go on meeting and debating as usual; but his partisans, neither the names nor the numbers of whom were publicly known, received from him instructions both when to speak and what language to hold. The great topic upon which they descanted, was the costliness of democratical institutions in the present distressed state of the finances, the heavy tax imposed upon the state by paying the senators, the *dikasts*, the *ekklesiasts*, or citizens who attended the public assembly, etc. The state could now afford to pay only those soldiers who fought in its defence, nor ought any one else to touch the public money. It was essential, they insisted, to exclude from the political franchise all except a select body of Five Thousand, composed of those who were best able to do service to the city by person and by purse.

The extensive disfranchisement involved in this last proposition was quite sufficiently shocking to the ears of an Athenian assembly. But in reality the proposition was itself a juggle, never intended to become reality, and representing something far short of what Antiphon and his partisans intended. Their design was to appropriate the powers of government to themselves simply, without control or partnership, leaving this body of Five Thousand not merely unconvened, but non-existent, as a mere empty name to impose upon the citizens generally. Of this real intention, however, not a word was as yet spoken. The projected body of Five Thousand was the theme preached upon by all the party orators; yet without submitting any substantial motion for the change, which could not be yet done without illegality.

Even thus indirectly advocated, the project of cutting down the franchise to Five Thousand, and of suppressing all the public civil functions, was a change sufficiently violent to call for abundant opponents. For such opponents Antiphon was fully prepared. Of the men who thus stood forward in opposition either all, or at least all the most prominent, were successively taken off by private assassination. The first of them who perished was Androklês, distinguished as a demagogue, or popular speaker, and marked out to vengeance not only by that circumstance, but by the farther fact that he had been among the most vehement accusers of Alkibiadês before his exile. For at

time, the breach of Peisander with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês had not yet become known at Athens, so that the latter was still supposed to be on the point of returning home as a member of the contemplated oligarchical government. After Androklês, many other speakers of similar sentiments perished in the same way, by unknown hands. A band of Grecian youths, strangers, and got together from different cities,¹ was organized for the business: the victims were all chosen on the same special ground, and the deed was so skilfully perpetrated that neither director nor instrument ever became known. After these assassinations — sure, special, secret, and systematic, emanating from an unknown directory, like a Vehmic tribunal — had continued for some time, the terror which they inspired became intense and universal. No justice could be had, no inquiry could be instituted, even for the death of the nearest and dearest relative. At last, no man dared to demand or even to mention inquiry, looking upon himself as fortunate that he had escaped the same fate in his own person. So finished an organization, and such well-aimed blows, raised a general belief that the conspirators were much more numerous than they were in reality. And as it turned out that there were persons among them who had before been accounted hearty democrats,² so at last dismay and mistrust became

¹ Thucyd. viii, 69. *Οἱ εἰκοσὶ καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ' αὐτῶν* (that is, along with the Four Hundred) *Ἑλλήνες νεανίσκοι, οἷς ἐχρῶντο εἰ τί ποὺ δέοι χεῖρουργεῖν.*

Dr. Arnold explains the words *Ἑλλήνες νεανίσκοι* to mean some of the members of the aristocratical clubs, or unions, formerly spoken of. But I cannot think that Thucydides would use such an expression to designate Athenian citizens: neither is it probable that Athenian citizens would be employed in repeated acts of such a character.

² Even Peisander himself had professed the strongest attachment to the democracy, coupled with exaggerated violence against parties suspected of oligarchical plots, four years before, in the investigations which followed on the mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens (Andokidês de *Myster.* c. 9, 10, sects. 36-43).

It is a fact that Peisander was one of the prominent movers on both these two occasions, four years apart. And if we could believe Isokratês (de *Begis*, sects. 4-7, p. 347), the second of the two occasions was merely the continuance and consummation of a plot which had been projected and begun on the first, and in which the conspirators had endeavored to enlist Alkibiadês. The latter refused, so his son, the speaker in the above-mentioned oration, contends, in consequence of his attachment to the democ

universally prevalent. Nor did any one dare even to express indignation at the murders going on, much less to talk about redress or revenge, for fear that he might be communicating with one of the unknown conspirators. In the midst of this terrorism all opposition ceased in the senate and public assembly, so that the speakers of the conspiring oligarchy appeared to carry an unanimous assent.¹

Such was the condition to which things had been brought in Athens, by Antiphon and the oligarchical conspirators acting under his direction, at the time when Peisander and the five envoys arrived thither returning from Samos. It is probable that they had previously transmitted home from Samos news of the rupture with Alkibiadês, and of the necessity of prosecuting the conspiracy without farther view either to him or to the Persian alliance. Such news would probably be acceptable both to Antiphon and Phrynichus, both of them personal enemies of Alkibiadês; especially Phrynichus, who had pronounced him to be incapable of fraternizing with an oligarchical revolution.² In any rate, the plans of Antiphon had been independent of any view to Persian aid, and had been directed to carry the revolution by means of naked, exorbitant, and well-directed fear, without any intermixture of hope or any prospect of public benefit. Peisander found the reign of terror fully matured. He had not come direct from Samos to Athens, but had halted in his voyages at various allied dependencies, while the other five envoys, well as a partisan named Diotrophês, had been sent to Thasos and elsewhere;³ all for the same purpose, of putting down

racy; upon which the oligarchical conspirators, incensed at his refusal, laid up the charge of irreligion against him and procured his banishment.

Though Droysen and Wattenbach (*De Quadringentorum Athenis*) mention, pp. 7, 8, Berlin, 1842) place confidence, to a considerable extent, in this manner of putting the facts, I consider it to be nothing better than a complete perversion; irreconcilable with Thucydides, confounding together facts unconnected in themselves as well as separated by a long interval of time, and introducing unreal causes, for the purpose of making out, which was certainly not true, that Alkibiadês was a faithful friend of the democracy, and even a sufferer in its behalf.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 66.

² Thucyd. viii, 68. *νομίζων οὐκ ἔν ποτε αὐτὸν (Alkibiadês) κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ δολιχαρχίας κατελθεῖν*, etc.

³ Thucyd. viii,

democracies in those allied cities where they existed, and establishing oligarchies in their room. Peisander made this change at Tênos, Andros, Karystus, Ægina, and elsewhere; collecting from these several places a regiment of three hundred hoplites, which he brought with him to Athens as a sort of body-guard to his new oligarchy.¹ He could not know until he reached Peiræus the full success of the terrorism organized by Antiphon and the rest; so that he probably came prepared to surmount a greater resistance than he actually found. As the facts stood, so completely had the public opinion and spirit been subdued, that he was enabled to put the finishing stroke at once, and his arrival was the signal for consummating the revolution, first, by an extorted suspension of the tutelary constitutional sanction, next, by the more direct employment of armed force.

First, he convoked a public assembly, in which he proposed a decree, naming ten commissioners with full powers, to prepare propositions for such political reform as they should think advisable, and to be ready by a given day.² According to the usual

¹ Thucyd. viii, 65. Οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον παραπλέοντες τε, ὥσπερ ἐδέδοκτο, τοὺς δῆμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυνον, καὶ ἅμα ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν χωρίων καὶ ὀπλίτας ἔχοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς συμμάχους ἤλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. Καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις προειργασμένα.

We may gather from c. 69 that the places which I have named in the text were among those visited by Peisander: all of them lay very much in his way from Samos to Athens.

² Thucyd. viii, 67. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον συλλέξαντες εἶπον γνώμην, δέκα ἀνδρας ἐλέσθαι ξυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας, τούτους δὲ ξυγγραψαντας γνώμην ἐσενεγκεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν, καθ' ὅτι ἀριστα ἡ πόλις οἰκῆσεται.

In spite of certain passages found in Suidas and Harpokration (see K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats Alterthümer*, sect. 167, note 12: compare also Wattenbach, *De Quadringentor. Factione*, p. 38), I cannot think that there was any connection between these ten *ξυγγραφεῖς*, and the Board of *πρόβουλοι* mentioned as having been before named (Thucyd. viii, 1). Nor has the passage in Lysias, to which Hermann makes allusion, anything to do with these *ξυγγραφεῖς*. The mention of Thirty persons by Androtion and Philochorus, seems to imply that they, or Harpokration, confounded the proceedings ushering in this oligarchy of Four Hundred, with those before the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty. The *συνέδροι*, or *συγγραφεῖς*, mentioned by Isokratēs (*Areopagit. Or. vii*, sect. 67) might refer either to the case of the Four Hundred or to that of the Thirty.

practice, this decree must previously have been approved in the senate of Five Hundred, before it was submitted to the people. Such was doubtless the case in the present instance, and the decree passed without any opposition. On the day fixed, a fresh assembly met, which Peisander and his partisans caused to be held, not in the usual place, called the Pnyx, within the city walls, but at a place called Kolónus, ten stadia, rather more than a mile, without the walls,¹ north of the city. Kolónus was a temple of Poseidon, within the precinct of which the assembly was inclosed for the occasion. Such an assembly was not likely to be numerous, wherever held,² since there could be little motive to attend, when freedom of debate was extinguished; but the oligarchical conspirators now transferred it without the walls; selecting a narrow area for the meeting, in order that they might lessen still farther the chance of numerous attendance, an assembly which they fully designed should be the last in the history of Athens. They were thus also more out of the reach of an armed movement in the city, as well as enabled to post their own armed partisans around, under color of protecting the meeting against disturbance by the Lacedæmonians from Dekeleia.

The proposition of the newly-appointed commissioners — probably Peisander, Antiphon, and other partisans themselves — was exceedingly short and simple. They merely moved the abolition

¹ Thucyd. viii, 67. Ἐπειτα, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐφῆκε, συνέκλεσαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὸν Κόλωνον (ἐστὶ δ' ἱερὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως, ἀπέχον σταδίου μάλιστα δέκα), etc.

The very remarkable word *συνέκλεσαν*, here used respecting the assembly, appears to me to refer (not, as Dr. Arnold supposes in his note, to any existing practice observed even in the usual assemblies which met in the Pnyx, but rather) to a departure from the usual practice, and the employment of a stratagem in reference to this particular meeting.

Kolónus was one of the Attic demes: indeed, there seems reason to imagine that two distinct demes bore this same name (see Boeckh, in the Commentary appended to his translation of the *Antigoné* of Sophoklēs, pp. 190, 191: and Ross, *Die Deme von Attika*, pp. 10, 11). It is in the grove of the Eumenidēs, hard by this temple of Poseidon, that Sophoklēs has laid the scene of his immortal drama, the *Œdipus Koloneus*.

² Compare the statement in Lysias (*Orat.* xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 76, p. 127) respecting the small numbers who attended and voted at the assembly by which the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty was named.

of the celebrated *Graphê Paranomôn*; that is, they proposed that every Athenian citizen should have full liberty of making any anti-constitutional proposition that he chose, and that every other citizen should be interdicted, under heavy penalties, from prosecuting him by *graphê paranomôn* indictment on the score of informality, illegality, or unconstitutionality, or from doing him any other mischief. This proposition was adopted without a single dissentient. It was thought more formal by the directing chiefs to sever this proposition pointedly from the rest, and to put it, singly and apart, into the mouth of the special commissioners; since it was the legalizing condition of every other positive change which they were about to move afterwards. Full liberty being thus granted to make any motion, however anti-constitutional, and to dispense with all the established formalities, such as preliminary authorization by the senate, Peisander now came forward with his substantive propositions to the following effect:—

1. All the existing democratical magistracies were suppressed at once, and made to cease for the future.
2. No civil functions whatever were hereafter to be salaried.
3. To constitute a new government, a committee of five persons were named forthwith, who were to choose a larger body of one hundred; that is, one hundred including the five choosers themselves. Each individual out of this body of one hundred, was to choose three persons.
4. A body of Four Hundred was thus constituted, who were to take their seat in the senate-house, and to carry on the government with unlimited powers, according to their own discretion.
5. They were to convene the Five Thousand, whenever they might think fit.¹ All was passed without a dissentient voice.

The invention and employment of this imaginary aggregate of Five Thousand was not the least dexterous among the combinations of Antiphon. No one knew who these Five Thousand were: yet the resolution just adopted purported,—not that such a number of citizens should be singled out and constituted, either by choice, or by lot, or in some determinate manner which should exhibit them to the view and knowledge of others,—but that the

¹ Thucyd. viii, 68. Ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς τετρακοσίους ὄντας ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον, ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἄριστα γινώσκωσιν, αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους δὲ ἐνυλλέγειν, ὅποτεν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ.

Four Hundred should convene *The Five Thousand*, whenever they thought proper: thus assuming the latter to be a list already made up and notorious, at least to the Four Hundred themselves. The real fact was, that the Five Thousand existed nowhere except in the talk and proclamations of the conspirators, as a supplement of fictitious auxiliaries. They did not even exist as individual names on paper, but simply as an imposturous nominal aggregate. The Four Hundred, now installed, formed the entire and exclusive rulers of the state.¹ But the mere name of the Five Thousand, though it was nothing more than a name, served two important purposes for Antiphon and his conspiracy. First, it admitted of being falsely produced, especially to the armament at Samos, as proof of a tolerably numerous and popular body of equal, qualified, concurrent citizens, all intended to take their turn by rotation in exercising the powers of government; thus lightening the odium of extreme usurpation to the Four Hundred, and passing them off merely as the earliest section of the Five Thousand, put into office for a few months, and destined at the end of that period to give place to another equal section.² Next,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 66. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οἴπερ καὶ μεθιστάναι ἐμελλον.

Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26.

² Thucyd. viii, 72. Πέμπουσιν δὲ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας. . . . διδάξοντας — πεντακισχίλιοι δὲ ὅτι εἰεν, καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον, οἱ πρῶσσαντες.

viii, 86. Οἱ δ' ἀπήγγελλον ὥς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετᾴσας γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ. . . . τῶν δὲ πεντακισχιλίων ὅτε πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, etc.

viii, 89. ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσαιτέραν καθιστάναι.

viii, 92. (After the Four Hundred had already been much opposed and humbled, and were on the point of being put down) — ἦν δὲ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἡ παράκλησις ὥς χρῆ, ὅστις τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους βούλεται ἄρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων, εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον. Ἐπεκρύπτοντο γὰρ ὁμῶς ἐν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἀντικρυς δῆμον ὅστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ἐνομάζειν — φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὥσι, καὶ πρὸς τινα εἰπὼν τίς τι δὲ ἄγνοϊαν σφαλῇ. Καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠθέλον τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους οὔτε εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ ὄντας δὴ λῶντας εἶναι. τὸ μὲν καταστήσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντικρυς δὲ δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, τὸ δ' αὖ ἄφαντες φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξειν.

viii, 93. λέγοντα; τοὺς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ

it immensely augmented the means of intimidation possessed by the Four Hundred at home, by exaggerating the impression of their supposed strength. For the citizens generally were made to believe that there were five thousand real and living partners in the conspiracy; while the fact that these partners were not known and could not be individually identified, rather aggravated the reigning terror and mistrust; since every man, suspecting that his neighbor might possibly be among them, was afraid to communicate his discontent or propose means for joint resistance.¹ In both these two ways, the name and assumed existence of the Five Thousand lent strength to the real Four Hundred conspirators. It masked their usurpation, while it increased their hold on the respect and fears of the citizens.

As soon as the public assembly at Kolônus had, with such seeming unanimity, accepted all the propositions of Peisander, they were dismissed; and the new regiment of Four Hundred were chosen and constituted in the form prescribed. It now only remained to install them in the senate-house. But this could not be done without force, since the senators were already within it; having doubtless gone thither immediately from the assembly, where their presence, at least the presence of the prytanes, or senators of the presiding tribe, was essential as legal presidents. They had to deliberate what they would do under the decree just passed, which divested them of all authority. Nor was it impossible that they might organize armed resistance; for which there seemed more than usual facility at the present moment, since the occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians kept Athens in a condition like that of a permanent camp, with a large proportion of the citizens day and night under arms.² Against this chance the Four Hundred made provision. They selected that hour of

τούτων ἐν μέρει, ἣ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίους δοκῇ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, τῶς δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ διαφθεῖρειν, etc.

Compare also c. 97.

¹ Compare the striking passage (Thucyd. viii, 92) cited in my previous note.

² See the jests of Aristophanês, about the citizens all in armor, buying their provisions in the market-place and carrying them home, in the *Lysistrata*, 560: a comedy represented about December 412 or January 411 B.C., three months earlier than the events here narrated.

the day when the greater number of citizens habitually went home, probably to their morning meal, leaving the military station, with the arms piled and ready, under comparatively thin watch. While the general body of hoplites left the station at this hour, according to the usual practice, the hoplites — Andrian, Tenian, and others — in the immediate confidence of the Four Hundred, were directed, by private order, to hold themselves prepared and in arms, at a little distance off; so that if any symptoms should appear of resistance being contemplated, they might at once interfere and forestall it. Having taken this precaution, the Four Hundred marched in a body to the senate-house, each man with a dagger concealed under his garment, and followed by their special body-guard of one hundred and twenty young men from various Grecian cities, the instruments of the assassinations ordered by Antiphon and his colleagues. In this array they marched into the senate-house, where the senators were assembled, and commanded them to depart; at the same time tendering to them their pay for all the remainder of the year, — seemingly about three months or more down to the beginning of Hecatombeon, the month of new nominations, — during which their functions ought to have continued. The senators were no way prepared to resist the decree just passed under the forms of legality with an armed body now arrived to enforce its execution. They obeyed and departed, each man as he passed the door receiving the salary tendered to him. That they should yield obedience to superior force, under the circumstances, can excite neither censure nor surprise; but that they should accept, from the hands of the conspirators, this anticipation of an unearned salary, was a meanness which almost branded them as accomplices, and dishonored the expiring hour of the last democratical authority. The Four Hundred now found themselves triumphantly installed in the senate-house; without the least resistance, either within its walls, or even without, by any portion of the citizens.¹

Thus perished, or seemed to perish, the democracy of Athens, after an uninterrupted existence of nearly one hundred years since the revolution of Kleisthenês. So incredible did it appear that the numerous, intelligent, and constitutional citizens of Ath-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 69, 70.

ens should suffer their liberties to be overthrown by a band of four hundred conspirators; while the great mass of them not only loved their democracy, but had arms in their hands to defend it, that even their enemy and neighbor Agis, at Dekeleia, could hardly imagine the revolution to be a fact accomplished. We shall see presently that it did not stand,—nor would it probably have stood, had circumstances even been more favorable,—but the accomplishment of it at all, is an incident too extraordinary to be passed over without some words in explanation.

We must remark that the tremendous catastrophe and loss of blood in Sicily had abated the energy of the Athenian character generally, but especially had made them despair of their foreign relations; of the possibility that they could make head against enemies, increased in number by revolts among their own allies, and farther sustained by Persian gold. Upon this sentiment of despair is brought to bear the treacherous delusion of Alkibiadēs, offering them the Persian aid; that is, means of defence and success against foreign enemies, at the price of their democracy. Reluctantly the people are brought, but they *are* brought, to entertain the proposition: and thus the conspirators gain their first capital point, of familiarizing the people with the idea of such a change of constitution. The ulterior success of the conspiracy—when all prospect of Persian gold, or improved foreign position, was at an end—is due to the combinations, alike nefarious and skilful, of Antiphon, wielding and organizing the united strength of the aristocratical classes at Athens; strength always exceedingly great, but under ordinary circumstances working in fractions disunited and even reciprocally hostile to each other,—restrained by the ascendant democratical institutions,—and reduced to corrupt what it could not overthrow. Antiphon, about to employ this anti-popular force in one systematic scheme, and for the accomplishment of a predetermined purpose, keeps still within the same ostensible constitutional limits. He raises no open mutiny: he maintains inviolate the cardinal point of Athenian political morality, respect to the decision of the senate and political assembly, as well as to constitutional maxims. But he knows well that the value of these meetings, as political securities, depends upon entire freedom of speech; and that, if that freedom be suppressed, the assembly itself becomes a nullity, or rather an instrument

of positive imposture and mischief. Accordingly, he causes all the popular orators to be successively assassinated, so that no man dares to open his mouth on that side; while on the other hand, the anti-popular speakers are all loud and confident, cheering one another on, and seeming to represent all the feeling of the persons present. By thus silencing each individual leader, and intimidating every opponent from standing forward as spokesman, he extorts the formal sanction of the assembly and the senate to measures which the large majority of the citizens detest. That majority, however, are bound by their own constitutional forms; and when the decision of these, by whatever means obtained, is against them, they have neither the inclination nor the courage to resist. In no part of the world has this sentiment of constitutional duty, and submission to the vote of a legal majority, been more keenly and universally felt, than it was among the citizens of democratical Athens.¹ Antiphon thus finds means to employ the constitutional sentiment of Athens as a means of killing the constitution: the mere empty form, after its vital and protective efficacy has been abstracted, remains simply as a cheat to paralyze individual patriotism.

It was this cheat which rendered the Athenians indisposed to stand forward with arms in defence of that democracy to which they were attached. Accustomed as they were to unlimited pacific contention within the bounds of their constitution, they were in the highest degree averse to anything like armed intestine contention. This is the natural effect of an established free and equal polity, to substitute the contests of the tongue for those of the sword, and sometimes, even to create so extreme a disinclination to the latter, that if liberty be energetically assailed, the counter-energy necessary for its defence may probably be found wanting. So difficult is it for the same people to have both the qualities requisite for making a free constitution work well in ordinary times, together with those very different qualities requisite for upholding it against exceptional dangers and under trying emergencies. None but an Athenian of extraordinary ability,

¹ This striking and deep-seated regard of the Athenians for all the forms of an established constitution, makes itself felt even by Mr. Mitford (*Hist. Gr. ch. xix, sect v vol. iv, p 235*)

like Antiphon, would have understood the art of thus making the constitutional feeling of his countrymen subservient to the success of his conspiracy, and of maintaining the forms of legal dealing towards assembled and constitutional bodies, while he violated them in secret and successive stabs directed against individuals. Political assassination had been unknown at Athens, as far as our information reaches, since it was employed, about fifty years before, by the oligarchical party against Ephialtês, the coadjutor of Periklês.¹ But this had been an individual case, and it was reserved for Antiphon and Phrynichus to organize a band of assassins working systematically, and taking off a series of leading victims one after the other. As the Macedonian kings in after-times required the surrender of the popular orators in a body, so the authors of this conspiracy found the same enemies to deal with, and adopted another way of getting rid of them; thus reducing the assembly into a tame and lifeless mass, capable of being intimidated into giving its collective sanction to measures which its large majority detested.

As Grecian history has been usually written, we are instructed to believe that the misfortunes, and the corruption, and the degradation of the democratical states are brought upon them by the class of demagogues, of whom Kleon, Hyperbolus, Androklês, etc., stand forth as specimens. These men are represented as mischief-makers and revilers, accusing without just cause, and converting innocence into treason. Now the history of this conspiracy of the Four Hundred presents to us the other side of the picture. It shows that the political enemies — against whom the Athenian people were protected by their democratical institutions, and by the demagogues as living organs of those institutions — were not fictitious but dangerously real. It reveals the continued existence of powerful anti-popular combinations, ready to come together for treasonable purposes when the moment appeared safe and tempting. It manifests the character and morality of the leaders, to whom the direction of the anti-popular force naturally fell. It proves that these leaders, men of uncommon ability, required nothing more than the extinction or silence of the dema-

¹ See Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10; Diodor. xi, 77; and vol. v, of this History, chap. xlvi, p. 370.

gogues, to be enabled to subvert the popular securities and get possession of the government. We need no better proof to teach us what was the real function and intrinsic necessity of these demagogues in the Athenian system, taking them as a class, and apart from the manner in which individuals among them may have performed their duty. They formed the vital movement of all that was tutelary and public-spirited in democracy. Aggressive in respect to official delinquents, they were defensive in respect to the public and the constitution. If that anti-popular force, which Antiphon found ready-made, had not been efficient, at a much earlier moment, in stifling the democracy, it was because there were demagogues to cry aloud, as well as assemblies to hear and sustain them. If Antiphon's conspiracy was successful, it was because he knew where to aim his blows, so as to strike down the real enemies of the oligarchy and the real defenders of the people. I here employ the term demagogues because it is that commonly used by those who denounce the class of men here under review: the proper neutral phrase, laying aside odious associations, would be to call them popular speakers, or opposition speakers. But, by whatever name they may be called, it is impossible rightly to conceive their position in Athens, without looking at them in contrast and antithesis with those anti-popular forces against which they formed the indispensable barrier, and which come forth into such manifest and melancholy working under the organizing hands of Antiphon and Phrynichus.

As soon as the Four Hundred found themselves formally installed in the senate-house, they divided themselves by lot into separate prytanies, — probably ten in number, consisting of forty members each, like the former senate of Five Hundred, in order that the distribution of the year to which the people were accustomed might not be disturbed, — and then solemnized their installation by prayer and sacrifice. They put to death some political enemies, though not many: they farther imprisoned and banished others, and made large changes in the administration of affairs, carrying everything with a strictness and rigor unknown under the old constitution.¹ It seems to have been proposed

¹ Thucyd. viii, 70. I imagine that this must be the meaning of the words τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐνεμεν κατὰ κράτος τὴν πόλιν.

among them to pass a vote of restoration to all persons under sentence of exile. But this was rejected by the majority in order that Alkibiadês might not be among the number; nor did they think it expedient, notwithstanding, to pass the law, reserving him as a special exception.

They farther despatched a messenger to Agis at Dekeleia, intimating their wish to treat for peace; which, they affirmed, he ought to be ready to grant to them, now that "the faithless Demos" was put down. Agis, however, not believing that the Athenian people would thus submit to be deprived of their liberty, anticipated that intestine dissension would certainly break out, or at least that some portion of the Long Walls would be found unguarded, should a foreign army appear. While therefore he declined the overtures for peace, he at the same time sent for reinforcements out of Peloponnesus, and marched with a considerable army, in addition to his own garrison, up to the very walls of Athens. But he found the ramparts carefully manned: no commotion took place within: even a sally was made, in which some advantage was gained over him. He therefore speedily retired, sending back his newly-arrived reinforcements to Peloponnesus; while the Four Hundred, on renewing their advances to him for peace, now found themselves much better received, and were even encouraged to despatch envoys to Sparta itself.¹

As soon as they had thus got over the first difficulties, and placed matters on a footing which seemed to promise stability, they despatched ten envoys to Samos. Aware beforehand of the danger impending over them in that quarter from the known aversion of the soldiers and seamen to anything in the nature of oligarchy, they had, moreover, just heard, by the arrival of Chæreas and the paralus, of the joint attack made by the Athenian and Samian oligarchs, and of its complete failure. Had this event occurred a little earlier, it might perhaps have deterred even some of their own number from proceeding with the revolution at Athens, which was rendered thereby almost sure of failure, from the first. Their ten envoys were instructed to represent at Samos that the recent oligarchy had been established with no views injurious to the city, but on the contrary for the general

¹ Thucyd. viii. 71.

benefit; that though the Council now installed consisted of Four Hundred only, yet the total number of partisans who had made the revolution, and were qualified citizens under it, was Five Thousand; a number greater, they added, than had ever been actually assembled in the Pnyx under the democracy, even for the most important debates,¹ in consequence of the unavoidable absences of numerous individuals on military service and foreign travel.

What satisfaction might have been given, by this allusion to the fictitious Five Thousand, or by the fallacious reference to the numbers, real or pretended, of the past democratical assemblies, had these envoys carried to Samos the first tidings of the Athenian revolution, we cannot say. They were forestalled by Chæreas, the officer of the paralus; who, though the Four Hundred tried to detain him, made his escape and hastened to Samos to communicate the fearful and unexpected change which had occurred at Athens. Instead of hearing that change described under the treacherous extenuations prescribed by Antiphon and Phrynichus, the armament first learned it from the lips of Chæreas, who told them at once the extreme truth, and even more than the truth. He recounted, with indignation, that every Athenian who ventured to say a word against the Four Hundred rulers of the city, was punished with the scourge; that even the wives and children of persons hostile to them were outraged; that there

¹ Thucyd. viii, 72. This allegation, respecting the number of citizens who attended in the Athenian democratical assemblies, has been sometimes cited as if it carried with it the authority of Thucydides; which is a great mistake, duly pointed out by all the best recent critics. It is simply the allegation of the Four Hundred, whose testimony, as a guarantee for truth, is worth little enough.

That no assembly had ever been attended by so many as five thousand (*οὐδενώποτε*) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that five thousand was an unusually large number of citizens to attend.

Dr. Arnold, in his note, opposes the allegation in part, by remarking that "the law required not only the presence but the sanction of at least six thousand citizens to some particular decrees of the assembly." It seems to me, however, quite possible that, in cases where this large number of votes was required, as in the ostracism, and where there was no discussion carried on immediately before the voting, the process of voting may have lasted some hours, like our keeping open of a poll. So that though more than six thousand citizens must have *voted*, altogether, it was not necessary that all should have been present in the same assembly.

was a design of seizing and imprisoning the relatives of the democrats at Samos, and putting them to death, if the latter refused to obey orders from Athens. The simple narrative of what had really occurred would have been quite sufficient to provoke in the armament a sentiment of detestation against the Four Hundred. But these additional details of Chæreas, partly untrue, filled them with uncontrollable wrath, which they manifested by open menace against the known partisans of the Four Hundred at Samos, as well as against those who had taken part in the recent oligarchical conspiracy in the island. It was not without difficulty that their hands were arrested by the more reflecting citizens present, who remonstrated against the madness of such disorderly proceedings when the enemy was close upon them.

But though violence and aggressive insult were thus seasonably checked, the sentiment of the armament was too ardent and unanimous to be satisfied without some solemn, emphatic, and decisive declaration against the oligarchs at Athens. A great democratical manifestation, of the most earnest and imposing character, was proclaimed, chiefly at the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The Athenian armament, brought together in one grand assembly, took an oath by the most stringent sanctions : to maintain their democracy ; to keep up friendship and harmony with each other ; to carry on the war against the Peloponnesians with energy ; to be at enmity with the Four Hundred at Athens, and to enter into no amicable communication with them whatever. The whole armament swore to this compact with enthusiasm, and even those who had before taken part in the oligarchical movements were forced to be forward in the ceremony.¹ What lent double force to this touching scene was, that the entire Samian pop-

² Thucyd. viii, 75. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, λαμπρῶς ἤδη ἐς δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστήσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σύμῳ ὃ τε Θρασύβουλος καὶ Θράσυλλος, ὥρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἢ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαι καὶ ὁμονήσῃν, καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν, καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμοι τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι. Ἐννῶμνυσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ὑποβησόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ξυνεκοινώσαντο οἱ στρατιῶται τοῖς Σαμίοις, νομίζοντες ὥτε ἐκείνους ἁποστροφῇ σωτηρίας οὔτε σφίσιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔαν τε οἱ τετρακόσιοι κρατήσω σιν ἔαν τε οἱ ἐκ Μιλήτου πολέμοι, διαφθαλέσεσθαι.

ulation, every male of the military age, took the oath along with the friendly armament. Both pledged themselves to mutual fidelity and common suffering or triumph, whatever might be the issue of the contest. Both felt that the Peloponnesians at Miletus, and the Four Hundred at Athens, were alike their enemies, and that the success of either would be their common ruin.

Pursuant to this resolution,—of upholding their democracy and at the same time sustaining the war against the Peloponnesians, at all cost or peril to themselves,—the soldiers of the armament now took a step unparalleled in Athenian history. Feeling that they could no longer receive orders from Athens under her present oligarchical rulers, with whom Charminus and others among their own leaders were implicated, they constituted themselves into a sort of community apart, and held an assembly as citizens to choose anew their generals and trierarchs. Of those already in command, several were deposed as unworthy of trust; others being elected in their places, especially Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. Nor was the assembly held for election alone; it was a scene of effusive sympathy, animating eloquence, and patriotism generous as well as resolute. The united armament felt that *they* were the real Athens; the guardians of her constitution, the upholders of her remaining empire and glory, the protectors of her citizens at home against those conspirators who had intruded themselves wrongfully into the senate-house; the sole barrier, even for those conspirators themselves, against the hostile Peloponnesian fleet. “*The city has revolted from us,*” exclaimed Thrasybulus and others in pregnant words, which embodied a whole train of feeling.¹ “But let not this abate our courage: for they are only the lesser force, we are the greater and the self-sufficing. We have here the whole navy of the state, whereby we can insure to ourselves the contributions from our dependencies just as well as if we started from Athens. We have the hearty attachment of Samos, second in power only to Athens herself, and serving us as a military station against the enemy, now as in the past. We are better able to obtain supplies for

¹ Thucyd. viii, 76. Καὶ παραινέσεις ἄλλας τε ἐποιοῦντο ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενοι, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθνυμῆν διὰ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκεν· τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἐς πάντα ποριμωτέρων μεθεσθῆναι.

ourselves, than those in the city for themselves; for it is only through our presence at Samos that they have hitherto kept the mouth of Peiræus open. If they refuse to restore to us our democratical constitution, we shall be better able to exclude them from the sea than they to exclude us. What, indeed, does the city do now for us to second our efforts against the enemy? Little or nothing. We have lost nothing by their separation. They send us no pay, they leave us to provide maintenance for ourselves; they are now out of condition for sending us even good counsel, which is the great superiority of a city over a camp.¹ As counsellors, we here are better than they; for they have just committed the wrong of subverting the constitution of our common country, while we are striving to maintain it, and will do our best to force them into the same track. Alkibiadês, if we insure to him a safe restoration, will cheerfully bring the alliance of Persia to sustain us; and, even if the worst comes to the worst, if all other hopes fail us, our powerful naval force will always enable us to find places of refuge in abundance, with city and territory adequate to our wants."

Such was the encouraging language of Thrasyllus and Thrasylulus, which found full sympathy in the armament, and raised among them a spirit of energetic patriotism and resolution, not unworthy of their forefathers when refugees at Salamis under the invasion of Xerxês. To regain their democracy and to sustain the war against the Peloponnesians, were impulses alike ardent and blended in the same tide of generous enthusiasm; a tide so vehement as to sweep before it the reluctance of that minority who had before been inclined to the oligarchical movement. But besides these two impulses, there was also a third, tending towards the recall of Alkibiadês; a coadjutor, if in many ways useful, yet bringing with him a spirit of selfishness and

¹ Thucyd. viii, 76. Βραχὺ δέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ᾧ πρὸς τὸ περιγίγνεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων ἡ πόλις χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπαλωλεκέναι, οἱ γε μήτε ὑργύριον ἔτι εἶχον πέμπειν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιῶται μήτε βούλευμα χρηστὸν, οὐκ ἐνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῖς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι, τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλύσαντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σώζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν. Ὡστε οὐδὲ τούτους, οἳ περ ἂν βωβλεῦοιεν τι χρηστὸν, παρὰ σφίσι χειρὸς εἶναι.

duplicity uncongenial to the exalted sentiment now all-powerful at Samos.¹

This exile had been the first to originate the oligarchical conspiracy, whereby Athens, already scarcely adequate to the exigencies of her foreign war, was now paralyzed in courage and torn by civil discord, preserved from absolute ruin only by that counter-enthusiasm which a fortunate turn of circumstances had raised up at Samos. Having at first duped the conspirators themselves, and enabled them to dupe the sincere democrats, by promising Persian aid, and thus floating the plot over its first and greatest difficulties,—Alkibiadês had found himself constrained to break with them as soon as the time came for realizing his promises. But he had broken off with so much address as still to keep up the illusion that he *could* realize them if he chose. His return by means of the oligarchy being now impossible, he naturally became its enemy, and this new antipathy superseded his feeling of revenge against the democracy for having banished him. In fact he was disposed, as Phrynichus had truly said about him,² to avail himself indifferently of either, according as the one or the other presented itself as a serviceable agency for his ambitious views. Accordingly, as soon as the turn of affairs at Samos had made itself manifest, he opened communication with Thrasybulus and the democratical leaders,³ renewing to them the same promises of Persian alliance, on condition of his

¹ The application of the Athenians at Samos to Alkibiadês, reminds us of the emphatic language in which Tacitus characterizes an incident in some respects similar. The Roman army, fighting in the cause of Vitellius against Vespasian, had been betrayed by their general Cæcina, who endeavored to carry them over to the latter: his army, however, refused to follow him, adhered to their own cause, and put him under arrest. Being afterwards defeated by the troops of Vespasian, and obliged to capitulate in Cremona, they released Cæcina, and solicited his intercession to obtain favorable terms. "Primores castrorum nomen atque imagines Vitellii amoliantur; catenas Cæcinæ (nam etiam tum victus erat) exsolvunt, orantque, ut causæ suæ deprecator adsistat: aspernantem tumentemque lacrymis fatigant. *Extremum malorum, tot fortissimi viri, proditoris opem invocantes.*" (Tacitus, *Hist.* iii, 31.)

² Thucyd. viii, 48.

³ Thucydides does not expressly mention this communication, but it is implied in the words 'Ἀλκιβιάδην — ἀσμενον' παρήξειν, etc. (viii, 76.)

own restoration, as he had before made to Peisander and the oligarchical party. Thrasybulus and his colleagues either sincerely believed him, or at least thought that his restoration afforded a possibility, not to be neglected, of obtaining Persian aid, without which they despaired of the war. Such possibility would at least infuse spirit into the soldiers; while the restoration was now proposed without the terrible condition which had before accompanied it, of renouncing the democratical constitution.

It was not without difficulty, however, nor until after more than one assembly and discussion,¹ that Thrasybulus prevailed on the armament to pass a vote of security and restoration to Alkibiadês. As Athenian citizens, the soldiers probably were unwilling to take upon them the reversal of a sentence solemnly passed by the democratical tribunal, on the ground of irreligion with suspicion of treason. They were, however, induced to pass the vote, after which Thrasybulus sailed over to the Asiatic coast, brought across Alkibiadês to the island, and introduced him to the assembled armament. The supple exile, who had denounced the democracy so bitterly, both at Sparta, and in his correspondence with the oligarchical conspirators, knew well how to adapt himself to the sympathies of the democratical assembly now before him. He began by deploring the sentence of banishment passed against him, and throwing the blame of it, not upon the injustice of his countrymen, but upon his own unhappy destiny.² He then entered upon the public prospects of the moment, pledging himself with entire confidence to realize the hopes of Persian alliance, and boasting, in terms not merely ostentatious but even extravagant, of the ascendant influence which he possessed over Tissaphernês. The satrap had promised him, so the speech went

¹ Thucyd. viii, 81. Θρασύβουλος, αεί τε τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἔχόμενος, ἐπειδὴ μετέστησε τὰ πράγματα, ὥστε κατὰ γένειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, καὶ τέλος ἐπ' ἐκκλησίας ἐπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 81. γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας τὴν τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν τῆς φυγῆς ἐπητιύσατο καὶ ἀνωλοφύρατο ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, etc.

Contrast the different language of Alkibiadês, vi, 92; viii, 47.

For the word ξυμφορὰν, compare i, 127.

Nothing can be more false and perverted than the manner in which the proceedings of Alkibiadês, during this period, are presented in the Oration of Isokratês de Bigis, sects. 18-23.

on, never to let the Athenians want for pay, as soon as he once came to trust them, not even if it were necessary to issue out his last daric or to coin his own silver couch into money. Nor would he require any farther condition to induce him to trust them, except that Alkibiadês should be restored and should become their guarantee. Not only would he furnish the Athenians with pay, but he would, besides, bring up to their aid the Phenician fleet, which was already at Aspendus, instead of placing it at the disposal of the Peloponnesians.

In the communications of Alkibiadês with Peisander and his coadjutors, Alkibiadês had pretended that the Great King could have no confidence in the Athenians unless they not only restored him, but abnegated their democracy. On this occasion, the latter condition was withdrawn, and the confidence of the Great King was said to be more easily accorded. But though Alkibiadês thus presented himself with a new falsehood, as well as with a new vein of political sentiment, his discourse was eminently successful. It answered all the various purposes which he contemplated; partly of intimidating and disuniting the oligarchical conspirators at home, partly of exalting his own grandeur in the eyes of the armament, partly of sowing mistrust between the Spartans and Tissaphernês. It was in such full harmony with both the reigning feelings of the armament, — eagerness to put down the Four Hundred, as well as to get the better of their Peloponnesian enemies in Ionia, — that the hearers were not disposed to scrutinize narrowly the grounds upon which his assurances rested. In the fulness of confidence and enthusiasm, they elected him general along with Thrasybulus and the rest, conceiving redoubled hopes of victory over their enemies both at Athens and at Milêtus. So completely, indeed, were their imaginations filled with the prospect of Persian aid, against their enemies in Ionia, that alarm for the danger of Athens under the government of the Four Hundred became the predominant feeling; and many voices were even raised in favor of sailing to Peiræus for the rescue of the city. But Alkibiadês, knowing well — what the armament did not know — that his own promises of Persian pay and fleet were a mere delusion, strenuously dissuaded such a movement, which would have left the dependencies in Ionia defenceless against the Peloponnesians. As soon as the

assembly broke up, he crossed over again to the mainland, under pretence of concerting measures with Tissaphernês to realize his recent engagements.

Relieved substantially, though not in strict form, from the penalties of exile, Alkibiadês was thus launched in a new career. After having first played the game of Athens against Sparta, next, that of Sparta against Athens, thirdly, that of Tissaphernês against both, he now professed to take up again the promotion of Athenian interests. In reality, however, he was and had always been playing his own game, or obeying his own self-interest, ambition, or antipathy. He was at this time eager to make a show of intimate and confidential communication with Tissaphernês, in order that he might thereby impose upon the Athenians at Samos, to communicate to the satrap his recent election as general of the Athenian force, that his importance with the Persians might be enhanced, and lastly, by passing backwards and forwards from Tissaphernês to the Athenian camp, to exhibit an appearance of friendly concert between the two, which might sow mistrust and alarm in the minds of the Peloponnesians. In this tripartite manœuvring, so suitable to his habitual character, he was more or less successful, especially in regard to the latter purpose. For though he never had any serious chance of inducing Tissaphernês to assist the Athenians, he did, nevertheless, contribute to alienate him from the enemy, as well as the enemy from him.¹

Without any longer delay in the camp of Tissaphernês than was necessary to keep up the faith of the Athenians in his promise of Persian aid, Alkibiadês returned to Samos, where he was found by the ten envoys sent by the Four Hundred from Athens, on their first arrival. These envoys had been long in their voyage; having made a considerable stay at Delos, under alarm from intelligence of the previous visit of Chæreas, and the furious indignation which his narrative had provoked.² At length they reached Samos, and were invited by the generals to make their communication to the assembled armament. They had the utmost difficulty in procuring a hearing, so strong was the antipathy against them, so loud were the cries that the subverters of the

¹ Thucyd. viii, 82, 83, 87.

² Thucyd. viii, 77-86.

democracy ought to be put to death. Silence being at length obtained, they proceeded to state that the late revolution had been brought to pass for the salvation of the city, and especially for the economy of the public treasure, by suppressing the salaried civil functions of the democracy, and thus leaving more pay for the soldiers; ¹ that there was no purpose of mischief in the change, still less of betrayal to the enemy, which might already have been effected, had such been the intention of the Four Hundred, when Agis advanced from Dekeleia up to the walls; that the citizens now possessing the political franchise, were not Four Hundred only, but Five Thousand in number, all of whom would take their turn in rotation for the places now occupied by the Four Hundred; ² that the recitals of Chareas,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 86. *Εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλειάν τι ξυντέμνηται, ὥστε τοὺς στρατιώ-
τας ἔχειν τροφὴν, πάνν ἐπαινεῖν.*

This is a part of the answer of Alkibiadēs to the envoys, and therefore indicates what they had urged.

² Thucyd. viii, 86. *τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μετέξουσιν*, etc. I dissent from Dr. Arnold's construction of this passage, which is followed both by Poppo and by Göller. He says, in his note: "The sense must clearly be, 'that all the citizens should be of the five thousand in their turn,' however strange the expression may seem, *μετέξουσιν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων*. But without referring to the absurdity of the meaning, that all the Five Thousand should partake of the government *in their turn*,—for they all partook of it as being the sovereign assembly,—yet *μετέχειν*, in this sense, would require *τῶν πραγμάτων* after it, and would be at least as harsh, standing alone, as in the construction of *μετέξουσιν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων*."

Upon this remark, 1. *Μετέχειν* may be construed with a genitive case not actually expressed, but understood out of the words preceding; as we may see by Thucyd. ii, 16, where I agree with the interpretation suggested by Matthiæ (Gr. Gr. § 325), rather than with Dr. Arnold's note.

2. In the present instance, we are not reduced to the necessity of gathering a genitive case for *μετέχειν* by implication out of previous phraseology: for the express genitive case stands there a line or two before—*τῆς πόλεως*, the idea of which is carried down without being ever dropped: *οἱ δ' ἀπήγγελλον, ὥς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετάστασις γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὐθ' ἵνα τοῖς πολέμοις παραδοθῇ* (i. e. ἡ πόλις). *τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μετέξουσιν* (i. e. τῆς πόλεως).

There is therefore no harshness of expression; nor is there any absurdity of meaning, as we may see by the repetition of the very same in viii, 93:

affirming ill-usage to have been offered to the relatives of the soldiers at Athens, were utterly false and calumnious.

Such were the topics on which the envoys insisted, in an apologetic strain, at considerable length, but without any effect in conciliating the soldiers who heard them. The general resentment against the Four Hundred was expressed by several persons present in public speech, by others in private manifestation of feeling against the envoys: and so passionately was this sentiment aggravated, — consisting not only of wrath for what the oligarchy had done, but of fear for what they might do, — that the proposition of sailing immediately to the Peiræus was revived with greater ardor than before. Alkibiadēs, who had already once discountenanced this design, now stood forward to repel it again. Nevertheless, all the plenitude of his influence, then greater than that of any other officer in the armament, and seconded by the esteemed character as well as the loud voice of Thrasybulus,¹ was required to avert it. But for him, it would have been executed. While he reprovved and silenced those who were most clamorous against the envoys, he took upon himself to give to the latter a public answer in the name of the collective armament. “We make no objection (he said) to the power of the Five Thousand: but the Four Hundred must go about their business, and reinstate the senate of Five Hundred as it was before. We are much obliged for what you have done in the way of economy, so as to increase the pay available for the soldiers. Above all, maintain the war strenuously, without any flinching before the enemy. For if the city be now safely

λέγοντες τοὺς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει, ἢ ἐν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίους δοκῇ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἐσεσθαι, etc.

Dr. Arnold's designation of these Five Thousand as “the sovereign assembly,” is not very accurate. They were not an assembly at all: they had never been called together, nor had anything been said about an intention of calling them together: in reality, they were but a fiction and a name; but even the Four Hundred themselves pretended only to talk of them as partners in the conspiracy and revolution, not as an assembly to be convoked — πεντακισχιλιοι — οἱ πρῶσσοι (viii, 72).

As to the idea of bringing all the remaining citizens to equal privileges, in rotation, with the Five Thousand, we shall see that it was never broached until considerably after the Four Hundred had been put down.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 26.

held, there is good hope that we may make up the mutual differences between us by amicable settlement; but if once either of us perish, either we here or you at home, there will be nothing left for the other to make up with.”¹

With this reply he dismissed the envoys; the armament reluctantly abandoning their wish of sailing to Athens. Thucydides insists much on the capital service which Alkibiadēs then rendered to his country, by arresting a project which would have had the effect of leaving all Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Peloponnesians. His advice doubtless turned out well in the result; yet if we contemplate the state of affairs at the moment when he gave it, we shall be inclined to doubt whether prudential calculation was not rather against him, and in favor of the impulse of the armament. For what was to hinder the Four Hundred from patching up a peace with Sparta, and getting a Lacedæmonian garrison into Athens to help them in maintaining their dominion? Even apart from ambition, this was their best chance, if not their only chance, of safety for themselves; and we shall presently see that they tried to do it; being prevented from succeeding, partly, indeed, by the mutiny which arose against them at Athens, but still more by the stupidity of the Lacedæmonians themselves. Alkibiadēs² could not really imagine that the Four Hundred would obey his mandate delivered to the envoys, and resign their power voluntarily. But if they remained masters of Athens, who could calculate what they would do,—after having received this declaration of hostility from Samos,—not merely in regard to the foreign enemy, but even in regard to the relatives of the absent soldiers? Whether we look to the legitimate apprehensions of the soldiers, inevitable while their relatives were thus exposed, and almost unnerving them as to the hearty prosecution of the war abroad, in their utter uncertainty with regard to matters at home,—or to the chance of irreparable public calamity, greater even than the loss of Ionia, by the betrayal of Athens to the enemy,—we shall be disposed to con-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 86. Καὶ τὰλλα ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν, καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ σφῶς αὐτοὺς σωζομένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὰν ἐλπίδα εἶναι καὶ συμβῆναι, εἰ δὲ ἅπαξ τὸ ἕτερον σφαλῆσεται ἢ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ἢ ἐκείναι οὐδὲ ὅτῃ διαλλαγῇσεται τις ἐτι εἶσεσθαι.

clude that the impulse of the armament was not merely natural, but even founded on a more prudent estimate of the actual chances, and that Alkibiadês was nothing more than fortunate in a sanguine venture. And if, instead of the actual chances, we look to the chances as Alkibiadês represented, and as the armament conceived them upon his authority,—namely, that the Phenician fleet was close at hand to act against the Lacedæmonians in Ionia,—we shall sympathize yet more with the defensive movement homeward. Alkibiadês had an advantage over every one else, simply by knowing his own falsehoods.

At the same assembly were introduced envoys from Argos, bearing a mission of recognition and an offer of aid to the Athenian Demos in Samos. They came in an Athenian trireme, navigated by the parali who had brought home Chæreas in the paralus from Samos to Athens, and had been then transferred into a common ship of war and sent to cruise about Eubœa. Since that time, however, they had been directed to convey Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melêsias,¹ as ambassadors from the Four Hundred to Sparta. But when crossing the Argolic gulf, probably under orders to land at Prasizæ, they declared against the oligarchy, sailed to Argos, and there deposited as prisoners the three ambassadors, who had all been active in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. Being then about to depart for Samos, they were requested by the Argeians to carry thither their envoys, who were dismissed by Alkibiadês with an expression of gratitude, and with a hope that their aid would be ready when called for.

Meanwhile the envoys returned from Samos to Athens, carrying back to the Four Hundred the unwelcome news of their total failure with the armament. A little before, it appears, some of the trierarchs on service at the Hellespont had returned to Athens also,—Eratosthenês, Iatroklês, and others, who had tried to turn their squadron to the purposes of the oligarchical conspirators, but had been baffled and driven off by the inflexible democracy of their own seamen.² If at Athens, the calculations of these

¹ Thucyd. viii, 86. It is very probable that the Melêsias here mentioned was the son of that Thucydidês who was the leading political opponent of Periklês. Melêsias appears as one of the *dramatis personæ* in Plato's dialogue called Lachês.

² Lysias cont. Eratosthen. sect. 43, c. 9, p. 411, Reisk. *ὁ γὰρ τὸν πρῶτον*

conspirators had succeeded more triumphantly than could have been expected beforehand, everywhere else they had completely miscarried; not merely at Samos and in the fleet, but also with the allied dependencies. At the time when Peisander quitted Samos for Athens, to consummate the oligarchical conspiracy even without Alkibiadês, he and others had gone round many of the dependencies and had effected a similar revolution in their internal government, in hopes that they would thus become attached to the new oligarchy at Athens. But this anticipation, as Phrynichus had predicted, was nowhere realized. The newly-created oligarchies only became more anxious for complete autonomy than the democracies had been before. At Thasos, especially, a body of exiles who had for some time dwelt in Peloponnesus were recalled, and active preparations were made for revolt, by new fortifications as well as by new triremes.¹ Instead of strengthening their hold on the maritime empire, the Four Hundred thus found that they had actually weakened it; while the pronounced hostility of the armament at Samos, not only put an end to all their hopes abroad, but rendered their situation at home altogether precarious.

From the moment when the coadjutors of Antiphon first learned, through the arrival of Chæreas at Athens, the proclamation of the democracy at Samos, discord, mistrust, and alarm began to spread even among their own members; together with a conviction that the oligarchy could never stand except through the presence of a Peloponnesian garrison in Athens. While Antiphon and Phrynichus, the leading minds who directed the majority of the Four Hundred, despatched envoys to Sparta for concluding peace,—these envoys never reached Sparta, being seized by the parali and sent prisoners to Argos, as above stated, and commenced the erection of a special fort at Ectioneia, the projecting mole which contracted and commanded, on the northern side, the narrow entrance of Peiræus, there began to arise even in the bosom of the Four Hundred an opposition minority affect-

(Eratosthenês) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει τὰ ἐνάντια ἐπραξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Τετρακοσίων ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστὰς ἐφευγεν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου τριηράρχος καταλιπὼν τὴν ναῦν, μετὰ Ἱατροκλέους καὶ ἑτέρων.... ἄφικόμενος δὲ δεῦρο τὰνάντια τοῖς βουλομένοις δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ἐπραττε.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 64.

ing popular sentiment, among whom the most conspicuous persons were Theramenês and Aristokratês.¹

Though these men had stood forward prominently as contrivers and actors throughout the whole progress of the conspiracy, they now found themselves bitterly disappointed by the result. Individually, their ascendancy with their colleagues was inferior to that of Peisander, Kallæschrus, Phrynichus, and others; while, collectively, the ill-gotten power of the Four Hundred was diminished in value, as much as it was aggravated in peril, by the loss of the foreign empire and the alienation of their Samian armament. Now began the workings of jealousy and strife among the successful conspirators, each of whom had entered into the scheme with unbounded expectations of personal ambition for himself, each had counted on stepping at once into the first place among the new oligarchical body. In a democracy, observes Thucydides, contentions for power and preëminence provoke in the unsuccessful competitors less of fierce antipathy and sense of injustice, than in an oligarchy; for the losing candidates acquiesce with comparatively little repugnance in the unfavorable vote of a large miscellaneous body of unknown citizens; but they are angry at being put aside by a few known comrades, their rivals as well as their equals: moreover, at the moment when an oligarchy of ambitious men has just raised itself on the ruins of a democracy, every man of the conspirators is in exaggerated expectation; every one thinks himself entitled to become at once the first man of the body, and is dissatisfied if he be merely put upon a level with the rest.²

¹ Thucyd. viii, 89, 90. The representation of the character and motives of Theramenês, as given by Lysias in the Oration contra Eratosthenem (Orat. xii, sects. 66, 67, 79; Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 12-17), is quite in harmony with that of Thucydides (viii, 89): compare Aristophan. Ran. 541-966; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 27-30.

² Thucyd. viii, 89. *ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧ καὶ μά- λιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται. Πάντες γὰρ αὐθιγερὸν ἀξιούσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὸν πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι. ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας ἀλρέσεως γιγνομένης, ῥᾶον τὰ ὑποβαίνοντα, ὥς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσοῦμένους τις φέρεται.*

I give in the text what appears to me the proper sense of this passage, the last words of which are obscure: see the long notes of the commentators,

Such were the feelings of disappointed ambition, mingled with despondency, which sprung up among a minority of the Four

especially Dr. Arnold and Poppo. Dr. Arnold considers τῶν ὁμοίων as a neuter, and gives the paraphrase of the last clause as follows: "Whereas under an old-established government, they (ambitious men of talent) are prepared to fail: they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing to lessen the mortification of defeat. Ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἑλασσοῦμενος, is, *being beaten when the game is equal, when the terms of the match are fair.*"

I cannot concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of these words, or of the general sense of the passage. He thinks that Thucydides means to affirm what applies generally "to an opposition minority when it succeeds in revolutionizing the established government, whether the government be a democracy or a monarchy; whether the minority be an aristocratical party or a popular one." It seems to me, on the contrary, that the affirmation bears only on the special case of an oligarchical conspiracy subverting a democracy, and that the comparison taken is applicable only to the state of things as it stood under the preceding democracy.

Next, the explanation given of the words by Dr. Arnold, assumes that "to be beaten in a fair race, or when the terms of the match are fair," causes to the loser *the maximum* of pain and offence. This is surely not the fact: or rather, the reverse is the fact. The man who loses his cause or his election through unjust favor, jealousy, or antipathy, is *more* hurt than if he had lost it under circumstances where he could find no injustice to complain of. In both cases, he is doubtless mortified; but if there be injustice, he is offended and angry as well as mortified: he is disposed to take vengeance on men whom he looks upon as his personal enemies. It is important to distinguish the mortification of simple failure, from the discontent and anger arising out of belief that the failure has been unjustly brought about: it is this discontent, tending to break out in active opposition, which Thucydides has present to his mind in the comparison which he takes between the state of feeling which precedes and follows the subversion of the democracy.

It appears to me that the words τῶν ὁμοίων are masculine, and that they have reference, like πάντες and ἴσοι, in the preceding line, to the privileged minority of equal confederates who are supposed to have just got possession of the government. At Sparta, the word οἱ ὅμοιοι acquired a sort of technical sense, to designate the small ascendent minority of wealthy Spartan citizens, who monopolized in their own hands political power, to the practical exclusion of the remainder (see Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 5; Xenoph. Resp. Lac. x, 7; xiii, 1; Demosth. cont. Lept. s. 88). Now these ὅμοιοι, or peers, here indicated by Thucydides as the peers of a recently-formed oligarchy, are not merely equal among themselves, but rivals one with another, and personally known to each other. It is important to bear in mind all these attributes as tacitly implied, though not literally designated or connoted by the word ὅμοιοι,

Hundred, immediately after the news of the proclamation of the democracy at Samos among the armament. Theramenês, the

or peers; because the comparison instituted by Thucydides is founded on all the attributes taken together; just as Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, ii, 8; ii, 13, 4), in speaking of the envy and jealousy apt to arise towards *τοῖς ὅμοιαις*, considers them as *ἀντρεπότες* and *ἀνταγωνιστάς*.

The Four Hundred at Athens were all peers, — equals, rivals, and personally known among one another, — who had just raised themselves by joint conspiracy to supreme power. Theramenês, one of the number, conceives himself entitled to preëminence, but finds that he is shut out from it, the men who shut him out being this small body of known equals and rivals. He is inclined to impute the exclusion to personal motives on the part of this small knot; to selfish ambition on the part of each; to ill-will, to jealousy, to wrongful partiality; so that he thinks himself injured, and the sentiment of injury is embittered by the circumstance that those from whom it proceeds are a narrow, known, and definite body of colleagues. Whereas, if his exclusion had taken place under the democracy, by the suffrage of a large, miscellaneous, and personally unknown collection of citizens, he would have been far less likely to carry off with him a sense of injury. Doubtless he would have been mortified; but he would not have looked upon the electors in the light of jealous or selfish rivals, nor would they form a definite body before him for his indignation to concentrate itself upon. Thus Nikomachidês — whom Sokratês (see Xenophon, *Memor.* iii, 4) meets returning mortified because the people had chosen another person and not him as general — would have been not only mortified, but angry and vindictive besides, if he had been excluded by a few peers and rivals.

Such, in my judgment, is the comparison which Thucydides wishes to draw between the effect of disappointment inflicted by the suffrage of a numerous and miscellaneous body of citizens, compared with disappointment inflicted by a small knot of oligarchical peers upon a competitor among their own number, especially at a moment when the expectations of all these peers are exaggerated, in consequence of the recent acquisition of their power. I believe the remark of the historian to be quite just; and that the disappointment in the first case is less intense, less connected with the sentiment of injury, and less likely to lead to active manifestation of enmity. This is one among the advantages of a numerous suffrage.

I cannot better illustrate the jealousies pretty sure to break out among a small number of *ὅμοιοι*, or rival peers, than by the description which Justin gives of the leading officers of Alexander the Great, immediately after that monarch's death (*Justin*, xii, 2): —

“Cæterum, occiso Alexandro, non, ut læti, ita et securi fuere, omnibus unum locum competentibus: nec minus milites invicem se timebant, quorum et libertas solutior et favor incertus erat. *Inter ipsos vero æqualitas discordiam augebat*, nemine tantum cæteros excedente, ut ei aliquis se submitteret.”

leader of this minority, — a man of keen ambition, clever but unsteady and treacherous, not less ready to desert his party than to betray his country, though less prepared for extreme atrocities than many of his oligarchical comrades, began to look out for a good pretence to disconnect himself from a precarious enterprise. Taking advantage of the delusion which the Four Hundred had themselves held out about the fictitious Five Thousand, he insisted that, since the dangers that beset the newly-formed authority were so much more formidable than had been anticipated, it was necessary to popularize the party by enrolling and producing these Five Thousand as a real instead of a fictitious body.¹ Such an opposition, formidable from the very outset, became still bolder and more developed when the envoys returned from Samos, with an account of their reception by the armament, as well as of the answer, delivered in the name of the armament, whereby Alkibiadês directed the Four Hundred to dissolve themselves forthwith, but at the same time approved of the constitution of the Five Thousand, coupled with the restoration of the old senate. To enroll the Five Thousand at once, would be meeting the army half way; and there were hopes that, at that price, a compromise and reconciliation might be effected, of which Alkibiadês had himself spoken as practicable.² In addition to the formal answer, the envoys

Compare Plutarch, Lysander, c. 23.

Haack and Poppe think that *ὁμοίων* cannot be masculine, because *ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος* would not then be correct, but ought to be *ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος*. I should dispute, under all circumstances, the correctness of this criticism: for there are quite enough parallel cases to defend the use of *ἀπὸ* here, (see Thucyd. i, 17; iii, 82; iv, 115; vi, 28, etc.) But we need not enter into the debate; for the genitive *τῶν ὁμοίων* depends rather upon *τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα* which precedes, than upon *ἐλασσούμενος* which follows; and the preposition *ἀπὸ* is what we should naturally expect. To mark this, I have put a comma after *ἀποβαίνοντα* as well as after *ὁμοίων*.

To show that an opinion is not correct, indeed, does not afford certain evidence that Thucydides may not have advanced it: for he might be mistaken. But it ought to count as good presumptive evidence, unless the words peremptorily bind us to the contrary, which in this case they do not.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 86, 2. Of this sentence, from *φοβούμενοι* down to *καθιστάναν*, I only profess to understand the last clause. It is useless to discuss the many conjectural amendments of a corrupt text, none of them satisfactory.

² Thucyd. viii, 86–89. It is alleged by Andokidês (in an oration delivered many years afterwards before the people of Athens, *De Reditu suo*, secta.

doubtless brought back intimation of the enraged feelings manifested by the armament, and of their eagerness, uncontrollable by every one except Alkibiadês, to sail home forthwith and rescue Athens from the Four Hundred. Hence arose an increased conviction that the dominion of the latter could not last: and an ambition, on the part of others as well as Theramenês, to stand forward as leaders of a popular opposition against it, in the name of the Five Thousand.¹

Against this popular opposition, Antiphon and Phrynichus

10-15), that during this spring he furnished the armament at Samos with wood proper for the construction of oars, only obtained by the special favor of Archelaus king of Macedonia, and of which the armament then stood in great need. He farther alleges, that he afterwards visited Athens, while the Four Hundred were in full dominion; and that Peisander, at the head of this oligarchical body, threatened his life for having furnished such valuable aid to the armament, then at enmity with Athens. Though he saved his life by clinging to the altar, yet he had to endure bonds and manifold hard treatment.

Of these claims, which Andokidês prefers to the favor of the subsequent democracy; I do not know how much is true.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 89. *σαφέστατα δὲ αὐτοῦς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει μόνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι. ἡγωνίζετο οὖν εἰς ἕκαστος προστατῆς τοῦ δήμου ἔσεσθαι.*

This is a remarkable passage, as indicating what is really meant by *προστατῆς τοῦ δήμου*: "the leader of a popular opposition." Theramenês, and the other persons here spoken of, did not even mention the name of the democracy, — they took up simply the name of the Five Thousand, — yet they are still called *πρόσταται τοῦ δήμου*, inasmuch as the Five Thousand were a sort of qualified democracy, compared to the Four Hundred.

The words denote the leader of a popular party, as opposed to an oligarchical party (see Thucyd. iii, 70; iv, 66: vi, 35), in a form of government either entirely democratical, or at least, in which the public assembly is frequently convoked and decides on many matters of importance. Thucydides does not apply the words to any Athenian except in the case now before us respecting Theramenês: he does not use the words even with respect to Kleon, though he employs expressions which seem equivalent to it (iii, 36; iv, 21) — *ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὦν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος*, etc. This is very different from the words which he applies to Periklēs — *ὦν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν* (i, 127). Even in respect to Nikias, he puts him in conjunction with Pleistoxanax at Sparta, and talks of both of them as *σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ* (v, 16).

Compare the note of Dr. Arnold on vi, 35.

exerted themselves, with demagogic assiduity, to caress and keep together the majority of the Four Hundred, as well as to uphold their power without abridgment. They were noway disposed to comply with this requisition that the fiction of the Five Thousand should be converted into a reality. They knew well that the enrollment of so many partners¹ would be tantamount to a democracy, and would be, in substance at least, if not in form, an annihilation of their own power. They had now gone too far to recede with safety; while the menacing attitude of Samos, as well as the opposition growing up against them at home, both within and without their own body, served only as instigation to them to accelerate their measures for peace with Sparta, and to secure the introduction of a Spartan garrison.

With this view, immediately after the return of their envoys from Samos, the two most eminent leaders, Antiphon and Phrynichus, went themselves with ten other colleagues in all haste to Sparta, prepared to purchase peace and the promise of Spartan aid almost at any price. At the same time, the construction of the fortress at Ectioneia was prosecuted with redoubled zeal; under pretence of defending the entrance of Peiræus against the armament from Samos, if the threat of their coming should be executed, but with the real purpose of bringing into it a Lacedæmonian fleet and army. For this latter object every facility was provided. The northwestern corner of the fortification of Peiræus, to the north of the harbor and its mouth, was cut off by a cross wall reaching southward so as to join the harbor: from the southern end of this cross wall, and forming an angle with it, a new wall was built, fronting the harbor and running to the extremity of the mole which narrowed the mouth of the harbor on the northern side, at which mole it met the termination of the northern wall of Peiræus. A separate citadel was thus inclosed, defensible against any attack either from Peiræus or from the harbor; furnished, besides, with distinct broad gates and posterns of its own, as well as with facilities for admitting an enemy with-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ μὲν καταστήσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντικρὺς ἂν ὄημον ἡγούμενοι, etc.

Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 4) calls Phrynichus the *demagogue* of the Four Hundred; that is, the person who most strenuously served *their* interests and struggled for *their* favor.

in it.¹ The new cross wall was carried so as to traverse a vast portico, or open market-house, the largest in Peiræus: the larger half of this portico thus became inclosed within the new citadel; and orders were issued that all the corn, both actually warehoused and hereafter to be imported into Peiræus, should be deposited therein and sold out from thence for consumption. As Athens was sustained almost exclusively on corn brought from Eubœa and elsewhere, since the permanent occupation of Dekeleia, the Four Hundred rendered themselves masters by this arrangement of all the subsistence of the citizens, as well as of the entrance into the harbor; either to admit the Spartans or exclude the armament from Samos.²

Though Theramenès, himself one of the generals named under the Four Hundred, denounced, in conjunction with his supporters, the treasonable purpose of this new citadel, yet the majority of the Four Hundred stood to their resolution, and the building made rapid progress under the superintendence of the general Alexiklès, one of the most strenuous of the oligarchical faction.³ Such was the habit of obedience at Athens to an established authority, when once constituted, — and so great the fear and mistrust arising out of the general belief in the reality of the Five Thousand unknown auxiliaries, supposed to be prepared to enforce the orders of the Four Hundred, — that the people, and even armed citizen hoplites, went on working at the building, in spite of their suspicions as to its design. Though not completed, it was so far advanced as to be defensible, when Antiphon and

¹ Thucyd. viii, 90–92. τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο, καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον, καὶ ἐσόδους, καὶ ἐπεισαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων, etc.

I presume that the last expression refers to facilities for admitting the enemy either from the sea-side, or from the land-side; that is to say, from the northwestern corner of the old wall of Peiræus, which formed one side of the new citadel.

See Leake's *Topographie Athens*, pp. 269, 270, Germ. transl.

² Thucyd. viii, 90. διωκοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ στοὰν, etc.

I agree with the note in M. Didot's translation, that this portico, or *halle*, open on three sides, must be considered as preëxisting; not as having been first built now; which seems to be the supposition of Colonel Leake, and the commentators generally.

³ Thucyd. viii, 91, 92. Ἀλεξικλέα, στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μέγιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἐταίρους τετραμμένον, etc.

Phrynichus returned from Sparta. They had gone thither prepared to surrender everything,—not merely their naval force, but their city itself,—and to purchase their own personal safety by making the Lacedæmonians masters of Peiræus.¹ Yet we read with astonishment that the latter could not be prevailed on to contract any treaty, and that they manifested nothing but backwardness in seizing this golden opportunity. Had Alkibiadēs been now playing their game, as he had been doing a year earlier, immediately before the revolt of Chios,—had they been under any energetic leaders, to impel them into hearty coöperation with the treason of the Four Hundred, who combined at this moment both the will and the power to place Athens in their hands, if seconded by an adequate force,—they might now have overpowered their great enemy at home, before the armament at Samos could have been brought to the rescue.

Considering that Athens was saved from capture only by the slackness and stupidity of the Spartans, we may see that the armament at Samos had reasonable excuse for their eagerness previously manifested to come home; and that Alkibiadēs, in combating that intention, braved an extreme danger which nothing but incredible good fortune averted. Why the Lacedæmonians remained idle, both in Peloponnesus and at Dekeleia, while Athens was thus betrayed, and in the very throes of dissolution, we can render no account: possibly, the caution of the ephors may have distrusted Antiphon and Phrynichus, from the mere immensity of their concessions. All that they would promise was, that a Lacedæmonian fleet of forty-two triremes, partly from Tarentum and Lokri, now about to start from Las in the Laconian gulf, and to sail to Eubœa on the invitation of a disaffected party in that island, should so far depart from its straight course as to hover near Ægina and Peiræus, ready to take advantage of any opportunity for attack laid open by the Four Hundred.²

¹ Thucyd. viii, 91. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσαγαγόμενοι ἀνευ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν συμβῆναι, καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν, εἰ τοῖς γε σώμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.

Ibid. ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμόνος πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς πᾶσι συμβατικόν, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 91. ἦν δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἔχόντων, καὶ οὐ πάνυ διὰ βολὴν μόνον τοῦ λόγου.

Of this squadron, however, even before it rounded Cape Malea, Theramênês obtained intelligence, and denounced it as intended to operate in concert with the Four Hundred for the occupation of Ectioneia. Meanwhile Athens became daily a scene of greater discontent and disorder, after the abortive embassy and return from Sparta of Antiphon and Phrynichus. The coercive ascendancy of the Four Hundred was silently disappearing, while the hatred which their usurpation had inspired, together with the fear of their traitorous concert with the public enemy, became more and more loudly manifested in men's private conversations as well as in gatherings secretly got together within numerous houses; especially the house of the peripolarch, the captain of the peripoli, or youthful hoplites, who formed the chief police of the country. Such hatred was not long in passing from vehement passion into act. Phrynichus, as he left the senate-house, was assassinated by two confederates, one of them a peripolus, or youthful hoplite, in the midst of the crowded market-place and in full daylight. The man who struck the blow made his escape, but his comrade was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred:¹ he was however a stranger, from Argos, and either could not or would not reveal the name of any directing accomplice. Nothing was obtained from him except general indications of meetings and wide-spread disaffection. Nor did the Four Hundred, being thus left without special evidence, dare to lay hands upon Theramênês, the pronounced leader of the opposition, as we shall find Kritias doing six years afterwards, under the rule of the Thirty. The assassins of Phrynichus remaining undiscovered and unpunished, Theramênês and his associates became bolder in their opposition than before. And the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas,—which, having now taken station at Epidaurus, had made a descent on Ægina, and was hovering not far off Peiræus, altogether out of the straight course for Eubœa,—lent double

The reluctant language, in which Thucydides admits the treasonable concert of Antiphon and his colleagues with the Lacedæmonians, deserves notice; also c. 94. τὰ χα μὲν τι καὶ ἀπὸ συγκατεμένου λόγου, etc.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 91. The statement of Plutarch is in many respects different (Alkibiades, c. 25).

force to all their previous assertions about the imminent dangers connected with the citadel at Ectioneia.

Amidst this exaggerated alarm and discord, the general body of hoplites became penetrated with aversion,¹ every day increasing, against the new citadel. At length the hoplites of the tribe in which Aristokratês, the warmest partisan of Theramenês was taxiarch, being on duty and engaged in the prosecution of the building, broke out into absolute mutiny against it, seized the person of Alexiklês, the general in command, and put him under arrest in a neighboring house; while the peripoli, or youthful military police, stationed at Munychia, under Hermon, abetted them in the proceeding.² News of this violence was speedily conveyed to the Four Hundred, who were at that moment holding session in the senate-house, Theramenês himself being present. Their wrath and menace were at first vented against him as the instigator of the revolt, a charge against which he could only vindicate himself by volunteering to go among the foremost for the liberation of the prisoner. He forthwith started in haste for the Peiræus, accompanied by one of the generals, his colleague, who was of the same political sentiment as himself. A third among the generals, Aristarchus, one of the fiercest of the oligarchs, followed him, probably from mistrust, together with some of the younger knights, horsemen, or richest class in the state, identified with the cause of the Four Hundred. The oligarchical partisans ran to marshal themselves in arms, alarming exaggerations being rumored, that Alexiklês had been put to death, and that Peiræus was under armed occupation; while at Peiræus the insurgents imagined that the hoplites from the city were in full march to attack them. For a time all was confusion and angry sentiment, which the slightest untoward accident might have inflamed into sanguinary civil carnage. Nor was it appeased except by earnest intreaty and remonstrance from the elder citizens, aided by Thucydidês of Pharsalus, proxenus or public guest of Athens, in his native town, on the ruinous madness of such discord when a foreign enemy was almost at their gates.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τὸ στίφος ταῦτα ἐβόηετο

² Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26, represents Hermon as one of the assassins of Phrynichus.

The perilous excitement of this temporary crisis, which brought into full daylight every man's real political sentiments, proved the oligarchical faction, hitherto exaggerated in number to be far less powerful than had been imagined by their opponents. And the Four Hundred had found themselves too much embarrassed how to keep up the semblance of their authority even in Athens itself, to be able to send down any considerable force for the protection of their citadel at Ectioneia; though they were reinforced, only eight days before their fall, by at least one supplementary member, probably in substitution for some predecessor who had accidentally died.¹ Theramènes, on reaching Peiræus, began to address the mutinous hoplites in a tone of simulated displeasure, while Aristarchus and his oligarchical companions spoke in the harshest language, and threatened them with the force which they imagined to be presently coming down from the city. But these menaces were met by equal firmness on the part of the hoplites, who even appealed to Theramènes himself, and called upon him to say whether he thought the construction of this citadel was for the good of Athens, or whether it would not be better demolished. His opinion had been fully pronounced beforehand; and he replied, that if they thought proper to demolish it, he cordially concurred. Without farther delay, hoplites and unarmed people mounted pell-mell upon the walls, and commenced the demolition with alacrity; under the general shout, "Whoever is for the Five Thousand in place of the Four Hundred, let him lend a hand in this work." The idea of the old democracy was in every one's mind, but no man uttered the word; the fear of the imaginary Five Thousand still continuing. The work of demolition seems to have been prosecuted all that day, and not to have been completed until the next day; after which the hoplites released Alexiklès from arrest, without doing him any injury.²

¹ See Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato. The fact that Polystratus was only eight days a member of the Four Hundred, before their fall, is repeated three distinct times in this Oration (c. 2, 4, 5, pp. 672, 674, 679, Reisk.), and has all the air of truth.

² Thucyd. viii, 92, 93. In the Oration of Demosthenès, or Deinarchus, against Theokrinès (c. 17, p. 1343), the speaker, Epicharès, makes allusion to this destruction of the fort at Ectioneia by Aristokratès, uncle of his

Two things deserve notice, among these details, as illustrating the Athenian character. Though Alexiklês was vehemently oligarchical as well as unpopular, these mutineers do no harm to his person, but content themselves with putting him under arrest. Next, they do not venture to commence the actual demolition of the citadel, until they have the formal sanction of Theramenês, one of the constituted generals. The strong habit of legality, implanted in all Athenian citizens by their democracy, — and the care, even in departing from it, to depart as little as possible, — stand plainly evidenced in these proceedings.

The events of this day gave a fatal shock to the ascendancy of the Four Hundred; yet they assembled on the morrow as usual in the senate-house; and they appear now, when it was too late, to have directed one of their members to draw up a real list, giving body to the fiction of the Five Thousand.¹ Meanwhile the hoplites in Peiræus, having finished the levelling of the new fortifications, took the still more important step of entering, armed as they were, into the theatre of Dionysus hard by, in Peiræus, but on the verge of Munychia, and there holding a formal assembly; probably under the convocation of the general Theramenês, pursuant to the forms of the anterior democracy. They here took the resolution of adjourning their assembly to the Anakeion, or temple of Castor and Pollux, the Dioskuri, in

grandfather. The allusion chiefly deserves notice from its erroneous mention of Kritias and the return of the Demos from exile, betraying a complete confusion between the events in the time of the Four Hundred and those in the time of the Thirty.

¹ Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

This task was confided to Polystratus, a very recent member of the Four Hundred, and therefore probably less unpopular than the rest. In his defence after the restoration of the democracy, he pretended to have undertaken the task much against his will, and to have drawn up a list containing nine thousand names instead of five thousand.

It may probably have been in this meeting of the Four Hundred, that Antiphon delivered his oration strongly recommending concord, *Περὶ ὁμονοίας*. All his eloquence was required just now, to bring back the oligarchical party, if possible, into united action. Philostratus (Vit. Sophistar. c. xv, p. 500, ed. Olear.) expresses great admiration for this oration, which is several times alluded to both by Harpokration and Suidas. See Westermann, Gesch. der Griech. Beredsamkeit, Beilage ii, p. 276.

the city itself and close under the acropolis; whither they immediately marched and established themselves, still retaining their arms. So much was the position of the Four Hundred changed, that they who had on the preceding day been on the aggressive against a spontaneous outburst of mutineers in Peiræus, were now thrown upon the defensive against a formal assembly, all armed, in the city, and close by their own senate-house. Feeling themselves too weak to attempt any force, they sent deputies to the Anakeion to negotiate and offer concessions. They engaged to publish the list of *The Five Thousand*, and to convene them for the purpose of providing for the periodical cessation and renewal of the Four Hundred, by rotation from the Five Thousand, in such order as the latter themselves should determine. But they entreated that time might be allowed for effecting this, and that internal peace might be maintained, without which there was no hope of defence against the enemy without. Many of the hoplites in the city itself joined the assembly in the Anakeion, and took part in the debates. The position of the Four Hundred being no longer such as to inspire fear, the tongues of speakers were now again loosed, and the ears of the multitude again opened, for the first time since the arrival of Peisander from Samos, with the plan of the oligarchical conspiracy. Such renewal of free and fearless public speech, the peculiar life-principle of the democracy, was not less wholesome in tranquillizing intestine discord than in heightening the sentiment of common patriotism against the foreign enemy.¹ The assembly at length dispersed, after naming an early future time for a second assembly, to bring about the reestablishment of harmony in the theatre of Dionysus.²

On the day, and at the hour, when this assembly in the theatre of Dionysus was on the point of coming together, the news ran

¹ Thucyd. viii, 93. Τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλήθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοῦς λόγων γιγνομένων, ἡπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ.

² Thucyd. viii, 93. συνεχώρησαν δὲ ὥστ' ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας.

The definition of time must here allude to the morrow, or to the day following the morrow; at least it seems impossible that the city could be left longer than this interval without a government.

through Peiræus and Athens, that the forty-two triremes under the Lacedæmonian Agesandridas, having recently quitted the harbor of Megara, were sailing along the coast of Salamis in the direction towards Peiræus. Such an event, while causing universal consternation throughout the city, confirmed all the previous warnings of Theramenês as to the treasonable destination of the citadel recently demolished, and every one rejoiced that the demolition had been accomplished just in time. Foregoing their intended assembly, the citizens rushed with one accord down to Peiræus, where some of them took post to garrison the walls and the mouth of the harbor; others got aboard the triremes lying in the harbor: others, again, launched some fresh triremes from the boat-houses into the water. Agesandridas rowed along the shore, near the mouth of Peiræus; but found nothing to promise concert within, or tempt him to the intended attack. Accordingly, he passed by and moved onward to Sunium, in a southerly direction. Having doubled the Cape of Sunium, he then turned his course along the coast of Attica northward, halted for a little while between Thorikus and Prasîæ, and presently took station at Orôpus.¹

Though relieved, when they found that he passed by Peiræus without making any attack, the Athenians knew that his destination must now be against Eubœa; which to them was hardly less important than Peiræus, since their main supplies were derived from that island. Accordingly, they put to sea at once with all the triremes which could be manned and got ready in the harbor. But from the hurry of the occasion, coupled with the mistrust and dissension now reigning, and the absence of their great naval force at Samos, the crews mustered were raw and ill-selected, and the armament inefficient. Polystratus, one of the members of the Four Hundred, perhaps others of them also, were aboard; men who had an interest in defeat rather than victory.² Thymocha-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 94.

² Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 676, Reisk.

From another passage in this oration, it would seem that Polystratus was in command of the fleet, possibly enough, in conjunction with Thymocharês, according to a common Athenian practice (c. 5, p. 679). His son, who defends him, affirms that he was wounded in the battle.

Diodorus (xiii, 34) mentions the discord among the crews on board these

rês, the admiral, conducted them round Cape Sunium to Eretria in Eubœa, where he found a few other triremes, which made up his whole fleet to thirty-six sail.

He had scarcely reached the harbor and disembarked, when, without allowing time for his men to procure refreshment, he found himself compelled to fight a battle with the forty-two ships of Agesandridas, who had just sailed across from Orôpus, and was already approaching the harbor. This surprise had been brought about by the anti-Athenian party in Eretria, who took care, on the arrival of Thymocharês, that no provisions should be found in the market-place, so that his men were compelled to disperse and obtain them from houses at the extremity of the town; while at the same time a signal was hoisted, visible at Orôpus on the opposite side of the strait, less than seven miles broad, indicating to Agesandridas the precise moment for bringing his fleet across to the attack, with their crews fresh after the morning meal. Thymocharês, on seeing the approach of the enemy, ordered his men aboard; but, to his disappointment, many of them were found to be so far off that they could not be brought back in time, so that he was compelled to sail out and meet the Peloponnesians with ships very inadequately manned. In a battle immediately outside of the Eretrian harbor, he was, after a short contest, completely defeated, and his fleet driven back upon the shore. Some of his ships escaped to Chalkis, others to a fortified post garrisoned by the Athenians themselves, not far from Eretria; yet not less than twenty-two triremes, out of the whole thirty-six, fell into the hands of Agesandridas, and a large proportion of the crews were slain or made prisoners. Of those seamen who escaped, too, many found their death from the hands of the Eretrians, into whose city they fled for shelter. On the news of this battle, not merely Eretria, but also all Eubœa, — except Oreus in the north of the island, which was settled by Athenian kleruchs, — declared its revolt from Athens, which had been intended more than a year before, and took measures for defending itself in concert with Agesandridas and the Bœotians.¹

ships under Thymocharês, almost the only point which we learn from his meagre notice of this interesting period.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 5; viii, 95.

Ill could Athens endure a disaster, in itself so immense and aggravated, under the present distressed condition of the city. Her last fleet was destroyed, her nearest and most precious island torn from her side; an island, which of late had yielded more to her wants than Attica itself, but which was now about to become a hostile and aggressive neighbor.¹ The previous revolt of Eubœa, occurring thirty-four years before, during the maximum of Athenian power, had been even then a terrible blow to Athens, and formed one of the main circumstances which forced upon her the humiliation of the Thirty years' truce. But this second revolt took place when she had not only no means of reconquering the island, but no means even of defending Peiræus against the blockade by the enemy's fleet. The dismay and terror excited by the news at Athens was unbounded, even exceeding what had been felt after the Sicilian catastrophe, or the revolt of Chios. Nor was there any second reserve now in the treasury, such as the thousand talents which had rendered such essential service on the last-mentioned occasion. In addition to their foreign dangers, the Athenians were farther weighed down by two intestine calamities in themselves hardly supportable, — alienation of their own fleet at Samos, and the discord, yet unappeased, within their own walls; wherein the Four Hundred still held provisionally the reins of government, with the ablest and most unscrupulous leaders at their head. In the depth of their despair, the Athenians expected nothing less than to see the victorious fleet of Agesandridas — more than sixty triremes strong, including the recent captures — off the Peiræus, forbidding all importation, and threatening them with approaching famine, in combination with Agis and Dekeleia. The enterprise would have been easy for there were neither ships nor seamen to repel him; and his arrival at this critical moment would most probably have enabled the Four Hundred to resume their ascendancy, with the means as well as the disposition to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison

¹ Thncyd. viii, 95. To show what Eubœa became at a later period, see Demosthenēs, *De Fals. Legat.* c. 64, p. 409: τὰ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατασκευασθῆσόμενα ὀρμητήρια ἐφ' ἑμῶς, etc.; and Demosthenēs, *De Coronâ*, c. 71; ἀπὸ τοῦ δ' ἡ θάλασσα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας ὀρμυμένων ληστῶν γέγονε, etc.

into the city.¹ And though the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Samos would have prevented this extremity, yet it could not have arrived in time, except on the supposition of a prolonged blockade: moreover, its mere transfer from Samos to Athens would have left Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Lacedæmonians and Persians, and would have caused the loss of all the Athenian empire. Nothing could have saved Athens, if the Lacedæmonians at this juncture had acted with reasonable vigor, instead of confining their efforts to Eubœa, now an easy and certain conquest. As on the former occasion, when Antiphon and Phrynichus went to Sparta prepared to make any sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining Lacedæmonian aid and accommodation, so now, in a still greater degree, Athens owed her salvation only to the fact that the enemies actually before her were indolent and dull Spartans, not enterprising Syracusans under the conduct of Gylippus.² And this is the second occasion, we may add, on which Athens was on the brink of ruin in consequence of the policy of Alkibiadês in retaining the armament at Samos.

Fortunately for the Athenians, no Agesandridas appeared off Peiræus; so that the twenty triremes, which they contrived to man as a remnant for defence, had no enemy to repel.³ Accordingly, the Athenians were allowed to enjoy an interval of repose which enabled them to recover partially both from consternation and from intestine discord. It was their first proceeding, when the hostile fleet did not appear, to convene a public assembly; and that too in the Pnyx itself, the habitual scene of the democratical assemblies, well calculated to reinspire that patriotism which had now been dumb and smouldering for the four last months. In this assembly, the tide of opinion ran vehemently against the Four Hundred:⁴ even those, who, like the Board of

¹ Thucyd. viii, 96. *Μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ δι' ἐγγυράτου ἐθορήβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺς σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἔρημον ὄντα νεῶν πλεῖν· καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἦδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρεῖναι. Ὅπερ ἂν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, βραδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν· καὶ ἡ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες, ἢ εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἂν ἰωνίας ναὺς ἠνάγκασαν ἂν βοηθῆσαι, etc.*

² Thucyd. viii, 96; vii, 21-55.

³ Thucyd. viii, 97.

⁴ It is to this assembly that I refer, with confidence, the remarkable dia-

elders entitled probûli had originally counselled their appointment, now denounced them along with the rest, though severely taunted by the oligarchical leader Peisander for their inconsistency. Votes were finally passed: 1. To depose the Four Hundred; 2. To place the whole government in the hands of *The Five Thousand*; 3. Every citizen, who furnished a panoply, either for himself or for any one else, was to be of right a member of this body of *The Five Thousand*; 4. No citizen was to receive pay for any political function, on pain of becoming solemnly accursed, or excommunicated.¹ Such were the points determined by the

logue of contention between Peisander and Sophoklês, one of the Athenian probûli, mentioned in Aristotel. Rhetoric. iii, 18, 2. There was no other occasion on which the Four Hundred were ever publicly thrown upon their defence at Athens.

This was not Sophoklês the tragic poet, but another person of the same name, who appears afterwards as one of the oligarchy of Thirty.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 97. Καὶ ἐκκλησίαν συνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πνύκα καλουμένην, οὐπερ καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ᾗ περ καὶ τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι· εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποσοι καὶ δπλα παρέχονται· καὶ μισθὸν μηδὲνα φέρειν, μηδεμίαν ἀρχῇ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὑστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν.

In this passage I dissent from the commentators on two points. First, they understand this number Five Thousand as a real definite list of citizens, containing five thousand names, neither more nor less. Secondly, they construe νομοθέτας, not in the ordinary meaning which it bears in Athenian constitutional language, but in the sense of *ἐγγγραφείς* (c. 67), "persons to model the constitution, corresponding to the *ἐγγγραφείς* appointed by the aristocratical party a little before," to use the words of Dr. Arnold.

As to the first point, which is sustained also by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 51, 2d ed.), Dr. Arnold really admits what is the ground of my opinion, when he says: "Of course the number of citizens capable of providing themselves with heavy arms must *have much exceeded five thousand*: and it is said in the defence of Polystratus, one of the Four Hundred (Lysias, p. 675, Reisk.), that he drew up a list of nine thousand. But we must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms were *eligible into the number of the Five Thousand*, whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand (viii, 93)."

Dr. Arnold here throws out a supposition which by no means conforms to the exact sense of the words of Thucydides — *εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποσοι καὶ δπλα παρέχονται*. These words distinctly signify, that all who furnished

first assembly held in the Pnyx. The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, etc., were renewed : after which many other assem-

heavy arms *should be of the Five Thousand ; should belong of right to that body* : which is something different from *being eligible* into the number of the Five Thousand, either by lot, rotation, or otherwise. The language of Thucydides, when he describes, in the passage referred to by Dr. Arnold, c. 93, the projected formation of the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand, is very different : *καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέλει τοὺς τετρακσίους ἐσεσθαι*, etc. M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, bk. ii, ch. 21, p. 268, Eng. Tr.) is not satisfactory in his description of this event.

The idea which I conceive of the Five Thousand, as a number existing from the commencement only in talk and imagination, neither realized nor intended to be realized, coincides with the full meaning of this passage of Thucydides, as well as with everything which he had before said about them.

I will here add that *ὅποσοι ὄπλα παρέχονται* means persons furnishing arms, not for themselves alone, but for others also (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 15.)

As to the second point, the signification of *νομοθέτας*, I stand upon the general use of that word in Athenian political language : see the explanation earlier in this History, vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 373. It is for the commentators to produce some justification of the unusual meaning which they assign to it : "persons to model the constitution ; commissioners who drew up the new constitution," as Dr. Arnold, in concurrence with the rest, translates it. Until some justification is produced, I venture to believe that *νομοθέται* is a word which would not be used in that sense with reference to nominees chosen by the democracy, and intended to act with the democracy ; for it implies a final, decisive, authoritative determination ; whereas the *ἐγγραφεῖς*, or "commissioners to draw up a constitution," were only invested with the function of submitting something for approbation to the public assembly or competent authority ; that is, assuming that the public assembly remained an efficient reality.

Moreover, the words *καὶ τὰλλα* would hardly be used in immediate sequence to *νομοθέτας*, if the latter word meant that which the commentators suppose : "Commissioners for framing a constitution, and the other things towards the constitution." Such commissioners are surely far too prominent and initiative in their function to be named in this way. Let us add, that the most material items in the new constitution, if we are so to call it, have already been distinctly specified as settled by public vote, before the *νομοθέται* are even named.

It is important to notice, that even the Thirty, who were named six years afterwards to draw up a constitution, at the moment when Sparta was mistress of Athens, and when the people were thoroughly put down, are not called *Νομοθέται*, but are named by a circumlocution equivalent to *ἐγγραφεῖς*—*Ἐδοξε τῷ δήμῳ, τριάκοντα ἀνδρας ἐλέσθαι, οἱ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους ἐγγ-*

blies were also held, in which nomothetæ, dikasts, and other institutions essential to the working of the democracy, were constituted. Various other votes were also passed; especially one, on the proposition of Kritias, seconded by Theramênês,¹ to restore Alkibiadês and some of his friends from exile; while messages were farther despatched, both to him and to the armament at Samos, doubtless confirming the recent nomination of generals, apprizing them of what had recently occurred at Athens, as well as bespeaking their full concurrence and unabated efforts against the common enemy.

Thucydidês bestows marked eulogy upon the general spirit of moderation and patriotic harmony which now reigned at Athens, and which directed the political proceedings of the people.² But he does not countenance the belief, as he has been sometimes understood, nor is it true in point of fact, that they now introduced a new constitution. Putting an end to the oligarchy, and to the rule of the Four Hundred, they restored the old democracy

γραφουσι, καθ' οὗς πολιτεύουσιν. — Αἰρεθέντες δὲ, ἐφ' ᾧ τε εὐγγράψαι νόμους καθ' οὐστίνας πολιτεύουσιντο, τούτους μὲν αἰεὶ ἐμελλον εὐγγράφειν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, etc. (Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 3, 2-11.) Xenophon calls Kritias and Chariklês the nomothetæ of the Thirty (Memor. i, 2, 30), but this is not democracy.

For the signification of Νομοθέτης (applied most generally to Solon, sometimes to others, either by rhetorical looseness or by ironical taunt), or Νομεθῆται, a numerous body of persons chosen and sworn, see Lysias cont. Nikomach. sects. 3, 33, 37; Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 81-85, c. 14, p. 38, where the nomothetæ are a sworn body of Five Hundred, exercising, conjointly with the senate, the function of accepting or rejecting laws proposed to them.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 33. Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 5, and Diodorus, xiii, 38-42) mentions Theramênês as the principal author of the decree for restoring Alkibiadês from exile. But the precise words of the elegy composed by Kritias, wherein the latter vindicates this proceeding to himself, are cited by Plutarch, and are very good evidence. Doubtless many of the leading men supported, and none opposed, the proposition.

² Thucyd. viii, 97. Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εὐγκρασίς ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν.

I refer the reader to a note on this passage in one of my former volumes, and on the explanation given of it by Dr. Arnold (see vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 330).

seemingly with only two modifications, first, the partial limitation of the right of suffrage; next, the discontinuance of all payment for political functions. The impeachment against Antiphon, tried immediately afterwards, went before the senate and the dikastery exactly according to the old democratical forms of procedure. But we must presume that the senate, the dikasts, the nomothetæ, the ekklesiasts, or citizens who attended the assembly, the public orators who prosecuted state-criminals, or defended any law when it was impugned, must have worked for the time without pay.

Moreover, the two modifications above mentioned were of little practical effect. The exclusive body of Five Thousand citizens, professedly constituted at this juncture, was neither exactly realized, nor long retained. It was constituted, even now, more as a nominal than as a real limit; a nominal total, yet no longer a mere blank, as the Four Hundred had originally produced it, but containing, indeed, a number of individual names greater than the total, and without any assignable line of demarkation. The mere fact, that every one who furnished a panoply was entitled to be of the Five Thousand, — and not they alone, but others besides,¹ — shows that no care was taken to adhere either to that or to any other precise number. If we may credit a speech composed by Lysias,² the Four Hundred had themselves, after the demolition of their intended fortress at Ectioneia, and when power was passing out of their hands, appointed a committee of their number to draw up for the first time a real list of *The Five Thousand*; and Polystratus, a member of that committee, takes credit with the succeeding democracy for having made the list comprise nine thousand names instead of five thousand. As this list of Polystratus — if, indeed, it ever existed — was never either published or adopted, I merely notice the description given of it, to illustrate my position that the number Five Thousand was now understood on all sides as an indefinite expression for a

¹ The words of Thucydides (viii, 97), *εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται*, show that this body was not composed *exclusively* of those who furnished panoplies. It could never have been intended, for example, to exclude the *hippeis*, or knights.

² Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

suffrage extensive, but not universal. The number had been first invented by Antiphon and the leaders of the Four Hundred, to cloak their own usurpation and intimidate the democracy: next, it served the purpose of Theramenes and the minority of the Four Hundred, as a basis on which to raise a sort of dynastic opposition, to use modern phraseology, within the limits of the oligarchy; that is, without appearing to overstep principles acknowledged by the oligarchy themselves: lastly, it was employed by the democratical party generally as a convenient middle term to slide back into the old system, with as little dispute as possible; for Alkibiades and the armament had sent word home that they adhered to the Five Thousand, and to the abolition of salaried civil functions.¹

But exclusive suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand, especially with the expansive numerical construction now adopted, was of little value either to themselves or to the state;² while it was an insulting shock to the feelings of the excluded multitude, especially to brave and active seamen like the parali. Though prudent as a step of momentary transition, it could not stand, nor was any attempt made to preserve it in permanence, amidst a community so long accustomed to universal citizenship, and where the necessities of defence against the enemy called for energetic efforts from all the citizens.

Even as to the gratuitous functions, the members of the Five Thousand themselves would soon become tired, not less than the poorer freemen, of serving without pay, as senators or in other ways; so that nothing but absolute financial deficit would prevent the reëstablishment, entire or partial, of the pay.³ And that deficit was never so complete as to stop the disbursement of

¹ Thucyd. viii, 86.

² Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ μὲν καταστήσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἄντικρυς δὲ δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, etc.

³ See the valuable financial inscriptions in M. Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum*, part i, nos. 147, 148, which attest considerable disbursements for the diobely in 410-409 B.C.

Nor does it seem that there was much diminution during these same years in the private expenditure and ostentation of the Choregi at the festivals and other exhibitions: see the Oration xxi, of Lysias — *Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας*, c. 1, 2, pp. 698-700, Reiske.

the diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each citizen on occasion of various religious festivals. Such distribution continued without interruption; though perhaps the number of occasions on which it was made may have been lessened.

How far or under what restriction, any reëstablishment of civil pay obtained footing during the seven years between the Four Hundred and the Thirty, we cannot say. But leaving this point undecided, we can show, that within a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, the suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand expanded into the suffrage of all Athenians without exception, or into the full antecedent democracy. A memorable decree, passed about eleven months after that event, — at the commencement of the archonship of Glaukippus (June 410 B.C.), when the senate of Five Hundred, the dikasts, and other civil functionaries, were renewed for the coming year, pursuant to the ancient democratical practice, — exhibits to us the full democracy not merely in action, but in all the glow of feeling called forth by a recent restoration. It seems to have been thought that this first renewal of archons and other functionaries, under the revived democracy, ought to be stamped by some emphatic proclamation of sentiment, analogous to the solemn and heart-stirring oath taken in the preceding year at Samos. Accordingly, Demophantus proposed and carried a (psephism or) decree,¹ prescribing the form of an oath to be taken by all Athenians to stand by the democratical constitution.

The terms of his psephism and oath are striking. "If any man subvert the democracy at Athens, or hold any magistracy after the democracy has been subverted, he shall be an enemy of the Athenians. Let him be put to death with impunity, and let his property be confiscated to the public, with the reservation of a tithe to Athênê. Let the man who has killed him, and the accomplice privy to the act, be accounted holy and of good religious

¹ About the date of this psephism, or decree, see Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, vol. ii, p. 168, in the comment upon sundry inscriptions appended to his work, not included in the English translation by Mr. Lewis; also Meier, *De Bonis Damnatorum*, sect. ii, pp. 6-10. Wachsmuth erroneously places the date of it after the Thirty; see *Hellen. Alterth.* ii, p. 267.

odor. Let all Athenians swear an oath under the sacrifice of full-grown victims, in their respective tribes and demes, to kill him.¹ Let the oath be as follows: 'I will kill with my own hand, if I am able, any man who shall subvert the democracy at Athens, or who shall hold any office in future after the democracy has been subverted, or shall rise in arms for the purpose of making himself a despot, or shall help the despot to establish himself. And if any one else shall kill him, I will account the slayer to be holy as respects both gods and demons, as having slain an enemy of the Athenians. And I engage by word, by deed, and by vote, to sell his property and make over one-half of the proceeds to the slayer, without withholding anything. If any man shall perish in slaying or in trying to slay the despot, I will be kind both to him and to his children, as to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and their descendants. And I hereby break and renounce all oaths which have been sworn hostile to the Athenian people, either at Athens or at the camp (at Samos) or elsewhere.²' Let all Athenians swear this as the regular oath, immediately before the festival of the Dionysia, with sacrifice and full-grown victims;³ invoking upon him who keeps it, good

¹ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.) — 'Ο δ' ἀποκτείνει τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα, καὶ ὁ συμβουλευέσας, δαίος ἔστω καὶ ἐταγής. 'Ομόσαι δ' Ἀθηναίους πάντας, καθ' ἱερῶν τελείων, κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ δήμους, ἀποκτείνειν τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα.

The comment of Sievers (Commentationes De Xenophontis Hellenicis; Berlin, 1833, pp. 18, 19) on the events of this time, is not clear.

² Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.) 'Οποσοὶ δ' ὄρκοι δμῶνονται Ἀθήνησιν ἢ ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἢ ἄλλοθὶ πού ἐνάντιοι τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, λῶω καὶ ἀφίημι.

To what particular anti-constitutional oaths allusion is here made, we cannot tell. All those of the oligarchical conspirators, both at Samos and at Athens, are doubtless intended to be abrogated: and this oath, like that of the armament at Samos (Thucyd. viii, 75), is intended to be sworn by every one, including those who had before been members of the oligarchical conspiracy. Perhaps it may also be intended to abrogate the covenant sworn by the members of the political clubs or *ξυνωμόσαι* among themselves, in so far as it pledged them to anti-constitutional acts (Thucyd. viii, 54-81).

³ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99, (c. 16, p. 48, R.) Ταῦτα δὲ ὁμοσάντων Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες καθ' ἱερῶν τελείων, τὸν νόμιμον ὄρκον, πρὸ Διονυσίων, etc.

things in abundance; but upon him who breaks it, destruction for himself as well as for his family."

Such was the remarkable decree which the Athenians not only passed in senate and public assembly, less than a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, but also caused to be engraved on a column close to the door of the senate-house. It plainly indicates, not merely that the democracy had returned, but an unusual intensity of democratical feeling along with it. The constitution which *all* the Athenians thus swore to maintain by the most strenuous measures of defence, must have been a constitution in which *all* Athenians had political rights, not one of Five Thousand privileged persons excluding the rest.¹ This decree became invalid after the expulsion of the Thirty, by the general resolution then passed not to act upon any laws passed before the archonship of Eukleidês, unless specially reenacted. But the column on which it stood engraved still remained, and the words were read upon it, at least down to the time of the orator Lykurgus, eighty years afterwards.²

The mere deposition of the Four Hundred, however, and the transfer of political power to the Five Thousand, which took place in the first public assembly held after the defeat off Eretria, was sufficient to induce most of the violent leaders of the Four Hundred forthwith to leave Athens. Peisander, Alexiklês, and others, went off secretly to Dekeleia:³ Aristarchus alone

¹ Those who think that a new constitution was established, after the deposition of the Four Hundred, are perplexed to fix the period at which the old democracy was restored. K. F. Hermann and others suppose, without any special proof, that it was restored at the time when Alkibiadês returned to Athens in 407 B.C. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staats Alterthümer, s. 167, note 13.

² Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. sect. 131, c. 31, p. 225: compare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. sect. 138, c. 34, p. 506.

If we wanted any proof, how perfectly reckless and unmeaning is the mention of the name of *Solon* by the orators, we should find it in this passage of Andokidês. He calls this psephism of Demophantus *a law of Solon* (sect. 96): see above in this History, vol. iii, ch. xi, p. 122.

³ Thucyd. viii, 98. Most of these fugitives returned six years afterwards, after the battle of Ægospotami, when the Athenian people again became subject to an oligarchy in the persons of the Thirty. Several of them be-

made his flight the means of inflicting a new wound upon his country. Being among the number of the generals, he availed himself of this authority to march — with some of the rudest among those Scythian archers, who did the police duty of the city — to Cenoë, on the Boeotian frontier, which was at that moment under siege by a body of Corinthians and Boeotians united. Aristarchus, in concert with the besiegers, presented himself to the garrison, and acquainted them that Athens and Sparta had just concluded peace, one of the conditions of which was that Cenoë should be surrendered to the Boeotians. He therefore, as general, ordered them to evacuate the place, under the benefit of a truce to return home. The garrison having been closely blocked up, and kept wholly ignorant of the actual condition of politics, obeyed the order without reserve; so that the Boeotians acquired possession of this very important frontier position, a new thorn in the side of Athens, besides Deceleia.¹

Thus was the Athenian democracy again restored, and the divorce between the city and the armament at Samos terminated, after an interruption of about four months by the successful conspiracy of the Four Hundred. It was only by a sort of miracle — or rather by the incredible backwardness and stupidity of her foreign enemies — that Athens escaped alive from this nefarious aggression of her own ablest and wealthiest citizens. That the victorious democracy should animadvert upon and punish the principal actors concerned in it, — who had satiated their own selfish ambition at the cost of so much suffering, anxiety, and peril to their country, — was nothing more than rigorous justice. But the circumstances of the case were peculiar: for the counter-revolution had been accomplished partly by the aid of a minority among the Four Hundred themselves, — Theramenês, Aristokratês, and others, together with the Board of Elders called Probûli, — all of whom had been, at the outset, either principals or

came members of the senate which worked under the Thirty (Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 80, c. 18. p. 495).

Whether Aristotelês and Chariklês were among the number of the Four Hundred who now went into exile, as Wattenbach affirms (De Quadringent. Ath. Factione, p. 66), seems not clearly made out.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 89, 90. Ἀριστάρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστον ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, etc.

accomplices in that system of terrorism and assassination, where by the democracy had been overthrown and the oligarchical rulers established in the senate-house. The earlier operations of the conspiracy, therefore, though among its worst features, could not be exposed to inquiry and trial without compromising these parties as fellow-criminals. Theramenes evaded this difficulty, by selecting for animadversion a recent act of the majority of the Four Hundred, which he and his partisans had opposed, and on which therefore he had no interests adverse either to justice or to the popular feeling. He stood foremost to impeach the last embassy sent by the Four Hundred to Sparta, sent with instructions to purchase peace and alliance at almost any price, and connected with the construction of the fort at Ectioneia for the reception of an enemy's garrison. This act of manifest treason, in which Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten other known envoys were concerned, was chosen as the special matter for public trial and punishment, not less on public grounds than with a view to his own favor in the renewed democracy. But the fact that it was Theramenes who thus denounced his old friends and fellow-conspirators, after having lent hand and heart to their earlier and not less guilty deeds, was long remembered as a treacherous betrayal, and employed in after days as an excuse for atrocious injustice against himself.¹

Of the twelve envoys who went on this mission, all except Phrynichus, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklēs, seem to have already escaped to Dekeleia or elsewhere. Phrynichus, as I have mentioned a few pages above, had been assassinated several days before. Respecting his memory, a condemnatory vote had already been just passed by the restored senate of Five Hundred, decreeing that his property should be confiscated and his house razed to the ground, and conferring the gift of citizenship, together with a pecuniary recompense, on two foreigners who

¹ *Lysias* cont. *Eratosthenes*, c. 11, p. 427, sects. 66-68. Βουλόμενος δὲ (Theramenes) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πιστὸς δοκεῖν εἶναι, Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον, φιλάτους ὄντας αὐτῷ, κατηγορῶν ὑπέκτεινεν· εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ κακίας ἦλθεν, ὥστε ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ὑμᾶς κατεδουλώσατο, οὕτως δὲ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς φίλους ὑπώλεσεν.

Compare *Xenophon*, *Hellen*, ii. 3. 30-33

claimed to have assassinated him.¹ The other three, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklês,² were presented in name to the senate by the generals, of whom probably Theramenês was one, as having gone on a mission to Sparta for purposes of mischief to Athens, partly on board an enemy's ship, partly through the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. Upon this presentation, doubtless a document of some length and going into particulars, a senator named Andron moved: That the generals, aided by any ten senators whom they may choose, do seize the three persons accused, and hold them in custody for trial; that the thesmothetæ do send to each of the three a formal summons, to prepare themselves for trial on a future day before the dikastery, on the charge of high treason, and do bring them to trial on the day named; assisted by the generals, the ten senators chosen as auxiliaries, and any other citizen who may please to take part, as their accusers. Each of the three was to be tried separately, and, if condemned,

¹ That these votes, respecting the memory and the death of Phrynichus, preceded the trial of Antiphon, we may gather from the concluding words of the sentence passed upon Antiphon: see Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834, B: compare Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 313.

Both Lysias and Lykurgus, the orators, contain statements about the death of Phrynichus which are not in harmony with Thucydides. Both these orators agree in reporting the names of the two foreigners who claimed to have slain Phrynichus, and whose claim was allowed by the people afterwards, in a formal reward and vote of citizenship, Thrasybulus of Kalydon, Apollodorus of Megara (Lysias cont. Agorat. c. 18, 492; Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 29, p. 217).

Lykurgus says that Phrynichus was assassinated by night, "near the fountain, hard by the willow-trees:" which is quite contradictory to Thucydides, who states that the deed was done in daylight, and in the market-place. Agoratus, against whom the speech of Lysias is directed, pretended to have been one of the assassins, and claimed reward on that score.

The story of Lykurgus, that the Athenian people, on the proposition of Kritias, exhumed and brought to trial the dead body of Phrynichus, and that Aristarchus and Alexiklês were put to death for undertaking its defence, is certainly in part false, and probably wholly false. Aristarchus was then at Cenoë, Alexiklês at Dekeleia.

² Onomaklês had been one of the colleagues of Phrynichus, as general of the armament in Ionia, in the preceding autumn (Thucyd. viii, 25).

In one of the Biographies of Thucydides (p. xxii, in Dr. Arnold's edition), it is stated that Onomaklês was executed along with the other two; but the document cited in the Pseudo-Plutarch contradicts this.

was to be dealt with according to the penal law of the city against traitors, or persons guilty of treason.¹

Though all the three persons thus indicated were at Athens, or at least were supposed to be there, on the day when this resolution was passed by the senate, yet, before it was executed, Onomaklès had fled; so that Antiphon and Archeptolemus only were imprisoned for trial. They too must have had ample opportunity for leaving the city, and we might have presumed that Antiphon would have thought it quite as necessary to retire as Peisander and Alexiklès. So acute a man as he, at no time very popular, must have known that now at least he had drawn the sword against his fellow-citizens in a manner which could never be forgiven. However, he chose voluntarily to stay: and this man, who had given orders for taking off so many of the democratical speakers by private assassination, received from the democracy, when triumphant, full notice and fair trial on a distinct and specific charge. The speech which he made in his defence, though it did not procure acquittal, was listened to, not merely with patience, but with admiration; as we may judge from the powerful and lasting effect which it produced. Thucydidès describes it as the most magnificent defence against a capital charge which had ever come before him;² and the poet Agathon, doubtless a hearer, warmly complimented Antiphon on his eloquence; to which the latter replied, that the approval of one such discerning judge was in his eyes an ample compensation for the unfriendly verdict of the multitude. Both he and Archeptolemus were found guilty by the dikastery and condemned to the penalties of treason. They were handed over to the magistrates called the Eleven, the chiefs of executive justice at Athens, to be put to death by the customary draught of hemlock. Their

¹ Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834; compare Xenophon, Hellenic. i, 7, 22. Apolèxis was one of the accusers of Antiphon: see Harpokration, v. Στρατώτης.

² Thucyd. viii, 68; Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. iii, 5.

Rühnken seems quite right (Dissertat. De Antiphont. p. 818, Reisk.) in considering the oration *περί μεταστροφῆς* to be Antiphon's defence of himself; though Westermann (Geschichte der Griech. Beredsamkeit, p. 277) controverts this opinion. This oration is alluded to in several of the articles in Harpokration.

properties were confiscated, their houses were directed to be razed, and the vacant site to be marked by columns, with the inscription: "The residence of Antiphon the traitor,—of Archeptolemus the traitor." They were not permitted to be buried either in Attica, or in any territory subject to Athenian dominion.¹ Their children, both legitimate and illegitimate, were deprived of the citizenship; and the citizen who should adopt any descendant of either of them, was to be himself in like manner disfranchised.

Such was the sentence passed by the dikastery, pursuant to the Athenian law of treason. It was directed to be engraved on the same brazen column as the decree of honor to the slayers of Phrynichus. From that column it was transcribed, and has thus passed into history.¹

¹ So, Themistoklēs, as a traitor, was not allowed to be buried in Attica (Thucyd. i, 138; Cornel. Nepos, Vit. Themistocl. ii, 10). His friends are said to have brought his bones thither secretly.

² It is given at length in Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. pp. 833, 834. It was preserved by Cæcilius, a Sicilian and rhetorical teacher, of the Augustan age; who possessed sixty orations ascribed to Antiphon, twenty-five of which he considered spurious.

Antiphon left a daughter, whom Kallæschrus sued for in marriage, pursuant to the forms of law, being entitled to do so on the score of near relationship (*ἐκδικάσασθαι*). Kallæschrus was himself one of the Four Hundred, perhaps a brother of Kritias. It seems singular that the legal power of suing at law for a female in marriage, by right of near kin (*τοῦ ἐκδικάζεσθαι*), could extend to a female disfranchised and debarred from all rights of citizenship.

If we may believe Harpokration, Andron, who made the motion in the senate for sending Antiphon and Archeptolemus to trial, had been himself a member of the Four Hundred oligarchs, as well as Theramenēs (Harp. v. "Ἀνδρων).

The note of Dr. Arnold upon that passage (viii, 68) wherein Thucydides calls Antiphon *ἀπερὶ οὐδένος ὀρεπός*, "inferior to no man in virtue," well deserves to be consulted. This passage shows, in a remarkable manner, what were the political and private qualities which determined the esteem of Thucydides. It shows that his sympathies went along with the oligarchical party; and that, while the exaggerations of opposition-speakers, or demagogues, such as those which he imputes to Kleon and Hyperbolus, provoked his bitter hatred, exaggerations of the oligarchical warfare, or multiplied assassinations, did not make him like a man the worse. But it shows, at the same time, his great candor in the narration of facts; for he gives an undisguised revelation both of the assassinations, and of the treason, of Antiphon.

How many of the Four Hundred oligarchs actually came to trial or were punished, we have no means of knowing; but there is ground for believing that none were put to death except Antiphon and Archeptolemus, perhaps also Aristarchus, the betrayer of Cenoë to the Boeotians. The latter is said to have been formally tried and condemned:¹ though by what accident he afterwards came into the power of the Athenians, after having once effected his escape, we are not informed. The property of Peisander, he himself having escaped, was confiscated, and granted either wholly or in part as a recompense to Apollodorus, one of the assassins of Phrynichus;² probably the property of the other conspicuous fugitive oligarchs was confiscated also. Polystratus, another of the Four Hundred, who had only become a member of that body a few days before its fall, was tried during absence, which absence his defenders afterwards accounted for, by saying that he had been wounded in the naval battle of Eretria, and heavily fined. It seems that each of the Four Hundred was called on to go through an audit and a trial of accountability, according to the practice general at Athens with magistrates going out of office. Such of them as did not appear to this trial were condemned to fine, to exile, or to have their names recorded as traitors: but most of those who did appear seem to have been acquitted; partly, we are told, by bribes to the logistæ, or auditing officers, though some were condemned either to fine or to partial political disability, along with those hoplites who had been the most marked partisans of the Four Hundred.³

¹ Xenoph. Hellenic. i, 7, 28. This is the natural meaning of the passage; though it *may* also mean that a day for trial was named, but that Aristarchus did not appear. Aristarchus may possibly have been made prisoner in one of the engagements which took place between the garrison of Dekeleia and the Athenians. The Athenian exiles in a body established themselves at Dekeleia, and carried on constant war with the citizens at Athens: see Lysias, De Bonis Niciæ Fratris, Or. xviii, ch. 4, p. 604: Pro Polystrato, Orat. xx, c. 7, p. 688; Andokidēs de Mysteriis, c. 17, p. 50.

² Lysias, De Oleâ Sacrâ, Or. vii, ch. ii, p. 263, Reisk.

³ "Quadringentis ipsa dominatio fraudi non fuit; imo qui cum Theramene et Aristocrate steterant, in magno honore habiti sunt: omnibus autem factiones reddendæ fuerunt; qui solum vertissent, proditores judicati sunt, nomina in publico proposita." (Wattenbach, De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, p. 65.)

Indistinctly as we make out the particular proceedings of the Athenian people at this restoration of the democracy, we know

From the psephism of Patrokleidês, passed six years subsequently, after the battle of Ægospotamos, we learn that the names of such among the Four Hundred as did not stay to take their trial, were engraved on pillars distinct from those who were tried and condemned either to fine or to various disabilities; Andokidês de *Mysteriis*, sects. 75-78: *Καὶ ὅσα ὀνόματα τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὸς ἐγγέγραπται, ἢ ἄλλο τι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων ἐστὶ πού γεγραμμένον, πλὴν ὅποσα ἐν στήλαις γέγραπται τῶν μὴ ἐνθάδε μεινάντων*, etc. These last names, as the most criminal, were excepted from the amnesty of Patrokleidês.

We here see that there were two categories among the condemned Four Hundred: 1. Those who remained to stand the trial of accountability, and were condemned either to a fine which they could not pay, or to some positive disability. 2. Those who did not remain to stand their trial, and were condemned *par contumace*.

Along with the first category we find other names besides those of the Four Hundred, found guilty as their partisans: *ἄλλο τι (ὄνομα) περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων*. Among these partisans we may rank the soldiers mentioned a little before, sect. 75: *οἱ στρατιῶται, οἷς ὅτι ἐπέμειναν ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἦν ἄπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, εἰπεῖν δ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ οὐκ ἔξην αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ βουλευσάαι*, where the preposition *ἐπὶ* seems to signify not simply contemporaneousness, but a sort of intimate connection, like the phrase *ἐπὶ προστάτῳ οἰκεῖν* (see *Matthiæ*, Gr. Gr. sect. 584; *Kühner*, Gr. Gr. sect. 611).

The oration of Lysias pro Polystrato is on several points obscure: but we make out that Polystratus was one of the Four Hundred who did not come to stand his trial of accountability, and was therefore condemned in his absence. Severe accusations were made against him, and he was falsely asserted to be the cousin, whereas he was in reality only fellow-demot, of Phrynichus (sects. 20, 24, 11). The defence explains his non-appearance, by saying that he had been wounded at the battle of Eretria, and that the trial took place immediately after the deposition of the Four Hundred (sects. 14, 24). He was heavily fined, and deprived of his citizenship (sects. 15, 33, 38). It would appear that the fine was greater than his property could discharge; accordingly this fine, remaining unpaid, would become chargeable upon his sons after his death, and unless they could pay it, they would come into the situation of insolvent public debtors to the state, which would debar them from the exercise of the rights of citizenship, so long as the debt remained unpaid. But while Polystratus was alive, his sons were not liable to the state for the payment of his fine; and they therefore still remained citizens, and in the full exercise of their rights, though he was disfranchised. They were three sons, all of whom had served with credit as hoplites, and even as horsemen, in Sicily and elsewhere. In the speech before us, one of them prefers a petition to the dikastery, that the sentence passed against his father

from Thucydides that their prudence and moderation were exemplary. The eulogy, which he bestows in such emphatic terms upon their behavior at this juncture, is indeed doubly remarkable: ¹ first, because it comes from an exile, not friendly to the democracy, and a strong admirer of Antiphon; next, because the juncture itself was one eminently trying to the popular morality, and likely to degenerate, by almost natural tendency, into excess of reactionary vengeance and persecution. The democracy was now one hundred years old, dating from Kleisthenês, and fifty years old, even dating from the final reforms of Ephialtês and Periklês; so that self-government and political equality were a part of the habitual sentiment of every man's bosom, heightened in this case by the fact that Athens was not merely a democracy, but an imperial democracy, having dependencies abroad.² At a moment when, from unparalleled previous disasters, she is barely able to keep up the struggle against her foreign enemies, a small knot of her own wealthiest citizens, taking advantage of her weakness, contrive, by a tissue of fraud and force not less flagitious than skilfully combined, to concentrate in their own hands the powers of the state, and to tear from their countrymen the security against bad government, the sentiment of equal citizenship, and the long-established freedom of speech. Nor is this all: these conspirators not only plant an oligarchical sovereignty in the senate-house, but also sustain that sovereignty by inviting a foreign garrison from without, and by betraying Athens to her Peloponnesian enemies. Two more deadly injuries it is impossi-

may be mitigated; partly on the ground that it was unmerited, being passed while his father was afraid to stand forward in his own defence, partly as recompense for distinguished military services of all the three sons. The speech was delivered at a time later than the battle of Kynossema, in the autumn of this year (sect. 31), but not very long after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, and certainly, I think, long before the Thirty; so that the assertion of Taylor (*Vit. Lysiaë*, p. 55) that *all* the extant orations of Lysias bear date after the Thirty, must be received with this exception.

¹ This testimony of Thucydides is amply sufficient to refute the vague assertions in the Oration xxv, of Lysias (*Δήμου Καταλυσ. Ἀπολ.* sects. 34, 35), about great enormities now committed by the Athenians; though Mr. Mitford copies these assertions as if they were real history, referring them to a time four years afterwards (*History of Greece*, ch. xx, s. 1, vol. iv, p. 327).

² Thucyd. viii, 68.

ble to imagine; and from neither of them would Athens have escaped, if her foreign enemy had manifested reasonable alacrity. Considering the immense peril, the narrow escape, and the impaired condition in which Athens was left, notwithstanding her escape, we might well have expected in the people a violence of reactionary hostility such as every calm observer, while making allowance for the provocation, must nevertheless have condemned; and perhaps somewhat analogous to that exasperation which, under very similar circumstances, had caused the bloody massacres at Korkyra.¹ And when we find that this is exactly the occasion which Thucydides, an observer rather less than impartial, selects to eulogize their good conduct and moderation, we are made deeply sensible of the good habits which their previous democracy must have implanted in them, and which now served as a corrective to the impulse of the actual moment. They had become familiar with the cementing force of a common sentiment; they had learned to hold sacred the inviolability of law and justice, even in respect to their worst enemy; and what was of not less moment, the frequency and freedom of political discussion had taught them not only to substitute the contentions of the tongue for those of the sword, but also to conceive their situation with its present and prospective liabilities, instead of being hurried away by blind retrospective vengeance against the past.

There are few contrasts in Grecian history more memorable or more instructive, than that between this oligarchical conspiracy, conducted by some of the ablest hands at Athens, and the democratical movement going on at the same time in Samos, among the Athenian armament and the Samian citizens. In the former, we have nothing but selfishness and personal ambition, from the beginning: first, a partnership to seize for their own advantage the powers of government; next, after this object has been accomplished, a breach among the partners, arising out of disappointment alike selfish. We find appeal made to nothing but the worst tendencies; either tricks to practise upon the credulity of the people, or extra-judicial murders to work upon their fear. In the latter, on the contrary, the sentiment invoked is that of common patriotism, and equal, public-minded sympathy. That

¹ See about the events in Korkyra, vol. vi, ch. 1. p. 283.

which we read in Thucydides,—when the soldiers of the armament and the Samian citizens, pledged themselves to each other by solemn oaths to uphold their democracy, to maintain harmony and good feeling with each other, to prosecute energetically the war against the Peloponnesians, and to remain at enmity with the oligarchical conspirators at Athens,—is a scene among the most dramatic and inspiring which occurs in his history.¹ Moreover, we recognize at Samos the same absence of reactionary vengeance as at Athens, after the attack of the oligarchs, Athenian as well as Samian, has been repelled; although those oligarchs had begun by assassinating Hyperbolus and others. There is throughout this whole democratical movement at Samos a generous exaltation of common sentiment over personal, and at the same time an absence of ferocity against opponents, such as nothing except democracy ever inspired in the Grecian bosom.

It is, indeed, true that this was a special movement of generous enthusiasm, and that the details of a democratical government correspond to it but imperfectly. Neither in the life of an individual, nor in that of a people, does the ordinary and every-day movement appear at all worthy of those particular seasons in which a man is lifted above his own level and becomes capable of extreme devotion and heroism. Yet such emotions, though their complete predominance is never otherwise than transitory, have their foundation in veins of sentiment which are not even at other times wholly extinct, but count among the manifold forces tending to modify and improve, if they cannot govern, human action. Even their moments of transitory predominance leave a luminous track behind, and render the men who have passed through them more apt to conceive again the same generous impulse, though in fainter degree. It is one of the merits of Grecian democracy that it *did* raise this feeling of equal and patriotic communion: sometimes, and on rare occasions, like the scene at Samos, with overwhelming intensity, so as to impassion an unanimous multitude; more frequently, in feebler tide, yet such as gave some chance to an honest and eloquent orator, of making successful appeal to public feeling against corruption or selfishness. If we follow the movements of Antiphon and his

¹ Thucyd. viii, 75.

fellow-conspirators at Athens, contemporaneous with the democratic manifestations at Samos, we shall see that not only was no such generous impulse included in it, but the success of their scheme depended upon their being able to strike all common and active patriotism out of the Athenian bosom. Under the "cold shade" of their oligarchy — even if we suppose the absence of cruelty and rapacity, which would probably soon have become rife had their dominion lasted, as we shall presently learn from the history of the second oligarchy of Thirty — no sentiment would have been left to the Athenian multitude except fear, servility, or at best a tame and dumb sequacity to leaders whom they neither chose nor controlled. To those who regard different forms of government as distinguished from each other mainly by the feelings which each tends to inspire in magistrates as well as citizens, the contemporaneous scenes of Athens and Samos will suggest instructive comparisons between Grecian oligarchy and Grecian democracy.

CHAPTER LXIII.

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.

THE oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens, installed in the senate-house about February or March 411 B.C., and deposed about July of the same year, after four or five months of danger and distraction such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what attendant circumstances, has been amply detailed. I now revert to the military and naval operations on the Asiatic coast, partly contemporaneous with the political dissensions at Athens, above described.

It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of

ninety-four triremes,¹ having remained not less than eighty days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milêtus towards the end of March; with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidês had been for some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions, of Tissaphernês, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phœnician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for coöperation with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the Spartan Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos and the neighboring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with Milêtus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus; an example followed, two days afterwards, by the neighboring town of Lampsakus.

It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichidês, the commander of the Athenian besieging armament. Though the Chians — driven to despair by increasing famine as well as by want of relief from Astyochus, and having recently increased their fleet to thirty-six triremes against the Athenian thirty-two, by the arrival of twelve ships under Leon, obtained from Milêtus during the absence of Astyochus at Rhodes — had sallied out and fought an obstinate naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage,² yet Strombichidês felt compelled immediately to carry away twenty-four triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont. Hence the Chians became sufficiently masters of the sea to provision themselves

¹ Thucyd. viii, 44, 45.

² Thucyd. viii, 61, 62. *ὅτι ἐλασσον ἔχοντες* means a certain success, not very decisive.

afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall Leon with the twelve triremes to Milêtus, and thus to strengthen his main fleet.¹

The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their plan of conspiracy as already recounted, and when the Athenian generals were divided in opinion, Charmînus siding with this party, Leon and Diomedon against it. Apprized of the reigning dissension, Astyochus thought it a favorable opportunity for sailing with his whole fleet up to the harbor of Samos, and offering battle; but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbor. He accordingly returned to Milêtus, where he again remained inactive, in expectation, real or pretended, of the arrival of the Phenician ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan contingent, presently became uncontrollable. They not only murmured at the inaction of the armament during this precious moment of disunion in the Athenian camp, but also detected the insidious policy of Tissaphernês in thus frittering away their strength without result; a policy still more keenly brought home to their feelings by his irregularity in supplying them with pay and provision, which caused serious distress. To appease their clamors, Astyochus was compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of which was pronounced in favor of immediate battle. He accordingly sailed from Milêtus with his whole fleet of one hundred and twelve triremes round to the promontory of Mykalê immediately opposite Samos, ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only eighty-two sail, in the absence of Strombichidês, was then moored near Glaukê on the mainland of Mykalê; but the public decision just taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior numbers.²

It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their attempt and miscarried; the reaction from which at-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 63.

² Thucyd. viii, 78, 79.

tempt brought about, with little delay, the great democratical manifestation, and solemn collective oath, of the Athenian armament, coupled with the nomination of new, cordial, and unanimous generals. They were now in high enthusiasm, anxious for battle with the enemy, and Strombichidês had been sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against the main enemy at Milêtus. That officer had recovered Lampsakus, but had failed in his attempt on Abydos.¹ Having established a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet at Samos, which by his arrival was increased to one hundred and eight sail. He arrived in the night, when the Peloponnesian fleet was preparing to renew its attack from Mykalê the next morning. It consisted of one hundred and twelve ships, and was therefore still superior in number to the Athenians. But having now learned both the arrival of Strombichidês, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity of the Athenians, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to persist in their resolution of fighting. They returned back to Milêtus, to the mouth of which harbor the Athenians sailed, and had the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.²

Such confession of inferiority was well calculated to embitter still farther the discontents of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus. Tissaphernês had become more and more parsimonious in furnishing pay and supplies; while the recall of Alkibiadês to Samos, which happened just now, combined with the uninterrupted apparent intimacy between him and the satrap, confirmed their belief that the latter was intentionally cheating and starving them in the interest of Athens. At the same time, earnest invitations arrived from Pharnabazus, soliciting the coöperation of the fleet at the Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus, who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta, for the express purpose of going to aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet, which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly, Klearchus was sent with forty triremes from Milêtus to the Hellespont, yet with instructions to evade the Athenians at Samos, by first stretching out westward into the

¹ Thucyd. viii, 62.

² Thucyd. viii, 79.

Ægean. Encountering severe storms, he was forced with the greater part of his squadron to seek shelter at Delos, and even suffered so much damage as to return to Milētus, from whence he himself marched to the Hellespont by land. Ten of his triremes, however, under the Megarian Helixus, weathered the storm and pursued their voyage to the Hellespont, which was at this moment unguarded, since Strombichidēs seems to have brought back all his squadron. Helixus passed on unopposed to Byzantium, a Doric city and Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached him, and which he now induced to revolt from Athens. This untoward news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance the circuitous route of Klearchus had eluded, of the necessity of guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even attempted in vain to recapture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes afterwards proceeded from Milētus to the Hellespont and Abydos, thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as the Bosphorus and Byzantium,¹ and even to ravage the Thracian Chersonese.

Meanwhile, the discontents of the fleet at Milētus broke out into open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernēs. Unpaid, and only half-fed, the seamen came together in crowds to talk over their grievances; denouncing Astyochus as having betrayed them for his own profit to the satrap, who was treacherously ruining the armament under the inspirations of Alkibiadēs. Even some of the officers, whose silence had been hitherto purchased, began to hold the same language; perceiving that the mischief was becoming irreparable, and that the men were actually on the point of desertion. Above all, the incorruptible Hermokratēs of Syracuse, and Dorieus the Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen, who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of the Peloponnesian ships), went in a body to Astyochus, with loud complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus while advocating their cause. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward to pelt Astyochus with missiles: he took

¹ Thucyd. viii, 80-99.

refuge, however, on a neighboring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.¹

Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet. The Milesians, also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which Tissaphernês had built in their town, watched an opportunity of attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap, sympathized in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas censured it severely, and intimated to the Milesians that they, as well as the other Greeks in the king's territory, were bound to be subservient to Tissaphernês within all reasonable limits, and even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should be prosperously terminated. It appears that in other matters also, Lichas had enforced instead of mitigating the authority of the satrap over them; so that the Milesians now came to hate him vehemently,² and when he shortly afterwards died of sickness, they refused permission to bury him in the spot — probably some place of honor — which his surviving countrymen had fixed upon. Though Lichas in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians, instead of acquiring autonomy, according to the general promises of Sparta, were now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected them against Persia much better than Sparta.

The subordination of the armament, however, was now almost at an end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede Astyochus, who was summoned home and took his departure. Both Hermokratês and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints against Tissaphernês; while the latter on his part sent thither an envoy named Gaulites, a Karian, brought up in equal familiarity with the Greek and Karian languages, both to defend himself against the often-repeated charges

¹ Thucyd. viii, 83, 84.

² Thucyd. viii, 84. 'Ο μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἡρέσκετο αὐτοῖς, ἔφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τὰ μέτρα, καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντάς τε αὐτὸν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι' ἄλλα τοιοντοτροπα, etc.

of Hermokratês, that he had been treacherously withholding the pay under concert with Alkibiadês and the Athenians, and to denounce the Milesians on his own side, as having wrongfully demolished his fort.¹ At the same time he thought it necessary to put forward a new pretence, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta, soothing the impatience of the armament, and conciliating the new admiral Mindarus. He announced that the Phenician fleet was on the point of arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to coöperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Milêtus, as deputy during his absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet.²

Mindarus, a new commander, without any experience of the mendacity of Tissaphernês, was imposed upon by this plausible assurance, and even captivated by the near prospect of so powerful a reinforcement. He despatched an officer named Philippus with two triremes round the Triopian Cape to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.

Here again was a fresh delay of no inconsiderable length, while Tissaphernês was absent at Aspendus, on this ostensible purpose. Some time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippus found the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of hope that it was really coming onward. But the satrap soon showed that his purpose now, as heretofore, was nothing better than delay and delusion. The Phenician ships were one hundred and forty-seven in number; a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernês affected to think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the Great King; who had commanded a fleet of three hundred sail to be fitted out for the service.³ He waited for some time in pretended expectation

¹ Thucyd. viii, 85.

² Thucyd. viii, 87.

³ Thucyd. viii, 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernês pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by Diodorus at three hundred sail. Thucydides does not assign any precise number (Diodor. xiii, 38, 42, 46).

On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phenician fleet as intended

that more ships were on their way, disregarding all the remonstrances of the Lacedæmonian officers.

Presently arrived the Athenian Alkibiadês, with thirteen Athenian triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap. He too had made use of this approaching Phenician fleet to delude his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernês at Aspendus, and to determine him, if possible, to send the fleet to the assistance of Athens, but at the very least, *not* to send it to the aid of Sparta. The latter alternative of the promise was sufficiently safe, for he knew well that Tissaphernês had no intention of applying the fleet to any really efficient purpose. But he was thereby enabled to take credit with his countrymen for having been the means of diverting this formidable reinforcement from the enemy.

Partly the apparent confidence between Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês, partly the impudent shifts of the former, grounded on the incredible pretence that the fleet was insufficient in number, at length satisfied Philippus that the present was only a new manifestation of deceit. After a long and vexatious interval, he apprized Mindarus — not without indignant abuse of the satrap — that nothing was to be hoped from the fleet at Aspendus. Yet the proceeding of Tissaphernês, indeed, in bringing up the Phenicians to that place, and still withholding the order for farther advance and action, was in every one's eyes mysterious and unaccountable. Some fancied that he did it with a view of levying larger bribes from the Phenicians themselves, as a premium for being sent home without fighting, as it appears that they actually were. But Thucydides supposes that he had no other motive than that which had determined his behavior during the last year, to protract the war and impoverish both Athens and Sparta, by setting up a fresh deception, which would last for some weeks, and thus procure so much delay.¹ The historian is doubtless right: but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe, that the maintenance of a fraudulent pretence, for so inconsiderable a time, should have been held as an adequate

to be augmented to a total of three hundred sail (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 1). It seems to have been the sort of standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 87, 88, 99.

motive for bringing this large fleet from Phenicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away unemployed.

Having at length lost all hope of the Phenician ships, Mindarus resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tisaphernês; the more so, as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with greater irregularity than ever, and to conduct his fleet to the Hellespont into coöperation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet¹—seventy-three triremes strong, after deducting thirteen which had been sent under Dorieus to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes—having been carefully prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that no previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. After having been delayed some days at Ikarus by bad weather, Mindarus reached Chios in safety. But here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed, with fifty-five triremes, to the northward of Chios, and was thus between the Lacedæmonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios, in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the part of the enemy's fleet.² Meanwhile he employed his Athenian force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately prevailed on to revolt by a body of three hundred assailants from Kymê under the Theban Anaxander, partly Methymnæan exiles, with some political sympathizers, partly mercenary foreigners, who succeeded in carrying Eresus after failing in an attack on Methymna. Thrasyllus found before Eresus a small Athenian squadron of five triremes under Thrasybulus, who had been despatched from Samos to try and forestall the revolt, but had arrived too late. He was farther joined

¹ Diodor. xiii, 38.

² Thucyd. viii, 100. *Αισθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῇ Χίῳ εἴη, καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν αὐτοῦ, σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑν-τεπέρᾳς ἡπείρῳ, εἰ ἄρα ποὶ κινούντο αἱ νῆες, ὅπως μὴ λάθῃεν, etc.*

I construe τῇ ἀντιπέρασ ἡπείρῳ, as meaning the mainland opposite Chios, not opposite Lesbos. The words may admit either sense, since Χίῳ and αὐτοῦ follow so immediately before: and the situation for the scouts was much more suitable, opposite the northern portion of Chios.

by two triremes from the Hellespont, and by others from Methymna, so that his entire fleet reached the number of sixty-seven triremes, with which he proceeded to lay siege to Eresus; trusting to his scouts for timely warning, in case the enemy's fleet should move northward.

The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take, was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates the northeastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the Asiatic mainland: after which it would probably sail past Eresus on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the Hellespont, though it might also go round on the eastern side between Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian scouts were planted so as to descry the Peloponnesian fleet, if it either passed through this strait or neared the island of Lesbos. But Mindarus did neither; thus eluding their watch, and reaching the Hellespont without the knowledge of the Athenians. Having passed two days in provisioning his ships, receiving besides from the Chians three *tesserakosta*, a Chian coin of unknown value, for each man among his seamen, he departed on the third day from Chios, but took a southerly route and rounded the island in all haste on its western or sea-side. Having reached and passed the northern latitude of Chios, he took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left hand, direct to the mainland; which he touched at a harbor called Karterii, in the Phokæan territory. Here he stopped to give the crew their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the gulf of Kymê to the little islets called Arginussæ, close on the Asiatic continent opposite Mitylênê, where he again halted for supper. Continuing his voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Harmatûs, on the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna, by the next day's morning meal: then still hastening forward after a short halt, he doubled Cape Lektum, sailed along the Troad and passed Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight; where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhœteium, and other neighboring places.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii, 101. The latter portion of this voyage is sufficiently distinct; the earlier portion less so. I describe it in the text differently

By this well-laid course and accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian fleet completely eluded the lookers-out of Thrasyllus, and

from all the best and most recent editors of Thucydides; from whom I dissent with the less reluctance, as they all here take the gravest liberty with his text, inserting the negative *οὐ* on pure conjecture, without the authority of a single MS. Niebuhr has laid it down as almost a canon of criticism that this is never to be done: yet here we have Krüger recommending it, and Haack, Göller, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and M. Didot, all adopting it as a part of the text of Thucydides; without even following the caution of Bekker in his small edition, who admonishes the reader, by inclosing the word in brackets. Nay, Dr. Arnold goes so far as to say in note, "*This correction is so certain and so necessary, that it only shows the inattention of the earlier editors that it was not made long since.*"

The words of Thucydides, *without* this correction, and as they stood universally before Haack's edition (even in Bekker's edition of 1821), are:—

Ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες, ἐπισιτισάμεναι ὅσιν ἡμέραις, καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαροκοσὰς ἑκάστος Χίος τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιοι, ἵνα μὴ περιτόχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσὶν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστερῇ τὴν Δέσβον ἔχοντες ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἡπειρον. Καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαίδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίῳ λιμένα, καὶ ἀριστοποιήσαντες, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν Ἀργεννοῦσαις τῆς ἡπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Μικρῆς, etc.

Haack and the other eminent critics just mentioned, all insist that these words as they stand are absurd and contradictory, and that it is indispensable to insert *οὐ* before *πελάγιοι*; so that the sentence stands in their editions *ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ πελάγιοι*. They all picture to themselves the fleet of Mindarus as sailing from the town of Chios northward, and going out at the northern strait. Admitting this, they say, plausibly enough, that the words of the old text involve a contradiction, because Mindarus would be going in the direction towards Eresus, and not away from it; though even then, the propriety of their correction would be disputable. But the word *πελάγιος*, when applied to ships departing from Chios,—though it may perhaps mean that they round the northeastern corner of the island and then strike west round Lesbos,—yet means also as naturally, and more naturally, to announce them as *departing by the outer sea*, or *sailing on the sea-side* (round the southern and western coast) of the island. Accept this meaning, and the old words construe perfectly well. *Ἀπαίρειν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος* is the natural and proper phrase for describing the circuit of Mindarus round the south and west coast of Chios. This, too, was the only way by which he could have escaped the scouts and the ships of Thrasyllus: for which same purpose of avoiding Athenian ships, we find (viii, 86) the squadron of Klearchus, on another occasion, making a

reached the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral was barely apprized of its departure from Chios. When it arrived at

long circuit out to sea. If it be supposed, which those who read *οὗ πελάγιοι* must suppose, that Mindarus sailed first up the northern strait between Chios and the mainland, and then turned his course east towards Phokæa this would have been the course which Thrasyllus expected that he would take; and it is hardly possible to explain why he was not seen both by the Athenian scouts as well as by the Athenian garrison at their station of Delphinium on Chios itself. Whereas, by taking the circuitous route round the southern and western coast, he never came in sight either of one or the other: and he was enabled, when he got round to the latitude north of the island, to turn to the right and take a straight easterly course, *with Lesbos on his left hand*, but at a sufficient distance from land to be out of sight of all scouts. *Ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος* (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 17), means to strike into the open sea, quite clear of the coast of Asia: that passage does not decisively indicate whether the ships rounded the southeast or the northeast corner of the island.

We are here told that the seamen of Mindarus received from the Chians per head *three Chian tessarakostæ*. Now this is a small Chian coin, nowhere else mentioned; and it is surprising to find so petty and local a denomination of money here specified by Thucydides, contrasted with the different manner in which Xenophon describes Chian payments to the Peloponnesian seamen (Hellen. i, 6, 12; ii, 1, 5). But the voyage of Mindarus round the south and west of the island explains the circumstance. He must have landed twice on the island during this circumnavigation (perhaps starting in the evening), for dinner and supper: and this Chian coin, which probably had no circulation out of the island, served each man to buy provisions at the Chian landing-places. It was not convenient to Mindarus to take aboard *more* provisions in kind, at the town of Chios; because he had already aboard a stock of provisions for two days, the subsequent portion of his voyage, along the coast of Asia to Sigæum, during which he could not afford time to halt and buy them, and where indeed the territory was not friendly.

It is enough if I can show that the old text of Thucydides will construe very well, without the violent intrusion of this conjectural *οὗ*. But I can show more: for this negative actually renders even the construction of the sentence awkward at least, if not inadmissible. Surely, *ἀπαίρουσιν οὐ πελάγιοι*, ἀλλὰ, ought to be followed by a correlative adjective or participle belonging to the same verb *ἀπαίρουσιν*: yet if we take *ἐχόντες* as such correlative participle, how are we to construe *ἐπλεον*? In order to express the sense which Haack brings out, we ought surely to have different words, such as: *οὐκ ἤφραν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιοι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀριστερὰ τὴν Λέσβον ἐχόντες ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἡπειρον*. Even the change of tense from present to past, when we follow the construction of Haack, is awkward; while if we

Harmatûs, however, opposite to and almost within sight of the Athenian station at Methymna, its progress could no longer remain a secret. As it advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news circulated everywhere, and was promulgated through numerous fire-signals and beacons on the hill, by friend as well as by foe.

These signals were perfectly visible, and perfectly intelligible, to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the Hellespont: eighteen Athenian triremes at Sestos in Europe, sixteen Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former it was destruction, to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards Elæûs at the southern extremity of that peninsular, so as to have the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guardships received the strictest orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, or perhaps even before he left Milêtus, that, if he should attempt the start, they were to keep a vigilant and special lookout for his coming, and reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in case he were attacked by Thrasyllus. When the signals first announced the arrival of Mindarus, the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos could not know in what position he was, nor whether the main Athenian fleet might not be near upon him. Accordingly they acted on these previous orders, holding themselves in reserve

understand the words in the sense which I propose, the change of tense is perfectly admissible, since the two verbs do not both refer to the same movement or to the same portion of the voyage. "*The fleet starts from Chios out by the sea-side of the island; but when it came to have Lesbos on the left hand, it sailed straight to the continent.*"

I hope that I am not too late to make good my *γραφὴν ξενίας*, or protest, against the unwarranted right of Thucydidean citizenship which the recent editors have conferred upon this word *εἰς*, in c. 101. The old text ought certainly to be restored; or, if these editors maintain their views, they ought at least to inclose the word in brackets. In the edition of Thucydides, published at Leipsic, 1845, by C. A. Koth, I observe that the text is still correctly printed, without the negative.

in their station at Abydos, until daylight should arrive, and they should be better informed. They thus neglected the Athenian Hellespontine squadron in its escape from Sestos to Elæus.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii, 102. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ τε φρουκτωροὶ ἐσθμαίνον, καὶ ἡσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέουσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτὸς, ὡς εἶχον τάχους, ὑπομίξαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ, παρέπλεον ἐπ' Ἐλαιούντος, βουλόμενοι ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολέμιων ναῦς. Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐκκαίδεκα ναῦς ἐλαθόν, προειρημένῃς φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἐξουσιν, ἣν ἐκπλέωσι· τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μινδάρου ἑμα ἐκ κατιδόντες, etc.

Here, again, we have a difficult text, which has much perplexed the commentators, and which I venture to translate, as it stands in my text, differently from all of them. The words, *προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἐξουσιν ἣν ἐκπλέωσι*, are explained by the Scholiast to mean: "Although watch had been enjoined to them (i. e. to the Peloponnesian guard-squadron at Abydos) by the friendly approaching fleet (of Mindarus), that they should keep strict guard on the Athenians at Sestos, in case the latter should sail out."

Dr. Arnold, Götter, Poppo, and M. Didot, all accept this construction, though all agree that it is most harsh and confused. The former says: "This again is most strangely intended to mean, *προειρημένου αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκπλεόντων φίλων φυλάσσειν τοὺς πολέμιους*."

To construe *τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ* as equivalent to *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκπλεόντων φίλων*, is certainly such a harshness as we ought to be very glad to escape. And the construction of the Scholiast involves another liberty which I cannot but consider as objectionable. He supplies, in his paraphrase, the word *καίτοι*, *although*, from his own imagination. There is no indication of *although*, either express or implied, in the text of Thucydides; and it appears to me hazardous to assume into the meaning so decisive a particle without any authority. The genitive absolute, when annexed to the main predication affirmed in the verb, usually denotes something naturally connected with it in the way of cause, concomitancy, explanation, or modification, not something opposed to it, requiring to be prefaced by an *although*; if this latter be intended, then the word *although* is expressed, not left to be understood. After Thucydides has told us that the Athenians at Sestos escaped their opposite enemies at Abydos, when he next goes on to add something under the genitive absolute, we expect that it should be a new fact which explains why or how they escaped: but if the new fact which he tells us, far from explaining the escape, renders it more extraordinary (such as, that the Peloponnesians had received strict orders to watch them), he would surely prepare the reader for this new fact by an express particle, such as *although* or *notwithstanding*: "The Athenians escaped, *although* the Peloponnesians had received the strictest orders to watch them and

On arriving about daylight near the southern point of the Chersonese, these Athenians were descried by the fleet of Min-

block them up." As nothing equivalent to, or implying, the adversative particle *although* is to be found in the Greek words, so I infer, as a high probability, that it is not to be sought in the meaning.

Differing from the commentators, I think that these words, *προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ*, *ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἣν ἐκπλέωσι*, do assign the reason for the fact which had been immediately before announced, and which was really extraordinary; namely, that the Athenian squadron was allowed to pass by Abydos, and escape from Sestos to Elæus. That reason was, that the Peloponnesian guard-squadron had before received special orders from Mindarus, *to concentrate its attention and watchfulness upon his approaching squadron*; hence it arose that they left the Athenians at Sestos unnoticed.

The words *τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ* are equivalent to *τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ*, and the pronoun *αὐτῶν*, which immediately follows, refers to *φίλων* (the approaching fleet of Mindarus), not to the Athenians at Sestos, as the Scholiast and the commentators construe it. This mistake about the reference of *αὐτῶν* seems to me to have put them all wrong.

That *τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ* must be construed as equivalent to *τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ* is certain; but it is not equivalent to *ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκπλεόντων φίλων*; nor is it possible to construe the words as the Scholiast would understand them: "*orders had been previously given by the approach (or arrival) of their friends*;" whereby we should turn *ὁ ἐπίπλους* into an acting and commanding personality. The "approach of their friends" is an event, which may properly be said "to have produced an effect," but which cannot be said "to have given previous orders." It appears to me that *τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ* is the dative case, governed by *φυλακῆς*; "*a look-out for the arrival of the Peloponnesians*," having been enjoined upon these guardships at Abydos: "*They had been ordered to watch for the approaching voyage of their friends*." The English preposition *for*, expresses here exactly the sense of the Greek dative; that is, the *object, purpose, or persons whose benefit is referred to*.

The words immediately succeeding, *ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἣν ἐκπλέωσι*, are an expansion of consequences intended to follow from *φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ*. "They shall watch for the approach of the main fleet, in order that they may devote special and paramount regard to its safety, in case it makes a start." For the phrase *ἀνακῶς ἔχειν*, compare Herodot. i, 24; viii, 109. Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33: *ἀνακῶς, φυλακτῶς, προνοητικῶς, ἐπιμελῶς*, the notes of Arnold and Götter here; and Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 533, *ἀνακῶς ἔχειν τινος*, for *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*. The words *ἀνακῶς ἔχειν* express the anxious and special vigilance which the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos was directed to keep for the arrival of Mindarus and his fleet, which was a matter of doubt and danger: but they would not be properly applicable to the duty of that squadron as respects the op-

darus, which had come the night before to the opposite stations of Sigeium and Rhoteium. The latter immediately gave chase:

posite Athenian squadron at Sestos, which was hardly of superior force to themselves, and was besides an avowed enemy, in sight of their own port.

Lastly, the words *ἦν ἐκπλέωσι* refer to *Mindarus* and *his fleet about to start from Chios, as their subject*, not to the Athenians at Sestos.

The whole sentence would stand thus, if we dismiss the peculiarities of Thucydides, and express the meaning in common Greek: *Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκαίδεκα ναῦς (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἔλαθον· προεῖρητο γὰρ (ἐκείναις ταῖς ναυσὶν) φυλάσσειν τὸν ἐπίπλοον τῶν φίλων, ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἦν ἐκπλέωσι.* The verb *φυλάσσειν* here, and of course the abstract substantive *φυλακή* which represents it, signifies to *watch* for, or *wait* for: like Thucyd. ii, 3, *φυλάξαντες ἐτι νύκτα, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περίορθρον*; also viii, 41, *ἐφύλασσε*.

If we construe the words in this way, they will appear in perfect harmony with the general scheme and purpose of Mindarus. That admiral is bent upon carrying his fleet to the Hellespont, but to avoid an action with Thrasyllus in doing so. This is difficult to accomplish, and can only be done by great secrecy of proceeding, as well as by an unusual route. He sends orders beforehand from Chios, perhaps even from Milêtus, before he quitted that place, to the Peloponnesian squadron guarding the Hellespont at Abydos. He contemplates the possible case that Thrasyllus may detect his plan, intercept him on the passage, and perhaps block him up or compel him to fight in some roadstead or bay on the coast opposite Lesbos, or on the Troad, which would indeed have come to pass, had he been seen by a single hostile fishing-boat in rounding the island of Chios. Now the orders sent forward, direct the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos what they are to do in this contingency; since without such orders, the captain of the squadron would not have known what to do, assuming Mindarus to be intercepted by Thrasyllus; whether to remain on guard at the Hellespont, which was his special duty; or to leave the Hellespont unguarded, keep his attention concentrated on Mindarus, and come forth to help him. "Let your first thought be to insure the safe arrival of the main fleet at the Hellespont, and to come out and render help to it, if it be attacked in its route; even though it be necessary for that purpose to leave the Hellespont for a time unguarded." Mindarus could not tell beforehand the exact moment when he would start from Chios, nor was it, indeed, absolutely certain that he would start at all, if the enemy were watching him: his orders were therefore sent, *conditional* upon his being able to get off (*ἦν ἐκπλέωσι*). But he was lucky enough, by the well-laid plan of his voyage, to get to the Hellespont without encountering an enemy. The Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, however, having received his special orders, when the fire-signals acquainted them that he was approaching, thought only of keeping themselves in reserve to lend him assistance if he needed it, and neglected the

but the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros, not without the loss, however, of four triremes, one even captured with all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilans at Elæûs: the crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by the squadron from Abydos, and their united force, eighty-six triremes strong, was employed for one day in trying to storm Elæûs. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Ereus, much disappointed that his scouts had been eluded and all his calculations baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He waited at Elæûs the return of the fugitive Athenian squadron from Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, seventy-six in number, for a general action.

After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestos up the Hellespont, by single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. The left or most advanced squadron, under Thrasyllus, stretched even beyond the headland called Kynossema, or the Dog's Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba: it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes, ten more than Thrasyllus in total number, extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore; the Syracusans under Hermokratês being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibatæ or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athenians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nau-

Athenians opposite. As it was night, probably the best thing which they could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could learn particulars of his position, and how or where they could render aid.

We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the escape of the Athenian squadron without interruption from Sestos.

nical manœuvring: nevertheless, the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manœuvring had fallen off since the glories of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; nor would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of the projecting headland of Kynossêma. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight, and found shelter first in the river Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless, eight Chian ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian, and as many Boeotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellênê, and Leukas, one each, fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals; who, however, on their own side lost fifteen ships. They erected a trophy on the headland of Kynossêma, near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba; not omitting the usual duties of burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the customary request for truce.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii, 105, 106; Diodor. xiii, 39, 40.

The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even in its most essential features, not reconcilable with Thucydides. It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority of the Athenian pilots and

A victory so incomplete and indecisive would have been little valued by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition. But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis, with the revolt of Eubœa, their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossema, seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the utmost delight and triumph. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favor, holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece of good fortune soon happened, to strengthen this belief. Mindarus was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending Hippokratês and Epiklês to bring the fleet of fifty triremes now acting at Eubœa.¹ This was in itself an important relief to Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home. But it was still further enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of this fleet, which, in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss of life among the crews; so that a remnant only, under Hippokratês, survived to join Mindarus.²

But though Athens was thus exempted from all fear of aggression on the side of Eubœa, the consequences of this departure of the fleet were such as to demonstrate how irreparably the island itself had passed out of her supremacy. The inhabitants

the Peloponnesian epibatæ. He states that twenty-five fresh ships arrived to join the Athenians in the middle of the battle, and determined the victory in their favor: this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent conflict a few months afterwards.

We owe to him, however, the mention of the chapel or tomb of Hecuba on the headland of Kynossema.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 107; Diodor. xiii, 41.

² Diodor. xiii, 41. It is probable that this fleet was in great part Boeotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of Athênê at Korôneia; which inscription was read and copied by Ephorus. By an exaggerated and over-literal confidence in the words of it, Diodorus is led to affirm that these twelve men were the only persons saved, and that every other person perished. But we know perfectly that Hippokratês himself survived, and that he was alive at the subsequent battle of Kyzikus (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 23).

of Chalkis and the other cities, now left without foreign defence against her, employed themselves jointly with the Bœotians, whose interest in the case was even stronger than their own, in divesting Eubœa of its insular character, by constructing a mole or bridge across the Euripus, the narrowest portion of the Eubœan strait, where Chalkis was divided from Bœotia. From each coast a mole was thrown out, each mole guarded at the extremity by a tower, and leaving only an intermediate opening, broad enough for a single vessel to pass through, covered by a wooden bridge. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenês, with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of this undertaking. The Eubœans and Bœotians both prosecuted it in such numbers, and with so much zeal, that it was speedily brought to completion. Eubœa, so lately the most important island attached to Athens, is from henceforward a portion of the mainland, altogether independent of her, even though it should please fortune to reëstablish her maritime power.¹

The battle of Kynosêma produced no very important consequences except that of encouragement to the Athenians. Even just after the action, Kyzikus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after it, the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution: moreover, in the voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing, off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian triremes which had accomplished, a

¹ Diodor. xiii, 47. He places this event a year later, but I agree with Sievers in conceiving it as following with little delay on the withdrawal of the protecting fleet (Sievers, Comment. in Xenoph. Hellen. p. 9; note, p. 66).

See Colonel Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, for a description of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii, ch. xiv, pp. 259-265.

I cannot make out from Colonel Leake what is the exact breadth of the channel. Strabo talks in his time of a bridge reaching two hundred feet (x, p. 400). But there must have been material alterations made by the inhabitants of Chalkis during the time of Alexander the Great (Strabo, x, p. 447). The bridge here described by Diodorus, covering an open space broad enough for one ship, could scarcely have been more than twenty feet broad; for it was not at all designed to render the passage easy. The ancient ships could all lower their masts. I cannot but think that Colonel Leake (p. 259) must have read, in Diodorus, xiii, 47, *ὅς* in place of *ὁ*.

little while before, the revolt of Byzantium. But, on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Elaëus, and there recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossema, which the Athenians had there deposited, except some of them which were so much damaged that the inhabitants of Elaëus set them on fire.¹

But that which now began to constitute a far more important element of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Tissaphernês, while furnishing neither aid nor pay to the Peloponnesians, had by his treacherous promises and bribes enervated all their proceedings for the last year, with the deliberate view of wasting both the belligerent parties. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set himself to strengthen them strenuously, by men as well as by money, and who labored hard to put down the Athenian power; as we shall find him laboring equally hard, eighteen years afterwards, to bring about its partial renovation. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes a reality in the Grecian war; and in the main — first, through the hands of Pharnabazus, next, through those of the younger Cyrus — the determining reality. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians are for the most part well paid, out of the Persian treasury, the Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even the most promising career of success. Twenty-six years after this, at a time when Sparta had lost her Persian allies, the Lacedæmonian Teleutias tried to appease the mutiny of his unpaid seamen, by telling them how much nobler it was to extort pay from the enemy by means of their own swords, than to obtain it by truckling to the foreigner;² and probably the Athenian generals, during these previous years of struggle, tried

¹ Thucyd. viii, 107.

² Xenoph. Hellen. v, 1, 17. Compare a like exclamation, under nobler circumstances, from the Spartan Kallikratidas, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 6.

similar appeals to the generosity of their soldiers. But it is not the less certain, that the new constant paymaster now introduced, gave fearful odds to the Spartan cause.

The good pay and hearty coöperation which the Peloponnesians now enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the more indignant at the previous deceit of Tissaphernês. Under the influence of this sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in expelling his general Arsakes with the Persian garrison. Arsakes had recently committed an act of murderous perfidy, under the influence of some unexplained pique, against the Delians established at Adramyttium: he had summoned their principal citizens to take part as allies in an expedition, and had caused them all to be surrounded, shot down, and massacred during the morning meal. Such an act was more than sufficient to excite hatred and alarm among the neighboring Antandrians, who invited a body of Peloponnesian hoplites from Abydos, across the mountain range of Ida, by whose aid Antandrus was liberated from the Persians.¹

In Milêtus, as well as in Knidus, Tissaphernês had already experienced the like humiliation:² Lichas was no longer alive to back his pretensions: nor do we hear that he obtained any result from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. Under these circumstances, he began to fear that he had incurred a weight of enmity which might prove seriously mischievous, nor was he without jealousy of the popularity and possible success of Pharnabazus. The delusion respecting the Phenician fleet, now that Mindarus had openly broken with him and quitted Milêtus, was no longer available to any useful purpose. Accordingly, he dismissed the Phenician fleet to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the Phenician towns were endangered by sudden attacks from Arabia and Egypt;³ while he himself quitted Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as well as to go forward to the Hellespont, for the purpose of renewing personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians. He wished, while trying again

¹ Thucyd. viii, 108; Diodor. xiii, 42.

² Thucyd. viii, 109.

³ Diodor. xiii, 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and seems probable enough, though he makes a strange confusion in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of Tissaphernês, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernês with the name of Pharnabazus.

to excuse his own treachery about the Phenician fleet, at the same time to protest against their recent proceedings at Antandrus ; or, at the least, to obtain some assurance against any repetition of such hostility. His visit to Ionia, however, seems to have occupied some time, and he tried to conciliate the Ionic Greeks by a splendid sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus.¹ Having quitted Aspendus, as far as we can make out, about the beginning of August

¹ Thucyd. viii, 109. It is at this point that we have to part company with the historian Thucydidēs, whose work not only closes without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks off, as we possess it, in the middle of a sentence.

The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived, except by those who have been called upon to study his work with the profound and minute attention required from an historian of Greece. To pass from Thucydidēs to the Hellenica of Xenophon, is a descent truly mournful ; and yet, when we look at Grecian history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical purposes and conceptions of Thucydidēs, as set forth by himself in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no preëxisting models before him from which to derive them ; nor are the eight books of his work, in spite of the unfinished condition of the last, unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or in execution. Even the peculiarity, the condensation, and the harshness, of his style, though it sometimes hides from us his full meaning, has the general effect of lending great additional force and of impressing his thoughts much more deeply upon every attentive reader.

During the course of my two last volumes, I have had frequent occasion to notice the criticisms of Dr. Arnold in his edition of Thucydidēs, most generally on points where I dissented from him. I have done this, partly because I believe that Dr. Arnold's edition is in most frequent use among all English readers of Thucydidēs, partly because of the high esteem which I entertain for the liberal spirit, the erudition, and the judgment, which pervade his criticisms generally throughout the book. Dr. Arnold deserves, especially, the high commendation, not often to be bestowed even upon learned and exact commentators, of conceiving and appreciating antiquity as a living whole, and not merely as an aggregate of words and abstractions. His criticisms are continually adopted by Gölher in the second edition of his Thucydidēs, and to a great degree also by Poppo. Desiring, as I do sincerely, that his edition may long maintain its preëminence among English students of Thucydidēs, I have thought it my duty at the same time to indicate many of the points on which his remarks either advance or imply views of Grecian history different from my own.

(411 B.C.), he did not reach the Hellespont until the month of November.¹

As soon as the Phenician fleet had disappeared, Alkibiadès returned with his thirteen triremes from Phasélis to Samos. He too, like Tissaphernès, made the proceeding subservient to deceit of his own: he took credit with his countrymen for having enlisted the good-will of the satrap more strongly than ever in the cause of Athens, and for having induced him to abandon his intention of bringing up the Phenician fleet.² At this time Dorieus was at Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus, before his departure from Milæus, in order to stifle the growth of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and Halikarnassus; for we now find Alkibiadès going to these places from Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen. He erected fortifications at the town of Kos, and planted in it an Athenian officer and garrison: from Halikarnassus he levied large contributions; upon what pretence, or whether from simple want of money, we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he returned to Samos.³

At the Hellespont, Mindarus had been reinforced after the battle of Kynossêma by the squadron from Eubœa, at least by that portion of it which had escaped the storm off Mount Athos. The departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Eubœa enabled the Athenians also to send a few more ships to their fleet at Sestos. Thus ranged on the opposite sides of the strait, the two fleets came to a second action, wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage; yet with little fruit. It was about the month of October, seemingly, that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin Mindarus at

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9.

² Thucyd. viii, 108. Diodorus (xiii, 38) talks of this influence of Alkibiadès over the satrap as if it were real. Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 26) speaks in more qualified language.

³ Thucyd. viii, 108. πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον. Haack and Sievers (see Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 103) construe this as indicating the middle of August, which I think too early in the year.

the Hellespont. He had hoped probably to get up the strait to Abydos during the night, but he was caught by daylight a little way from the entrance, near Rhœteium; and the Athenian scouts instantly gave signal of his approach. Twenty Athenian triremes were despatched to attack him: upon which Doriæus fled, and sought safety by hauling his vessel ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. The Athenian squadron here attacked him, but were repulsed and forced to sail back to Madytus. Mindarus was himself a spectator of this scene, from a distance; being engaged in sacrificing to Athênê, on the venerated hill of Ilium. He immediately hastened to Abydos, where he fitted out his whole fleet of eighty-four triremes, Pharnabazus coöperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the ships of Doriæus, his next care was to resist the entire Athenian fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the two fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue; at length, towards the evening, twenty fresh triremes were seen approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alkibiadês sailing from Samos: having probably heard of the rejunction of the squadron of Doriæus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his own counter-balancing reinforcement.¹ As soon as his purple flag or signal was ascertained, the Athenian fleet became animated with redoubled spirit. The new-comers aided them in pressing the action so vigorously, that the Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up their success, and endeavored to tow them all off. But the Persian land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost in the combat; even pushing into the water in person, as far as his horse could stand. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved; yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had themselves lost in the two preceding actions.²

Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during

¹ Diodorus (xiii, 48) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 27) speak of his coming to the Hellespont by accident, κατὰ τύχην, which is certainly very improbable.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i 1, 6, 7.

the winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among his allies to solicit reinforcements: in the mean time, he engaged jointly with Pharnabazus in operations by land against various Athenian allies on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead of keeping their fleet united to prosecute the victory, were compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons, for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos; while Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were sent out under Theramenês; who first endeavored without success to impede the construction of the bridge between Eubœa and Bœotia, and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents upon hostile territory, and also extorted money from various parties, either contemplating or supposed to contemplate revolt, among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still subsisted, Theramenês deposed and fined the men who had exercised it, establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the temporary pay of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the siege of Pydna; blocking up the town by sea while the Macedonians besieged it by land. The blockade having lasted the whole winter, Theramenês was summoned away before its capture, to join the main Athenian fleet in Thrace: Archelaus, however, took Pydna not long afterwards, and transported the town with its residents from the sea-board to a distance more than two miles inland.¹ We trace in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of money which now drove the Athenians to injustice, extortion, and interference with their allies, such as they had never committed during the earlier years of the war.

It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine commotion in Korkyra, less stained, however, with savage enormities than that recounted in the seventh year of the war. It appears that the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment nearly destroyed at that period, had since

¹ Diodor. xiii, 47-49.

gained strength, and was encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the island into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The democratical leaders, apprized of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian admiral Konon. He came, with a detachment of six hundred Messenians, by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a thousand. The extent of their alarm is attested by the fact, that they liberated the slaves and conferred the right of citizenship upon the foreigners. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent, came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise and by the restoration of the exiles.¹ We know nothing about the particulars of this compromise, but it seems to have been wisely drawn up and faithfully observed; for we hear nothing about Korkyra until about thirty-five years after this period, and the island is then presented to us as in the highest perfection of cultivation and prosperity.² Doubtless the emancipation of slaves and the admission of so many new foreigners to the citizenship, contributed to this result.

Meanwhile Tissaphernês, having completed his measures in Ionia, arrived at the Hellespont not long after the battle of Abydos, seemingly about November, 411 B.C. He was anxious to regain some credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon presented itself. Alkibiadês, then in command of the Athenian fleet at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of

¹ Diodor. xiii, 48. Sievers (Commentat. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 12; and p. 65, note 58) controverts the reality of these tumults in Korkyra, here mentioned by Diodorus, but not mentioned in the Hellenika of Xenophon, and contradicted, as he thinks, by the negative inference derivable from Thucyd. iv, 48, *ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε*. But it appears to me that F. W. Ullrich (Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, pp. 95-99), has properly explained this phrase of Thucydides as meaning, in the place here cited, the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, between the surprise of Plataea and the Peace of Nikias.

I see no reason to call in question the truth of these disturbances in Korkyra, here alluded to by Diodorus.

² Xenoph. Hellen, vi, 2, 25.

victory, bringing the customary presents; but the satrap seized his person and sent him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he had the Great King's express orders for carrying on war with the Athenians.¹ Here was an end of all the delusions of Alkibiadês, respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels. Yet these delusions had already served his purpose by procuring for him a renewed position in the Athenian camp, which his own military energy enabled him to sustain and justify.

Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so great,—partly, as it would appear, through reinforcements obtained by the former, partly through the dispersion of the latter into flying squadrons from want of pay,—that the Athenians no longer dared to maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed round the southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia, on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula. Here, about the commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alkibiadês; who had found means to escape from Sardis, along with Mantitheus, another Athenian prisoner, first to Klazomenæ, and next to Lesbos, where he collected a small squadron of five triremes. The dispersed squadrons of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate, Theramenês came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with his fleet from the Hellespont to Kyzikus, and was now engaged in the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian land-force.

His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when the Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do it by surprise. Having passed first from Kardia to Elætis at the south of the Chersonese, they sailed up the Hellespont to Prokonnesus by night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos.²

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 27.

² Diodor. xiii, 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact, which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of Mindarus could not have been accomplished.

Resting at Prokonnesus one night, and seizing every boat on the island, in order that their movements might be kept secret, Alkibiadês warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. "We have no money (said he), while our enemies have plenty from the Great King." Neither zeal in the men nor contrivance in the commanders was wanting. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the territory of Kyzikus, for the purpose of operating a diversion; after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing near to Kyzikus with his single division, challenged the fleet of Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended flight to a distance from the harbor; while the other Athenian divisions, assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighboring mainland. After a gallant and hard-fought battle, partly on shipboard, partly ashore, — at one time unpromising to the Athenians, in spite of their superiority of number, but not very intelligible in its details, and differently conceived by our two authorities, — both the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain; and the entire fleet, every single trireme, was captured, except the triremes of Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crews; while Kyzikus itself surrendered to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution, being spared from all other harm. The booty taken by the victors was abundant and valuable. The numbers of the triremes thus captured or destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at sixty, the highest at eighty.¹

This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alkibiadês and his two colleagues, about April 410 B.C., changed sensibly the relative position of the belligerents. The Peloponnesians had now no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained a small squadron at the station of Milêtus;

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 14-20; Diodor. xiii, 50, 51.

The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the events of these few years, are collected by Sievers, *Commentat in Xenoph. Hellen.* note, 62, pp. 65, 66, seq.

while the Athenian fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by Hippokratês, secretary of the late admiral Mindarus, to the ephors at Sparta: "All honor and advantage are gone from us: Mindarus is slain: the men are starving: we are in straits what to do.¹" The ephors doubtless heard the same deplorable tale from more than one witness; for this particular despatch never reached them, having been intercepted and carried to Athens. So discouraging was the view which they entertained of the future, that a Lacedæmonian embassy, with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace; or rather perhaps Endius — ancient friend and guest of Alkibiadês, who had already been at Athens as envoy before — was allowed to come thither now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal manner, which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy: and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in questioning the reality of the event, — which is stated by Diodorus, perhaps on the authority of Theopompus, and is noway improbable in itself, — nevertheless, leads me to doubt whether the ephors themselves admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is to be remembered that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to her confederates generally, was at this moment bound by special convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.

According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on the following terms: That each party should stand just as they were; that the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn; that prisoners should be exchanged, one Lacedæmonian against one Athenian. Endius insisted in his speech on the mutual mischief which each was doing to the other by prolonging the war; but he contended that Athens was by far the greater sufferer of the two, and had the deepest interest in accelerating peace. She had no money, while Sparta had the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἐρρεῖ τὰ καλὰ· Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσοῦσα· πετινῶντι τῶνδρες· ἀπορέομεν τί χρὴ δρᾶν.

Plutarch, Alkib. c. 28.

Great King as a paymaster: she was robbed of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Dekeleia, while Peloponnesus was undisturbed: all her power and influence depended upon superiority at sea, which Sparta could dispense with, and yet retain her pre-eminence.¹

If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only the demagogues, the disturbers, those who were accustomed to blow up the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed it. Especially the demagogue Kleophon, now enjoying great influence, enlarged upon the splendor of the recent victory, and upon the new chances of success now opening to them: insomuch that the assembly ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius.²

It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Ægospotamos and the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the stock denunciations against an insane people, misled by a corrupt demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition, even assuming it to have been formal and authorized, as well as the time at which it was made, we shall hesitate before we pronounce Kleophon to have been foolish, much less corrupt, for recommending its rejection. In reference to the charge of corrupt interest in the continuance of war, I have already made some remarks about Kleon, tending to show that no such interest can fairly be ascribed to demagogues of that character.³ They were essentially unwarlike men, and had quite as much chance personally of losing, as of gaining, by a state of war. Especially this is true respecting Kleophon, during the last years of the war, since the financial posture of Athens was then so unprosperous, that all her available means were exhausted to provide for ships and men, leaving little or no surplus for political speculators. The admirals, who paid the seamen by raising contributions abroad, might possibly enrich themselves, if so inclined; but the politicians at home had much less chance of such gains than they would have had in time of peace. Besides,

¹ Diodor. xiii, 52.

² Diodor. xiii. 53.

³ See the preceding vol. vi, ch. liv, p. 455

even if Kleophon were ever so much a gainer by the continuance of war, yet, assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed in the war, he was certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his position, but of his life also.

So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The question whether his advice was judicious, is not so easy to dispose of. Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated, and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippekratês to the ephors, divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand, the despatches of the Athenian generals, announcing their victory, had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public thanksgiving, at Athens: nor can we doubt that Alkibiadês and his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius? What he proposes, is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position; to withdraw garrisons; to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylos, she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia; such an exchange would have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war, doubtless real and important.

Now the question is, whether a statesman like Periklês would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory of Kyzikus, and the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice, calculated to paralyze Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet.² Sparta could not pledge herself

¹ Diodor. xiii, 52.

² Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 371) appears to have said that

either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates; indeed, past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have obtained relief from the entire burden of war; but would merely have blunted the ardor and tied up the hands of her own troops, at a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success. By the armament, most certainly,—and by the generals, Alkibiadès, Theramènès, and Thrasybulus,—the acceptance of such terms at such a moment would have been regarded as a disgrace. It would have balked them of conquests ardently, and at that time not unreasonably, anticipated; conquests tending to restore Athens to that eminence from which she had been so recently deposed. And it would have inflicted this mortification, not merely without compensating gain to her in any other shape, but with a fair probability of imposing upon all her citizens the necessity of redoubled efforts at no very distant future, when the moment favorable to her enemies should have arrived.

If, therefore, passing from the vague accusation that it was the demagogue Kleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he induced his countrymen to reject, we shall find that he had very strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice. Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible, to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such efforts would have succeeded, even if they had been made; yet a statesman like Periklès would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink her. A mere opposition speaker, like Kleophon, even when taking what was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him, did not look so far forward into the future.

Meanwhile the Athenian fleet reigned alone in the Propontis and its two adjacent straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont; although the ardor and generosity of Pharnabazus not only sup-

the Athenians rejected the proposition as insincerely meant: *Λακεδαιμονίων πρεσβευσασμένων περὶ εἰρήνης ἀπιστήσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκοντο*; compare also Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 772, Philochori Fragment.

plied maintenance and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of these captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months, and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the abundant forests of Mount Ida, and assisted the officers in putting new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus; near to which, at a place called Aspaneus, the Idæan wood was chiefly exported.¹

Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at Chalkêdon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their first operation after the victory, had been to sail to Perinthus and Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens: the former, intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself to Athens; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed itself from attack for the present, by the payment of a pecuniary fine. Alkibiadês then conducted them to Chalkêdon, opposite to Byzantium on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was a point of first-rate moment to Athens; first, because it enabled her to secure the arrival of the corn ships from the Euxine, for her own consumption; next, because she had it in her power to impose a tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through, not unlike the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound, even down to the present time. For the opposite reasons, of course, the importance of the position was equally great to the enemies of Athens. Until the spring of the preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April, 411 B. C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalkêdon in the Bosphorus (about June, 411 B. C.), had deprived her of this pre-eminence; and her supplies obtained during the last few months could only have come through during those intervals when her fleets there stationed had the preponderance, so as to give them convoy. Accordingly, it is highly probable that her supplies of corn from the Euxine during the autumn of 411 B. C., had been comparatively restricted.

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i, 1, 24-26; Strabo, xiii, p. 606.

Though Chalkêdon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out against Athens, Alkibiadês now took possession of Chrysopolis, its unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular titling-port for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine.¹ The Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium, until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of revenue: it was now reestablished under the auspices of Alkibiadês. In so far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty triremes under Theramênês, were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve as annoyance to the enemy.

The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedæmonians already told in respect to the adherence of the cities. At Thasus, especially,² the citizens, headed by Ekphantus, expelled the Lacedæmonian harmost Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. It will be recollected that this was one of the cities in which Peisander and the Four Hundred conspirators (early in 411 B.C.) had put down the democracy and established an oligarchical government, under pretence that the allied cities would be faithful to Athens as soon as she was relieved from her democratical institutions. All the

¹ See Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 71; and Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 22. καὶ δεκατεντήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ (Χρυσόπολει), καὶ τὴν δεκάτην ἐξελέγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων: compare iv, 8, 27; and v, 1, 28; also Diodor. xiii, 64.

The expression, τὴν δεκάτην, implies that this tithe was something known and preestablished.

Polybius (iv, 44) gives credit to Alkibiadês for having been the first to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is evidence that it was practised long before, even anterior to the Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see Herodot. vi, 5).

See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. sect. 6.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. s. 48, c. 14, p. 474

calculations of these oligarchs had been disappointed, as Phrynichus had predicted from the first: the Thasians, as soon as their own oligarchical party had been placed in possession of the government, recalled their disaffected exiles,¹ under whose auspices a Laconian garrison and harmost had since been introduced. Eteonikua, now expelled, accused the Lacedæmonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernês; an accusation which seems improbable, but which the Lacedæmonians believed, and accordingly banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.²

The tone at Athens since the late naval victories, had become more hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with spirit and success by Thrasyllus. But that which most mortified the Lacedæmonian king, was to discern from his lofty station at Dekeleia, the abundant influx into the Peiræus of cornships from the Euxine, again renewed in the autumn of 410 B.C. since the occupation of the Bosphorus and Hellespont by Alkibiadês. For the safe reception of these vessels, Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis exclaimed that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them. Accordingly, he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus to Byzantium and Chalkêdon. That Spartan was a public guest of the Byzantines, and had already been singled out to command auxiliaries intended for that city. He seems to have begun his voyage during the ensuing winter (B.C. 410-409), and reached Byzantium in safety, though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine Athenian triremes who guarded the Hellespont.³

¹ Thucyd. viii, 64.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 35-36. He says that the ships of Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont, fled first to Sestos, and

In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at the head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded fifty triremes, one thousand of the regular hoplites, one hundred horsemen, and five thousand seamen, with the means of arming these latter as peltasts; also transports for his troops besides the triremes.¹ Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he made a descent at Pygela, and next succeeded in making himself master of Kolophon, with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernês had summoned, under proclamation "to go and succor the goddess Artemis;" as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinusian triremes recently arrived.² From these enemies, Thrasyllus sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost three hundred men, and was compelled to sail off to Notium; from whence, after burying his dead, he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont. On their way thither, while halting for a while at Methymna in the north of Lesbos, Thrasyllus saw the twenty-five Syracusan triremes passing by on their voyage from Ephesus to Abydos. He immediately attacked them, captured four along with the entire crews, and chased the remainder back to their station at Ephesus. All the prisoners taken were sent to Athens, where they were deposited for custody in the stone-quarries of Peiræus, doubtless in retaliation for the treatment of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse; they contrived, however, during the ensuing winter, to break a way out and escape to Dekeleia. Among the prisoners taken, was found Alkibiadês, the Athenian, cousin and fellow-exile of the Athe-

afterwards to Byzantium. But *Sestos* was the *Athenian* station. The name must surely be put by inadvertence for *Abydos*, the Peloponnesian station.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 34; i, 2, 1. Diodorus (xiii, 64) confounds Thrasybulus with Thrasyllus.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 5-11. Xenophon distinguishes these twenty-five Syracusan triremes into τῶν προτέρων εἰκοσι νῆων, and then αἱ ἑτεραι πέντε, αἱ νεωστὶ ἤκουσαι. But it appears to me that the twenty triremes, as well as the five, must have come to Asia since the battle of Kyzikus, though the five may have been somewhat later in their period of arrival. All the Syracusan ships in the fleet of Mindarus were destroyed; and it seems impossible to imagine that that admiral can have left twenty Syracusan ships at Ephesus or Miletus, in addition to those which he took with him to the Hellespont.

nian general of the same name, whom Thrasýllus caused to be set at liberty, while the others were sent to Athens.¹

After the delay caused by this pursuit, he brought back his armament to the Hellespont and joined the force of Alkibiadês at Sestos. Their joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement of autumn, to Lampsakus, on the Asiatic side of the strait; which place they fortified and made their headquarters for the autumn and winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions, throughout the neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus. It is curious to learn, however, that when Alkibiadês was proceeding to marshal them all together,—the hoplites, according to Athenian custom, taking rank according to their tribes,—his own soldiers, never yet beaten, refused to fraternize with those of Thrasýllus, who had been so recently worsted at Ephesus. Nor was this alienation removed until after a joint expedition against Abydos; Pharnabazus presenting himself with a considerable force, especially cavalry, to relieve that place, was encountered and defeated in a battle wherein all the Athenians present took part. The honor of the hoplites of Thrasýllus was now held to be reëstablished, so that the fusion of ranks was admitted without farther difficulty.² Even the entire army, however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on the Hellespont.

Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large armament recently sent with Thrasýllus, that her enemies near home were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylos, which had remained as an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenês, in B.C. 425. The place was vigorously attacked, both by sea and by land, and soon became much pressed. Not unmindful of its distress, the Athenians sent to its relief thirty triremes under Anytus, who, however, came back without even reaching the place, having been prevented by stormy weather or unfavorable winds from doubling Cape Malea. Pylos was soon after-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 8-15.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13-17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 29

wards obliged to surrender, the garrison departing on terms of capitulation.¹ But Anytus, on his return, encountered great displeasure from his countrymen, and was put on his trial for having betrayed, or for not having done his utmost to fulfil, the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved himself from condemnation by bribing the dikastery, and that he was the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption.² Whether he could really have reached Pylos, and whether the obstacles which baffled him were such as an energetic officer would have overcome, we have no means of determining; still less, whether it be true that he actually escaped by bribery. The story seems to prove, however, that the general Athenian public thought him deserving of condemnation, and were so much surprised by his acquittal, as to account for it by supposing, truly or falsely, the use of means never before attempted.

It was about the same time, also, that the Megarians recovered by surprise their port of Nisæa, which had been held by an Athenian garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to recover it, but failed; though they defeated the Megarians in an action.³

Thrasyllus, during the summer of B.C. 409, and even the joint force of Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês during the autumn of the same year, seem to have effected less than might have been expected from so large a force: indeed, it must have been at some period during this year that the Lacedæmonian Klearchus, with his fifteen Megarian ships, penetrated up the Hellespont to Byzantium, finding it guarded only by nine Athenian triremes.⁴ But the operations of 408 B.C. were more important. The entire force under Alkibiadês and the other commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalkêdon and Byzantium. The Chalkêdonians,

¹ Diodor. xiii, 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon (Hellen. i, 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylos, as a mere retreat of some runaway Helots from Malea, as well as his employment of the name *Koryphasion*, and not of *Pylos*, prove how much he wrote after Lacedæmonian informants.

² Diodor. xiii, 64; Plutarch, Coriolan. c. 14.

Aristotle, *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, ap. Harpokration, v. Δεκάζων, and in the Collection of Fragment. Aristotel. no. 72, ed. Didot (Fragment. Historic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 127).

³ Diodor. xiii, 65.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 36.

having notice of the project, deposited their movable property for safety in the hand of their neighbors the Bithynian Thracians; a remarkable evidence of the good feeling and confidence between the two, contrasting strongly with the perpetual hostility which subsisted on the other side of the Bosphorus between Byzantium and the Thracian tribes adjoining.¹ But the precaution was frustrated by Alkibiadês, who entered the territory of the Bithynians and compelled them by threats to deliver up the effects confided to them. He then proceeded to block up Chalkêdon by a wooden wall carried across from the Bosphorus to the Propontis; though the continuity of this wall was interrupted by a river, and seemingly by some rough ground on the immediate brink of the river. The blockading wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army for the relief of the place, and advanced as far as the Herakleion, or temple of Heraklês, belonging to the Chalkedonians. Profiting by his approach, Hippokratês, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the town, made a vigorous sally; but the Athenians repelled all the efforts of Pharnabazus to force a passage through their lines and join him; so that, after an obstinate contest, the sallying force was driven back within the walls of the town, and Hippokratês himself killed.²

The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alkibiadês departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence, Theramenês and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the capitulation of Chalkêdon. It was agreed that the town should again become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent period should be paid up. Moreover, Pharnabazus himself engaged to pay to the Athenians twenty talents on behalf of the town, and also to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted to abstain from hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus.³ Oaths to this effect

¹ Polyb. iv. 44-45.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 5-7; Diodor. xiii. 66.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 9. Ὑποτελεῖν τὸν φόρον Χαλκηδονίους Ἀθηναίους

were mutually exchanged, after the return of Alkibiadēs from his expedition. For Pharnabazus positively refused to complete the ratification with the other generals, until Alkibiadēs should be there to ratify in person also; a proof at once of the great individual importance of the latter, and of his known facility in finding excuses to evade an agreement. Two envoys were accordingly sent by Pharnabazus to Chrysopolis, to receive the oaths of Alkibiadēs, while two relatives of Alkibiadēs came to Chalkêdon as witnesses to those of Pharnabazus. Over and above the common oath shared with his colleagues, Alkibiadēs took a special covenant of personal friendship and hospitality with the satrap, and received from him the like.

Alkibiadēs had employed his period of absence in capturing Selybria, from whence he obtained a sum of money, and in getting together a large body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium. That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation of Chalkêdon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of circumvallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made by missiles and battering engines. These, however, the Lacedæmonian garrison, under the hardest Klearchus, aided by some Megarians under Helixus, and Bœotians under Kœratadas, was perfectly competent to repel. But the ravages of famine were not so easily dealt with. After the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so

δοσιν περ εἰώθεσαν, καὶ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα ἀποδοῦναι. Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Χαλκηδονίοις, ἕως ἂν οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα πρέσβεις ἐλθωσιν.

This passage strengthens the doubts which I threw out in a former chapter, whether the Athenians ever did or could realize their project of commuting the tribute, imposed upon the dependent allies, for an *ad valorem* duty of five per cent. on imports and exports, which project is mentioned by Thucydides (vii, 28) as having been resolved upon at least, if not carried out, in the summer of 413 B.C. In the bargain here made with the Chalkedonians, it seems implied that the payment of tribute was the last arrangement subsisting between Athens and Chalkêdon, at the time of the revolt of the latter.

Next, I agree with the remark made by Schneider, in his note upon the passage, Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Χαλκηδονίοις. He notices the tenor of the covenant as it stands in Plutarch, τὴν Φάρναβάζου δὲ χώραν μὴ ἀδικεῖν (Alkib. c. 31), which is certainly far more suitable to the circumstances. Instead of Χαλκηδονίοις, he proposes to read Φαρναβάζω. At any rate, this is the meaning.

that Klearchus, strict and harsh, even under ordinary circumstances, became inexorable and oppressive, from exclusive anxiety for the subsistence of his soldiers; and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief, he sallied forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus; and to get together, if possible, a fleet for some aggressive operation that might divert the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Kœratadas and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta, whatever might be their suffering. But the favorable terms recently granted to Chalkêdon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine, induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alkibiadês with the Athenians into the wide interior square called the Thrakion. Helixus and Kœratadas, apprized of this attack only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to surrender at discretion: they were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Kœratadas contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Peiræus. Favorable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkêdon.¹

So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalkêdon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year; the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter.² Both of them, however, were acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and insuring to her two valuable tributary allies. Nor was this all the improvement which the summer had operated in her position. The accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 15-22; Diodor. xiii, 67; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31.

The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium, which I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and probable. It does not consist with the complicated stratagem described in Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as in Frontinus, iii, xi, 3; alluded to also in Polyænus, i, 48, 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 1.

promise. It was plain that the satrap had grown weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the Peloponnesians, and that he was well disposed to assist the Athenians in coming to terms with the Great King. The mere withdrawal of his hearty support from Sparta, even if nothing else followed from it, was of immense moment to Athens; and thus much was really achieved. The envoys, five Athenians and two Argians, — all, probably, sent for from Athens, which accounts for some delay, — were directed, after the siege of Chalkêdon, to meet Pharnabazus at Kyzikus. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, and even the Syracusan Hermokratês, who had been condemned and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort, and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium in Phrygia; and it was while pursuing their track into the interior at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son of king Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part of Asia Minor. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, Bœotians and others, were travelling down along with him, after having fulfilled their mission at the Persian court.¹

CHAPTER LXIV.

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ.

THE advent of Cyrus, commonly known as Cyrus the younger, into Asia Minor, was an event of the greatest importance, opening what may be called the last phase in the Peloponnesian war.

He was the younger of the two sons of the Persian king Darius Nothus by the cruel queen Parysatis, and was now sent down by his father as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia the greater, and Kappadokia, as well as general of all that military division of which the muster-place was Kastôlus. His command did not at this

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4,2-3.

time comprise the Greek cities on the coast, which were still left to Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus.¹ But he nevertheless brought down with him a strong interest in the Grecian war, and an intense anti-Athenian feeling, with full authority from his father to carry it out into act. Whatever this young man willed, he willed strongly; his bodily activity, rising superior to those temptations of sensual indulgence which often enervated the Persian grandees, provoked the admiration even of Spartans:² and his energetic character was combined with a certain measure of ability. Though he had not as yet conceived that deliberate plan for mounting the Persian throne which afterwards absorbed his whole mind, and was so near succeeding by the help of the Ten Thousand Greeks, yet he seems to have had from the beginning the sentiment and ambition of a king in prospect, not those of a satrap. He came down, well aware that Athens was the efficient enemy by whom the pride of the Persian kings had been humbled, the insular Greeks kept out of the sight of a Persian ship, and even the continental Greeks on the coast practically emancipated, for the last sixty years. He therefore brought down with him a strenuous desire to put down the Athenian power, very different from the treacherous balancing of Tissaphernês, and much more formidable even than the straightforward enmity of Pharnabazus, who had less money, less favor at court, and less of youthful ardor. Moreover, Pharnabazus, after having heartily espoused the cause of the Peloponnesians for the last three years, had now become weary of the allies whom he had so long kept in pay. Instead of expelling Athenian influence from his coasts with little difficulty, as he had expected to do, he found his satrapy plundered, his revenues impaired or absorbed, and an Athenian fleet all-powerful in the Propontis and Hellespont; while the Lacedæmonian fleet, which he had taken so much pains to invite, was destroyed. Decidedly sick of the Peloponnesian cause, he was even leaning towards Athens; and the envoys whom he was escorting to Susa might perhaps have laid the foundation of an altered Persian policy in Asia Minor, when the journey of Cyrus

¹ The *Anabasis* of Xenophon (i, 1, 6-8; i, 9, 7-9) is better authority, and speaks more exactly, than the *Hellenica*, i, 4, 3.

² See the anecdote of Cyrus and Lysander in Xenoph. *CEconom.* iv, 21-23.

down to the coast overthrew all such calculations. The young prince brought with him a fresh, hearty, and youthful antipathy against Athens, a power inferior only to that of the Great King himself, and an energetic determination to use it without reserve in insuring victory to the Peloponnesians.

From the moment that Pharnabazus and the Athenian envoys met Cyrus, their farther progress towards Susa became impossible. Boeotius, and the other Lacedæmonian envoys travelling along with the young prince, made extravagant boasts of having obtained all that they asked for at Susa; and Cyrus himself announced his powers as unlimited in extent over the whole coast, all for the purpose of prosecuting vigorous war in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians. Pharnabazus, on hearing this intelligence, and seeing the Great King's seal to the words, "I send down Cyrus, as lord of all those who muster at Kastólus," not only refused to let the Athenian envoys proceed onward, but was even obliged to obey the orders of the young prince, who insisted that they should either be surrendered to him, or at least detained for some time in the interior, in order that no information might be conveyed to Athens. The satrap resisted the first of these requisitions, having pledged his word for their safety; but he obeyed the second, detaining them in Kappadokia for no less than three years, until Athens was prostrate and on the point of surrender, after which he obtained permission from Cyrus to send them back to the sea-coast.¹

This arrival of Cyrus, overruling the treachery of Tissaphernês as well as the weariness of Pharnabazus, and supplying the enemies of Athens with a double flow of Persian gold at a moment when the stream would otherwise have dried up, was a paramount item in that sum of causes which concurred to determine the result of the war.² But important as the event was in itself, it was

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 3-8. The words here employed respecting the envoys, when returning after their three years' detention, *δθεν πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀπέπλευσαν*, appear to me an inadvertence. The return of the envoys must have been in the spring of 404 B. C., at a time when Athens had no camp: the surrender of the city took place in April 404 B.C. Xenophon incautiously speaks as if that state of things which existed when the envoys departed, still continued at their return.

² The words of Thucydides (ii, 65) imply this as his opinion, *Κύρω τε ὕστερον βασιλείῳ παιδί προσγενομένῳ*, etc.

rendered still more important by the character of the Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, with whom the young prince first came into contact on reaching Sardis.

Lysander had come out to supersede Kratesippidas, about December, 408 B.C., or January, 407 B.C.¹ He was the last, after Brasidas and Gylippus, of that trio of eminent Spartans, from whom all the capital wounds of Athens proceeded, during the course of this long war. He was born of poor parents, and is even said to have been of that class called *mothakes*, being only enabled by the aid of richer men to keep up his contribution to the public mess; and his place in the constant drill and discipline. He was not only an excellent officer,² thoroughly competent to the

¹ The commencement of Lysander's navarchy, or year of maritime command, appears to me established for this winter. He had been some time actually in his command before Cyrus arrived at Sardis: *Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ Κρατησιππίδα τῆς ναυαρχίας παρεληλυθῆναι, Δυσανόρον ἐπέπεμψαν ναύαρχον. Ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐς Ῥόδον, καὶ ναὺς ἐκείθεν λαβὼν, ἐς Κῶ καὶ Μίλητον ἐπλευσεν· ἐκείθεν δὲ ἐς Ἐφέσον· καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔμεινε, ναὺς ἔχων ἐβδομήκοντα, μέχρις οὐ Κῦρος ἐς Σάρδεϊς ἀφίκετο* (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 1).

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. H. ad ann. 407 B.C.) has, I presume, been misled by the first words of this passage, *πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ*, when he says: "During the stay of Alcibiadēs at Athens, Lysander is sent as *ναύαρχος*, Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 1. Then followed the defeat of Antiochus, the deposition of Alcibiadēs, and the substitution of ἄλλους δέκα, between September 407 and September 406, when Callicratidas succeeded Lysander."

Now Alcibiadēs came to Athens in the month of Thargelion, or about the end of May, 407, and stayed there till the beginning of September, 407. Cyrus arrived at Sardis before Alcibiadēs reached Athens, and Lysander had been some time at his post before Cyrus arrived; so that Lysander was not sent out "during the stay of Alcibiadēs at Athens," but some months before. Still less is it correct to say that Kallikratidas succeeded Lysander in September, 406. The battle of Arginusæ, wherein Kallikratidas perished, was fought about August, 406, after he had been admiral for several months. The words *πρότερον τούτων*, when construed along with the context which succeeds, must evidently be understood in a large sense; "*these events*," mean the general series of events which begins i, 4, 8; the proceedings of Alcibiadēs, from the beginning of the spring of 407.

² Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Athenæus, vi, p. 271. The assertion that Lysander belonged to the class of *mothakes* is given by Athenæus as coming from Phylarchus, and I see no reason for calling it in question. Ælian states the same thing respecting Gylippus and Kallikratidas, also; I do not know on what authority.

duties of military command, but possessed also great talents for intrigue, and for organizing a political party as well as keeping up its disciplined movements. Though indifferent to the temptations either of money or of pleasure,¹ and willingly acquiescing in the poverty to which he was born, he was altogether unscrupulous in the prosecution of ambitious objects, either for his country or for himself. His family, poor as it was, enjoyed a dignified position at Sparta, belonging to the gens of the Herakleidæ, not connected by any near relationship with the kings: moreover, his personal reputation as a Spartan was excellent, since his observance of the rules of discipline had been rigorous and exemplary. The habits of self-constraint thus acquired, served him in good stead when it became necessary to his ambition to court the favor of the great. His recklessness about falsehood and perjury is illustrated by various current sayings ascribed to him; such as, that children were to be taken in by means of dice; men, by means of oaths.² A selfish ambition—for promoting the power of his country not merely in connection with, but in subservience to, his own—guided him from the beginning to the end of his career. In this main quality, he agreed with Alkibiadēs; in reckless immorality of means, he went even beyond him. He seems to have been cruel; an attribute which formed no part of the usual character of Alkibiadēs. On the other hand, the love of personal enjoyment, luxury, and ostentation, which counted for so much in Alkibiadēs, was quite unknown to Lysander. The basis of his disposition was Spartan, tending to merge appetite, ostentation, and expansion of mind, all in the love of command and influence,—not Athenian, which tended to the development of many and diversified impulses; ambition being one, but only one, among the number.

Kratesippidas, the predecessor of Lysander, seems to have enjoyed the maritime command for more than the usual yearly period, having superseded Pasippidas during the middle of the year of the latter. But the maritime power of Sparta was then so weak, having not yet recovered from the ruinous defeat at Kyzikus, that he achieved little or nothing. We hear of him only as further-

¹ Theopompus, *Fragm.* 21, ed. Didot; Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 30.

² Plutarch, *Lysander*, c. 8.

ing, for his own profit, a political revolution at Chios. Bribed by a party of Chian exiles, he took possession of the acropolis, re-instated them in the island, and aided them in deposing and expelling the party then in office, to the number of six hundred. It is plain that this is not a question between democracy and oligarchy; but between two oligarchical parties, the one of which succeeded in purchasing the factious agency of the Spartan admiral. The exiles whom he expelled took possession of Atarneus, a strong post belonging to the Chians on the mainland opposite Lesbos. From hence they made war, as well as they could, upon their rivals now in possession of the island, and also upon other parts of Ionia; not without some success and profit, as will appear by their condition about ten years afterwards.¹

The practice of reconstituting the governments of the Asiatic cities, thus begun by Kratesippidas, was extended and brought to a system by Lysander; not indeed for private emolument, which he always despised, but in views of ambition. Having departed from Peloponnesus with a squadron, he reinforced it at Rhodes, and then sailed onward to Kôa — an Athenian island, so that he could only have touched there — and Milêtus. He took up his final station at Ephesus, the nearest point to Sardis, where Cyrus was expected to arrive; and while awaiting his coming, augmented his fleet to the number of seventy triremes. As soon as Cyrus reached Sardis, about April or May 407 B.C., Lysander went to pay his court to him, along with some Lacedæmonian envoys, and found himself welcomed with every mark of favor. Preferring bitter complaints against the double-dealing of Tissaphernês, — whom they accused of having frustrated the king's orders, and sacrificed the interests of the empire, under the seductions of Alkibiadês, — they intreated Cyrus to adopt a new policy, and execute the stipulations of the treaty, by lending the most vigorous aid to put down the common enemy. Cyrus replied, that these were the express orders which he had received from his father, and that he was prepared to fulfil them with all his might. He had brought with him, he said, five hundred talents, which

¹ Diodor. xiii, 65; Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 11. I presume that this conduct of Kratesippidas is the fact glanced at by Isokratês de Pace, sect. 128, p. 240, ed. Bekk.

should be at once devoted to the cause : if these were insufficient, he would resort to the private funds which his father had given him ; and if more still were needed, he would coin into money the gold and silver throne on which he sat.¹

Lysander and the envoys returned the warmest thanks for these magnificent promises, which were not likely to prove empty words from the lips of a vehement youth like Cyrus. So sanguine were the hopes which they conceived from his character and proclaimed sentiments, that they ventured to ask him to restore the rate of pay to one full Attic drachma per head for the seamen ; which had been the rate promised by Tissaphernês through his envoys at Sparta, when he first invited the Lacedæmonians across the Ægean, and when it was doubtful whether they would come, but actually paid only for the first month, and then reduced to half a drachma, furnished in practice with miserable irregularity. As a motive for granting this increase of pay, Cyrus was assured that it would determine the Athenian seamen to desert so largely, that the war would sooner come to an end, and of course the expenditure also. But he refused compliance, saying that the rate of pay had been fixed both by the king's express orders and by the terms of the treaty, so that he could not depart from it.² In this reply Lysander was forced to acquiesce. The envoys were treated with distinction, and feasted

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 3-4 : Diodor. xiii, 70 ; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 4. This seems to have been a favorite metaphor, either used by, or at least ascribed to, the Persian grandees ; we have already had it, a little before, from the mouth of Tissaphernês.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 5. *εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὰς συνθήκας οὕτως ἐχούσας, τριῶν κοντα μνᾶς ἑκάστη νηὶ τοῦ μηνὸς διδόναι, ὅπως ἂν βούλοιντο τρέφειν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.*

This is not strictly correct. The rate of pay is not specified in either of the three conventions, as they stand in Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58. It seems to have been, from the beginning, matter of verbal understanding and promise ; first, a drachma per day was promised by the envoys of Tissaphernês at Sparta ; next, the satrap himself, at Miletus, cut down this drachma to half a drachma, and promised this lower rate for the future (viii, 29).

Mr. Mitford says : " Lysander proposed that an Attic drachma, which was eight *oboli*, nearly tenpence sterling, should be allowed for daily pay to every seaman."

Mr. Mitford had in the previous sentence stated *three oboli* as equal to not quite *fourpence* sterling. Of course, therefore, it is plain that he did not

at a banquet; after which Cyrus, drinking to the health of Lysander, desired him to declare what favor he could do to gratify him most. "To grant an additional obolus per head for each seaman's pay," replied Lysander. Cyrus immediately complied, having personally bound himself by his manner of putting the question. But the answer impressed him both with astonishment and admiration; for he had expected that Lysander would ask some favor or present for himself, judging him not only according to the analogy of most Persians, but also of Astyochus and the officers of the Peloponnesian armament at Milêtus, whose corrupt subservience to Tissaphernês had probably been made known to him. From such corruption, as well as from the mean carelessness of Theramênês, the Spartan, respecting the condition of the seamen,¹ Lysander's conduct stood out in pointed and honorable contrast.

The incident here described not only procured for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet the daily pay of four oboli, instead of three, per man, but also insured to Lysander himself a degree of esteem and confidence from Cyrus which he knew well how to turn to account. I have already remarked,² in reference to Periklês and Nikias, that an established reputation for personal incorruptibility, rare as that quality was among Grecian leading politicians, was among the most precious items in the capital stock of an ambitious man, even if looked at only in regard to the 'durability' of his own influence. If the proof of such disinterestedness was of so much value in the eyes of the Athenian people, yet more powerfully did it work upon the mind of Cyrus. With his Persian and princely ideas of winning adherents by munificence,³ a man who despised presents was a phenomenon

consider three oboli as the half of a drachma (Hist. Greece, ch. xx, sect. i, vol. iv, p. 317, oct. ed. 1814).

That a drachma was equivalent to *six* oboli, that is, an Æginæan drachma to six Æginæan oboli, and an Attic drachma to six Attic oboli, is so familiarly known, that I should almost have imagined the word *eight*, in the first sentence here cited, to be a misprint for *six*, if the sentence cited next had not clearly demonstrated that Mr. Mitford really believed a drachma to be equal to *eight* oboli. It is certainly a mistake surprising to find.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 29.

² See the former volume vi, ch. li, p. 287.

³ See the remarkable character of Cyrus the younger, given in the Anabasis of Xenophon, i, 9, 22-23.

commanding the higher sentiment of wonder and respect. From this time forward he not only trusted Lysander with implicit pecuniary confidence, but consulted him as to the prosecution of the war, and even condescended to second his personal ambition to the detriment of this object.¹

Returning from Sardis to Ephesus, after such unexampled success in his interview with Cyrus, Lysander was enabled not only to make good to his fleet the full arrear actually due, but also to pay them for a month in advance, at the increased rate of four oboli per man; and to promise that high rate for the future. A spirit of the highest satisfaction and confidence was diffused through the armament. But the ships were in indifferent condition, having been hastily and parsimoniously got up since the late defeat at Kyzikus. Accordingly, Lysander employed his present affluence in putting them into better order, procuring more complete tackle, and inviting picked crews.² He took another step pregnant with important results. Summoning to Ephesus a few of the most leading and active men from each of the Asiatic cities, he organized them into disciplined clubs, or factions, in correspondence with himself. He instigated these clubs to the most vigorous prosecution of the war against Athens, promising that, as soon as that war should be concluded, they should be invested and maintained by Spartan influence in the government of their respective cities.³ His newly established influence with Cyrus, and the abundant supplies of which he was now master, added double force to an invitation in itself but too seducing. And thus, while infusing increased ardor into the joint warlike efforts of these cities, he at the same time procured for himself an ubiquitous correspondence, such as no successor could manage, rendering the continuance of his own command almost essential to success. The fruits of his factious manoeuvres will be seen in the subsequent dekadarchies, or oligarchies of Ten, after the complete subjugation of Athens.

While Lysander and Cyrus were thus restoring formidable efficacy to their side of the contest, during the summer of 407

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 13; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 4-9.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 10.

³ Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

B.C., the victorious exile Alkibiadès had accomplished the important and delicate step of reëntering his native city for the first time. According to the accommodation with Pharnabazus, concluded after the reduction of Chalkêdon, the Athenian fleet was precluded from assailing his satrapy, and was thus forced to seek subsistence elsewhere. Byzantium and Selymbria, with contributions levied in Thrace, maintained them for the winter: in the spring (407 B.C.), Alkibiadès brought them again to Samos; from whence he undertook an expedition against the coast of Karia, levying contributions to the extent of one hundred talents. Thrasybulus, with thirty triremes, went to attack Thrace, where he reduced Thasos, Abdêra, and all those towns which had revolted from Athens; Thasos being now in especial distress from famine as well as from past seditions. A valuable contribution for the support of the fleet was doubtless among the fruits of this success. Thrasyllus at the same time conducted another division of the army home to Athens, intended by Alkibiadès as precursors of his own return.¹

Before Thrasyllus arrived, the people had already manifested their favorable disposition towards Alkibiadès by choosing him anew general of the armament, along with Thrasybulus and Konon. Alkibiadès was now tending homeward from Samos with twenty triremes, bringing with him all the contributions recently levied: he first stopped at Paros, then visited the coast of Laconia, and lastly looked into the harbor of Gytheion in Laconia, where he had learned that thirty triremes were preparing. The news which he received of his reëlection as general, strengthened by the pressing invitations and encouragements of his friends, as well as by the recall of his banished kinsmen at length determined him to sail to Athens. He reached Peiræus on a marked day, the festival of the Plyntéria; on the 25th of the month Thargélion, about the end of May, 407 B.C. This was a day of melancholy solemnity, accounted unpropitious for any action of importance. The statue of the goddess Athênê was stripped of all its ornaments, covered up from every one's gaze,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 9-10; Diodor. xiii, 72. The chronology of Xenophon, though not so clear as we could wish, deserves unquestionable preference over that of Diodorus.

and washed or cleansed under a mysterious ceremonial, by the holy gens, called Praxiërgidæ. The goddess thus seemed to turn away her face, and refuse to behold the returning exile. Such at least was the construction of his enemies; and as the subsequent turn of events tended to bear them out, it has been preserved; while the more auspicious counter-interpretation, doubtless suggested by his friends, has been forgotten.

The most extravagant representations, of the pomp and splendor of this return of Alkibiadês to Athens, were given by some authors of antiquity, especially by Duris of Samos, an author about two generations later. It was said that he brought with him two hundred prow-ornaments belonging to captive enemies' ships, or, according to some, even the two hundred captured ships themselves; that his trireme was ornamented with gilt and silvered shields, and sailed by purple sails; that Kallippidês, one of the most distinguished actors of the day, performed the functions of keleustês, pronouncing the chant or word of command to the rowers; that Chrysogonus, a flute-player, who had gained the first prize at the Pythian games, was also on board playing the air of return.¹ All these details, invented with melancholy facility, to illustrate an ideal of ostentation and insolence, are refuted by the more simple and credible narrative of Xenophon. The reëntury of Alkibiadês was not merely unostentatious, but even mistrustful and apprehensive. He had with him only twenty triremes; and though encouraged, not merely by the assurances of his friends, but also by the news that he had just been reëlected general, he was, nevertheless, half afraid to disembark, even at the instant when he made fast his ship to the quay in Peiræus. A vast crowd had assembled there from the city and the port, animated by curiosity, interest, and other emotions of every kind, to see him arrive. But so little did he trust their sentiments that he hesitated at first to step on shore, and stood upon the deck looking about for his friends and kinamen. Presently, he saw Euryptolemus his cousin, and others, by whom he was heartily welcomed, and in the midst of whom he landed. But they too were so apprehensive of his numerous enemies, that they formed themselves into a sort of body-guard, to sur-

¹ Diodor. xiii 68; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31; Athenæ. xii, p. 535.

round and protect him against any possible assault during his march from Peiræus to Athens.¹

No protection, however, was required. Not merely did his enemies attempt no violence against him, but they said nothing in opposition when he made his defence before the senate and the public assembly. Protesting before the one as well as the other, his innocence of the impiety laid to his charge, he denounced bitterly the injustice of his enemies, and gently, but pathetically, deplored the unkindness of the people. His friends all spoke warmly in the same strain. So strenuous, and so pronounced, was the sentiment in his favor, both of the senate and of the public assembly, that no one dared to address them in the contrary sense.² The sentence of condemnation passed against him was cancelled: the Eumolpidæ were directed to revoke the curse which they had pronounced upon his head: the record of the sentence was destroyed, and the plate of lead upon which the curse was engraven, thrown into the sea: his confiscated property was restored: lastly, he was proclaimed general with full powers, and allowed to prepare an expedition of one hundred triremes, fifteen hundred hoplites from the regular muster-roll, and one hundred and fifty horsemen. All this passed, by unopposed vote, amidst silence on the part of enemies and acclamations from friends, amidst unmeasured promises of future achievement from himself, and confident assurances, impressed by his friends on willing hearers, that Alkibiadês was the only man competent to restore the empire and grandeur of Athens. The general expectation, which he and his friends took every possible pains to excite, was, that his victorious career of the last three years was a preparation for yet greater triumphs during the next.

We may be satisfied, when we advert to the apprehensions of Alkibiadês on entering the Peiræus, and to the body-guard organized by his friends, that this overwhelming and uncontradicted

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 18, 19. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ, πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὁρμισθεὶς, ἐπέβαινε μὲν οὐκ εὐθέως, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐχθρούς· ἐπαναστὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστροφώματος, ἐσκόπει τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδείους, εἰ παρήσαν. Κατιδὼν δὲ Εὐρυπτόλεμον τὸν Πεισιάνακτος, αὐτοῦ δὲ ἀνεψίου, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους καὶ φίλους μετ' αὐτῶν, τότε ἀποβὰς ἀναβαίνει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, μετὰ τῶν παροικουμένων, εἰ τις ἄπτοίτο, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 33; Diodor. xiii, 69.

triumph greatly surpassed the anticipations of both. It intoxicated him, and led him to make light of enemies whom only just before he had so much dreaded. This mistake, together with the carelessness and insolence arising out of what seemed to be an unbounded ascendancy, proved the cause of his future ruin. But the truth is, that these enemies, however they might remain silent, had not ceased to be formidable. Alkibiadês had now been eight years in exile, from about August 415 B.C. to May 407 B.C. Now absence was in many ways a good thing for his reputation, since his overbearing private demeanor had been kept out of sight, and his impieties partially forgotten. There was even a disposition among the majority to accept his own explicit denial of the fact laid to his charge, and to dwell chiefly upon the unworthy manœuvres of his enemies in resisting his demand for instant trial immediately after the accusation was broached, in order that they might calumniate him during his absence. He was characterized as a patriot animated by the noblest motives, who had brought both first-rate endowments and large private wealth to the service of the commonwealth, but had been ruined by a conspiracy of corrupt and worthless speakers, every way inferior to him; men, whose only chance of success with the people arose from expelling those who were better than themselves, while he, Alkibiadês, far from having any interest adverse to the democracy, was the natural and worthy favorite of a democratical people.¹ So far as the old causes of unpopularity were concerned, therefore, time and absence had done much to weaken their effect, and to assist his friends in countervailing them by pointing to the treacherous political manœuvres employed against him.

But if the old causes of unpopularity had thus, comparatively speaking, passed out of sight, others had since arisen, of a graver and more ineffaceable character. His vindictive hostility to his country had been not merely ostentatiously proclaimed, but actively manifested, by stabs but too effectively aimed at her vitals. The sending of Gylippus to Syracuse, the fortification of Dekeleia, the revolts of Chios and Milêtus, the first origination of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, had all been emphatically the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 14-16.

measures of Alkibiadês. Even for these, the enthusiasms of the moment attempted some excuse: it was affirmed that he had never ceased to love his country, in spite of her wrongs towards him, and that he had been compelled by the necessities of exile to serve men whom he detested, at the daily risk of his life.¹ But such pretences could not really impose upon any one. The treason of Alkibiadês during the period of his exile remained indefensible as well as undeniable, and would have been more than sufficient as a theme for his enemies, had their tongues been free. But his position was one altogether singular: having first inflicted on his country immense mischief, he had since rendered her valuable service, and promised to render still more. It is true, that the subsequent service was by no means adequate to the previous mischief: nor had it indeed been rendered exclusively by him, since the victories of Abydos and Kyzikus belong not less to Theramenês and Thrasybulus than to Alkibiadês:² moreover, the peculiar present or capital which he had promised to bring with him, — Persian alliance and pay to Athens, — had proved a complete delusion. Still, the Athenian arms had been eminently successful since his junction, and we may see that not merely common report, but even good judges, such as Thucydides, ascribed this result to his superior energy and management.

Without touching upon these particulars, it is impossible fully to comprehend the very peculiar position of this returning exile before the Athenian people in the summer of 407 B.C. The more distant past exhibited him as among the worst of criminals; the recent past, as a valuable servant and patriot: the future promised continuance in this last character, so far as there were any positive indications to judge by. Now this was a case in which discussion and recrimination could not possibly answer any useful purpose. There was every reason for reappointing Alkibiadês to his command; but this could only be done under

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 15.

² This point is justly touched upon, more than once, by Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Alcibiad. c. 6: "Quamquam Theramenês et Thrasybulus eisdem rebus præfuerant." And again, in the life of Thrasybulus (c. 1): "Primum Peloponnesiaco bello multa hic (Thrasybulus) sine Alcibiade gessit; ille nullam rem sine hoc."

prohibition of censure on his past crimes, and provisional acceptance of his subsequent good deeds, as justifying the hope of yet better deeds to come. The popular instinct felt this situation perfectly, and imposed absolute silence on his enemies.¹ We are not to infer from hence that the people had forgotten the past deeds of Alkibiadēs, or that they entertained for him nothing but unqualified confidence and admiration. In their present very justifiable sentiment of hopefulness, they determined that he should have full scope for prosecuting his new and better career, if he chose; and that his enemies should be precluded from reviving the mention of an irreparable past, so as to shut the door against him. But what was thus interdicted to men's lips as unseasonable, was not effaced from their recollections; nor were the enemies, though silenced for the moment, rendered powerless for the future. All this train of combustible matter lay quiescent, ready to be fired by any future misconduct or negligence, perhaps even by blameless ill-success, on the part of Alkibiadēs.

At a juncture when so much depended upon his future behavior, he showed, as we shall see presently, that he completely misinterpreted the temper of the people. Intoxicated by the unexpected triumph of his reception, according to that fatal susceptibility so common among distinguished Greeks, he forgot his own past history, and fancied that the people had forgotten and forgiven it also; construing their studied and well-advised silence into a proof of oblivion. He conceived himself in assured possession of public confidence; and looked upon his numerous enemies as if they no longer existed, because they were not allowed to speak at a most unseasonable hour. Without doubt, his exultation was shared by his friends, and this sense of false security proved his future ruin.

Two colleagues, recommended by Alkibiadēs himself, Adeimantus and Aristokratēs, were named by the people as generals of the hoplites to go out with him, in case of operations ashore.²

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20. *λεχθέντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων, καὶ οὐδε-
νός ἀντειπόντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι ἂν τὴν ἐκκλη-
σίαν, etc.*

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 21. Both Diodorus (xiii, 69) and Cornelius Nepos

In less than three months, his armament was ready; but he designedly deferred his departure until that day of the month Boedromion, about the beginning of September, when the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated, and when the solemn processional march of the crowd of communicants was wont to take place, along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. For seven successive years, ever since the establishment of Agis at Dekeleia, this march had been of necessity discontinued, and the procession had been transported by sea, to the omission of many of the ceremonial details. Alkibiadēs, on this occasion, caused the land-march to be renewed, in full pomp and solemnity; assembling all his troops in arms to protect, in case any attack should be made from Dekeleia. No such attack was hazarded; so that he had the satisfaction of reviving the full regularity of this illustrious scene, and escorting the numerous communicants out and home, without the smallest interruption; an exploit gratifying to the religious feelings of the people, and imparting an acceptable sense of undiminished Athenian power; while in reference to his own reputation, it was especially politic, as serving to make his peace with the Eumolpidæ and the Two Goddesses, on whose account he had been condemned.¹

Immediately after the mysteries, he departed with his armament. It appears that Agis at Dekeleia, though he had not chosen to come out and attack Alkibiadēs when posted to guard the Eleusinian procession, had nevertheless felt humiliated by the defiance offered to him. He shortly afterwards took advantage of the departure of this large force, to summon reinforcements from Peloponnesus and Boeotia, and attempt to surprise the walls of Athens on a dark night. If he expected any connivance within, the plot miscarried: alarm was given in time, and the eldest and youngest hoplites were found at their posts to defend the walls. The assailants — said to have amounted to

(Vit. Alcib. c. 7) state Thrasybulus and Adeimantus as his colleagues: both state also that his colleagues were chosen on his recommendation. I follow Xenophon as to the names, and also as to the fact, that they were named as *κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοί*.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20; Plutarch, Alcib. c. 34. Neither Diodorus nor Cornelius Nepos mentions this remarkable incident about the escort of the Eleusinian procession.

twenty-eight thousand men, of whom half were hoplites, with twelve hundred cavalry, nine hundred of them Bœotians — were seen on the ensuing day close under the walls of the city, which were amply manned with the full remaining strength of Athens. In an obstinate cavalry battle which ensued, the Athenians gained the advantage even over the Bœotians. Agis encamped the next night in the garden of *Akadêmus*; again on the morrow he drew up his troops and offered battle to the Athenians, who are affirmed to have gone forth in order of battle, but to have kept under the protection of the missiles from the walls, so that Agis did not dare to attack them.¹ We may well doubt whether the Athenians went out at all, since they had been for years accustomed to regard themselves as inferior to the Peloponnesians in the field. Agis now withdrew, satisfied apparently with having offered battle, so as to efface the affront which he had received from the march of the Eleusinian communicants in defiance of his neighborhood.

The first exploit of *Alkibiadês* was to proceed to *Andros*, now under a Lacedæmonian harvest and garrison. Landing on the island, he plundered the fields, defeated both the native troops and the Lacedæmonians, and forced them to shut themselves up within the town; which he besieged for some days without avail, and then proceeded onward to *Samos*, leaving *Konon* in a fortified post, with twenty ships, to prosecute the siege.² At *Samos*, he first ascertained the state of the Peloponnesian fleet at *Ephesus*, the influence acquired by *Lysander* over *Cyrus*, the strong anti-Athenian dispositions of the young prince, and the ample rate of pay, put down even in advance, of which the Peloponnesian seamen were now in actual receipt. He now first became convinced of the failure of those hopes which he had conceived, not without good reason, in the preceding year, — and of which he had doubtless boasted at Athens, — that the alliance of Persia might be neutralized at least, if not won over, through the envoys escorted to *Susa* by *Pharnabazus*. It was in vain that he prevailed upon *Tissaphernês* to mediate with *Cyrus*, to introduce to

¹ Diodor. xiii, 72, 73.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 22; i, 5, 18; Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 35; Diodor. xiii, 69. The latter says that *Thrasylulus* was left at *Andros*, which cannot be true.

him some Athenian envoys, and to inculcate upon him his own views of the true interests of Persia; that is, that the war should be fed and protracted so as to wear out both the Grecian belligerent parties, each by means of the other. Such a policy, uncongenial at all times to the vehement temper of Cyrus, had become yet more repugnant to him since his intercourse with Lysander. He would not consent even to see the envoys, nor was he probably displeased to put a slight upon a neighbor and rival satrap. Deep was the despondency among the Athenians at Samos, when painfully convinced that all hopes from Persia must be abandoned for themselves; and farther, that Persian pay was both more ample and better assured, to their enemies, than ever it had been before.¹

Lysander had at Ephesus a fleet of ninety triremes, which he employed himself in repairing and augmenting, being still inferior in number to the Athenians. In vain did Alkibiadês attempt to provoke him out to a general action. This was much to the interest of the Athenians, apart from their superiority of number, since they were badly provided with money, and obliged to levy contributions wherever they could: but Lysander was resolved not to fight unless he could do so with advantage, and Cyrus, not afraid of sustaining the protracted expense of the war, had even enjoined upon him this cautious policy, with additional hopes of a Phœnician fleet to his aid, which in his mouth was not intended to delude, as it had been by Tissaphernês.² Unable to bring about a general battle, and having no immediate or capital enterprise to constrain his attention, Alkibiadês became careless, and abandoned himself partly to the love of pleasure, partly to reckless predatory enterprises for the purpose of getting money to pay his army. Thrasybulus had come from his post on the Hellespont, and was now engaged in fortifying Phokæa, probably for the purpose of establishing a post, to be enabled to pillage the interior. Here he was joined by Alkibiadês, who sailed across with a squadron, leaving his main fleet at Samos. He left it under the com-

¹ Xenophon, *Hellen.* i, 5, 9; Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 4. The latter tells us that the Athenian ships were presently emptied by the desertion of the seamen; a careless exaggeration.

² Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 9. I venture to antedate the statements which he there makes, as to the encouragements from Cyrus to Lysander.

mand of his favorite pilot Antiochus, but with express orders on no account to fight until his return.

While employed in this visit to Phokæa and Klazomenæ, Alkibiadês, perhaps hard-pressed for money, conceived the unwarrantable project of enriching his men by the plunder of the neighboring territory of Kymê, an allied dependency of Athens. Landing on this territory unexpectedly, after fabricating some frivolous calumnies against the Kymæans, he at first seized much property and a considerable number of prisoners. But the inhabitants assembled in arms, bravely defended their possessions, and repelled his men to their ships; recovering the plundered property, and lodging it in safety within their walls. Stung with this miscarriage, Alkibiadês sent for a reinforcement of hoplites from Mitylênê, and marched up to the walls of Kymê, where he in vain challenged the citizens to come forth and fight. He then ravaged the territory at pleasure: nor had the Kymæans any other resource, except to send envoys to Athens, to complain of so gross an outrage, inflicted by the Athenian general upon an unoffending Athenian dependency.¹

This was a grave charge, nor was it the only charge which Alkibiadês had to meet at Athens. During his absence at Phokæa and Kymê, Antiochus the pilot, whom he had left in command, disobeying the express order pronounced against fighting a battle, first sailed across from Samos to Nôtium, the harbor of Kolophon, and from thence to the mouth of the harbor of Ephesus, where the Peloponnesian fleet lay. Entering that harbor with his own ship and another, he passed close in front of the prows of the Peloponnesian triremes, insulting them scornfully and defying them to combat. Lysander detached some ships to pursue him, and an action gradually ensued, which was exactly that which Antiochus desired. But the Athenian ships were all in disorder,

¹ Diodor. xiii, 73. I follow Diodorus in respect to this story about Kymê, which he probably copied from the Kymæan historian Ephorus. Cornelius Nepos (Alcib. c. 7) briefly glances at it.

Xenophon (Hellen. i, 5, 11) as well as Plutarch (Lysand. c. 5) mention the visit of Alkibiadês to Thrasybulus at Phokæa. They do not name Kymê, however: according to them, the visit to Phokæa has no assignable purpose or consequences. But the plunder of Kymê is a circumstance both sufficiently probable in itself, and suitable to the occasion.

and came into battle as each of them separately could; while the Peloponnesian fleet was well marshalled and kept in hand; so that the battle was all to the advantage of the latter. The Athenians, compelled to take flight, were pursued to Notium, losing fifteen triremes, several along with their full crews. Antiochus himself was slain. Before retiring to Ephesus, Lysander had the satisfaction of erecting his trophy on the shore of Notium; while the Athenian fleet was carried back to its station at Samos.¹

It was in vain that Alkibiadès, hastening back to Samos, mustered the entire Athenian fleet, sailed to the mouth of the harbor of Ephesus, and there ranged his ships in battle order, challenging the enemy to come forth. Lysander would give him no opportunity of wiping out the late dishonor. And as an additional mortification to Athens, the Lacedæmonians shortly afterwards captured both Teos and Delphinium; the latter being a fortified post which the Athenians had held for the last three years in the island of Chios.²

Even before the battle of Notium, it appears that complaints and dissatisfactions had been growing up in the armament against Alkibiadès. He had gone out with a splendid force, not inferior, in number of triremes and hoplites, to that which he had conducted against Sicily, and under large promises, both from himself and his friends, of achievements to come. Yet in a space of time which can hardly have been less than three months, not a single success had been accomplished; while on the other side there was to be reckoned the disappointment on the score of Persia, which had great effect on the temper of the armament, and which, though not his fault, was contrary to expectations which he had held out, the disgraceful plunder of Kymê, and the defeat at Notium. It was true that Alkibiadès had given peremptory orders to Antiochus not to fight, and that the battle had been hazarded in flagrant disobedience to his injunctions. But this cir-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 12-15; Diodor. xiii, 71; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 15; Diodor. xiii, 76.

I copy Diodorus, in putting Teos, pursuant to Weiske's note, in place of Eion, which appears in Xenophon. I copy the latter, however, in ascribing these captures to the year of Lysander, instead of to the year of Kalikratidas.

cumstance only raised new matter for dissatisfaction of a graver character. If Antiochus had been disobedient,—if, besides disobedience, he had displayed a childish vanity and an utter neglect of all military precautions,—who was it that had chosen him for deputy; and that too against all Athenian precedent, putting the pilot, a paid officer of the ship, over the heads of the trierarchs who paid their pilots, and served at their own cost? It was Alkibiadês who placed Antiochus in this grave and responsible situation,—a personal favorite, an excellent convivial companion, but destitute of all qualities befitting a commander. And this turned attention on another point of the character of Alkibiadês, his habits of excessive self-indulgence and dissipation. The loud murmurs of the camp charged him with neglecting the interests of the service for enjoyments with jovial parties and Ionian women, and with admitting to his confidence those who best contributed to the amusement of these chosen hours.¹

It was in the camp at Samos that this general indignation against Alkibiadês first arose, and was from thence transmitted formally to Athens, by the mouth of Thrasybulus son of Thrasion,² not the eminent Thrasybulus, son of Lykus, who has been already often spoken of in this history, and will be so again. There came at the same time to Athens the complaints from Kymê, against the unprovoked aggression and plunder of that place by Alkibiadês; and seemingly complaints from other places besides.³ It was even urged as accusation against him, that he

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36. He recounts, in the tenth chapter of the same biography, an anecdote, describing the manner in which Antiochus first won the favor of Alkibiadês, then a young man, by catching a tame quail, which had escaped from his bosom.

² A person named *Thrasion* is mentioned in the Choiseul Inscription (No. 147, pp. 221, 222, of the Corp. Inscr. of Boeckh) as one of the Hellenotamiae in the year 410 B.C. He is described by his Deme as *Butades*; he is probably enough the father of this Thrasybulus.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 16–17. Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν οὖν, πονηρῶς καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ φερόμενος, etc. Diodor. xiii, 73. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ κατ' αὐτοῦ, etc.

Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36.

One of the remaining speeches of Lysias (Orat. xxi, Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας) is delivered by the trierarch in this fleet, on board of whose ship Alkibiadês himself chose to sail. This trierarch complains of Alkibiadês as

was in guilty collusion to betray the fleet to Pharnabazus and the Lacedæmonians, and that he had already provided three strong forts in the Chersonese to retire to, as soon as this scheme should be ripe for execution.

Such grave and wide-spread accusations, coupled with the disaster at Notium, and the complete disappointment of all the promises of success, were more than sufficient to alter the sentiments of the people of Athens towards Alkibiadês. He had no character to fall back upon; or rather, he had a character worse than none, such as to render the most criminal imputations of treason not intrinsically improbable. The comments of his enemies, which had been forcibly excluded from public discussion during his summer visit to Athens, were now again set free; and all the adverse recollections of his past life doubtless revived. The people had refused to listen to these, in order that he might have a fair trial, and might verify the title, claimed for him by his friends, to be judged only by his subsequent exploits, achieved since the year 411 B.C. He had now had his trial; he had been found wanting; and the popular confidence, which had been provisionally granted to him, was accordingly withdrawn.

It is not just to represent the Athenian people, however Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos may set before us this picture, as having indulged an extravagant and unmeasured confidence in Alkibiadês in the month of July, demanding of him more than man could perform, and as afterwards in the month of December passing, with childish abruptness, from confidence into wrathful displeasure, because their own impossible expectations were not already realized. That the people entertained large expectations, from so very considerable an armament, cannot be doubted: the largest of all, probably, as in the instance of the Sicilian expedition, were those entertained by Alkibiadês himself, and promulgated by his friends. But we are not called upon to determine what the people would have done, had Alkibiadês, after per-

having been a most uncomfortable and troublesome companion (sect. 7). His testimony on the point is valuable; for there seems no disposition here to make out any case against Alkibiadês. The trierarch notices the fact, that Alkibiadês preferred his trireme, simply as a proof that it was the best equipped, or among the best equipped, of the whole fleet. Archestratus and Erasinidês preferred it afterwards, for the same reason.

forming all the duties of a faithful, skilful, and enterprising commander, nevertheless failed, from obstacles beyond his own control, in realizing their hopes and his own promises. No such case occurred: that which did occur was materially different. Besides the absence of grand successes, he had farther been negligent and reckless in his primary duties; he had exposed the Athenian arms to defeat, by his disgraceful selection of an unworthy lieutenant;¹ he had violated the territory and property of an allied dependency, at a moment when Athens had a paramount interest in cultivating by every means the attachment of her remaining allies. The truth is, as I have before remarked, that he had really been spoiled by the intoxicating reception given to him so unexpectedly in the city. He had mistaken a hopeful public, determined, even by forced silence as to the past, to give him the full benefit of a meritorious future, but requiring as condition from him, that that future should really be meritorious, for a public of assured admirers, whose favor he had already earned and might consider as his own. He became an altered man after that visit, like Miltiadēs after the battle of Marathon; or, rather, the impulses of a character essentially dissolute and insolent, broke loose from that restraint under which they had before been partially controlled. At the time of the battle of Kyzikus, when Alkibiadēs was laboring to regain the favor of his injured countrymen, and was yet uncertain whether he should

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 16. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἡγγέλθη ἡ ναυμαχία, χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, οἰόμενοι δι' ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀκράτειαν ὑπολῶκεναι τὰς ναῦς.

The expression which Thucydides employs in reference to Alkibiadēs requires a few words of comment: (vi, 15) καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδία ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἐχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες (the Athenians), οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἐσφελαν τὴν πόλιν.

The "strenuous and effective prosecution of warlike business" here ascribed to Alkibiadēs, is true of all the period between his exile and his last visit to Athens (about September B.C. 415 to September B.C. 407). During the first four years of that time, he was very effective against Athens; during the last four, very effective in her service.

But the assertion is certainly not true of his last command, which ended with the battle of Notium; nor is it more than partially true, at least, it is an exaggeration of the truth, for the period before his exile.

succeed, he would not have committed the fault of quitting his fleet and leaving it under the command of a lieutenant like Antiochus. If, therefore, Athenian sentiment towards Alkibiadês underwent an entire change during the autumn of 407 B.C., this was in consequence of an alteration in his character and behavior; an alteration for the worse, just at the crisis when everything turned upon his good conduct, and upon his deserving at least, if he could not command success.

We may, indeed, observe that the faults of Nikias before Syracuse, and in reference to the coming of Gylippus, were far graver and more mischievous than those of Alkibiadês during this turning season of his career, and the disappointment of antecedent hopes at least equal. Yet while these faults and disappointment brought about the dismissal and disgrace of Alkibiadês, they did not induce the Athenians to dismiss Nikias, though himself desiring it, nor even prevent them from sending him a second armament to be ruined along with the first. The contrast is most instructive, as demonstrating upon what points durable esteem in Athens turned; how long the most melancholy public incompetency could remain overlooked, when covered by piety, decorum, good intentions, and high station;¹ how short-lived was the ascendancy of a man far superior in ability and energy, besides an equal station, when his moral qualities and antecedent life were such as to provoke fear and hatred in many, esteem from none. Yet, on the whole, Nikias, looking at him as a public servant, was far more destructive to his country than Alkibiadês. The mischief done to Athens by the latter was done in the avowed service of her enemies.

On hearing the news of the defeat of Notium and the accumulated complaints against Alkibiadês, the Athenians simply voted that he should be dismissed from his command; naming

¹ To meet the case of Nikias, it would be necessary to take the converse of the judgment of Thucydides respecting Alkibiadês, cited in my last note, and to say: *καὶ δημοσίᾳ κάκιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἀγασθέντες, καὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἐσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.*

The reader will of course understand that these last Greek words are not an actual citation, but a transformation of the actual words of Thucydides, for the purpose of illustrating the contrast between Alkibiadês and Nikias.

ten new generals to replace him. He was not brought to trial, nor do we know whether any such step was proposed. Yet his proceedings at Kymê, if they happened as we read them, richly deserved judicial animadversion; and the people, had they so dealt with him, would only have acted up to the estimable function ascribed to them by the oligarchical Phrynichus, "of serving as refuge to their dependent allies, and chastising the high-handed oppressions of the optimates against them."¹ In the perilous position of Athens, however, with reference to the foreign war, such a political trial would have been productive of much dissension and mischief. And Alkibiadês avoided the question by not coming to Athens. As soon as he heard of his dismissal, he retired immediately from the army to his own fortified posts on the Chersonese.

The ten new generals named were Konon, Diomedon, Leon, Periklês, Erasinidês, Aristokratês, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenês. Of these, Konon was directed to proceed forthwith from Andros with the twenty ships which he had there, to receive the fleet from Alkibiadês; while Phanosthenês proceeded with four triremes to replace Konon at Andros.²

In his way thither, Phanosthenês fell in with Dorieus the Rhodian and two Thurian triremes, which he captured, with every man aboard. The captives were sent to Athens, where all were placed in custody, in case of future exchange, except Dorieus himself. The latter had been condemned to death, and banished from his native city of Rhodes, together with his kindred, probably on the score of political disaffection, at the time when Rhodes was a member of the Athenian alliance. Having since then become a citizen of Thurii, he had served with distinction in the fleet of Mindarus, both at Milêtus and the Hellespont. The Athenians now had so much compassion upon him, that they released him at once and unconditionally, without even demanding a ransom or an equivalent. By what particular circumstance their compassion was determined, forming a pleasing

¹ Thucyd. viii, 48. τὸν δὲ δῆμον, σφῶν τε, of the allied dependencies, *καταφυγὴν, καὶ ἐκείνων*, i. e. of the high persons called *καλοκάγαθοι*, or optimates, *σωφρονιστήν*.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 18; Diodor. xiii, 74.

exception to the melancholy habits which pervaded Grecian warfare in both belligerents, we should never have learned from the meagre narrative of Xenophon. But we ascertain from other sources, that Dorieus, the son of Diagoras of Rhodes, was illustrious beyond all other Greeks for his victories in the pankration at the Olympic, Isthmian, and Nemean festivals; that he had gained the first prize at three Olympic festivals in succession, of which Olympiad 88, or 428 B.C. was the second, a distinction altogether without precedent, besides eight Isthmian and seven Nemean prizes; that his father Diagoras, his brothers, and his cousins, were all celebrated as successful athletes; lastly, that the family were illustrious from old date in their native island of Rhodes, and were even descended from the Messenian hero Aristomenês. When the Athenians saw before them as their prisoner a man doubtless of magnificent stature and presence, as we may conclude from his athletic success, and surrounded by such a halo of glory, impressive in the highest degree to Grecian imagination, the feelings and usages of war were at once overruled. Though Dorieus had been one of their most vehement enemies, they could not bear either to touch his person, or to exact from him any condition. Released by them on this occasion, he lived to be put to death, about thirteen years afterwards, by the Lacedæmonians.¹

When Konon reached Samos to take the command, he found the armament in a state of great despondency; not merely from the dishonorable affair of Notium, but also from disappointed hopes connected with Alkibiadês, and from difficulties in procuring regular pay. So painfully was the last inconvenience felt, that the first measure of Konon was to contract the numbers of the armament from above one hundred triremes to seventy; and to reserve for the diminished fleet all the ablest seamen of the larger. With this fleet, he and his colleagues roved about the enemies' coasts to collect plunder and pay.²

Apparently about the same time that Konon superseded Alkibiadês, that is, about December 407 B.C. or January 406 B.C., the year of Lysander's command expired, and Kallikratidas arrived

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausan. vi, 7, 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 20; compare i, 6, 16; Diodor. xiii, 77.

from Sparta to replace him. His arrival was received with undisguised dissatisfaction by the leading Lacedæmonians in the armament, by the chiefs in the Asiatic cities, and by Cyrus. Now was felt the full influence of those factious correspondences and intrigues which Lysander had established with all of them, for indirectly working out the perpetuity of his own command. While loud complaints were heard of the impolicy of Sparta, in annually changing her admiral, both Cyrus and the rest concurred with Lysander in throwing difficulties in the way of the new successor.

Kallikratidas, unfortunately only shown by the Fates,¹ and not suffered to continue in the Grecian world, was one of the noblest characters of his age. Besides perfect courage, energy, and incorruptibility, he was distinguished for two qualities, both of them very rare among eminent Greeks; entire straightforwardness of dealing, and a Pan-Hellenic patriotism² alike comprehensive, exalted, and merciful. Lysander handed over to him nothing but an empty purse; having repaid to Cyrus all the money remaining in his possession, under pretence that it had been confided to himself personally.³ Moreover, on delivering up the fleet to Kallikratidas, at Ephesus, he made boast of delivering to him at the same time the mastery of the sea, through the victory recently gained at Notium. "Conduct the fleet from Ephesus along the coast of Samos, passing by the Athenian station (replied Kallikratidas), and give it up to me at Milætus: I shall then believe in your mastery of the sea." Lysander had nothing else

¹ Virgil, *Æneid*, vi, 870.

Ostendent terris hunc tantum fata, neque ultra
Esse sinent.

² How completely this repayment was a manoeuvre for the purpose of crippling his successor,—and not an act of genuine and conscientious obligation to Cyrus, as Mr. Mitford represents it,—we may see by the conduct of Lysander at the close of the war. He then carried away with him to Sparta all the residue of the tributes from Cyrus which he had in his possession, instead of giving them back to Cyrus (*Xenoph. Hellen.* ii, 3, 8). The obligation to give them back to Cyrus was greater at the end of the war than it was at the time when Kallikratidas came out, and when war was still going on; for the war was a joint business, which the Persians and the Spartans had sworn to prosecute by common efforts.

to say, except that he should give himself no farther trouble, now that his command had been transferred to another.

Kallikratidas soon found that the leading Lacedæmonians in the fleet, gained over to the interests of his predecessor, openly murmured at his arrival, and secretly obstructed all his measures; upon which he, summoned them together, and said: "I, for my part, am quite content to remain at home; and if Lysander, or any one else, pretends to be a better admiral than I am, I have nothing to say against it. But sent here as I am by the authorities at Sparta to command the fleet, I have no choice except to execute their orders in the best way that I can. You now know how far my ambition reaches;¹ you know also the murmurs which are abroad against our common city (for her frequent change of admirals). Look to it, and give me your opinion. Shall I stay where I am, or shall I go home, and communicate what has happened here?"

This remonstrance, alike pointed and dignified, produced its full effect. Every one replied, that it was his duty to stay and undertake the command. The murmurs and cabals were from that moment discontinued.

His next embarrassments arose from the manœuvre of Lysander in paying back to Cyrus all the funds from whence the continuous pay of the army was derived. Of course this step was admirably calculated to make every one regret the alteration of command. Kallikratidas, who had been sent out without funds, in full reliance on the unexhausted supply from Sardis, now found himself compelled to go thither in person and solicit a renewal of the bounty. But Cyrus, eager to manifest in every way his partiality for the last admiral, deferred receiving him, first for two days, then for a farther interval, until the patience of Kallikratidas was wearied out, so that he left Sardis in disgust without an interview. So intolerable to his feelings was the humiliation of thus begging at the palace gates, that he bitterly deplored those miserable dissensions among the Greeks which constrained both parties to truckle to the foreigner for money; swearing that, if he survived the year's campaign, he would use

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 5. ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὸς ἃ ἐγὼ τε φιλοτιμοῦμαι, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν αἰτιάσεται (ἴσ-ε γὰρ αὐτὰ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ) ξυμβουλευέτε, etc.

every possible effort to bring about an accommodation between Athens and Sparta.¹

In the mean time, he put forth all his energy to obtain money in some other way, and thus get the fleet to sea; knowing well, that the way to overcome the reluctance of Cyrus was, to show that he could do without him. Sailing first from Ephesus to Milētus, he despatched from thence a small squadron to Sparta, disclosing his unexpected poverty, and asking for speedy pecuniary aid. In the mean time he convoked an assembly of the Milesians, communicated to them the mission just sent to Sparta, and asked from them a temporary supply until this money should arrive. He reminded them that the necessity of this demand sprang altogether from the manœuvre of Lysander, in paying back the funds in his hands; that he had already in vain applied to Cyrus for farther money, meeting only with such insulting neglect as could no longer be endured: that they, the Milesians, dwelling amidst the Persians, and having already experienced the maximum of ill-usage at their hands, ought now to be foremost in the war, and to set an example of zeal to the other allies,² in order to get clear the sooner from dependence upon such imperious taskmasters. He promised that, when the remittance from Sparta and the hour of success should arrive, he would richly requite their forwardness. "Let us, with the aid of the gods, show these foreigners (he concluded) that we can punish our enemies without worshipping them."

The spectacle of this generous patriot, struggling against a degrading dependence on the foreigner, which was now becoming unhappily familiar to the leading Greeks of both sides, excites our warm sympathy and admiration. We may add, that his language to the Milesians, reminding them of the misery which they had endured from the Persians as a motive to exertion in the war, is full of instruction as to the new situation opened for the Asiatic Greeks since the breaking-up of the Athenian power. No such evils had they suffered while Athens was com-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 6.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 9. *ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐγὼ ἀξιῶ προθυμοτάτους εἶναι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τὸ οἰκοῦντας ἐν βαρβάρους πλείστα κακὰ ἤδη ὑπ' αὐτῶν πεπονθέναι.*

petent to protect them, and while they were willing to receive protection from her, during the interval of more than fifty years between the complete organization of the confederacy of Delos and the disaster of Nikias before Syracuse.

The single-hearted energy of Kallikratidas imposed upon all who heard him, and even inspired so much alarm to those leading Milesians who were playing underhand the game of Lysander, that they were the first to propose a large grant of money towards the war, and to offer considerable sums from their own purses; an example probably soon followed by other allied cities. Some of the friends of Lysander tried to couple their offers with conditions; demanding a warrant for the destruction of their political enemies, and hoping thus to compromise the new admiral. But he strenuously refused all such guilty compliances.¹ He was soon able to collect at Milêtus fifty fresh triremes in addition to those left by Lysander, making a fleet of one hundred and forty sail in all. The Chians having furnished him with an outfit of five drachmas for each seaman, equal to ten days' pay at the usual rate, he sailed with the whole fleet northward towards Lesbos. Of this numerous fleet, the greatest which had yet been assembled throughout the war, only ten triremes were Lacedæmonian;² while a considerable proportion, and among the best equipped, were Bœotian and Eubœan.³ In his voyage towards Lesbos, Kallikratidas seems to have made himself master of Phokæa and Kymê,⁴ perhaps with the greater facility in consequence of the recent ill-treatment of the Kymæans by Alkibiadês. He then sailed to attack Methymna, on the northern coast of Lesbos; a town not only strongly attached to the Athenians, but also defended by an Athenian garrison. Though at first repulsed, he renewed his attacks until at length he took the town by storm. The property in it was all plundered by the soldiers, and the slaves collected and sold for their benefit. It was farther demanded by the allies, and expected pursuant to ordinary cus-

¹ Plutarch, *Apophthegm. Laconic.* p. 222, C, *Xenoph. Hellen.* i, 6, 12.

² *Xenoph. Hellen.* i, 6, 34.

³ *Diodor.* xiii, 99.

⁴ I infer this from the fact, that at the period of the battle of Arginusæ, both these towns appear as adhering to the Peloponnesians; whereas during the command of Alkibiadês they had been both Athenian (*Xenoph. Hellen.* i, 5, 11; i, 6, 33; *Diodor.* xiii, 73-99).

toni, that the Methymnæan and Athenian prisoners should be sold also. But Kallikratidas peremptorily refused compliance, and set them all free the next day; declaring that, so long as he was in command, not a single free Greek should be reduced to slavery if he could prevent it.¹

No one, who has not familiarized himself with the details of Grecian warfare, can feel the full grandeur and sublimity of this proceeding, which stands, so far as I know, unparalleled in Grecian history. It is not merely that the prisoners were spared and set free; as to this point, analogous cases may be found, though not very frequent. It is, that this particular act of generosity was performed in the name and for the recommendation of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood and Pan-Hellenic independence of the foreigner: a comprehensive principle, announced by Kallikratidas on previous occasions as well as on this, but now carried into practice under emphatic circumstances, and coupled with an explicit declaration of his resolution to abide by it in all future cases. It is, lastly, that the step was taken in resistance to formal requisition on the part of his allies, whom he had very imperfect means either of paying or controlling, and whom therefore it was so much the more hazardous for him to offend. There cannot be any doubt that these allies felt personally wronged and indignant at the loss, as well as confounded with the proposition of a rule of duty so new, as respected the relations of belligerents in Greece; against which too, let us add, their murmurs would not be without some foundation: "If *we* should come to be Konon's prisoners, he will not treat *us* in this manner." Reciprocity of dealing is absolutely essential to constant moral observance, either public or private; and doubtless Kallikratidas felt a well-grounded confidence, that two or three conspicuous examples would sensibly modify the future practice on both sides. But some one must begin by setting such examples, and the man who does begin —

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 14. Καὶ κελευόντων τῶν συμμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους, οὐκ ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων εἰς τοῦκείνου δυνάτην ἀνδραποδισθῆναι.

Compare a later declaration of Agesilaus, substantially to the same purpose, yet delivered under circumstances far less emphatic, in Xenophon, Agesilaus, vii 6

having a position which gives reasonable chance that others will follow — is the hero. An admiral like Lysander would not only sympathize heartily with the complaints of the allies, but also condemn the proceeding as a dereliction of duty to Sparta; even men better than Lysander would at first look coldly on it as a sort of Quixotism, in doubt whether the example would be copied: while the Spartan ephors, though probably tolerating it because they interfered very sparingly with their admirals afloat, would certainly have little sympathy with the feelings in which it originated. So much the rather is Kallikratidas to be admired, as bringing out with him not only a Pan-Hellenic patriotism,¹ rare either at Athens or Sparta, but also a force of individual character and conscience yet rarer, enabling him to brave unpopularity and break through routine, in the attempt to make that patriotism fruitful and operative in practice. In his career, so sadly and prematurely closed, there was at least this circumstance to be envied; that the capture of Methymna afforded him the opportunity, which he greedily seized, as if he had known that it would be the last, of putting in act and evidence the full aspirations of his magnanimous soul.

Kallikratidas sent word by the released prisoners to Konon, that he would presently put an end to his adulterous intercourse with the sea;² which he now considered as his wife, and lawfully appertaining to him, having one hundred and forty triremes against the seventy triremes of Konon. That admiral, in spite of his inferior numbers, had advanced near to Methymna, to try and relieve it; but finding the place already captured, had retired to the islands called Hekatonnésos, off the continent bearing northeast from Lesbos. Thither he was followed by Kallikratidas, who, leaving Methymna at night, found him quitting his moorings at break of day, and immediately made all sail to try and cut him off from the southerly course towards Samos. But Konon,

¹ The sentiment of Kallikratidas deserved the designation of Ἑλληνικώτατον πολίτευμα, far more than that of Nikias, to which Plutarch applies those words (Compar. of Nikias and Crassus, c. 2).

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 15. Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι πάσαι αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλασσαν, etc. He could hardly say *this* to Konon, in any other way than through the Athenian prisoners.

having diminished the number of his triremes from one hundred to seventy, had been able to preserve all the best rowers, so that in speed he outran Kallikratidas and entered first the harbor of Mitylênê. His pursuers, however, were close behind, and even got into the harbor along with him, before it could be closed and put in a state of defence. Constrained to fight a battle at its entrance, he was completely defeated; thirty of his ships were taken, though the crews escaped to land; and he preserved the remaining forty only by hauling them ashore under the wall.¹

The town of Mitylênê, originally founded on a small islet off Lesbos, had afterwards extended across a narrow strait to Lesbos itself. By this strait, whether bridged over or not we are not informed, the town was divided into two portions, and had two harbors, one opening northward towards the Hellespont, the other southward towards the promontory of Kanê on the mainland.² Both these harbors were undefended, and both now fell into the occupation of the Peloponnesian fleet; at least all the outer portion of each, near to the exit of the harbor, which Kallikrati-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 17; Diodor. xiii, 78, 79.

Here, as on so many other occasions, it is impossible to blend these two narratives together. Diodorus conceives the facts in a manner quite different from Xenophon, and much less probable. He tells us that Konon practised a stratagem during his flight (the same in Polyænus, i, 482), whereby he was enabled to fight with and defeat the foremost Peloponnesian ships before the rest came up: also, that he got into the harbor in time to put it into a state of defence before Kallikratidas came up. Diodorus then gives a prolix description of the battle by which Kallikratidas forced his way in.

The narrative of Xenophon, which I have followed, plainly implies that Konon could have had no time to make preparations for defending the harbor.

² Thucyd. viii, 6. *τοὺς ἐπὶ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λιμένι ἐποιοῦντο* (Strabo, xiii, p. 617). Xenophon talks only of the harbor, as if it were one; and possibly, in very inaccurate language, it might be described as one harbor with two entrances. It seems to me, however, that Xenophon had no clear idea of the locality.

Strabo speaks of the northern harbor as defended by a mole, the southern harbor, as defended by triremes chained together. Such defences did not exist in the year 406 B.C. Probably, after the revolt of Mitylênê in 427 B.C., the Athenians had removed what defences might have been before provided for the harbor.

das kept under strict watch. He at the same time sent for the full forces of Methymna and for hoplites across from Chios, so as to block up Mitylênê by land as well as by sea. As soon as his success was announced, too, money for the fleet, together with separate presents for himself, which he declined receiving,¹ was immediately sent to him by Cyrus; so that his future operations became easy.

No preparations had been made at Mitylênê for a siege; no stock of provisions had been accumulated, and the crowd within the walls was so considerable, that Konon foresaw but too plainly the speedy exhaustion of his means. Nor could he expect succor from Athens, unless he could send intelligence thither of his condition; of which, as he had not been able to do so, the Athenians remained altogether ignorant. All his ingenuity was required to get a trireme safe out of the harbor, in the face of the enemy's guard. Putting afloat two triremes, the best sailers in his fleet, and picking out the best rowers for them out of all the rest, he caused these rowers to go aboard before daylight, concealing the epibatæ, or maritime soldiers, in the interior of the vessel, instead of the deck, which was their usual place, with a moderate stock of provisions, and keeping the vessel still covered with hides or sails, as was customary with vessels hauled ashore, to protect them against the sun.² These two triremes were thus

¹ Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 222, E.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 19. Κατελκύσας (Konon) τῶν νεῶν τὰς ἀρίστα πλεούσας δύο, ἐπλήρωσε πρὸς ἡμέρας, ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν νεῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐρέτας ἐκλέξας, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ἐς κοίλην ναὺν μεταβιβάσας, καὶ τὰ παραβρύματα παραβαλὼν.

The meaning of παραβρύματα is very uncertain. The commentators give little instruction; nor can we be sure that the same thing is meant as is expressed by παραβλήματα (*infra*, ii, 1, 22). We may be quite sure that the matters meant by παραβρύματα were something which, if visible at all to a spectator without, would at least afford no indication that the trireme was intended for a speedy start; otherwise, they would defeat the whole contrivance of Konon, whose aim was secrecy. It was essential that this trireme, though afloat, should be made to look as much as possible like to the other triremes which still remained hauled ashore; in order that the Peloponnesians might not suspect any purpose of departure. I have endeavored in the text to give a meaning which answers this purpose, without forsaking the explanations given by the commentators: see Boeckh, Ueber das Attische. See Wesen, ch. x, p. 159.

made ready to depart at a moment's notice, without giving any indication to the enemy that they were so. They were fully manned before daybreak, the crews remained in their position all day, and after dark were taken out to repose. This went on for four days successively, no favorable opportunity having occurred to give the signal for attempting a start. At length, on the fifth day, about noon, when many of the Peloponnesian crews were ashore for their morning meal, and others were reposing, the moment seemed favorable, the signal was given, and both the triremes started at the same moment with their utmost speed; one to go out at the southern entrance towards the sea, between Lesbos and Chios, the other to depart by the northern entrance towards the Hellespont. Instantly, the alarm was given among the Peloponnesian fleet: the cables were cut, the men hastened aboard, and many triremes were put in motion to overtake the two runaways. That which departed southward, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, was caught towards evening and brought back with all her crew prisoners: that which went towards the Hellespont escaped, rounded the northern coast of Lesbos, and got safe with the news to Athens; sending intelligence also, seemingly, in her way, to the Athenian admiral Diomedon at Samos.

The latter immediately made all haste to the aid of Konon, with the small force which he had with him, no more than twelve triremes. The two harbors being both guarded by a superior force, he tried to get access to Mitylênê through the Euripus, a strait which opens on the southern coast of the island into an interior lake, or bay, approaching near to the town. But here he was attacked suddenly by Kalikratidas, and his squadron all captured except two triremes, his own and another; he himself had great difficulty in escaping.¹

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 22. Διομέδων δὲ βοηθῶν Κόνωνι πολιορκουμένῳ δώδεκα ναυσὶν ὤρμισατο ἐς τὸν εὐρίπον τὸν Μιτυληναίων.

The reader should look at a map of Lesbos, to see what is meant by the Euripus of Mitylênê, and the other Euripus of the neighboring town of Pyrrha.

Diodorus (xiii, 79) confounds the Euripus of Mitylênê with the harbor of Mitylênê, with which it is quite unconnected. Schneider and Plehn seem to make the same confusion (see Plehn, *Lesbiaca*, p. 15).

Athens was all in consternation at the news of the defeat of Konon and the blockade of Mitylênê. The whole strength and energy of the city was put forth to relieve him, by an effort greater than any which had been made throughout the whole war. We read with surprise that within the short space of thirty days, a fleet of no less than one hundred and ten triremes was fitted out and sent from Peiræus. Every man of age and strength to serve, without distinction, was taken to form a good crew; not only freemen, but slaves, to whom manumission was promised as reward: many also of the horsemen, or knights,¹ and citizens of highest rank, went aboard as epibatæ, hanging up their bridles like Kimon before the battle of Salamis. The levy was in fact as democratical and as equalizing as it had been on that memorable occasion. The fleet proceeded straight to Samos, whither orders had doubtless been sent to get together all the triremes which the allies could furnish as reinforcements, as well as all the scattered Athenian. By this means, forty additional triremes, ten of them Samian, were assembled, and the whole fleet, one hundred and fifty sail, went from Samos to the little islands called Arginusæ, close on the mainland, opposite to Malea, the southeastern cape of Lesbos.

Kallikratidas, apprized of the approach of the new fleet while it was yet at Samos, withdrew the greater portion of his force from Mitylênê, leaving fifty triremes under Eteonikus to continue the blockade. Less than fifty probably would not have been sufficient, inasmuch as two harbors were to be watched; but he was thus reduced to meet the Athenian fleet with inferior numbers, one hundred and twenty triremes against one hundred and fifty. His fleet was off Cape Malea, where the crews took their suppers, on the same evening as the Athenians supped at the opposite islands of Arginusæ. It was his project to sail across the intermediate channel in the night, and attack them in the morning before they were prepared; but violent wind and rain forced him to defer all movement till daylight. On the ensuing morning, both parties prepared for the greatest naval encounter which had taken place throughout the whole war. Kallikratidas was advised by his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, to retire for the present without fighting, inasmuch as the Athenians

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 24-25: Diodor. xiii. 97.

fleet had the advantage of thirty triremes over him in number. He replied that flight was disgraceful, and that Sparta would be no worse off, even if he should perish.¹ The answer was one congenial to his chivalrous nature; and we may well conceive, that, having for the last two or three months been lord and master of the sea, he recollected his own haughty message to Konon, and thought it dishonor to incur or deserve, by retiring, the like taunt upon himself. We may remark too that the disparity of numbers, though serious, was by no means such as to render the contest hopeless, or to serve as a legitimate ground for retreat, to one who prided himself on a full measure of Spartan courage.

The Athenian fleet was so marshalled, that its great strength was placed in the two wings; in each of which there were sixty Athenian ships, divided into four equal divisions, each division commanded by a general. Of the four squadrons of fifteen ships each, two were placed in front, two to support them in the rear. Aristokratês and Diomedon commanded the two front squadrons of the left division, Periklês and Erasimidês the two squadrons in the rear: on the right division, Protomachus and Thrasyllus commanded the two in front, Lysias and Aristogenês the two in the rear. The centre, wherein were the Samians and other allies, was left weak, and all in single line: it appears to have been exactly in front of one of the isles of Arginusæ, while the two other divisions were to the right and left of that isle. We read with some surprise that the whole Lacedæmonian fleet was arranged by single ships, because it sailed better and manœuvred better than the Athenians; who formed their right and left divisions in deep order, for the express purpose of hindering the enemy from performing the nautical manœuvres of the *diekplus* and the *periplus*.² It would seem that the Athenian centre, hav-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 32; Diodor. xiii, 97, 98; the latter reports terrific omens beforehand for the generals.

The answer has been a memorable one, more than once adverted to, Plutarch, Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 832; Cicero, De Offi. i, 24.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 31. *ὁδῶ δ' ἐτάχθησαν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) ἵνα μὴ διέκπλουν διδοῖεν· χειρόν γάρ ἐπλεον. Αἱ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀντιτεταγμέναι ἦσαν ἅπασαι ἐπὶ μιᾷ, ὥς πρὸς διέκπλουν καὶ περίπλουν παρεσκευασμένοι, διὰ τὸ βέλτιον πλεῖν.*

Contrast this with Thucyd. ii, 84-89 (the speech of Phormion), iv, 12; vii, 36.

ing the land immediately in its rear, was supposed to be better protected against an enemy "sailing through the line out to the rear, and sailing round about," than the other divisions, which were in the open waters; for which reason it was left weak, with the ships in single line. But the fact which strikes us the most is, that, if we turn back to the beginning of the war, we shall find that this *diekplus* and *periplus* were the special manœuvres of the Athenian navy, and continued to be so even down to the siege of Syracuse; the Lacedæmonians being at first absolutely unable to perform them at all, and continuing for a long time to perform them far less skilfully than the Athenians. Now, the comparative value of both parties is reversed: the superiority of nautical skill has passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies: the precautions whereby that superiority is neutralized or evaded, are forced as a necessity on the Athenians. How astonished would the Athenian admiral Phormion have been, if he could have witnessed the fleets and the order of battle at Arginusæ!

Kallikratidas himself, with the ten Lacedæmonian ships, was on the right of his fleet: on the left were the Bœotians and Eubœans, under the Bœotian admiral Thrasondas. The battle was long and obstinately contested, first by the two fleets in their original order; afterwards, when all order was broken, by scattered ships mingled together and contending in individual combat. At length the brave Kallikratidas perished. His ship was in the act of driving against the ship of an enemy, and he himself probably, like Brasidas¹ at Pylos, had planted himself on the fore-castle, to be the first in boarding the enemy, or in preventing the enemy from boarding him, when the shock arising from impact threw him off his footing, so that he fell overboard and was drowned.² In spite of the discouragement springing from his death, the ten Lacedæmonian triremes displayed a courage worthy of his, and nine of them were destroyed or disa-

¹ See Thucyd. iv, 11.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 33. *ἐπεὶ δὲ Καλλικρατίδης τε ἐμβалоύσης τῆς νεὼς ἀποπεσὼν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἠφανίσθη*, etc.

The details given by Diodorus about this battle and the exploits of Kallikratidas are at once prolix and unworthy of confidence. See an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on Thucyd. iv, 12, respecting the description given by Diodorus of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylos.

bled. At length the Athenians were victorious in all parts: the Peloponnesian fleet gave way, and their flight became general, partly to Chios, partly to Phokæa. More than sixty of their ships were destroyed over and above the nine Lacedæmonian, seventy-seven in all; making a total loss of above the half of the entire fleet. The loss of the Athenians was also severe, amounting to twenty-five triremes. They returned to Arginusæ after the battle.¹

The victory of Arginusæ afforded the most striking proof how much the democratical energy of Athens could yet accomplish, in spite of so many years of exhausting war. But far better would it have been, if her energy on this occasion had been less efficacious and successful. The defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the death of their admirable leader, — we must take the second as inseparable from the first, since Kallikratidas was not the man to survive a defeat, — were signal misfortunes to the whole Grecian world; and in an especial manner, misfortunes to Athens herself. If Kallikratidas had gained the victory and survived it, he would certainly have been the man to close the Peloponnesian war; for Mitylênê must immediately have surrendered, and Konon, with all the Athenian fleet there blocked up, must have become his prisoners; which circumstance, coming at the back of a defeat, would have rendered Athens disposed to acquiesce in any tolerable terms of peace. Now to have the terms dictated at a moment when her power was not wholly prostrate, by a man like Kallikratidas, free from corrupt personal ambition and of a generous Pan-Hellenic patriotism, would have been the best fate which at this moment could befall her; while to the Grecian world generally, it would have been an unspeakable benefit, that, in the reorganization which it was sure to undergo at the close of the war, the ascendant individual of the moment should be penetrated with devotion to the great ideas of Hellenic brotherhood at home, and Hellenic independence against the foreigner. The near prospect of such a benefit was opened by that rare chance which threw Kallikratidas into the command, enabled him not only to publish his lofty profession of faith but to show that he was prepared to act upon it, and for a time float-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34; Diodor. xiii, 99, 100.

ed him on towards complete success. Nor were the envious gods ever more envious, than when they frustrated, by the disaster of Arginusæ, the consummation which they had thus seemed to promise. The pertinence of these remarks will be better understood in the next chapter, when I come to recount the actual winding-up of the Peloponnesian war under the auspices of the worthless, but able, Lysander. It was into his hands that the command was retransferred, a transfer almost from the best of Greeks to the worst. We shall then see how much the sufferings of the Grecian world, and of Athens especially, were aggravated by his individual temper and tendencies, and we shall then feel by contrast, how much would have been gained if the commander armed with such great power of dictation had been a Pan-Hellenic patriot. To have the sentiment of that patriotism enforced, at a moment of break-up and rearrangement throughout Greece, by the victorious leader of the day, with single-hearted honesty and resolution, would have been a stimulus to all the better feelings of the Grecian mind, such as no other combination of circumstances could have furnished. The defeat and death of Kallikratidas was thus even more deplorable as a loss to Athens and Greece, than to Sparta herself. To his lofty character and patriotism, even in so short a career, we vainly seek a parallel.

The news of the defeat was speedily conveyed to Eteonikus at Mitylênê by the admiral's signal-boat. As soon as he heard it, he desired the crew of the signal-boat to say nothing to any one, but to go again out of the harbor, and then return with wreaths and shouts of triumph, crying out that Kallikratidas had gained the victory and had destroyed or captured all the Athenian ships. All suspicion of the reality was thus kept from Konon and the besieged, while Eteonikus himself, affecting to believe the news, offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving; but gave orders to all the triremes to take their meal and depart afterwards without losing a moment, directing the masters of the trading-ships also to put their property silently aboard, and get off at the same time. And thus, with little or no delay, and without the least obstruction from Konon, all these ships, triremes and merchantmen, sailed out of the harbor and were carried off in safety to Chios, the wind being fair. Eteonikus at the same time withdrew his land-forces

to Methymna, burning his camp. Konon, thus finding himself unexpectedly at liberty, put to sea with his ships when the wind had become calmer, and joined the main Athenian fleet, which he found already on its way from Arginusæ to Mitylênê. The latter presently came to Mitylênê, and from thence passed over to make an attack on Chios; which attack proving unsuccessful, they went forward to their ordinary station at Samos.¹

The news of the victory at Arginusæ diffused joy and triumph at Athens. All the slaves who had served in the armament were manumitted and promoted, according to promise, to the rights of Plateæans at Athens, a qualified species of citizenship. Yet the joy was poisoned by another incident, which became known at the same time, raising sentiments of a totally opposite character, and ending in one of the most gloomy and disgraceful proceedings in all Athenian history.

Not only the bodies of the slain warriors floating about on the water had been picked up for burial, but the wrecks had not been visited to preserve those who were yet living. The first of these two points, even alone, would have sufficed to excite a painful sentiment of wounded piety at Athens. But the second point, here an essential part of the same omission, inflamed that sentiment into shame, grief, and indignation of the sharpest character.

In the descriptions of this event, Diodorus and many other writers take notice of the first point, either exclusively,² or at

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 38; Diodor. xiii, 100.

² See the narrative of Diodorus (xiii, 100, 101, 102), where nothing is mentioned except about picking up the floating *dead* bodies; about the crime, and offence in the eyes of the people, of omitting to secure burial to so many *dead* bodies. He does not seem to have fancied that there were any *living* bodies, or that it was a question between life and death to so many of the crews. Whereas, if we follow the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. i, 7), we shall see that the question is put throughout about picking up the *living* men, the *shipwrecked* men, or the men belonging to, and still living aboard of, the broken ships, ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, τοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, τοὺς καταδύντας (Hellen. ii, 3, 32): compare, especially, ii, 3, 35, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς καταδεδυνκίας ναῦς καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους (i, 6, 36). The word *ναυαγός* does not mean a dead body, but a *living* man who has suffered shipwreck: *Ναυαγός* ἦκω, ξένος, ἀσύλητον γένος (says Menelaus, Eurip. Helen. 457); also 407, Καὶ νῦν τάλας ναυαγός, ἀπολέσας φίλους Ἐξέπεσον ἐς γῆν τῆνδε, etc.; again, 538. It corresponds with the Latin *naufragus*: "mersâ rate naufragus assem Dum

least with slight reference to the second; which latter, nevertheless, stands as far the gravest in the estimate of every impartial critic, and was also the most violent in its effect upon Athenian feelings. Twenty-five Athenian triremes had been ruined, along with most of their crews; that is, lay heeled over or disabled, with their oars destroyed, no masts, nor any means of moving; mere hulls, partially broken by the impact of an enemy's ship, and gradually filling and sinking. The original crew of each was two hundred men. The field of battle, if we may use that word for a space of sea, was strewed with these wrecks; the men remaining on board being helpless and unable to get away, for the ancient trireme carried no boat, nor any aids for escape. And there were, moreover, floating about, men who had fallen overboard, or were trying to save their lives by means of acci-

rogat, et pictâ se tempestate tuetur," (Juvenal, xiv, 301.) Thucydides does not use the word *ναυαγός*, but speaks of *τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ ναυαγία*, meaning by the latter word the damaged ships, with every person and thing on board.

It is remarkable that Schneider and most other commentators on Xenophon, Sturz in his *Lexicon Xenophonticum* (v. *ἀναίρεσις*), Stallbaum ad Platon. *Apol. Socrat.* c. 20, p. 32, Sjevvers, *Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen.* p. 31, Forchhammer, *Die Athener und Sokratès*, pp. 30-31, Berlin, 1837, and others, all treat this event as if it were nothing but a question of picking up dead bodies for sepulture. This is a complete misinterpretation of Xenophon; not merely because the word *ναυαγός*, which he uses four several times, means a *living person*, but because there are two other passages, which leave absolutely no doubt about the matter: *Παρήλθε δέ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, φάσκων ἐπὶ τεύχευς ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, ἐὰν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατῆγοι οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.* Again (ii, 3, 35), Theramenes, when vindicating himself before the oligarchy of Thirty, two years afterwards, for his conduct in accusing the generals, says that the generals brought their own destruction upon themselves by accusing him first, and by saying that the men on the disabled ships might have been saved with proper diligence: *φάσκοντες γὰρ (the generals) οἶον τε εἶναι σῶσαι τοὺς ἀνδρας, προέμενοι αὐτοὺς ἀπολέσθαι, ἀποπλέοντες φχοντο.* These passages place the point beyond dispute, that the generals were accused of having neglected to save the lives of men on the point of being drowned, and who by their neglect afterwards were drowned, not of having neglected to pick up dead bodies for sepulture. The misinterpretation of the commentators is here of the gravest import. It alters completely the criticisms on the proceedings at Athens.

dental spars or empty casks. It was one of the privileges of a naval victory, that the party who gained it could sail over the field of battle, and thus assist their own helpless or wounded comrades aboard the disabled ships,¹ taking captive, or sometimes killing, the corresponding persons belonging to the enemy. According even to the speech made in the Athenian public assembly afterwards, by Euryptolemus, the defender of the accused generals, there were twelve triremes with their crews on board lying in the condition just described. This is an admission by the defence, and therefore the minimum of the reality: there cannot possibly have been fewer, but there were probably several more, out of the whole twenty-five stated by Xenophon.² No step being taken to preserve them, the surviving portion, wounded as well

¹ See Thucyd. i, 50, 51.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34. 'Ἀπώλοντο δὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀθηναίων νῆες πέντε καὶ εἰκοσὶν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων τῶν πρὸς τὴν γῆν προσενηχθέντων.

Schneider in his note, and Mr. Mitford in his *History*, express surprise at the discrepancy between the number *twelve*, which appears in the speech of Euryptolemus, and the number *twenty-five*, given by Xenophon.

But, first, we are not to suppose Xenophon to guarantee those assertions, as to matters of fact which he gives, as coming from Euryptolemus; who, as an advocate, speaking in the assembly, might take great liberties with the truth.

Next, Xenophon speaks of the total number of ships ruined or disabled in the action: Euryptolemus speaks of the total number of wrecks afloat and capable of being visited so as to rescue the sufferers, *at the subsequent moment*, when the generals directed the squadron under Theramenes to go out for the rescue. It is to be remembered that the generals went back to Arginusæ from the battle, and there determined, according to their own statement, to send out from thence a squadron for visiting the wrecks. A certain interval of time must therefore have elapsed between the close of the action and the order given to Theramenes. During that interval, undoubtedly, *some* of the disabled ships went down, or came to pieces: if we are to believe Euryptolemus, thirteen out of the twenty-five must have thus disappeared, so that their crews were already drowned, and no more than twelve remained floating for Theramenes to visit, even had he been ever so active and ever so much favored by weather.

I distrust the statement of Euryptolemus, and believe that he most probably underrated the number. But assuming him to be correct, this will only show how much the generals were to blame, as we shall hereafter remark for not having seen to the visitation of the wrecks *before* they went back to their moorings at Arginusæ.

as unwounded, of these crews, were left to be gradually drowned as each disabled ship went down. If any of them escaped, it was by unusual goodness of swimming, by finding some fortunate plank or spar, at any rate by the disgrace of throwing away their arms, and by some method such as no wounded man would be competent to employ.

The first letter from the generals which communicated the victory, made known at the same time the loss sustained in obtaining it. It announced, doubtless, the fact which we read in Xenophon, that twenty-five Athenian triremes had been lost, with nearly all their crews; specifying, we may be sure, the name of each triremè which had so perished; for each trireme in the Athenian navy, like modern ships, had its own name.¹ It mentioned, at the same time, that no step whatever had been taken by the victorious survivors to save their wounded and drowning countrymen on board the sinking ships. A storm had arisen, such was the reason assigned, so violent as to render all such intervention totally impracticable.²

It is so much the custom, in dealing with Grecian history, to presume the Athenian people to be a set of children or madmen, whose feelings it is not worth while to try and account for, that I have been obliged to state these circumstances somewhat at length, in order to show that the mixed sentiment excited at Athens by the news of the battle of Arginusæ was perfectly natural and justifiable. Along with joy for the victory, there was blended horror and remorse at the fact that so many of the brave men who had helped to gain it had been left to perish unheeded. The friends and relatives of the crews of these lost triremes were

¹ Boeckh, in his instructive volume, *Urkunden über das Attische See-Wesen* (vii, p. 84, *seq.*), gives, from inscriptions, a long list of the names of Athenian triremes, between B.C. 356 and 322. All the names are feminine: some curious. We have a long list also of the Athenian ship-builders; since the name of the builder is commonly stated in the inscription along with that of the ship: Εὐχαρις, Ἀλεξιμάχου ἔργον; Σειρήν, Ἀριστοκράτους ἔργον; Ἐλευθερία, Ἀρχενέου ἔργον; Ἐπίδειξις, Λυσιστράτου ἔργον; Δημοκρατία, Χαϊρεστράτου ἔργον, etc.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* i, 7, 4. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλον καθήκοντο (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυε (Theramènes) μαρτύριον· καὶ ἐπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι τὸν χειμῶνα.

of course foremost in the expression of such indignant emotion. The narrative of Xenophon, meagre and confused as well as unfair, presents this emotion as if it were something causeless, factitious, pumped up out of the standing irascibility of the multitude by the artifices of Theramênês, Kallixenus, and a few others. But whatever may have been done by these individuals to aggravate the public excitement, or pervert it to bad purposes, assuredly the excitement itself was spontaneous, inevitable, and amply justified. The very thought that so many of the brave partners in the victory had been left to drown miserably on the sinking hulls, without any effort on the part of their generals and comrades near to rescue them, was enough to stir up all the sensibilities, public as well as private, of the most passive nature, even in citizens who were not related to the deceased, much more in those who were so. To expect that the Athenians would be so absorbed in the delight of the victory, and in gratitude to the generals who had commanded, as to overlook such a desertion of perishing warriors, and such an omission of sympathetic duty, is, in my judgment, altogether preposterous; and would, if it were true, only establish one more vice in the Athenian people, besides those which they really had, and the many more with which they have been unjustly branded.

The generals, in their public letter, accounted for their omission by saying that the violence of the storm was too great to allow them to move. First, was this true as matter of fact? Next, had there been time to discharge the duty, or at the least to try and discharge it, before the storm came on to be so intolerable? These points required examination. The generals, while honored with a vote of thanks for the victory, were superseded, and directed to come home; all except Konon, who having been blocked up at Mitylênê, was not concerned in the question. Two new colleagues, Philoklês and Adeimantus, were named to go out and join him.¹ The generals probably received the notice of their re-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 1; Diodor. xiii, 101: ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ νίκῃ τοὺς στρατηγούς ἐπὶνουν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ περιῖδεν ὑτάφους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τετελευτηκότας χαλεπῶς διετέθησαν.

I have before remarked that Diodorus makes the mistake of talking about nothing but *dead bodies*, in place of the living *ναυαγοὶ* spoken of by Xenophon.

call at Samos, and came home in consequence; reaching Athens seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, the battle of Arginusæ having been fought in August 406 B.C. Two of the generals, however, Protomachus and Aristogenês, declined to come: warned of the displeasure of the people, and not confiding in their own case to meet it, they preferred to pay the price of voluntary exile. The other six, Periklês, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinidês, Aristokratês, and Thrasyllus, — Archedemus, one of the original ten, having died at Mitylênê,¹ — came without their two colleagues; an unpleasant augury for the result.

On their first arrival, Archedemus, at that time an acceptable popular orator, and exercising some magistracy or high office which we cannot distinctly make out,² imposed upon Erasinidês a fine to that limited amount which was within the competence of magistrates without the sanction of the dikastery, and accused him besides before the dikastery; partly for general misconduct in his command, partly on the specific charge of having purloined some public money on its way from the Hellespont. Erasinidês was found guilty, and condemned to be imprisoned, either until the money was made good, or perhaps until farther examination could take place into the other alleged misdeeds.

This trial of Erasinidês took place before the generals were

¹ Lysias, Orat. xxi ('*Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας*), sect. vii.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 2. Archedemus is described as *τῆς Δεκελείας ἐπιμελούμενος*. What is meant by these words, none of the commentators can explain in a satisfactory manner. The text must be corrupt. Some conjecture like that of Dobree seems plausible; some word like *τῆς δεκάτης* or *τῆς δεκατεύσεως*, having reference to the levying of the tithe in the Hellespont; which would furnish reasonable ground for the proceeding of Archedemus against Erasinidês.

The office held by Archedemus, whatever it was, must have been sufficiently exalted to confer upon him the power of imposing the fine of limited amount called *ἐπιβολή*.

I hesitate to identify this Archedemus with the person of that name mentioned in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, ii, 9. There seems no similarity at all in the points of character noticed.

The popular orator Archedemus was derided by Eupolis and Aristophanes as having sore eyes, and as having got his citizenship without a proper title to it (see Aristophan. Ran. 419-588, with the Scholia). He is also charged, in a line of an oration of Lysias, with having embezzled the public money (Lysias cont. Alkibiad. sect. 25, Orat. xiv).

summoned before the senate to give their formal exposition respecting the recent battle, and the subsequent neglect of the drowning men. And it might almost seem as if Archedêmus wished to impute to Erasinidês exclusively, apart from the other generals, the blame of that neglect; a distinction, as will hereafter appear, not wholly unfounded. If, however, any such design was entertained, it did not succeed. When the generals went to explain their case before the senate, the decision of that body was decidedly unfavorable to all of them, though we have no particulars of the debate which passed. On the proposition of the senator Timokratês,¹ a resolution was passed that the other five generals present should be placed in custody, as well as Erasinidês, and thus handed over to the public assembly for consideration of the case.²

The public assembly was accordingly held, and the generals were brought before it. We are here told who it was that appeared as their principal accuser, along with several others; though unfortunately we are left to guess what were the topics on which they insisted. Theramenês was the man who denounced them most vehemently, as guilty of leaving the crews of the disabled triremes to be drowned, and of neglecting all efforts to rescue them. He appealed to their own public letter to the people, officially communicating the victory; in which letter they made no mention of having appointed any one to undertake the duty, nor of having any one to blame for not performing it. The omission, therefore, was wholly their own: they might have performed it, and ought to be punished for so cruel a breach of duty.

The generals could not have a more formidable enemy than Theramenês. We have had occasion to follow him, during the revolution of the Four Hundred, as a long-sighted as well as tortuous politician: he had since been in high military command, a partaker in victory with Alkibiadês at Kyzikus and elsewhere; and he had served as trierarch in the victory of Arginusæ itself. His authority therefore was naturally high, and told for much,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 3. Τιμοκράτους ὃ ἐλπόντος, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς χρὴ δεθέντας ἐς τὸν δῆμον παραδοθῆναι, ἢ βουλῇ ἰδούσε.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4.

when he denied the justification which the generals had set up founded on the severity of the storm. According to him, they might have picked up the drowning men, and ought to have done so: either they might have done so before the storm came on, or there never was any storm of sufficient gravity to prevent them: upon their heads lay the responsibility of omission.¹ Xenophon, in his very meagre narrative, does not tell us, in express words, that Theramenês contradicted the generals as to the storm. But that he did so contradict them, point blank, is implied distinctly in that which Xenophon alleges him to have said. It seems also that Thrasybulus — another trierarch at Arginusæ, and a man not only of equal consequence, but of far more estimable character — concurred with Theramenês in this same accusation of the generals,² though not standing forward so prominently in the case. He too therefore must have denied the reality of the storm; or at least, the fact of its being so instant after the battle, or so terrible as to forbid all effort for the relief of these drowning seamen.

The case of the generals, as it stood before the Athenian public, was completely altered when men like Theramenês and Thrasybulus stood forward as their accusers. Doubtless what was said by these two had been said by others before, in the senate and elsewhere; but it was now publicly advanced by men of influence, as well as perfectly cognizant of the fact. And we are thus enabled to gather indirectly, what the narrative of Xenophon, studiously keeping back the case against the generals,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκκλησία ἐγένετο, ἐν ᾗ τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγοροῦν ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θηραμένης μάλιστα, δικάιους εἶναι λέγων λόγον ὑποσχεῖν, διότι οὐκ ἀνείλυντο τοὺς ναυαγούς. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλον καθήπταντο, ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυε μαρτύριον· καὶ ἐπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

² That Thrasybulus concurred with Theramènes in accusing the generals, is intimated in the reply which Xenophon represents the generals to have made (i, 7, 6): Καὶ οὐχ, ὅτι γε κατηγοροῦσιν ἡμῶν, ἔφασαν, ψευδόμεθα φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλύσαν τὴν ἀναίρεσιν.

The plural κατηγοροῦσιν shows that Thrasybulus as well as Theramenês stood forward to accuse the generals, though the latter was the most prominent and violent.

does not directly bring forward, that though the generals affirmed the storm, there were others present who denied it, thus putting in controversy the matter of fact which formed their solitary justification. Moreover, we come—in following the answer made by the generals in the public assembly to Theramenês and Thrasybulus—to a new point in the case, which Xenophon lets out as it were indirectly, in that confused manner which pervades his whole narrative of the transaction. It is, however, a new point of extreme moment. The generals replied that if any one was to blame for not having picked up the drowning men, it was Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves; for it was they two to whom, together with various other trierarchs and with forty-eight triremes, the generals had expressly confided the performance of this duty; it was they two who were responsible for its omission, not the generals. Nevertheless they, the generals, made no charge against Theramenês and Thrasybulus, well knowing that the storm had rendered the performance of the duty absolutely impossible, and that it was therefore a complete justification for one as well as for the other. They, the generals, at least could do no more than direct competent men like these two trierarchs to perform the task, and assign to them an adequate squadron for the purpose; while they themselves with the main fleet went to attack Eteonikus, and relieve Mitylênê. Diomedon, one of their number, had wished after the battle to employ all the ships in the fleet for the preservation of the drowning men, without thinking of anything else until that was done. Erasinidês, on the contrary, wished that all the fleet should move across at once against Mitylênê; Thrasyllus said that they had ships enough to do both at once. Accordingly, it was agreed that each general should set apart three ships from his division, to make a squadron of forty-eight ships under Thrasybulus and Theramenês. In making these statements, the generals produced pilots and others, men actually in the battle as witnesses in general confirmation.

Here, then, in this debate before the assembly, were two new and important points publicly raised. First, Theramenês and Thrasybulus denounced the generals as guilty of the death of these neglected men; next, the generals affirmed that they had delegated the duty to Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves.

If this latter were really true, how came the generals, in their official despatch first sent home, to say nothing about it? Euryptolemus, an advocate of the generals, speaking in a subsequent stage of the proceedings, though we can hardly doubt that the same topics were also urged in this very assembly, while blaming the generals for such omission, ascribed it to an ill-placed goodness on their part, and reluctance to bring Theramenês and Thrasybulus under the displeasure of the people. Most of the generals, he said, were disposed to mention the fact in their official despatch, but were dissuaded from doing so by Periklês and Diomedon; an unhappy dissuasion, in his judgment, which Theramenês and Thrasybulus had ungratefully requited by turning round and accusing them all.¹

This remarkable statement of Euryptolemus, as to the intention of the generals in wording the official despatch, brings us to a closer consideration of what really passed between them on the one side, and Theramenês and Thrasybulus on the other; which is difficult to make out clearly, but which Diodorus represents in a manner completely different from Xenophon. Diodorus states that the generals were prevented partly by the storm, partly by the fatigue and reluctance and alarm of their own seamen, from taking any steps to pick up, what he calls, the dead bodies for burial; that they suspected Theramenês and Thrasybulus, who went to Athens before them, of intending to accuse them before the people, and that for this reason they sent home intimation to the people that they had given special orders to these two trierarchs to perform the duty. When these letters were read in the public assembly, Diodorus says, the Athenians

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 17. Euryptolemus says: Κατηγορῶ μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐπεισαν τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας, βουλομένους πέμπειν γράμματα τῇ τε βουλῇ καὶ ὑμῖν, ὅτι ἐπέταξαν τῷ Θηράμηνει καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ τετταράκοντα καὶ ἑπτα τριήρεσιν ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναγαγούς, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο. Ἐλτα νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν κοινὴν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνων ἰδίᾳ ἁμαρτόντων· καὶ ἑντὶ τῆς τότε φιλανθρωπίας, νῦν ὑπ' ἐκείνων τε καὶ τινων ἄλλων ἐπιβουλευόμενοι κινδυνεύουσιν ἀπολέσθαι.

We must here construe *ἐπεισαν* as equivalent to *ἀνέπεισαν* or *μετέπεισαν*, placing a comma after *ξυνάρχοντας*. This is unusual, but not inadmissible. To persuade a man to alter his opinion or his conduct, might be expressed by *πείθειν*, though it would more properly be expressed by *ἀναπείθειν*· see *ἐπεισθῆναι*, Thucyd. iii, 32.

were excessively indignant against Theramênês ; who, however, defended himself effectively and completely, throwing the blame back upon the generals. He was thus forced, against his own will, and in self-defence, to become the accuser of the generals, carrying with him his numerous friends and partisans at Athens. And thus the generals, by trying to ruin Theramênês, finally brought condemnation upon themselves.¹

Such is the narrative of Diodorus, in which it is implied that the generals never really gave any special orders to Theramênês and Thrasybulus, but falsely asserted afterwards that they had done so, in order to discredit the accusation of Theramênês against themselves. To a certain extent, this coincides with what was asserted by Theramênês himself, two years afterwards, in his defence before the Thirty, that he was not the first to accuse the generals ; they were the first to accuse him ; affirming that they had ordered him to undertake the duty, and that there was no sufficient reason to hinder him from performing it ; they were the persons who distinctly pronounced the performance of the duty to be possible, while he had said, from the beginning, that the violence of the storm was such as even to forbid any movement in the water ; much more, to prevent rescue of the drowning men.²

Taking the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus together, in combination with the subsequent accusation and defence of Theramênês at the time of the Thirty, and blending them so as to reject as little as possible of either, I think it probable that the order for picking up the exposed men was really given by the generals to Theramênês, Thrasybulus, and other trierarchs ; but

¹ Diodor. xiii, 100, 101.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35. If Theramênês really did say, in the actual discussions at Athens on the conduct of the generals, that which he here asserts himself to have said, namely, that the violence of the storm rendered it impossible for any one to put to sea, his accusation against the generals must have been grounded upon alleging that they might have performed the duty at an earlier moment ; before they came back from the battle ; before the storm arose ; before they gave the order to him. But I think it most probable that he misrepresented at the later period what he had said at the earlier, and that he did not, during the actual discussions, admit the sufficiency of the storm as fact and justification.

that, first, a fatal interval was allowed to elapse between the close of the battle and the giving of such order; next, that the forty-eight triremes talked of for the service, and proposed to be furnished by drafts of three out of each general's division, were probably never assembled; or, if they assembled, were so little zealous in the business as to satisfy themselves very easily that the storm was too dangerous to brave, and that it was now too late. For when we read the version of the transaction, even as given by Eurypotemus, we see plainly that none of the generals, except Diomedon, was eager in the performance of the task. It is a memorable fact, that of all the eight generals, not one of them undertook the business in person, although its purpose was to save more than a thousand drowning comrades from death.¹ In a proceeding where every interval even of five minutes was precious, they go to work in the most dilatory manner, by determining that each general shall furnish three ships, and no more, from his division. Now we know from the statement of Xenophon, that, towards the close of the battle, the ships on both sides were much dispersed.² Such collective direction therefore would not be quickly realized; nor, until all the eight fractions were united, together with the Samians and others, so as to make the force complete, would Theramenês feel bound to go out upon his preserving visitation. He doubtless disliked the service, as we see that most of the generals did; while the crews also, who had just got to land after having gained a victory, were thinking most about rest and refreshment, and mutual congratulations.³ All

¹ The total number of ships lost with all their crews was twenty-five, of which the aggregate crews, speaking in round numbers, would be five thousand men. Now we may fairly calculate that each one of the disabled ships would have on board half her crew, or one hundred men, after the action; not more than half would have been slain or drowned in the combat. Even ten disabled ships would thus contain one thousand living men, wounded and unwounded. It will be seen, therefore, that I have understated the number of lives in danger.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 83.

³ We read in Thucydides (vii, 73) how impossible it was to prevail on the Syracusans to make any military movement after their last maritime victory in the Great Harbor, when they were full of triumph, felicitation, and enjoyment.

They had visited the wrecks and picked up both the living men on board

were glad to find some excuse for staying in their moorings instead of going out again to buffet what was doubtless unfavorable weather. Partly from this want of zeal, coming in addition to the original delay, partly from the bad weather, the duty remained unexecuted, and the seamen on board the damaged ships were left to perish unassisted.

But presently arose the delicate, yet unavoidable question, "How are we to account for the omission of this sacred duty, in our official despatch to the Athenian people?" Here the generals differed among themselves, as Euryptolemus expressly states: Periklês and Diomedon carried it, against the judgment of their colleagues, that in the official despatch, which was necessarily such as could be agreed to by all, nothing should be said about the delegation to Theramenês and others; the whole omission being referred to the terrors of the storm. But though such was the tenor of the official report, there was nothing to hinder the generals from writing home and communicating individually with their friends in Athens as each might think fit; and in these unofficial communications, from them as well as from others who went home from the armament, — communications not less efficacious than the official despatch, in determining the tone of public feeling at Athens, — they did not disguise their convictions that the blame of not performing the duty belonged to Theramenês. Having thus a man like Theramenês to throw the blame upon, they did not take pains to keep up the story of the intolerable storm, but intimated that there had been nothing to hinder *him* from performing the duty if he had chosen. It is this which he accuses them of having advanced against him, so as to place him as the guilty man before the Athenian public: it was this which made him, in retaliation and self-defence, violent and unscrupulous in denouncing them as the persons really blamable.¹ As they

and the floating bodies *before* they went ashore. It is remarkable that the Athenians on that occasion were so completely overpowered by the immensity of their disaster, that they never even thought of asking permission, always granted by the victors when asked, to pick up their dead or visit their wrecks (viii, 72).

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 32. The light in which I here place the conduct of Theramenês is not only coincident with Diodorus, but with the representations of Kritias, the violent enemy of Theramenês under the govern-

had made light of this alleged storm, in casting the blame upon him, so he again made light of it, and treated it as an insufficient excuse, in his denunciations against them; taking care to make good use of their official despatch, which virtually exonerated him, by its silence, from any concern in the matter.

Such is the way in which I conceive the relations to have stood between the generals on one side and Theramenês on the other, having regard to all that is said both in Xenophon and in Diodorus. But the comparative account of blame and recrimination between these two parties is not the most important feature of the case. The really serious inquiry is, as to the intensity or instant occurrence of the storm. Was it really so instant and so dangerous, that the duty of visiting the wrecks could not be performed, either before the ships went back to Arginusæ, or afterwards? If we take the circumstances of the case, and apply them to the habits and feelings of the English navy, if we suppose more than one thousand seamen, late comrades in the victory, distributed among twenty damaged and helpless hulls, awaiting the moment when these hulls would fill and consign them all to a watery grave, it must have been a frightful storm indeed, which would force an English admiral even to go back to his moorings leaving these men so exposed, or which would deter him, if he were at his moorings, from sending out the very first and nearest ships at hand to save them. And granting the danger to be such that he hesitated to give the order, there

ment of the Thirty, just before he was going to put Theramenês to death: Οὗτος δέ τοι ἐστίν, ὃς ταχθεὶς ἀνελέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς καταδύντας Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ περὶ Λέσβον ναυμαχίᾳ, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀνελόμενος ὁμῶς τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτοῦς, ἵνα αὐτὸς παρῖσθῃ εἰς τὴν. (Xen. *ut sup.*)

Here it stands admitted that the first impression at Athens was, as Diodorus states expressly, that Theramenês was ordered to pick up the men on the wrecks, might have done it if he had taken proper pains, and was to blame for not doing it. Now how did this impression arise? Of course, through communications received from the armament itself. And when Theramenês, in his reply, says that the generals themselves made communications in the same tenor, there is no reason why we should not believe him, in spite of their joint official despatch, wherein they made no mention of him, and in spite of their speech in the public assembly afterwards, where the previous official letter fettered them, and prevented them from accusing

would probably be found officers and men to volunteer, against the most desperate risks, in a cause so profoundly moving all their best sympathies. Now, unfortunately for the character of Athenian generals, officers, and men, at Arginusæ, — for the blame belongs, though in unequal proportions, to all of them, — there exists here strong presumptive proof that the storm on this occasion was not such as would have deterred any Grecian seamen animated by an earnest and courageous sense of duty. We have only to advert to the conduct and escape of Eteonikus and the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios; recollecting that Mitylênê was separated from the promontory of Kanê on the Asiatic mainland, and from the isles of Arginusæ, by a channel only one hundred and twenty stadia broad,¹ about fourteen English miles. Eteonikus, apprized of the defeat by the Peloponnesian official signal-boat, desired that boat to go out of the harbor, and then to sail into it again with deceptive false news, to the effect that the Peloponnesians had gained a complete victory: he then directed his seamen, after taking their dinners, to depart immediately, and the masters of the merchant vessels silently to put their cargoes aboard, and get to sea also. The whole fleet, triremes and merchant vessels both, thus went out of the harbor of Mitylênê and made straight for Chios, whither they arrived in safety; the merchant vessels carrying their sails, and having what Xenophon calls "a fair wind."² Now it is scarcely possi-

him, forcing them to adhere to the statement first made, of the all-sufficiency of the storm.

The main facts which we here find established, even by the enemies of Theramenês, are: 1. That Theramenês accused the generals because he found himself in danger of being punished for the neglect. 2. That his enemies, who charged him with the breach of duty, did not admit the storm as an excuse for him.

¹ Strabo, xiii, p. 617.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 37. 'Ετεόνικος δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι (the signal-boat, with news of the pretended victory) κατέπλεον, ἔδνε τὰ εὐαγγέλια, καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρήγγειλε δειπνοποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις, τὰ σκρήματα σιωπῇ ἐνδεμένους ἐς τὰ πλοῖα ἀποκλεῖν ἐς Χίον, ἣν δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα οὐρίον, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις τὴν ταχίστην. Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπῆγεν ἐς τὴν Μηθύμνην, τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσας. Κόνων δὲ καθελκύσας τὰς ναῦς, ἐπεὶ οἱ τε πολέμιοι ἀποδεδράκεσαν, καὶ ὁ ἀνεμος εὐδαιότερος ἦν, ἀπαντήσας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἀνηγμένους ἐκ τῶν Ἀργινουσῶν, ἔφρασε τὰ περὶ Ἐτεονίκου.

One sees, by the expression used by Xenophon respecting the proceedings

ble that all this could have taken place, had there blown during this time an intolerable storm between Mitylênê and Arginusæ. If the weather was such as to allow of the safe transit of Eteonikus and all his fleet from Mitylênê to Chios, it was not such as to form a legitimate obstacle capable of deterring any generous Athenian seaman, still less a responsible officer, from saving his comrades exposed on the wrecks near Arginusæ. Least of all was it such as ought to have hindered the attempt to save them, even if such attempt had proved unsuccessful. And here the gravity of the sin consists, in having remained inactive while the brave men on the wrecks were left to be drowned. All this reasoning, too, assumes the fleet to have been already brought back to its moorings at Arginusæ, discussing only how much was practicable to effect after that moment, and leaving untouched the no less important question, why the drowning men were not picked up before the fleet went back.

I have thought it right to go over these considerations, indispensable to the fair appreciation of this memorable event, in order that the reader may understand the feelings of the assembly and the public of Athens, when the generals stood before them, rebutting the accusations of Theramenês and recriminating in their turn against him. The assembly had before them the grave and deplorable fact, that several hundreds of brave seamen had been suffered to drown on the wrecks, without the least effort to rescue them. In explanation of this fact, they had not only no justification, at once undisputed and satisfactory, but not even any straightforward, consistent, and uncontradicted statement of facts. There were discrepancies among the generals themselves, comparing their official with their unofficial, as well as with their present statements, and contradictions between them and Theramenês, each having denied the sufficiency of the storm as a vindication for the neglect imputed to the other. It was

of Konon, that he went out of the harbor "as soon as the wind became calmer;" that it blew a strong wind, though in a direction favorable to carry the fleet of Eteonikus to Chios. Konon was under no particular motive to go out immediately: he could afford to wait until the wind became quite calm. The important fact is, that wind and weather were perfectly compatible with, indeed even favorable to, the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios.

impossible that the assembly could be satisfied to acquit the generals on such a presentation of the case; nor could they well know how to apportion the blame between them and Theramênês. The relatives of the men left to perish would be doubtless in a state of violent resentment against one or other of the two, perhaps against both. Under these circumstances, it could hardly have been the sufficiency of their defence,—it must have been rather the apparent generosity of their conduct towards Theramênês, in formally disavowing all charge of neglect against him, though he had advanced a violent charge against them,—which produced the result that we read in Xenophon. The defence of the generals was listened to with favor and seemed likely to prevail with the majority.¹ Many individuals present offered themselves as bail for the generals, in order that the latter might be liberated from custody: but the debate had been so much prolonged—we see from hence that there must have been a great deal of speaking—that it was now dark, so that no vote could be taken, because the show of hands was not distinguishable. It was therefore resolved to adjourn the whole decision until another assembly; but that in the mean time the senate should meet, should consider what would be the proper mode of trying and judging the generals, and should submit a proposition to that effect to the approaching assembly.

It so chanced that immediately after this first assembly, during the interval before the meeting of the senate or the holding of the second assembly, the three days of the solemn annual festival called Apaturia intervened; early days in the month of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 5-7. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχεία ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὔτεθ' ὅτισι λόγοις κατὰ τὸν νόμον.....

Τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἐπειθοῦν τὸν ὄχλον. The imperfect tense ἐπειθοῦν must be noticed: "they were persuading," or, *seemed in the way to persuade*, the people; not ἐπεισαν the aorist, which would mean that they actually did satisfy the people.

The first words here cited from Xenophon, do not imply that the generals were checked or abridged in their liberty of speaking before the public assembly, but merely that no judicial trial and defence were granted to them. In judicial defence, the person accused had a measured time for defence—by the clepsydra, or water-clock—allotted to him, during which no one could interrupt him; a time doubtless much longer than any single speaker would be permitted to occupy in the public assembly.

October. This was the characteristic festival of the Ionic race; handed down from a period anterior to the constitution of Kleis-thenês, and to the ten new tribes each containing so many demes, and bringing together the citizens in their primitive unions of family, gens, phratry, etc., the aggregate of which had originally constituted the four Ionic tribes, now superannuated. At the Apaturia, the family ceremonies were gone through; marriages were enrolled, acts of adoption were promulgated and certified, the names of youthful citizens first entered on the gentile and phratrie roll; sacrifices were jointly celebrated by these family assemblages to Zeus Phratrius, Athênê, and other deities, accompanied with much festivity and enjoyment. A solemnity like this, celebrated every year, naturally provoked in each of these little unions, questions of affectionate interest: "Who are those that were with us last year, but are not here now? The absent, where are they? The deceased, where or how did they die?" Now the crews of the twenty-five Athenian triremes, lost at the battle of Arginusæ, at least all those among them who were free-men, had been members of some one of these family unions, and were missed on this occasion. The answer to the above inquiry, in their case, would be one alike melancholy and revolting: "They fought like brave men, and had their full share in the victory: their trireme was broken, disabled, and made a wreck, in the battle: aboard this wreck they were left to perish, while their victorious generals and comrades made not the smallest effort to preserve them." To hear this about fathers, brothers, and friends,—and to hear it in the midst of a sympathizing family circle,—was well calculated to stir up an agony of shame, sorrow, and anger, united; an intolerable sentiment, which required as a satisfaction, and seemed even to impose as a duty, the punishment of those who had left these brave comrades to perish. Many of the gentile unions, in spite of the usually festive and cheerful character of the Apaturia, were so absorbed by this sentiment, that they clothed themselves in black garments and shaved their heads in token of mourning, resolving to present themselves in this guise at the coming assembly, and to appease the manes of their abandoned kinsmen by every possible effort to procure retribution on the generals.¹

¹ Lysias puts into one of his orations a similar expression respecting the

Xenophon in his narrative describes this burst of feeling at the Apaturia as false and factitious, and the men in mourning as a number of hired impostors, got up by the artifices of Theramenês,¹ to destroy the generals. But the case was one in which

feeling at Athens towards these generals; ἡγοούμενοι χρήναι τῇ τῶν τεθνήκτων ὑπερῇ παρ' ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν; *Lysias* cont. *Eratosth.* s. 37.

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 7, 8. Οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην παρεσκεύασαν ἀνδράτους μέλανα ἱμάτια ἔχοντας, καὶ ἐν χρῶ κεκαρμένους πολλοὺς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἑορτῇ, ἵνα πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἤκοιεν, ὥς δὲ ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες τῶν ἀπολωλότων.

Here I adopt substantially the statement of Diodorus, who gives a juster and more natural description of the proceeding; representing it as a spontaneous action of mournful and vindictive feeling on the part of the kinsmen of the deceased (xiii, 101).

Other historians of Greece, Dr. Thirlwall not excepted (*Hist. of Greece*, ch. xxx, vol. iv, pp. 117-125), follow Xenophon on this point. They treat the intense sentiment against the generals at Athens as "popular prejudices;" "excitement produced by the artifices of Theramenês," (Dr. Thirlwall, pp. 117-124.) "Theramenês (he says) hired a great number of persons to attend the festival, dressed in black, and with their heads shaven, as mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost in the sea-fight."

Yet Dr. Thirlwall speaks of the narrative of Xenophon in the most unfavorable terms; and certainly in terms no worse than it deserves (see p. 116, the note): "It looks as if Xenophon had *purposely* involved the whole affair in obscurity." Compare also p. 123, where his criticism is equally severe.

I have little scruple in deserting the narrative of Xenophon, of which I think as meanly as Dr. Thirlwall, so far as to supply, without contradicting any of his main allegations, an omission which I consider capital and preponderant. I accept his account of what actually passed at the festival of the Apaturia, but I deny his statement of the manoeuvres of Theramenês as the producing cause.

Most of the obscurity which surrounds these proceedings at Athens arises from the fact, that no notice has been taken of the intense and spontaneous emotion which the desertion of the men on the wrecks was naturally calculated to produce on the public mind. It would, in my judgment, have been unaccountable if such an effect had not been produced, quite apart from all instigations of Theramenês. The moment that we recognize this capital fact, the series of transactions becomes comparatively perspicuous and explicable.

Dr. Thirlwall, as well as Sievers (*Commentat. de Xenophontis Hellen.* pp. 25-30), suppose Theramenês to have acted in concert with the oligarchical party, in making use of this incident to bring about the ruin of generals odious to them, several of whom were connected with Alkibiadês. I

no artifice was needed. The universal and self-acting stimulants of intense human sympathy stand here so prominently marked, that it is not simply superfluous but even misleading, to look behind for the gold and machinations of a political instigator. The-ramenês might do all that he could to turn the public displeasure against the generals, and to prevent it from turning against himself: it is also certain that he did much to annihilate their defence. He may thus have had some influence in directing the sentiment against them, but he could have had little or none in creating it. Nay, it is not too much to say that no factitious agency of this sort could ever have prevailed on the Athenian public to desecrate such a festival as the Apaturia, by all the insignia of mourning. If they did so, it could only have been through some internal emotion alike spontaneous and violent, such as the late event was well calculated to arouse.

Moreover, what can be more improbable than the allegation that a great number of men were hired to personate the fathers or brothers of deceased Athenian citizens, all well known to their really surviving kinsmen? What more improbable, than the story that numbers of men would suffer themselves to be hired, not merely to put on black clothes for the day, which might be taken off in the evening, but also to shave their heads, thus stamping upon themselves an ineffaceable evidence of the fraud, until the hair had grown again? That a cunning man, like The-ramenês, should thus distribute his bribes to a number of persons, all presenting naked heads which testified his guilt, when there were real kinsmen surviving to prove the fact of personation? That having done this, he should never be arraigned or accused for it afterwards,—neither during the prodigious reaction of feeling which took place after the condemnation of the generals, which Xenophon himself so strongly attests, and which fell so heavily upon Kallixenus and others,—nor by his bitter enemy Kritias, under the government of the Thirty? Not only The-ramenês is never mentioned as having been afterwards accused, but, for aught that appears, he preserved his political influence and standing, with little if any abatement. This is one forcible

confess, that I see nothing to countenance this idea: but at all events, the cause here named is only secondary, not the grand and dominant fact of the period

reason among many others, for disbelieving the bribes and the all-pervading machinations which Xenophon represents him as having put forth, in order to procure the condemnation of the generals. His speaking in the first public assembly, and his numerous partisans voting in the second, doubtless contributed much to that result, and by his own desire. But to ascribe to his bribes and intrigues the violent and overruling emotion of the Athenian public, is, in my judgment, a supposition alike unnatural and preposterous both with regard to them and with regard to him.

When the senate met, after the Apaturia, to discharge the duty confided to it by the last public assembly, of determining in what manner the generals should be judged, and submitting their opinion for the consideration of the next assembly, the senator Kallixenus — at the instigation of Theramênês, if Xenophon is to be believed — proposed, and the majority of the senate adopted, the following resolution: "The Athenian people having already heard, in the previous assembly, both the accusation and the defence of the generals, shall at once come to a vote on the subject by tribes. For each tribe two urns shall be placed, and the herald of each tribe shall proclaim: All citizens who think the generals guilty, for not having rescued the warriors who had conquered in the battle, shall drop their pebbles into the foremost urn; all who think otherwise, into the hindmost. Should the generals be pronounced guilty, by the result of the voting, they shall be delivered to the Eleven, and punished with death; their property shall be confiscated, the tenth part being set apart for the goddess Athênê."¹ One single vote was to embrace the case of all the eight generals.²

The unparalleled burst of mournful and vindictive feeling at the festival of the Apaturia, extending by contagion from the relatives of the deceased to many other citizens, — and the probability thus created that the coming assembly would sanction the most violent measures against the generals, — probably emboldened Kallixenus to propose, and prompted the senate to adopt, this deplorable resolution. As soon as the assembly met, it was read and moved by Kallixenus himself, as coming from the senate in discharge of the commission imposed upon them by the people.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 8, 9.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 34.

It was heard by a large portion of the assembly with well-merited indignation. Its enormity consisted in breaking through the established constitutional maxims and judicial practices of the Athenian democracy. It deprived the accused generals of all fair trial; alleging, with a mere faint pretence of truth which was little better than utter falsehood, that their defence as well as their accusation had been heard in the preceding assembly. Now there has been no people, ancient or modern, in whose view the formalities of judicial trial were habitually more sacred and indispensable than in that of the Athenians; formalities including ample notice beforehand to the accused party, with a measured and sufficient space of time for him to make his defence before the dikasts; while those dikasts were men who had been sworn beforehand as a body, yet were selected by lot for each occasion as individuals. From all these securities the generals were now to be debarred; and submitted, for their lives, honors, and fortunes, to a simple vote of the unsworn public assembly, without hearing or defence. Nor was this all. One single vote was to be taken in condemnation or absolution of the eight generals collectively. Now there was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism of Kannónus,—originally adopted, we do not know when, on the proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for some particular case, but since generalized into common practice, and grown into great prescriptive reverence,—which peremptorily forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a separate judicial vote should, in all cases, be taken for or against each accused party. The psephism of Kannónus, together with all the other respected maxims of Athenian criminal justice, was here audaciously trampled under foot.¹

¹ I cannot concur with the opinion expressed by Dr. Thirlwall in Appendix iii, vol. iv, p. 501, of his History, on the subject of the psephism of Kannónus. The view which I give in the text coincides with that of the expositors generally, from whom Dr. Thirlwall dissents.

The psephism of Kannónus was the only enactment at Athens which made it illegal to vote upon the case of two accused persons at once. This had now grown into a practice in the judicial proceedings at Athens; so that two or more prisoners, who were ostensibly tried under some other law, and not under the psephism of Kannónus, with its various provisions, would yet have the benefit of this its particular provision, namely, severance of trial.

As soon as the resolution was read in the public assembly, Euryptolemus, an intimate friend of the generals, denounced it as

In the particular case before us, Euryptolemus was thrown back to appeal to the psephism itself; which the senate, by a proposition unheard of at Athens, proposed to contravene. The proposition of the senate offended against the law in several different ways. It deprived the generals of trial before a sworn dikastery; it also deprived them of the liberty of full defence during a measured time: but farther, it prescribed that they should all be condemned or absolved by one and the same vote; and, in this last respect, it sinned against the psephism of Kannónus. Euryptolemus in his speech, endeavoring to persuade an exasperated assembly to reject the proposition of the senate and adopt the psephism of Kannónus as the basis of the trial, very prudently dwells upon the severe provisions of the psephism, and artfully slurs over what he principally aims at, the severance of the trials, by offering his relative Periklēs to be tried *first*. The words *δίχα ἕκαστον* (sect 37) appear to me to be naturally construed with *κατὰ τὸ Καννόνου ψήφισμα*, as they are by most commentators, though Dr. Thirlwall dissents from it. It is certain that this was the capital feature of illegality, among many, which the proposition of the senate presented, I mean the judging and condemning all the generals by *one* vote. It was upon this point that the amendment of Euryptolemus was taken, and that the obstinate resistance of Sokratēs turned (Plato, *Apol.* 20; Xenoph. *Memor.* i, 1, 18).

Farther, Dr. Thirlwall, in assigning what he believes to have been the real tenor of the psephism of Kannónus, appears to me to have been misled by the Scholiast in his interpretation of the much-discussed passage of Aristophanēs, *Ekkleziās*. 1089:—

Τοῦτ' ἰδὲ πρᾶγμα κατὰ τὸ Καννόνου σαφές
ἤψισμα, βινεῖν δὲ με διαλελημμένον,
Πῶς οὖν δικαπεῖν ἀμφοτέρας ἀνέησομαι;

Upon which Dr. Thirlwall observes, "that the young man is comparing his plight to that of a culprit, who, under the decree of Cannónus, was placed at the bar held by a person on each side. In this sense the Greek Scholiast, though his words are corrupted, clearly understood the passage."

I cannot but think that the Scholiast understood the words completely wrong. The young man in Aristophanēs does not compare his situation with that of the culprit, but with that of the dikastery which tried culprits. The psephism of Kannónus directed that each defendant should be tried separately: accordingly, if it happened that two defendants were presented for trial, and were both to be tried without a moment's delay, the dikastery could only effect this object by dividing itself into two halves, or portions; which was perfectly practicable, whether often practised or not, as it was a numerous body. By doing this, *κρίνειν διαλελημμένον*, it could try both the defendants at once: but in no other way.

Now the young man in Aristophanēs compares himself to the dikastery thus circumstanced; which comparison is signified by the pun of *βινεῖν*

grossly illegal and unconstitutional, presenting a notice of indictment against Kallixenus, under the *Graphê Paranomôn*, for having proposed a resolution of that tenor. Several other citizens supported the notice of indictment, which, according to the received practice of Athens, would arrest the farther progress of the measure until the trial of its proposer had been consummated. Nor was there ever any proposition made at Athens, to which the *Graphê Paranomôn* more closely and righteously applied.

But the numerous partisans of Kallixenus — especially the men who stood by in habits of mourning, with shaven heads, agitated with sad recollections and thirst of vengeance — were in no temper to respect this constitutional impediment to the discussion of what had already been passed by the senate. They loudly clamored, that "it was intolerable to see a small knot of citizens thus hindering the assembled people from doing what they chose;" and one of their number, Lykiskus, even went so far as to threaten that those who tendered the indictment against Kallixenus should be judged by the same vote along with the generals, if they would not let the assembly proceed to consider and determine on the motion just read.¹ The excited disposition of the large party thus congregated, farther inflamed by this menace of Lykiskus, was wound up to its highest pitch by various other speakers; especially by one, who stood forward and said:

διαλελημμένον in place of *κρίνειν διαλελημμένον*. He is assailed by two obtrusive and importunate customers, neither of whom will wait until the other has been served. Accordingly he says: "Clearly, I ought to be divided into two parts, like a dikastery acting under the psephism of Kannónus, to deal with this matter: yet how *shall* I be able to serve both at once?"

This I conceive to be the proper explanation of the passage in Aristophanês; and it affords a striking confirmation of the truth of that which is generally received as purport of the psephism of Kannónus. The Scholiast appears to me to have puzzled himself, and to have misled every one else.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7. Τὸν δὲ Καλλιξένον προσεκαλέσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες ξυγγεγραμέναι, Εὐρυπτόλεμός τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἑνίνας· τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπὶ φωνῇ· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα, δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πρᾶττειν, ὃ ἂν βούληται. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἰπόντος Δυκίσκου, καὶ τούτους τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι, ἥπερ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς, ἔαν μὴ ὑφ᾽ ὧσι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ δῆμος, καὶ ἡγαγασθῶσαν ὑφίεναι τὰς κλήσεις.

All this violence is directed to the special object of getting the proposition discussed and decided on by the assembly, in spite of constitutional obstacles.

"Athenians! I was myself a wrecked man in the battle; I escaped only by getting upon an empty meal-tub; but my comrades, perishing on the wrecks near me, implored me, if I should myself be saved, to make known to the Athenian people, that their generals had abandoned to death warriors who had bravely conquered in behalf of their country." Even in the most tranquil state of the public mind, such a communication of the last words of these drowning men, reported by an ear-witness, would have been heard with emotion; but under the actual predisposing excitement, it went to the inmost depth of the hearers' souls, and marked the generals as doomed men.¹ Doubtless there were

¹ Xenoph. Hellen, i, 7, 11. Παρήλθε δέ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων, ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους εἰς σωθῆναι, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.

I venture to say that there is nothing in the whole compass of ancient oratory, more full of genuine pathos and more profoundly impressive, than this simple incident and speech; though recounted in the most bald manner, by an unfriendly and contemptuous advocate.

Yet the whole effect of it is lost, because the habit is to dismiss everything which goes to inculcate the generals, and to justify the vehement emotion of the Athenian public, as if it was mere stage-trick and falsehood. Dr. Thirlwall goes even beyond Xenophon, when he says (p. 119, vol. iv): "A man was brought forward, who pretended he had been preserved by clinging to a meal-barrel, and that his comrades," etc. So Mr. Mitford: "A man was produced," etc. (p. 347).

Now παρήλθε does not mean, "*he was brought forward*:" it is a common word employed to signify one who *comes forward* to speak in the public assembly (see Thucyd. iii, 44, and the participle παρελθόν, in numerous places).

Next, φάσκων, while it sometimes means *pretending*, sometimes also means simply *affirming*: Xenophon does not guarantee the matter affirmed, but neither does he pronounce it to be false. He uses φάσκων in various cases where he himself agrees with the fact affirmed (see Hellen. i, 7, 12; Memorab. i, 2, 29; Cyropæd. viii, 3, 41; Plato, Ap. Socr. c. 6, p. 21).

The people of Athens heard and fully believed this deposition; nor do I see any reason why an historian of Greece should disbelieve it. There is nothing in the assertion of this man which is at all improbable; nay, more, it is plain that several such incidents must have happened. If we take the smallest pains to expand in our imaginations the details connected with this painfully interesting crisis at Athens, we shall see that numerous stories of the same affecting character must have been in circulation; doubtless many false, but many also perfectly true.

other similar statements, not expressly mentioned to us, bringing to view the same fact in other ways, and all contributing to aggravate the violence of the public manifestations; which at length reached such a point, that Euryptolemus was forced to withdraw his notice of indictment against Kallixenus.

Now, however, a new form of resistance sprung up, still preventing the proposition from being taken into consideration by the assembly. Some of the prytanes,—or senators of the presiding tribe, on that occasion the tribe Antiochis,—the legal presidents of the assembly, refused to entertain or put the question; which, being illegal and unconstitutional, not only inspired them with aversion, but also rendered them personally open to penalties. Kallixenus employed against them the same menaces which Lykiskus had uttered against Euryptolemus: he threatened, amidst encouraging clamor from many persons in the assembly, to include them in the same accusation with the generals. So intimidated were the prytanes by the incensed manifestations of the assembly, that all of them, except one, relinquished their opposition, and agreed to put the question. The single obstinate prytanis, whose refusal no menace could subdue, was a man whose name we read with peculiar interest, and in whom an impregnable adherence to law and duty was only one among many other titles to reverence. It was the philosopher Sokratês; on this trying occasion, once throughout a life of seventy years, discharging a political office, among the fifty senators taken by lot from the tribe Antiochis. Sokratês could not be induced to withdraw his protest, so that the question was ultimately put by the remaining prytanes without his concurrence.¹ It should be observed that his resistance did not imply any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the generals, but applied simply to the illegal and unconstitutional proposition now submitted for determining their fate

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 14, 15; Plato, Apol. Socr. c. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 18; iv, 4, 2.

In the passage of the Memorabilia, Xenophon says that Sokratês was epistatês, or presiding prytanis, for that actual day. In the Hellenica, he only reckons him as one among the prytanes. It can hardly be accounted certain that he *was* epistatês, the rather as this same passage of the Memorabilia is inaccurate on another point: it names *nine* generals as having been condemned, instead of *eight*.

a proposition, which he must already have opposed once before, in his capacity of member of the senate.

The constitutional impediments having been thus violently overthrown, the question was regularly put by the prytanes to the assembly. At once the clamorous outcry ceased, and those who had raised it resumed their behavior of Athenian citizens, patient hearers of speeches and opinions directly opposed to their own. Nothing is more deserving of notice than this change of demeanor. The champions of the men drowned on the wrecks had resolved to employ as much force as was required to eliminate those preliminary constitutional objections, in themselves indisputable, which precluded the discussion. But so soon as the discussion was once begun, they were careful not to give to the resolution the appearance of being carried by force. Euryptolemus, the personal friend of the generals, was allowed not only to move an amendment negating the proposition of Kallixenus, but also to develop it in a long speech, which Xenophon sets before us.¹

His speech is one of great skill and judgment in reference to the case before him and to the temper of the assembly. Beginning with a gentle censure on his friends, the generals Periklēs and Diomedon, for having prevailed on their colleagues to abstain from mentioning, in their first official letter, the orders given to Theramenēs, he represented them as now in danger of becoming victims to the base conspiracy of the latter, and threw himself upon the justice of the people to grant them a fair trial. He besought the people to take full time to instruct themselves before they pronounced so solemn and irrevocable a sentence; to trust only to their own judgment, but at the same time to take security that judgment should be pronounced after full information and impartial hearing, and thus to escape that bitter and unavailing remorse which would otherwise surely follow. He proposed that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannōnus, with proper notice, and ample time allowed for the defence as well as for the accusation; but that, if found guilty, they should suffer the heaviest and most disgraceful penalties, his own relation Periklēs the first. This

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 16. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, that is, after the cries and threats above recounted, ἀναβὰς Εὐρυπτόλεμος ἔλεξεν ὑπὲρ τῶν στρατηγῶν τάδε, etc.

was the only way of striking the guilty, of saving the innocent, and of preserving Athens from the ingratitude and impiety of condemning to death, without trial as well as contrary to law, generals who had just rendered to her so important a service. And what could the people be afraid of? Did they fear lest the power of trial should slip out of their hands, that they were so impatient to leap over all the delays prescribed by the law?¹ To the worst of public traitors, Aristarchus, they had granted a day with full notice for trial, with all the legal means for making his defence: and would they now show such flagrant contrariety of measure to victorious and faithful officers? "Be not ye (he said) the men to act thus, Athenians. The laws are your own work; it is through them that ye chiefly hold your greatness: cherish them, and attempt not any proceeding without their sanction."²

Euryptolemus then shortly recapitulated the proceedings after the battle, with the violence of the storm which had prevented approach to the wrecks; adding that one of the generals, now in peril, had himself been on board a broken ship, and had only escaped by a fortunate accident.³ Gaining courage from his own harangue, he concluded by reminding the Athenians of the brilliancy of the victory, and by telling them that they ought in justice to wreath the brows of the conquerors, instead of following those wicked advisers who pressed for their execution.⁴

It is no small proof of the force of established habits of public discussion, that the men in mourning and with shaven heads, who had been a few minutes before in a state of furious excitement, should patiently hear out a speech so effective and so conflicting with their strongest sentiments as this of Euryptolemus. Perhaps others may have spoken also; but Xenophon does not men-

¹ It is this accusation of "reckless hurry," *προπέτεια*, which Pausanias brings against the Athenians in reference to their behavior toward the six generals (vi, 7, 2).

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 30. *Μὴ ὑμεῖς γε, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι· ἀλλ' ἐαυτῶν ὄντας τοὺς νόμους, δι' οὓς μάλιστα μέγιστοί ἐστε, φυλάττοντες, ἀνευ τούτων μηδὲν πρᾶττειν πειρᾶσθε.*

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 35. *τούτων δὲ μάρτυρες οἱ σωθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἵματος, ὧν εἰς τῶν ὑμετέρων στρατηγῶν ἐπὶ καταδόσης νεῶς σωθεῖς, etc.*

⁴ The speech is contained in Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 16-36.

tion them. It is remarkable that he does not name Theraménès as taking any part in this last debate.

The substantive amendment proposed by Euryptolemus was, that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannónus; implying notice to be given to each, of the day of trial, and full time for each to defend himself. This proposition, as well as that of the senate moved by Kallixenus, was submitted to the vote of the assembly; hands being separately held up, first for one, next for the other. The prytanes pronounced the amendment of Euryptolemus to be carried. But a citizen named Meneklès impeached their decision as wrong or invalid, alleging seemingly some informality or trick in putting the question, or perhaps erroneous report of the comparative show of hands. We must recollect that in this case the prytanes were declared partisans. Feeling that they were doing wrong in suffering so illegal a proposition as that of Kallixenus to be put at all, and that the adoption of it would be a great public mischief, they would hardly scruple to try and defeat it even by some unfair manœuvre. But the exception taken by Meneklès constrained them to put the question over again, and they were then obliged to pronounce that the majority was in favor of the proposition of Kallixenus.¹

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 38. *Τούτων δὲ διαχειροτονουμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔκριναν τὴν Εὐρυπτολέμου· ὑπομοσαμένου δὲ Μενεκλέους, καὶ πάλιν διαχειροτονίας γενομένης, ἔκριναν τὴν τῆς βουλῆς.*

I cannot think that the explanations of this passage given either by Schömann (*De Comitibus Athen.* part ii, 1, p. 160, *seq.*) or by Meier and Schömann (*Der Attische Prozess*, b. iii, p. 295; b. iv, p. 696) are satisfactory. The idea of Schömann, that, in consequence of the unconquerable resistance of Sokratēs, the voting upon this question was postponed until the next day, appears to me completely inconsistent with the account of Xenophon; and, though countenanced by a passage in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called *Axiochus* (c. 12), altogether loose and untrustworthy. It is plain to me that the question was put without Sokratēs, and could be legally put by the remaining prytanes, in spite of his resistance. The word *ὑπομοσία* must doubtless bear a meaning somewhat different here to its technical sense before the dikastery; and different also, I think, to the other sense which Meier and Schömann ascribe to it, of *a formal engagement to prefer at some future time an indictment*, or *γραφὴ παρανόμων*. It seems to me here to denote, an *objection taken on formal grounds, and sustained*

That proposition was shortly afterwards carried into effect by disposing the two urns for each tribe, and collecting the votes of the citizens individually. The condemnatory vote prevailed, and all the eight generals were thus found guilty; whether by a large or a small majority we should have been glad to learn, but are not told. The majority was composed mostly of those who acted under a feeling of genuine resentment against the generals, but in part also of the friends and partisans of Theramenes,¹ not inconsiderable in number. The six generals then at Athens, — Perikles (son of the great statesman of that name by Aspasia), Diomedon, Erasinidês, Thrasyllus, Lysias, and Aristokratês, — were then delivered to the Eleven, and perished by the usual draught

by oath either tendered or actually taken, to the decision of the prytanes, or presidents. These latter had to declare on which side the show of hands in the assembly preponderated: but there surely must have been some power of calling in question their decision, if they declared falsely, or if they put the question in a treacherous, perplexing, or obscure manner. The Athenian assembly did not admit of an appeal to a division, like the Spartan assembly or like the English House of Commons; though there were many cases in which the votes at Athens were taken by pebbles in an urn, and not by show of hands.

Now it seems to me that Meneklês here exercised the privilege of calling in question the decision of the prytanes, and constraining them to take the vote over again. He may have alleged that they did not make it clearly understood which of the two propositions was to be put to the vote first; that they put the proposition of Kallixenus first, without giving due notice; or perhaps that they misreported the numbers. By what followed, we see that he had good grounds for his objection.

¹ Diodor. xiii, 101. In regard to these two component elements of the majority, I doubt not that the statement of Diodorus is correct. But he represents, quite erroneously, that the generals were condemned by the vote of the assembly, and led off from the assembly to execution. The assembly only decreed that the subsequent urn-voting should take place, the result of which was necessarily uncertain beforehand. Accordingly, the speech which Diodorus represents Diomedon to have made in the assembly, after the vote of the assembly had been declared, cannot be true history: "Athenians, I wish that the vote which you have just passed may prove beneficial to the city. Do you take care to fulfil those vows to Zeus Soter, Apollo, and the Venerable Goddesses, under which we gained our victory, since fortune has prevented us from fulfilling them ourselves." It is impossible that Diomedon can have made a speech of this nature, since he was not then a condemned man; and after the condemnatory vote, no assembly was held.

of hemlock ; their property being confiscated, as the decree of the senate prescribed.

Respecting the condemnation of these unfortunate men, pronounced without any of the recognized tutelary preliminaries for accused persons, there can be only one opinion. It was an act of violent injustice and illegality, deeply dishonoring the men who passed it, and the Athenian character generally. In either case, whether the generals were guilty or innocent, this censure is deserved, for judicial precautions are not less essential in dealing with the guilty than with the innocent. But it is deserved in an aggravated form, when we consider that the men against whom such injustice was perpetrated, had just come from achieving a glorious victory. Against the democratical constitution of Athens, it furnishes no ground for censure, nor against the habits and feelings which that constitution tended to implant in the individual citizen. Both the one and the other strenuously forbade the deed ; nor could the Athenians ever have so dishonored themselves, if they had not, under a momentary ferocious excitement, risen in insurrection not less against the forms of their own democracy, than against the most sacred restraints of their habitual constitutional morality.

If we wanted proof of this, the facts of the immediate future would abundantly supply it. After a short time had elapsed, every man in Athens became heartily ashamed of the deed.¹ A vote of the public assembly was passed,² decreeing that those who had misguided the people on this occasion ought to be brought to judicial trial, that Kallixenus with four others should be among the number, and that bail should be taken for their appearance. This was accordingly done, and the parties were kept under custody of the sureties themselves, who were responsible for their appearance on the day of trial. But presently both foreign misfortunes and internal sedition began to press too heavily on Athens to leave any room for other thoughts, as we shall

¹ I translate here literally the language of Sokratēs in his Defence (Plato, Apol. c. 20), *παρὰ νόμους, ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσι νῦν ἴδοιτο*.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 39. This vote of the public assembly was known at Athens by the name of Probolê. The assembled people discharged on this occasion an ante-judicial function, something like that of a Grand Jury

see in the next chapter. Kallixenus and his accomplices found means to escape before the day of trial arrived, and remained in exile until after the dominion of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy. Kallixenus then returned under the general amnesty. But the general amnesty protected him only against legal pursuit, not against the hostile memory of the people. "Detested by all, he died of hunger," says Xenophon;¹ a memorable proof how much the condemnation of these six generals shocked the standing democratical sentiment at Athens.

From what cause did this temporary burst of wrong arise, so foreign to the habitual character of the people? Even under the strongest political provocation, and towards the most hated traitors, — as Euryptolemus himself remarked, by citing the case of Aristarchus, — after the Four Hundred as well as after the Thirty, the Athenians never committed the like wrong, never deprived an accused party of the customary judicial securities. How then came they to do it here, where the generals condemned were not only not traitors, but had just signalized themselves by a victorious combat? No Theramênês could have brought about this phenomenon; no deep-laid oligarchical plot is, in my judgment, to be called in as an explanation.² The true explanation is different, and of serious moment to state. Political hatred, intense as it might be, was never dissociated, in the mind of a citizen of Athens, from the democratical forms of procedure: but the men, who stood out here as actors, had broken loose from the obligations of citizenship and commonwealth, and surrendered themselves, heart and soul, to the family sympathies and antipathies; feelings first kindled, and justly kindled, by the thought that their friends and relatives had been left to perish unheeded on the wrecks; next, inflamed into preternatural and overwhelming violence by the festival of the Apaturia, where all the religious traditions connected with the ancient family tie, all those associations which imposed upon the relatives of a murdered man the duty of pursuing the murderer, were expanded into detail and worked up by their appropriate renovating solemnity. The

¹ Xenophon. Hellen. i, 7, 40. *μισούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων, λιμῷ ἀπέθανεν.*

² This is the supposition of Sievers, Forchhammer, and some other learned men; but, in my opinion, it is neither proved nor probable.

garb of mourning and the shaving of the head — phenomena unknown at Athens, either in a political assembly or in a religious festival — were symbols of temporary transformation in the internal man. He could think of nothing but his drowning relatives, together with the generals as having abandoned them to death, and his own duty as survivor to insure to them vengeance and satisfaction for such abandonment. Under this self-justifying impulse, the shortest and surest proceeding appeared the best, whatever amount of political wrong it might entail:¹ nay, in this case it appeared the only proceeding really sure, since the interposition of the proper judicial delays, coupled with severance of trial on successive days, according to the psephism of Kannónus, would probably have saved the lives of five out of the six generals, if not of all the six. When we reflect that such absorbing sentiment was common, at one and the same time, to a large proportion of the Athenians, we shall see the explanation of that misguided vote, both of the senate and of the *ekklesia*, which sent the six generals to an illegal ballot, and of the subsequent ballot which condemned them. Such is the natural behavior of those who, having for the moment forgotten their sense of political commonwealth, become degraded into exclusive family men. The family affections, productive as they are of so large an amount of gentle sympathy and mutual happiness in the interior circle, are also liable to generate disregard, malice, sometimes even ferocious vengeance, towards others. Powerful towards good generally, they are not less powerful occasionally towards evil; and require, not less than the selfish propensities, constant subordinating control from that moral reason which contemplates for its end the security and happiness of all. And

¹ If Thucydides had lived to continue his history so far down as to include this memorable event, he would have found occasion to notice τὸ ἐγγυένες, kinship, as being not less capable of ἀπροφάσιτος τόλμα, unscrupulous daring, than τὸ ἐταϊρικόν, faction. In his reflections on the Korkyræan disturbances (iii, 82), he is led to dwell chiefly on the latter, the antipathies of faction, of narrow political brotherhood or conspiracy for the attainment and maintenance of power, as most powerful in generating evil deeds: had he described the proceedings after the battle of Arginusæ, he would have seen that the sentiment of kinship, looked at on its antipathetic or vindictive side, is pregnant with the like tendencies.

when a man, either from low civilization, has never known this large moral reason, — or when from some accidental stimulus, righteous in the origin, but wrought up into fanaticism by the conspiring force of religious as well as family sympathies, he comes to place his pride and virtue in discarding its supremacy, — there is scarcely any amount of evil or injustice which he may not be led to perpetrate, by a blind obedience to the narrow instincts of relationship. “Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout,” was the satirical remark of Talleyrand upon the gross public jobbing so largely practised by those who sought place or promotion for their sons. The same words understood in a far more awful sense, and generalized for other cases of relationship, sum up the moral of this melancholy proceeding at Athens.

Lastly, it must never be forgotten that the generals themselves were also largely responsible in the case. Through the unjustifiable fury of the movement against them, they perished like innocent men, without trial, “*inauditi et indefensi, tamquam innocentes, perierunt* ;” but it does not follow that they were really innocent. I feel persuaded that neither with an English, nor French, nor American fleet, could such events have taken place as those which followed the victory of Arginusæ. Neither admiral nor seamen, after gaining a victory and driving off the enemy, could have endured the thoughts of going back to their anchorage, leaving their own disabled wrecks unmanageable on the waters, with many living comrades aboard, helpless, and depending upon extraneous succor for all their chance of escape. That the generals at Arginusæ did this, stands confessed by their own advocate Eurypolemus,¹ though they must have known well the condition of disabled ships after a naval combat, and some ships even of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 31. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κρατήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν γῆν κατέπλευσαν, Διομέδων μὲν ἐκέλευεν, ἀναχθέντας ἐπὶ κέρως ἅπαντας ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὰ ναύαγια καὶ τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, Ἐρασινίδης δὲ, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐς Μιτυλήνην πολεμίους τὴν ταχίστην πλεῖν ἅπαντας· Θράσυλλος δ' ἀμφοτέρα ἐφη γενέσθαι, ὅν τὰς μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλίπῃσι, ταῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίους πλέωσι· καὶ δοξάντων τούτων, etc.

I remarked, a few pages before, that the case of Erasimidēs stood in some measure apart from that of the other generals. He proposed, according to this speech of Eurypolemus, that all the fleet should at once go again to Mitylênê; which would of course have left the men on the wrecks to their fate.

the victorious fleet were sure to be disabled. If these generals, after their victory, instead of sailing back to land, had employed themselves first of all in visiting the crippled ships, there would have been ample time to perform this duty, and to save all the living men aboard, before the storm came on. This is the natural inference, even upon their own showing; this is what any English, French, or American naval commander would have thought it an imperative duty to do. What degree of blame is imputable to Theraménès, and how far the generals were discharged by shifting the responsibility to him, is a point which we cannot now determine. But the storm, which is appealed to as a justification of both, rests upon evidence too questionable to serve that purpose, where the neglect of duty was so serious, and cost the lives probably of more than one thousand brave men. At least, the Athenian people at home, when they heard the criminations and recriminations between the generals on one side and Theraménès on the other, — each of them in his character of accuser implying that the storm was no valid obstacle, though each, if pushed for a defence, fell back upon it as a resource in case of need, — the Athenian people could not but look upon the storm more as an afterthought to excuse previous omissions, than as a terrible reality nullifying all the ardor and resolution of men bent on doing their duty. It was in this way that the intervention of Theraménès chiefly contributed to the destruction of the generals, not by those manœuvres ascribed to him in Xenophon: he destroyed all belief in the storm as a real and all-covering hindrance. The general impression of the public at Athens — in my opinion, a natural and unavoidable impression — was, that there had been most culpable negligence in regard to the wrecks, through which negligence alone the seamen on board perished. This negligence dishonors, more or less, the armament at Arginusæ as well as the generals: but the generals were the persons responsible to the public at home, who felt for the fate of the deserted seamen more justly as well as more generously than their comrades in the fleet.

In spite, therefore, of the guilty proceeding to which a furious exaggeration of this sentiment drove the Athenians, — in spite of the sympathy which this has naturally and justly procured for

the condemned generals, — the verdict of impartial history will pronounce that the sentiment itself was well founded, and that the generals deserved censure and disgrace. The Athenian people might with justice proclaim to them: "Whatever be the grandeur of your victory, we can neither rejoice in it ourselves, nor allow you to reap honor from it, if we find that you have left many hundreds of those who helped in gaining it to be drowned on board the wrecks without making any effort to save them, when such effort might well have proved successful."

CHAPTER LXV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY.

THE victory of Arginusæ gave for the time decisive mastery of the Asiatic seas to the Athenian fleet; and is even said to have so discouraged the Lacedæmonians, as to induce them to send propositions of peace to Athens. But this statement¹ is open to

¹ The statement rests on the authority of Aristotle, as referred to by the Scholiast on the last verse of the *Ranæ* of Aristophanès. And this, so far as I know, is the only authority: for when Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fest. Hellen. ad ann. 406*) says that Æschinès (*De Fals. Legat. p. 38, c. 24*) mentions the overtures of peace, I think that no one who looks at that passage will be inclined to found any inference upon it.

Against it, we may observe: —

1. Xenophon does not mention it. This is something, though far from being conclusive when standing alone.
2. Diodorus does not mention it.
3. The terms alleged to have been proposed by the Lacedæmonians, are exactly the same as those said to have been proposed by them after the death of Mindarus at Kyzikus, namely: —

To evacuate Dekeleia, and each party to stand as they were. Not only the terms are the same, but also the person who stood prominent in opposition is in both cases the same, *Kleophon*. The overtures after Arginusæ are in fact a second edition of those after the battle of Kyzikus

much doubt, and I think it most probable that no such propositions were made. Great as the victory was, we look in vain for any positive results accruing to Athens. After an unsuccessful attempt on Chios, the victorious fleet went to Samos, where it seems to have remained until the following year, without any farther movements than were necessary for the purpose of procuring money.

Meanwhile Eteonikus, who collected the remains of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, being left unsupplied with money by Cyrus, found himself much straitened, and was compelled to leave the seamen unpaid. During the later summer and autumn, these men maintained themselves by laboring for hire on the Chian lands; but when winter came, this resource ceased, so that they found themselves unable to procure even clothes or shoes. In such forlorn condition, many of them entered into a conspiracy to assail and plunder the town of Chios; a day was named for the enterprise, and it was agreed that the conspirators should know each other by wearing a straw, or reed. Informed of the design, Eteonikus was at the same time intimidated by the number of these straw-bearers; he saw that if he dealt with the conspirators openly and ostensibly, they might perhaps rush to arms and succeed in plundering the town; at any rate, a conflict would arise in which many of the allies would be slain, which would produce the worst effect upon all future operations. Accordingly, resorting to stratagem, he took with him a guard of fifteen men armed with daggers, and marched through the town of Chios. Meeting presently one of these straw-bearers, — a man with a complaint in his eyes, coming out of a surgeon's house, — he directed his guards to put the man to death on the spot. A crowd gathered round, with astonishment as well as sympathy,

Now, the supposition that on two several occasions the Lacedæmonians made propositions of peace, and that both are left unnoticed by Xenophon, appears to me highly improbable. In reference to the propositions after the battle of Kyzikus, the testimony of Diodorus outweighed, in my judgment, the silence of Xenophon; but here Diodorus is silent also.

In addition to this, the exact sameness of the two alleged events makes me think that the second is only a duplication of the first, and that the Scholiast, in citing from Aristotle, mistook the battle of Arginusæ for that of Kyzikus, which latter was by far the more decisive of the two.

and inquired on what ground the man was put to death; upon which Eteonikus ordered his guards to reply, that it was because he wore a straw. The news became diffused, and immediately the remaining persons who wore straws became so alarmed as to throw their straws away.¹

Eteonikus availed himself of the alarm to demand money from the Chians, as a condition of carrying away this starving and perilous armament. Having obtained from them a month's pay, he immediately put the troops on shipboard, taking pains to encourage them, and make them fancy that he was unacquainted with the recent conspiracy.

The Chians and the other allies of Sparta presently assembled at Ephesus to consult, and resolved, in conjunction with Cyrus, to despatch envoys to the ephors, requesting that Lysander might be sent out a second time as admiral. It was not the habit of Sparta ever to send out the same man as admiral a second time, after his year of service. Nevertheless, the ephors complied with the request substantially, sending out Arakus as admiral, but Lysander along with him, under the title of secretary, invested with all the real powers of command.

Lysander, having reached Ephesus about the beginning of B.C. 405, immediately applied himself with vigor to renovate both Lacedæmonian power and his own influence. The partisans in the various allied cities, whose favor he had assiduously cultivated during his last year's command, the clubs and factious combinations, which he had organized and stimulated into a partnership of mutual ambition, all hailed his return with exultation. Discountenanced and kept down by the generous patriotism of his predecessor Kallikratidas, they now sprang into renewed activity, and became zealous in aiding Lysander to refit and augment his fleet. Nor was Cyrus less hearty in his preference than before. On arriving at Ephesus, Lysander went speedily to visit him at Sardis, and solicited a renewal of the pecuniary aid. The young prince said in reply that all the funds which he had received from Susa had already been expended, with much more besides; in testimony of which he exhibited a specification of the sums furnished to each Peloponnesian officer.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1-4.

Nevertheless, such was his partiality for Lysander, that he complied even with the additional demand now made, so as to send him away satisfied. The latter was thus enabled to return to Ephesus in a state for restoring the effective condition of his fleet. He made good at once all the arrears of pay due to the seamen, constituted new trierarchs, summoned Eteonikus with the fleet from Chios, together with all the other scattered squadrons, and directed that fresh triremes should be immediately put on the stocks at Antandrus.¹

In none of the Asiatic towns was the effect of Lysander's second advent felt more violently than at Milêtus. He had there a powerful faction or association of friends, who had done their best to hamper and annoy Kallikratidas on his first arrival, but had been put to silence, and even forced to make a show of zeal, by the straightforward resolution of that noble-minded admiral. Eager to reimburse themselves for this humiliation, they now formed a conspiracy, with the privity and concurrence of Lysander, to seize the government for themselves. They determined, if Plutarch and Diodorus are to be credited, to put down the existing democracy, and establish an oligarchy in its place. But we cannot believe that there could have existed a democracy at Milêtus, which had now been for five years in dependence upon Sparta and the Persians jointly. We must rather understand the movement as a conflict between two oligarchical parties; the friends of Lysander being more thoroughly self-seeking and anti-popular than their opponents, and perhaps even crying them down, by comparison, as a democracy. Lysander lent himself to the scheme, fanned the ambition of the conspirators, who were at one time disposed to a compromise, and even betrayed the government into a false security, by promises of support which he never intended to fulfil. At the festival of the Dionysia, the conspirators, rising in arms, seized forty of their chief opponents in their houses, and three hundred more in the market-place; while the government—confiding in the promises of Lysander, who affected to reprove, but secretly continued instigating the insurgents—made but a faint resistance. The three hundred and forty leaders thus seized, probably men who had gone heartily

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i', 1, 10-12.

along with Kallikratidas, were all put to death ; and a still larger number of citizens, not less than one thousand, fled into exile. Milêtus thus passed completely into the hands of the friends and partisans of Lysander.¹

It would appear that factious movements in other towns, less revolting in respect of bloodshed and perfidy, yet still of similar character to that of Milêtus, marked the reappearance of Lysander in Asia ; placing the towns more and more in the hands of his partisans. While thus acquiring greater ascendancy among the allies, Lysander received a summons from Cyrus to visit him at Sardis. The young prince had just been sent for to come and visit his father Darius, who was both old and dangerously ill, in Media. About to depart for this purpose, he carried his confidence in Lysander so far as to delegate to him the management of his satrapy and his entire revenues. Besides his admiration for the superior energy and capacity of the Greek character, with which he had only recently contracted acquaintance ; and besides his esteem for the personal disinterestedness of Lysander, attested as it had been by the conduct of the latter in the first visit and banquet at Sardis ; Cyrus was probably induced to this step by the fear of raising up to himself a rival, if he trusted the like power to any Persian grandee. At the same time that he handed over all his tributes and his reserved funds to Lysander, he assured him of his steady friendship both towards himself and towards the Lacedæmonians ; and concluded by entreating that he would by no means engage in any general action with the Athenians, unless at great advantage in point of numbers. The defeat of Arginusæ having strengthened his preference for this dilatory policy, he promised that not only the Persian treasures, but also the Phenician fleet, should be brought into active employment for the purpose of crushing Athens.²

Thus armed with an unprecedented command of Persian treasure, and seconded by ascendent factions in all the allied cities, Lysander was more powerful than any Lacedæmonian commander had ever been since the commencement of the war. Having his fleet well paid, he could keep it united, and direct it

¹ Diodor. xiii, 104 ; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 8.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 14 ; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

whither he chose, without the necessity of dispersing it in roving squadrons for the purpose of levying money. It is probably from a corresponding necessity that we are to explain the inaction of the Athenian fleet at Samos; for we hear of no serious operations undertaken by it, during the whole year following the victory of Arginusæ, although under the command of an able and energetic man, Konon, together with Philoklês and Adeimantus; to whom were added, during the spring of 405 B.C., three other generals, Tydeus, Menander, and Kephisodotus. It appears that Theramenês also was put up and elected one of the generals, but rejected when submitted to the confirmatory examination called the dokimasy.¹ The fleet comprised one hundred and eighty triremes, rather a greater number than that of Lysander; to whom they in vain offered battle near his station at Ephesus. Finding him not disposed to a general action, they seem to have dispersed to plunder Chios, and various portions of the Asiatic coast; while Lysander, keeping his fleet together, first sailed southward from Ephesus, stormed and plundered a semi-Hellenic town in the Kerameikan gulf, named Kedreia, which was in alliance with Athens, and thence proceeded to Rhodes.² He was even bold enough to make an excursion across the Ægean to the coast of Ægina and Attica, where he had an interview with Agis, who came from Dekeleia to the sea-coast.³ The Athenians were prepared to follow him thither when they learned that he had recrossed the Ægean, and he soon afterwards appeared with all his fleet at the Hellespont, which important pass they had left unguarded. Lysander went straight to Abydos, still the great Peloponnesian station in the strait, occupied by Thorax as harmost with a land force; and immediately proceeded to attack, both by sea and land, the neighboring town of Lampsakus, which was taken by storm. It was wealthy in every way, and abundantly stocked with bread and wine, so that the soldiers obtained a large booty; but Lysander left the free inhabitants untouched.⁴

¹ Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 13.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 15, 16.

³ This flying visit of Lysander across the Ægean to the coasts of Attica and Ægina is not noticed by Xenophon, but it appears both in Diodorus and in Plutarch (Diodor. xiii, 104: Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9).

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 18, 19; Diodor. xiii, 104 Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9

The Athenian fleet seems to have been employed in plundering Chios, when it received news that the Lacedæmonian commander was at the Hælespont engaged in the siege of Lampsakus. Either from the want of money, or from other causes which we do not understand, Konon and his colleagues were partly inactive, partly behindhand with Lysander, throughout all this summer. They now followed him to the Hellespont, sailing out on the seaside of Chios and Lesbos, away from the Asiatic coast, which was all unfriendly to them. They reached Elæus, at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, with their powerful fleet of one hundred and eighty triremes, just in time to hear, while at their morning meal, that Lysander was already master of Lampsakus; upon which they immediately proceeded up the strait to Sestos, and from thence, after stopping only to collect a few provisions, still farther up, to a place called Ægospotami.¹

Ægospotami, or Goat's River — a name of fatal sound to all subsequent Athenians — was a place which had nothing to recommend it except that it was directly opposite to Lampsakus, separated by a breadth of strait about one mile and three-quarters. But it was an open beach, without harbor, without good anchorage, without either houses or inhabitants or supplies; so that everything necessary for this large army had to be fetched from Sestos, about one mile and three-quarters distant even by land, and yet more distant by sea, since it was necessary to round a headland. Such a station was highly inconvenient and dangerous to an ancient naval armament, without any organized commissariat; since the seamen, being compelled to go to a distance from their ships in order to get their meals, were not easily reassembled. Yet this was the station chosen by the Athenian generals, with the full design of compelling Lysander to fight a battle. But the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was at Lampsakus, in a good harbor, with a well-furnished town in his rear, and a land-force to coöperate, had no intention of accepting the challenge of his enemies at the moment which suited their convenience. When the Athenians sailed across the strait the next morning, they found all his ships fully manned,—the men having already taken their morning meal,—and ranged in perfect order of bat-

tle, with the land-force disposed ashore to lend assistance; but with strict orders to await attack and not to move forward. Not daring to attack him in such a position, yet unable to draw him out by manœuvring all the day, the Athenians were at length obliged to go back to Ægospotami. But Lysander directed a few swift-sailing vessels to follow them, nor would he suffer his own men to disembark until he thus ascertained that their sea-men had actually dispersed ashore.¹

For four successive days this same scene was repeated; the Athenians becoming each day more confident in their own superior strength, and more full of contempt for the apparent cowardice of the enemy. It was in vain that Alkibiadês — who from his own private forts in the Chersonese witnessed what was passing — rode up to the station and remonstrated with the generals on the exposed condition of the fleet on this open shore; urgently advising them to move round to Sestos, where they would be both close to their own supplies and safe from attack, as Lysander was at Lampsakus, and from whence they could go forth to fight whenever they chose. But the Athenian generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, disregarded his advice, and even dismissed him with the insulting taunt, that they were now in command, not he.² Continuing thus in their exposed position the Athenian seamen on each successive day became more and more careless of their enemy, and rash in dispersing the moment they returned back to their own shore. At length, on the fif

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 22-24; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 10; Diodor. xiii, 1.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 25; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 10; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.

Diodorus (xiii, 105) and Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 8) represent Alkibiadês as wishing to be readmitted to a share in the command of the fleet, and as promising, if that were granted, that he would assemble a body of Thracians, attack Lysander by land, and compel him to fight a battle or retreat. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 37) alludes also to promises of this sort held out to Alkibiadês.

Yet it is not likely that Alkibiadês should have talked of anything obviously impossible. How could he bring a Thracian land-force to attack Lysander, who was on the opposite side of the Hellespont? How could he carry a land-force across in the face of Lysander's fleet.

The representation of Xenophon (followed in my text) is clear and intelligible.

day, Lysander ordered the scout-ships, which he sent forth to watch the Athenians on their return, to hoist a bright shield as a signal, as soon as they should see the ships at their anchorage and the crews ashore in quest of their meal. The moment he beheld this welcome signal, he gave orders to his entire fleet to row across as swiftly as possible from Lampsakus to Ægospotami, while Thorax marched along the strand with the land-force in case of need. Nothing could be more complete or decisive than the surprise of the Athenian fleet. All the triremes were caught at their moorings ashore, some entirely deserted, others with one or at most two of the three tiers of rowers which formed their complement. Out of all the total of one hundred and eighty, only twelve were found in tolerable order and preparation ;¹ the trireme of Konôn himself, together with a squadron of seven under his immediate orders, and the consecrated ship called *paralus*, always manned by the *élite* of the Athenian seamen, being among them. It was in vain that Konon, on seeing the fleet of Lysander approaching, employed his utmost efforts to get his fleet manned and in some condition for resistance. The attempt was desperate, and the utmost which he could do was to escape himself with the small squadron of twelve, including the *paralus*. All the remaining triremes, nearly one hundred and seventy in number, were captured by Lysander on the shore, defenceless, and seemingly without the least attempt on the part of any one to resist. He landed, and made prisoners most of the crews ashore, though some of them fled and found shelter in the neighboring forts. This prodigious and unparalleled victory was obtained, not merely without the loss of a single ship, but almost without that of a single man.²

Of the number of prisoners taken by Lysander, — which must have been very great, since the total crews of one hundred and eighty triremes were not less than thirty-six thousand men,³ — we

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29 ; Lysias, Orat. xxi, (Ἰσουλ. Δωροδ.) s. 12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28 ; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 11 ; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36 ; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 8 ; Polyæn. i, 45, 2.

Diodorus (xiii, 106) gives a different representation of this important military operation ; far less clear and trustworthy than that of Xenophon.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28. τὰς δ' ἄλλας πύσας (ναῦς) Ἀσσανδρος ἔλαβε

hear only of three thousand or four thousand native Athenians, though this number cannot represent all the native Athenians in the fleet. The Athenian generals Philoklēs and Adeimantus were certainly taken, and seemingly all except Konon. Some of the defeated armament took refuge in Sestos, which, however surrendered with little resistance to the victor. He admitted them to capitulation, on condition of their going back immediately to Athens, and nowhere else: for he was desirous to multiply as much as possible the numbers assembled in that city, knowing well that the city would be the sooner starved out. Konon to was well aware that, to go back to Athens, after the ruin of the entire fleet, was to become one of the certain prisoners in the doomed city, and to meet, besides, the indignation of his fellow citizens, so well deserved by the generals collectively. Accordingly, he resolved to take shelter with Evagoras, prince of Salamis in the island of Cyprus, sending the paralus, with some others of the twelve fugitive triremes, to make known the sad news at Athens. But before he went thither, he crossed the strait—with singular daring, under the circumstances—to Cap Abarnis in the territory of Lampsakus, where the great sails of Lysander's triremes, always taken out when a trireme was made ready for fighting, lay seemingly unguarded. These sails he took away, so as to lessen the enemy's powers of pursuit, and then made the best of his way to Cyprus.¹

On the very day of the victory, Lysander sent off the Milesian privateer Theopompus to proclaim it at Sparta, who, by wonderful speed of rowing, arrived there and made it known the third day after starting. The captured ships were towed and the prisoners carried across to Lampsakus, where a general assembly of the victorious allies was convened, to determine what manner the prisoners should be treated. In this assembly, most bitter inculpations were put forth against the Athenians, to the manner in which they had recently dealt with their captives. The Athenian general Philoklēs, having captured a

πρὸς τῇ γῇ· τοὺς δὲ πλείστους ἀνδρας ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐκνήλεξεν· οἱ δὲ καὶ γον ἐς τὰ τευχύδια.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Diodor. xiii, 106: the latter is discrepant, however, on many points.

rinthian and Andrian trireme, had put the crews to death by hurling them headlong from a precipice. It was not difficult, in Grecian warfare, for each of the belligerents to cite precedents of cruelty against the other; but in this debate, some speakers affirmed that the Athenians had deliberated what they should do with their prisoners, in case they had been victorious at Ægospotami; and that they had determined — chiefly on the motion of Philoklês, but in spite of the opposition of Adeimantus — that they would cut off the right hands of all who were captured. Whatever opinion Philoklês may have expressed personally, it is highly improbable that any such determination was ever taken by the Athenians.¹ In this assembly of the allies, however, besides all that could be said against Athens with truth, doubtless the most extravagant falsehoods found ready credence. All the Athenian prisoners captured at Ægospotami, three thousand or four thousand in number, were massacred forthwith, Philoklês himself at their head.² The latter, taunted by Lysander with his cruel execution of the Corinthian and Andrian crews, disdained to return any answer, but placed himself in conspicuous vestments at the head of the prisoners led out to execution. If we may believe Pausanias, even the bodies of the prisoners were left unburied.

Never was a victory more complete in itself, more overwhelming in its consequences, or more thoroughly disgraceful to the defeated generals, taken collectively, than that of Ægospotami. Whether it was in reality very glorious to Lysander, is doubtful; for it was the general belief afterwards, not merely at Athens, but seemingly in other parts of Greece also, that the Athenian fleet was sold to perdition by the treason of some of its own commanders. Of this suspicion both Konon and Philoklês stand clear. Adeimantus was named as the chief traitor, and Tydeus along with him.³ Konon even preferred an accusation against

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 31. This story is given with variations in Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9, and by Cicero de Offic. iii, 11. It is there the right thumb which is to be cut off, and the determination is alleged to have been taken in reference to the Æginetans.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 32; Pausan. ix, 32, 6; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 32: Lysias cont. Alkib. A. s. 38; Pausan. iv, 17, 2; x, 9, 5; Isokratês ad Philipp. Or. v, sect. 70. Lysias, in his *Δόγος Ἐπιτάφιος* (s. 58), speaks of the treason, yet not as a matter of certainty.

Adeimantus to this effect,¹ probably by letter written home from Cyprus, and perhaps by some formal declaration made several years afterwards, when he returned to Athens as victor from the battle of Knidus. The truth of the charge cannot be positively demonstrated, but all the circumstances of the battle tend to render it probable, as well as the fact that Konon alone among all the generals was found in a decent state of preparation. Indeed we may add, that the utter impotence and inertness of the numerous Athenian fleet during the whole summer of 405 B.C. conspire to suggest a similar explanation. Nor could Lysander master as he was of all the treasures of Cyrus, apply any portion of them more efficaciously than in corrupting the majority of the six Athenian generals, so as to nullify all the energy and ability of Konon.

The great defeat of *Ægospotami* took place about September 405 B.C. It was made known at Peiræus by the paralus, which arrived there during the night, coming straight from the Hellespont. Such a moment of distress and agony had never been experienced at Athens. The terrible disaster in Sicily had become known to the people by degrees, without any authorized reporter; but here was the official messenger, fresh from the scene, leaving no room to question the magnitude of the disaster or the irreparable ruin impending over the city. The wailing and cries of woe, first beginning in Peiræus, were transmitted by the guards stationed on the Long Walls up to the city. "On that night (says Xenophon) not a man slept; not merely from sorrow for the past calamity, but from terror for the future fate which they themselves were now menaced, a retribution for what they had themselves inflicted on the *Æginetans*, *Melians*, *Skionæans*, and others." After this night of misery, they met in public assembly on the following day, resolving to make the best

Cornelius Nepos (*Lysand.* c. 1; *Alcib.* c. 8) notices only the disorder of the Athenian armament, not the corruption of the generals, as having caused the defeat. Nor does Diodorus notice the corruption (xiii, 105).

Both these authors seem to have copied from Theopompus, in describing the battle of *Ægospotami*. His description differs on many points from that of Xenophon (*Theopomp. Fragm.* 8, ed. Didot).

¹ Demosthen. *de Fals. Legat.* p. 401, c. 57

preparations they could for a siege, to put the walls in full state of defence, and to block up two out of the three ports.¹ For Athens thus to renounce her maritime action, the pride and glory of the city ever since the battle of Salamis, and to confine herself to a defensive attitude within her own walls, was a humiliation which left nothing worse to be endured except actual famine and surrender.

Lysander was in no hurry to pass from the Hellespont to Athens. He knew that no farther corn-ships from the Euxine, and few supplies from other quarters, could now reach Athens; and that the power of the city to hold out against blockade must necessarily be very limited; the more limited, the greater the numbers accumulated within it. Accordingly, he permitted the Athenian garrisons which capitulated, to go only to Athens, and nowhere else.² His first measure was to make himself master of Chalkêdon and Byzantium, where he placed the Lacedæmonian Sthenelaus as harmost, with a garrison. Next, he passed to Lesbos, where he made similar arrangements at Mitylênê and other cities. In them, as well as in the other cities which now came under his power, he constituted an oligarchy of ten native citizens, chosen from among his most daring and unscrupulous partisans, and called a dekadarchy, or dekadarchy, to govern in conjunction with the Lacedæmonian harmost. Eteonikus was sent to the Thracian cities which had been in dependence on Athens, to introduce similar changes. In Thasus, however, this change was stained by much bloodshed: there was a numerous philo-Athenian party whom Lysander caused to be allured out of their place of concealment into the temple of Heraklês, under the false assurance of an amnesty: when assembled under this pledge, they were all put to death.³ Sanguinary proceedings of the like character, many in the presence of Lysander himself,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 3; Diodor. xiii, 107.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 2; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

³ Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i, 45, 4. It would appear that this is the same incident which Plutarch (Lysand. c. 19) recounts as if the Milesians, not the Thasians, were the parties suffering. It cannot well be the Milesians, however, if we compare chapter 8 of Plutarch's Life of Lysander.

together with large expulsions of citizens obnoxious to his new despoticisms, signalized everywhere the substitution of Sparta for Athenian ascendancy.¹ But nowhere, except at Samos, did the citizens or the philo-Athenian party in the cities continue any open hostility, or resist by force Lysander's entrance and his revolutionary changes. At Samos, they still held out: the people had too much dread of that oligarchy, whom they had expelled at the insurrection of 412 B.C., to yield without a farther struggle. With this single reserve, every city in alliance or dependent upon Athens submitted without resistance both to the supremacy and the subversive measures of the Lacedæmonian admiral.

The Athenian empire was thus annihilated, and Athens left altogether alone. What was hardly less painful, all her cleruchs or out-citizens, whom she had formerly planted in Ægina, Melos, and elsewhere throughout the islands, as well as in the Chersonese, were now deprived of their properties and driven home.

¹ Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. *πολλὰς παραγινόμενες αὐτὸς σφαγαῖς καὶ νεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, etc.*

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 6. *εὐθὺς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ἀφειστήκει Ἀθαίων, πλὴν Σαμίων οὗτοι δὲ, σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες, κατεῖχον πόλιν.*

I interpret the words *σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες* to refer to violent revolution at Samos, described in Thucyd. viii, 21, whereby oligarchy were dispossessed and a democratical government established. The word *σφαγὰς* is used by Xenophon (Hellen. v, 4, 14), in a subsequent passage, to describe the conspiracy and revolution effected by Pelopidas and his friends at Thebes. It is true that we might rather have expected the preterite participle *πεποιηκότες* than the aorist *ποιήσαντες*. But employment of the aorist participle in a preterite sense is not uncommon with Xenophon: see *κατηγορήσας, δάξας*, i, 1, 31; *γενομένους*, i, 7 ii, 2, 20.

It appears to me highly improbable that the Samians should have called this occasion to make a fresh massacre of their oligarchical citizens, as Mitford represents. The democratical Samians must have been now blinded and intimidated, seeing their subjugation approaching; and contented to hold out by finding themselves already so deeply compromised through the former revolution. Nor would Lysander have spared them personally afterwards, as we shall find that he did, when he had them submitted to his power (ii, 3, 6), if they had now committed any fresh public massacre.

³ Xenoph. Memorab. ii, 8, 1; ii, 10, 4; Xenoph. Sympos. iv, 31. rare Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 24, p. 491.

The leading philo-Athenians, too, at Thasus, Byzantium, and other dependent cities,¹ were forced to abandon their homes in the like state of destitution, and to seek shelter at Athens. Everything thus contributed to aggravate the impoverishment, and the manifold suffering, physical as well as moral, within her walls. Notwithstanding the pressure of present calamity, however, and yet worse prospects for the future, the Athenians prepared, as best they could, for an honorable resistance.

It was one of their first measures to provide for the restoration of harmony, and to interest all in the defence of the city, by removing every sort of disability under which individual citizens might now be suffering. Accordingly, Patrokleidēs — having first obtained special permission from the people, without which it would have been unconstitutional to make any proposition for abrogating sentences judically passed, or releasing debtors regularly inscribed in the public registers — submitted a decree such as had never been mooted since the period when Athens was in a condition equally desperate, during the advancing march of Xerxes. All debtors to the state, either recent or of long standing; all official persons now under investigation by the Logistæ, or about to be brought before the dikastery on the usual accountability after office; all persons who were liquidating by instalment debts due to the public, or had given bail for sums thus owing; all persons who had been condemned either to total disfranchisement, or to some specific disqualification or disability; nay, even all those who, having been either members or auxiliaries of the Four Hundred, had stood trial afterwards, and had been condemned to any one of the above-mentioned penalties, all these persons were pardoned and released; every register of the penalty or condemnation being directed to be destroyed. From this comprehensive pardon were excepted: Those among the Four Hundred who had fled from Athens without standing their

A great number of new proprietors acquired land in the Chersonese through the Lacedæmonian sway, doubtless in place of these dispossessed Athenians; perhaps by purchase at a low price, but most probably by appropriation without purchase (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 5).

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 1; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 14, p. 474. Ekphantus and the other Thasian exiles received the grant of ἀτέλεια, or immunity from the peculiar charges imposed upon metics at Athens.

trial; those who had been condemned either to exile or to death by the Areopagus, or any of the other constituted tribunals for homicide, or for subversion of the public liberty. Not merely the public registers of all the condemnations thus released were ordered to be destroyed, but it was forbidden, under severe penalties, to any private citizen to keep a copy of them, or to make any allusion to such misfortunes.¹

Pursuant to the comprehensive amnesty and forgiveness adopted by the people in this decree of Patrokleidês, the general body of citizens swore to each other a solemn pledge of mutual harmony in the acropolis.² The reconciliation thus introduced enabled them the better to bear up under their distress;³ especially as the persons relieved by the amnesty were, for the most part, not politically disaffected, like the exiles. To restore the latter, was a measure which no one thought of: indeed, a large proportion of them had been and were still at Dekeleia, assisting the Lacedæmonians in their warfare against Athens.⁴ But even the most prudent internal measures could do little for Athens in reference to her capital difficulty, that of procuring subsistence for the numerous population within her walls, augmented every day by outlying garrisons and citizens. She had long been shut out from the produce of Attica by the garrison at Dekeleia; she obtained nothing from Eubœa, and since the late defeat of Ægospotami nothing from the Euxine, from Thrace, or from the islands. Perhaps some corn may still have reached her from Cyprus, and her small remaining navy did what was possible to keep Peirææ supplied,⁵ in spite of the menacing prohibitions of Lysander, p

¹ This interesting decree or psephism of Patrokleidês is given at length in the Oration of Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 76-80: "Α δ' εἰρηται καὶ λείψαι μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἰδίᾳ μηδενὶ ἐξελθαι, μηδὲ μνησικαῆσαι μηδέποτε.

² Andokid. de Myst. s. 76. καὶ πίστιν ἀλλήλοις περὶ ὁμονοίας δοῦνα ἀκροπόλει.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 11. τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιήσαντες ἐκατέρωθεν.

⁴ Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 80-101; Lysias, Orat. xviii, De B. Nicisæ Fratr. sect. 9.

At what particular moment the severe condemnatory decree had been passed by the Athenian assembly against the exiles serving with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Dekeleia, we do not know. The decree is mentioned by Lykurgus, cont. Leokrat. sects. 122, 123, p. 164.

⁵ Isokratês adv. Kallimachum, sect. 71; compare Andokidês de R.

ceding his arrival to block it up effectually; but to accumulate any stock for a siege, was utterly impossible.

At length, about November, 405 B.C., Lysander reached the Saronic gulf, having sent intimation beforehand, both to Agis and to the Lacedæmonians, that he was approaching with a fleet of two hundred triremes. The full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force (all except the Argeians), under king Pausanias, was marched into Attica to meet him, and encamped in the precinct of Acadêmus, at the gates of Athens; while Lysander, first coming to Ægina with his overwhelming fleet of one hundred and fifty sail; next, ravaging Salamis, blocked up completely the harbor of Peiræus. It was one of his first measures to collect together the remnant which he could find of the Æginetan and Melian populations, whom Athens had expelled and destroyed; and to restore to them the possession of their ancient islands.¹

Though all hope had now fled, the pride, the resolution, and the despair of Athens, still enabled her citizens to bear up; nor was it until some men actually began to die of hunger, that they sent propositions to entreat peace. Even then their propositions were not without dignity. They proposed to Agis to become allies of Sparta, retaining their walls entire and their fortified harbor of Peiræus. Agis referred the envoys to the ephors at Sparta, to whom he at the same time transmitted a statement of their propositions. But the ephors did not even deign to admit the envoys to an interview, but sent messengers to meet them at Sellasia on the frontier of Laconia, desiring that they would go back and come again prepared with something more admissible, and acquainting them at the same time that no proposition could be received which did not include the demolition of the Long Walls, for a continuous length of ten stadia. With this gloomy reply the envoys returned. Notwithstanding all the suffering in the city, the senate and people would not consent even to take such humiliating terms into consideration. A senator named Archestratus, who advised that they should be accepted, was placed in

quo, sect. 21, and Lysias cont. Diogeiton. Or. xxxii, sect. 22, about Cyprus and the Chersonese, as ordinary sources of supply of corn to Athens

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9; Diodor. xiii, 107.

custody, and a general vote was passed,¹ on the proposition Kleophon, forbidding any such motion in future.

Such a vote demonstrates the courageous patience both of senate and the people; but unhappily it supplied no improved prospects, while the suffering within the walls continued become more and more aggravated. Under these circumstances Theramenês offered himself to the people to go as envoy to Lysander and Sparta, affirming that he should be able to detect what the real intention of the ephors was in regard to Athens, whether they really intended to root out the population and sell them slaves. He pretended, farther, to possess personal influence founded on circumstances which he could not divulge, such would very probably insure a mitigation of the doom. He was accordingly sent, in spite of strong protest from the senate, Areopagus and others, — but with no express powers to conclude — simply to inquire and report. We hear with astonishment that he remained more than three months as companion of Lysander, who, he alleged, had detained him thus long, and had acquainted him, after the fourth month had begun, that not only but the ephors had any power to grant peace. It seems to have been the object of Theramenês, by this long delay, to wear out the patience of the Athenians, and to bring them into such a state of intolerable suffering, that they would submit to any terms of peace which would only bring provisions into the town. In this scheme he completely succeeded; and considering how great were the privations of the people even at the moment of departure, it is not easy to understand how they could have been able to sustain protracted and increasing famine for three months longer.²

We make out little that is distinct respecting these last months of imperial Athens. We find only an heroic endurance displayed to such a point that numbers actually died of starvation, with

• ¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 12-15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sects. 10-12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 16; Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosthen. sects. 65-71.

See an illustration of the great suffering during the siege, in Xen. Apolog. Socrat. s. 18.

any offer to surrender on humiliating conditions.¹ Amidst the general acrimony, and exasperated special antipathies, arising out of such a state of misery, the leading men who stood out most earnestly for prolonged resistance became successively victims to the prosecutions of their enemies. The demagogue Kleophon was condemned and put to death, on the accusation of having evaded his military duty; the senate, whose temper and proceedings he had denounced, constituting itself a portion of the *dikastery* which tried him, contrary both to the forms and the spirit of Athenian judicatures.² Such proceedings, however, though denounced by orators in subsequent years as having contributed to betray the city into the hands of the enemy, appear to have been without any serious influence on the result, which was brought about purely by famine.

By the time that Theramenês returned after his long absence, so terrible had the pressure become, that he was sent forth again with instructions to conclude peace upon any terms. On reaching Sellasia, and acquainting the ephors that he had come with unlimited powers for peace, he was permitted to come to Sparta, where the assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy was convened, to settle on what terms peace should be granted. The leading allies, especially Corinthians and Thebans, recommended that no agreement should be entered into, nor any farther measure kept, with this hated enemy now in their power; but that the name of Athens should be rooted out, and the population sold for

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 15-21; compare Isokratês, Areopagit. Or. vii. sect. 73.

² Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 15, 16, 17; Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sects. 13-17.

This seems the most probable story as to the death of Kleophon, though the accounts are not all consistent, and the statement of Xenophon, especially (Hellen. i, 7, 35), is not to be reconciled with Lysias. Xenophon conceived Kleophon as having perished earlier than this period, in a sedition (*στάσις τις γενομένης ἐν ᾗ Κλεοφῶν ἀπέθανε*), before the flight of Kallixenus from his recognizances. It is scarcely possible that Kallixenus could have been still under recognizance, during this period of suffering between the battle of Ægospotami and the capture of Athens. He must have escaped before that battle. Neither long detention of an accused party in prison, before trial, nor long postponement of trial when he was under recognizance were at all in Athenian habits.

slaves. Many of the other allies seconded the same views, who would have probably commanded a majority, had it not been the resolute opposition of the Lacedæmonians themselves; who declared unequivocally that they would never consent to annihilate or enslave a city which had rendered such capital service to all Greece at the time of the great common danger from the Persians.¹ Lysander farther calculated on so dealing with Athens as to make her into a dependency, and an instrument of increased power to Sparta, apart from her allies. Peace was accordingly granted on the following conditions: That the Long Walls and fortifications of the Peiræus should be destroyed; that the Athenians should evacuate all their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own territory; that they should surrender their ships of war; that they should readmit all their exiles; that they should become allies of Sparta, following her leaders both by sea and land, and recognizing the same enemies and friends.²

With this document, written according to Lacedæmonian practice on a *skytalê*, — or roll intended to go round a stick, of w

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 19; vi, 5, 35–46; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

The Thebans, a few years afterwards, when they were soliciting aid from the Athenians against Sparta, disavowed this proposition of their delegate Erianthus, who had been the leader of the Boeotian contingent serving with Lysander at Ægospotami, honored in that character by having his statue erected at Delphi, along with the other allied leaders who took part in the battle, and along with Lysander and Eteonikus (Pausan. x, 9, 4).

- It is one of the exaggerations so habitual with Isokratês, to serve a particular purpose, when he says that the Thebans were the *only* parties, among the Peloponnesian confederates, who gave this harsh anti-Athenian vote (Isokratês, Orat. Plataic. Or. xiv, sect. 34).

Demosthenês says that the Phocians gave their vote, in the same sense, against the Theban proposition (Demosth. de Fala. Legat. c. 22, p. 34).

It seems from Diodor. xv, 63, and Polyæn. i, 45, 5, as well as from passages in Xenophon himself, that the motives of the Lacedæmonians thus resisting the proposition of the Thebans against Athens, were far more in policy than in generosity.

- ² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14; Diodor. xii, 1. Plutarch gives the express words of the Lacedæmonian decree, *αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν*, which words are very perplexing. The conjecture of G. Hermann, *αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν* instead of *αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν*, has been adopted into the text of Plutarch by some, though it seems very uncertain.

the Lacedæmonian commander had always one, and the ephors another, corresponding, — Theraménês went back to Athens. As he entered the city, a miserable crowd flocked round him, in distress and terror lest he should have failed altogether in his mission. The dead and the dying had now become so numerous, that peace at any price was a boon; nevertheless, when he announced in the assembly the terms of which he was bearer, strongly recommending submission to the Lacedæmonians as the only course now open, there was still a high-spirited minority who entered their protest, and preferred death by famine to such insupportable disgrace. The large majority, however, accepted them, and the acceptance was made known to Lysander.¹

It was on the 16th day of the Attic month Munychion,² — about the middle or end of March, — that this victorious commander sailed into the Peiræus, twenty-seven years, almost exactly, after that surprise of Plataea by the Thebans, which opened the Peloponnesian war. Along with him came the Athenian exiles, several of whom appear to have been serving with his army,³ and assisting him with their counsel. To the population of Athens generally, his entry was an immediate relief, in spite of the cruel degradation, or indeed political extinction, with which it was accompanied. At least it averted the sufferings and horrors of famine, and permitted a decent interment of the many unhappy victims who had already perished. The Lacedæmonians, both naval and military force, under Lysander and Agis, continued in occupation of Athens until the conditions of the peace had been fulfilled. All the triremes in Peiræus were carried away by Lysander, except twelve, which he permitted the Athenians to retain: the ephors, in their skytalê, had left it to his discretion what number he would thus allow.⁴ The unfinished ships in the dock-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 23. Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 71) lays the blame of this wretched and humiliating peace upon Theraménês, who plainly ought not to be required to bear it; compare Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 12-20.

² Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15. He says, however, that this was also the day on which the Athenians gained the battle of Salamis. This is incorrect: that victory was gained in the month Boedromion.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 18.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; ii, 3, 8; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. He gives the contents of the skytalê *verbatim*.

yards were burnt, and the arsenals themselves ruined.¹ demolish the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiræus, however, a work of some time; and a certain number of were granted to the Athenians, within which it was required to be completed. In the beginning of the work, the Lacedæmonians and their allies all lent a hand, with the full pride and exultation of conquerors; amidst women playing the flute and dancing crowned with wreaths; mingled with joyful exclamations from the Peloponnesian allies, that this was the first day of Greek freedom.² How many days were allowed for this humiliating task imposed upon Athenian hands, of demolishing the elaborate, costly, and commanding works of their forefathers, we are not told. But the business was not completed within the interval named, so that the Athenians did not come up to the letter of the conditions, and had therefore, by strict construction, forfeited their right to the peace granted.³ The interval seems, however, to have been prolonged; probably considering that for the real labour as well as the melancholy character of the work to be done, so short a time had been allowed at first.

It appears that Lysander, after assisting at the solemn ceremony of beginning to demolish the walls, and making such a breach as left Athens without any substantial means of resistance, did not remain to complete the work, but withdrew with a portion of his fleet to undertake the siege of Samos which still he left leaving the remainder to see that the conditions imposed were fulfilled.⁴ After so long an endurance of extreme misery, and less the general population thought of little except relief from famine and its accompaniments, without any disposition to

¹ Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 15; *Lysias* cont. Agorat. sect. 50. *ἔτι δὲ τὰ τε κατεσκάφη, καὶ αἱ νῆες τοῖς πολεμίοις παρεδόθησαν, καὶ τὰ νεώρια καθ' ἑαυτὰς* etc.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii, 2, 23. *Καὶ τὰ τεῖχη κατέσκαπτον ὅπ' ἀλλήλων προθυμίᾳ, νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἄρχειν τῇ θέρει.*

Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 15.

³ *Lysias* cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, sect. 75, p. 431, R.; Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 15; Diodor. xiv, 3.

⁴ Lysander dedicated a golden crown to Athênê in the acropolis, as recorded in the inscriptions among the articles belonging to the goddess. See Boeckh, *Corp. Inscr. Attic.* Nos. 150-152, p. 235.

tend against the fiat of their conquerors. If some high-spirited men formed an exception to the pervading depression, and still kept up their courage against better days, there was at the same time a party of totally opposite character, to whom the prostrate condition of Athens was a source of revenge for the past, exultation for the present, and ambitious projects for the future. These were partly the remnant of that faction which had set up, seven years before, the oligarchy of Four Hundred, and still more, the exiles, including several members of the Four Hundred,¹ who now flocked in from all quarters. Many of them had been long serving at Dekeleia, and had formed a part of the force blockading Athens. These exiles now revisited the acropolis as conquerors, and saw with delight the full accomplishment of that foreign occupation at which many of them had aimed seven years before, when they constructed the fortress of Ectoneia, as a means of insuring their own power. Though the conditions imposed extinguished at once the imperial character, the maritime power, the honor, and the independence of Athens, these men were as eager as Lysander to carry them all into execution; because the continuance of the Athenian democracy was now entirely at his mercy, and because his establishment of oligarchies in the other subdued cities plainly intimated what he would do in this great focus of Grecian democratical impulse.

Among these exiles were comprised Aristodemus and Aristotélès, both seemingly persons of importance, the former having at one time been one of the Hellenotamiæ, the first financial office of the imperial democracy, and the latter an active member of the Four Hundred;² also Chariklès, who had been so distinguished for his violence in the investigation respecting the Hermæ, and another man, of whom we now for the first time obtain historical

¹ Lysias, Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 80.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 18; ii, 3, 46; Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. Vit. Lycurg. init.

M. E. Meier, in his Commentary on Lykurgus, construes this passage of Plutarch differently, so that the person therein specified as exile would be, not Aristodemus, but the grandfather of Lykurgus. But I do not think this construction justified: see Meier, Comm. de Lykurg. Vita, p. iv, (Hall 1847).

Respecting Chariklès, see Isokratès, Orat. xvi, De Bigis, s. 52.

knowledge in detail, Kritias, son of Kalliaschrus. He had been among the persons accused as having been concerned in the mutilation of the *Hērma*, and seems to have been for a long time important in the political, the literary, and the philosophic world of Athens. To all three, his abilities qualified him to honor. Both his poetry, in the Solonian or moralizing vein, and his eloquence, published specimens of which remained in the Augustan age, were of no ordinary merit. His wealth was large and his family among the most ancient and conspicuous in Athens: one of his ancestors had been friend and companion of the lawgiver Solon. He was himself maternal uncle of the philosopher Plato,¹ and had frequented the society of Sokratēs so much as to have his name intimately associated in the public mind with that remarkable man. We know neither the cause, nor even the date of his exile, except so far, as that he was not banishment immediately after the revolution of the Four Hundred, and that he *was* in banishment at the time when the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ.² He had passed the time, or a part of the time, of his exile in Thessaly where he took an active part in the sanguinary feuds carried among the oligarchical parties of that lawless country. He is said to have embraced, along with a leader named, or surnamed Prometheus, what passed for the democratical side in Thessaly, arming the *penestæ*, or serfs, against their masters.³ What conduct and dispositions of Kritias had been before this period we are unable to say; but he brought with him now, on return

¹ See Stallbaum's Preface to the *Charmidēs* of Plato, his note on *Timæus* of Plato, p. 20, E, and the Scholia on the same passage.

Kritias is introduced as taking a conspicuous part in four of the Platonic dialogues; *Protagoras*, *Charmidēs*, *Timæus*, and *Kritias*; the last or fragment, not to mention the *Eryxias*.

The small remains of the elegiac poetry of Kritias are to be found in Schneidewin, *Delect. Poet. Græc.* p. 136, seq. Both Cicero (*De Orat.* i. 93) and Dionys. Hal. (*Judic. de Lysiā*, c. 2, p. 454; *Jud. de Isæo*, p. notice his historical compositions.

About the concern of Kritias in the mutilation of the *Hērma*, as affirmed by Diognētus, see Andokidēs de *Mysteriis*, s. 47. He was first cousin to Andokidēs, by the mother's side.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii, 3, 35.

³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii, 3, 35; *Memorab.* i, 2, 24

ing from exile, not merely an unmeasured and unprincipled lust of power, but also a rancorous impulse towards spoliation and bloodshed¹ which outran even his ambition, and ultimately ruined both his party and himself.

Of all these returning exiles, animated with mingled vengeance and ambition, Kritias was decidedly the leading man, like Antiphon among the Four Hundred; partly from his abilities, partly from the superior violence with which he carried out the common sentiment. At the present juncture, he and his fellow-exiles became the most important persons in the city, as enjoying most the friendship and confidence of the conquerors. But the oligarchical party at home were noway behind them, either in servility or in revolutionary fervor, and an understanding was soon established between the two. Probably the old faction of the Four Hundred, though put down, had never wholly died out: at any rate, the political hetæries, or clubs, out of which it was composed, still remained, prepared for fresh coöperation when a favorable moment should arrive; and the catastrophe of Ægospotami had made it plain to every one that such moment could not be far distant. Accordingly, a large portion, if not the majority, of the senators, became ready to lend themselves to the destruction of the democracy, and only anxious to insure places among the oligarchy in prospect;² while the supple Theramenes — resuming his place as oligarchical leader, and abusing his mission as envoy to wear out the patience of his half-famished countrymen — had, during his three months' absence in the tent of Lysander, concerted arrangements with the exiles for future proceedings.³

As soon as the city surrendered, and while the work of demolition was yet going on, the oligarchical party began to organize itself. The members of the political clubs again came together, and named a managing committee of five, called ephors in com-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2. *ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν (Kritias) προπετὴς ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολλὰς ἀποκτείνειν, ἅτε καὶ φύγων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου*, etc.

² Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, s. 23, p. 132.

³ Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 78, p. 128. Theramenes is described, in his subsequent defence, *δνειδίζων μὲν τοῖς φεύγουσιν ὅτι δι' αὐτὸν κατέλθοιεν*, etc.

The general narrative of Xenophon, meagre as it is, harmonizes with this.

pliment to the Lacedæmonians, to direct the general proceedings of the party; to convene meetings when needful, to appoint ordinate managers for the various tribes, and to determine what propositions were to be submitted to the public assembly.¹ Among these five ephors were Kritias and Eratosthenês; probably Theramenês also.

But the oligarchical party, though thus organized and audacious, with a compliant senate and a dispirited people, and with an auxiliary enemy actually in possession, still thought themselves not powerful enough to carry their intended change without seizing the most resolute of the democratical leaders. Accordingly, a citizen named Theokritus tendered an accusation to the senate against the general Strombichidês, together with several others of the democratical generals and taxiarchs; supported by the deposition of a slave, or lowborn man, named Agoratus. Although Nikias and several other citizens tried to prevail upon Agoratus to leave Athens, furnished him with means of escape, and offered to go away with him thence from Munychia, until the political state of Athens should come into a more assured condition,² yet he refused to retire, appe-

¹ Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 44, p. 124. 'Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ναυμαχία συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο, δημοκρατίας ἐτι οὐσης, ὅθεν τῆς στάσεως ἰένετε ἄνδρες ἔφοροι κατέστησαν ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἰριων, συναγωγείς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄρχοντες δὲ τῶν συνωμοτῶν, ἐνόμιζον τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πράττοντες.

² Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, s. 28 (p. 132); s. 35, p. 133. Καὶ οὖν οὖσαντες δύο πλοῖα Μονυχιάσιν, ἰδόντο αὐτοῦ ('Αγοράτου) παντὶ ἀπελθεῖν Ἀθήνηθεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔφασαν συνεκπλευσεῖσθαι, ἕως τὰ πρὸς κατασταίῃ, etc.

Lysias represents this accusation of the generals, and this behavior of Agoratus, as having occurred *before* the surrender of the city, but *after* the return of Theramenês, bringing back the final terms imposed by the dæmonians. He thus so colors it, that Agoratus, by getting the generals of the way, was the real cause why the degrading peace brought by Theramenês was accepted. Had the generals remained at large, he affirms, they would have prevented the acceptance of this degrading peace, and have been able to obtain better terms from the Lacedæmonians (Lysias cont. Agor. sects. 16-20).

Without questioning generally the matters of fact set forth by Lysias in this oration (delivered a long time afterwards, see s. 90), I believe it

before the senate, and accused the generals of being concerned in a conspiracy to break up the peace; pretending to be himself their accomplice. Upon his information, given both before the senate and before an assembly at Munychia, the generals, the taxiarchs, and several other citizens, men of high worth and courageous patriots, were put into prison, as well as Agoratus himself, to stand their trial afterwards before a dikastery consisting of two thousand members. One of the parties thus accused, Menestratus, being admitted by the public assembly, on the proposition of Hagnodôrus, the brother-in-law of Kritias, to become accusing witness, named several additional accomplices, who were also forthwith placed in custody.¹

Though the most determined defenders of the democratical constitution were thus eliminated, Kritias and Theramenês still farther insured the success of their propositions by invoking the presence of Lysander from Samos. The demolition of the walls had been completed, the main blockading army had disbanded, and the immediate pressure of famine had been removed, when an assembly was held to determine on future modifications of the constitution. A citizen named Drakontidês,² moved that a Board of Thirty should be named, to draw up laws for the future government of the city, and to manage provisionally the public affairs, until that task should be completed. Among the thirty persons proposed, prearranged by Theramenês and the oligarchical five ephors, the most prominent names were those of Kritias and Theramenês: there were, besides, Drakontidês himself, — Onomaklês, one of the Four Hundred who had escaped, — Aristotelês and Chariklês, both exiles newly returned, Eratosthenês,

misdates them, and represents them as having occurred *before* the surrender, whereas they really occurred *after* it. We know from Xenophon, that when Theramenês came back the second time with the real peace, the people were in such a state of famine, that farther waiting was impossible: the peace was accepted immediately that it was proposed; cruel as it was, the people were glad to get it (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 22). Besides, how could Agoratus be conveyed with two vessels out of Munychia, when the harbor was closely blocked up? and what is the meaning of *ἐως τὰ πρόγμματα καταραίνῃ*, referred to a moment just *before* the surrender?

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, sects. 38, 60, 68.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 74: compare Aristotle ap. Schol. ad Aristophan. Vesp. 157.

and others whom we do not know, but of whom probably several had also been exiles or members of the Four Hundred.¹ Though this was a complete abrogation of the constitution, yet so conscious were the conspirators of their own strength, that they not deem it necessary to propose the formal suspension of *graphê paranômôn*, as had been done prior to the installation of the former oligarchy. Still, notwithstanding the seizure of leaders and the general intimidation prevalent, a loud murmur of repugnance was heard in the assembly at the motion of Draktidês. But Theramenês rose up to defy the murmur, telling the assembly that the proposition numbered many partisans even among the citizens themselves, and that it had, besides, the probatation of Lysander and the Lacedæmonians. This was presently confirmed by Lysander himself, who addressed the assembly in person. He told them, in a menacing and contemptuous tone, that Athens was now at his mercy, since the walls had been demolished before the day specified, and consequently conditions of the promised peace had been violated. He added that, if they did not adopt the recommendation of Theramenês, they would be forced to take thought for their personal safety instead of for their political constitution. After a notice as plain and so crushing, farther resistance was vain. The dissentients all quitted the assembly in sadness and indignation; with a remnant — according to Lysias, inconsiderable in number as well as worthless in character — stayed to vote acceptance of the motion.²

Seven years before, Theramenês had carried, in conjunction with Antiphon and Phrynichus, a similar motion for the installation of the Four Hundred; extorting acquiescence by domestic terrorism as well as by multiplied assassinations. He now, in conjunction with Kritias and the rest, a second time extinguished the constitution of his country, by the still greater humiliation of a foreign conqueror dictating terms to the Athenians assembled in their own Pnyx. Having seen the Thirty regularly constituted, Lysander retired from Athens to finish the siege of Samos, which still held out. Though blocked up both by

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 2.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, sects. 74-77.

and sea, the Samians obstinately defended themselves for some months longer, until the close of the summer. Nor was it until the last extremity that they capitulated; obtaining permission for every freeman to depart in safety, but with no other property except a single garment. Lysander handed over the city and the properties to the ancient citizens, that is, to the oligarchy and their partisans, who had been partly expelled, partly disfranchised, in the revolution eight years before. But he placed the government of Samos, as he had dealt with the other cities, in the hands of one of his dekadarchies, or oligarchy of Ten Samians, chosen by himself; leaving Thorax as Lacedæmonian harmost, and doubtless a force under him.¹

Having thus finished the war, and trodden out the last spark of resistance, Lysander returned in triumph to Sparta. So imposing a triumph never fell to the lot of any Greek, either before or afterwards. He brought with him every trireme out of the harbor of Peiræus, except twelve, left to the Athenians as a concession; he brought the prow-ornaments of all the ships captured at Ægospotami and elsewhere; he was loaded with golden crowns, voted to him by the various cities; and he farther exhibited a sum of money not less than four hundred and seventy talents, the remnant of those treasures which Cyrus had handed over to him for the prosecution of the war.² That sum had been greater, but is said to have been diminished by the treachery of Gylippus, to whose custody it had been committed and who sullied by such mean peculation the laurels which he had so gloriously earned at Syracuse.³ Nor was it merely the triumphant evidences of past exploits which now decorated this returning admiral. He wielded besides an extent of real power greater than any individual Greek either before or after. Imperial Sparta, as she had now become, was as it were personified in Lysander, who was master of almost all the insular, Asiatic, and Thracian cities, by means of the harmost and the native dekadarchies named by himself and selected from his creatures. To this state of things we shall presently return, when we have followed the eventful history of the Thirty at Athens.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 6-8.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 9, 2.

³ Plutarch, Lysand. c. 16; Diodor. xiii, 106.

These thirty men — the parallel of the dekarchies whom Lysander had constituted in the other cities — were intended for the same purpose, to maintain the city in a state of humiliation and dependence upon Lacedæmon, and upon Lysander, as the representative of Lacedæmon. Though appointed, in the pretence of drawing up a scheme of laws and constitution for Athens, they were in no hurry to commence this duty. They appointed a new senate, composed of compliant, assured, and oligarchical persons; including many of the returned exiles who had been formerly in the Four Hundred, and many also of the preceding senators who were willing to serve their designs.¹ They farmed new magistrates and officers; a new Board of Eleven to manage the business of police and the public force, with Satyrus, one of their most violent partisans, as chief; a Board of Ten to govern in Peiræus;² an archon, to give name to the year, Pythodorus, and a second, or king-archon, Patroklês,³ to offer the customary sacrifices on behalf of the city. While thus securing their own ascendancy, and placing all power in the hands of the most violent oligarchical partisans, they began by professing re-forming principles of the strictest virtue; denouncing the abuses of the past democracy, and announcing their determination to purge the city of evil-doers.⁴ The philosopher Plato — then a young man about twenty-four years old, of anti-democratical politics, and nephew of Kritias — was at first misled, together with various others, by these splendid professions; he conceived hope, and even received encouragement from his relations, that he might play an active part under the new oligarchy.⁵ Though soon came to discern how little congenial his feelings were to theirs, yet in the beginning doubtless such honest illusions contributed materially to strengthen their hands.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 11; Lysias cont. Agorat. Orat. xiii, sects. 2-4. Kritias, the brother-in-law of Chariklês, was a member of this senate (Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, s. 53).

² Plato, Epist. vii, p. 324, B.; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 54.

³ Isokratês cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, s. 6, p. 372.

⁴ Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 5, p. 121. Ἐπειδὴ δ' οἱ τριπονηροὶ μὲν καὶ συγκόφανται ὄντες εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν, φάσκειν χρῆναι τῶν ἀδίκων καθαρὰν ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πολίτας ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην τραπεύσαι, &c. ⁵ Plato, Epist. vii, p. 324.

In execution of their design to root out evil-doers, the Thirty first laid hands on some of the most obnoxious politicians under the former democracy; "men (says Xenophon) whom every one knew to live by making calumnious accusations, called *sycophancy*, and who were pronounced in their enmity to the oligarchical citizens." How far most of these men had been honest or dishonest in their previous political conduct under the democracy, we have no means of determining. But among them were comprised *Strombichidês* and the other democratical officers who had been imprisoned under the information of *Agoratus*, men whose chief crime consisted in a strenuous and inflexible attachment to the democracy. The persons thus seized were brought to trial before the new senate appointed by the Thirty, contrary to the vote of the people, which had decreed that *Strombichidês* and his companions should be tried before a *dikastery* of two thousand citizens.¹ But the *dikastery*, as well as all the other democratical institutions, were now abrogated, and no judicial body was left except the newly constituted senate. Even to that senate, though composed of their own partisans, the Thirty did not choose to intrust the trial of the prisoners, with that secrecy of voting which was well known at Athens to be essential to the free and genuine expression of sentiment. Whenever prisoners were tried, the Thirty were themselves present in the senate-house, sitting on the benches previously occupied by the *prytanes*: two tables were placed before them, one signifying condemnation, the other, acquittal; and each senator was required to deposit his pebble openly before them, either on one or on the other.² It was not merely judgment by the senate, but judgment by the senate under pressure and intimidation by the all-powerful Thirty. It seems probable that neither any semblance of defence, nor any exculpatory witnesses, were allowed; but even if such formalities were not wholly dispensed with, it is certain that there was no real trial, and that condemnation was assured beforehand. Among the great numbers whom the Thirty brought before the senate, not a single man was acquitted except the informer *Agoratus*, who was brought to trial as an accomplice along with *Strombichidês* and his companions, but was liberated

¹ *Lysias* cont. *Agorat.* s. 38.

² *Lysias* cont. *Agorat.* s. 40.

in recompense for the information which he had given against them.¹ The statement of Isokratēs, Lysias, and others — that the victims of the Thirty, even when brought before the senate, were put to death untried — is authentic and trustworthy: many were even put to death by simple order from the Thirty themselves, without any cognizance of the senate.²

In regard to the persons first brought to trial, however, whether we consider them, as Xenophon intimates, to have been notorious evil-doers, or to have been innocent sufferers by reactionary vengeance of returning oligarchical exiles, as was the case certainly with Strombichidēs and the officers accused along with him, — there was little necessity for any constraint on the part of the Thirty over the senate. That body itself partook of the sentiment which dictated the condemnation, and acted as a willing instrument; while the Thirty themselves were unanimous. Theramenēs being even more zealous than Kritias in these executions, to demonstrate his sincere antipathy towards the existing democracy.³ As yet too, since all the persons condemned, just or unjustly, had been marked politicians, so, all other citizens who had taken no conspicuous part in politics, even if they approved of the condemnations, had not been led to conceive apprehension of the like fate for themselves. Here, then, Theramenēs, and along with him a portion of the Thirty as well as the senate, were inclined to pause. While enough had been done to satiate their antipathies, by the death of the most obnoxious leaders of the democracy, they at the same time conceived that oligarchical government to be securely established, and contemplated that farther bloodshed would only endanger its stability, spreading alarm, multiplying enemies, and alienating friends as well as neutrals.

But these were not the views either of Kritias or of the Thirty generally, who surveyed their position with eyes very different from the unstable and cunning Theramenēs, and who had brought

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 41.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 18; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 51; Isokrat. xx, cont. Lochit. s. 15, p. 397.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 12, 28, 38. Ἀὐτὸς (Theramenēs) μάστιγι ἑξορμήσας ἡμᾶς, τοῖς πρώτοις ἐπεγομένους ἐς ἡμᾶς δίκην ἐπιτιθεῖν.

with them from exile a long arrear of vengeance yet to be appeased. Kritias knew well that the numerous population of Athens were devotedly attached, and had good reason to be attached, to their democracy; that the existing government had been imposed upon them by force, and could only be upheld by force; that its friends were a narrow minority, incapable of sustaining it against the multitude around them, all armed; that there were still many formidable enemies to be got rid of, so that it was indispensable to invoke the aid of a permanent Lacedæmonian garrison in Athens, as the only condition not only of their stability as a government, but even of their personal safety. In spite of the opposition of Theramenes, Æschines and Aristotelês, two among the Thirty, were despatched to Sparta to solicit aid from Lysander; who procured for them a Lacedæmonian garrison under Kallibius as harmost, which they engaged to maintain without any cost to Sparta, until their government should be confirmed by putting the evil-doers out of the way.¹ Kallibius was not only installed as master of the acropolis, — full as it was of the mementos of Athenian glory, — but was farther so caressed and won over by the Thirty, that he lent himself to everything which they asked. They had thus a Lacedæmonian military force constantly at their command, besides an organized band of youthful satellites and assassins, ready for any deeds of violence; and they proceeded to seize and put to death many citizens, who were so distinguished for their courage and patriotism, as to be likely to serve as leaders to the public discontent. Several of the best men in Athens thus successively perished, while Thrasybulus, Anytus, and many others, fearing a similar fate, fled out of Attica, leaving their property to be confiscated and appropriated by the oligarchs;² who passed a decree of exile against them in their absence, as well as against Alkibiadês.³

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 13. *ἕως δὴ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἐκποδῶν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαντο τὴν πολιτείαν.*

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 15, 23, 42; Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, s. 30, p. 375.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 42; ii, 4, 14. *οἱ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀκνῶς ἀδικούντες, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπιδημοῦντες ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἐβύγαζοντο, etc.*

Isokratês, Orat. xvi, De Bigis, s. 46, p. 355.

These successive acts of vengeance and violence were war opposed by Theramênês, both in the council of Thirty and in senate. The persons hitherto executed, he said, had deserved their death, because they were not merely noted politicians or the democracy, but also persons of marked hostility to oligarchical men. But to inflict the same fate on others, who had manifested no such hostility, simply because they had enjoyed influence under the democracy, would be unjust: "Even you and I (reminded Kritias) have both said and done many things for sake of popularity." But Kritias replied: "We cannot afford to be scrupulous; we are engaged in a scheme of aggressive ambition, and must get rid of those who are best able to hinder. Though we are Thirty in number, and not one, our government is not the less a despotism, and must be guarded by the same jealous precautions. If you think otherwise, you must be simpleminded indeed." Such were the sentiments which animated the majority of the Thirty, not less than Kritias, and which prompted them to an endless string of seizures and executions. It was not merely the less obnoxious democratical politicians who became their victims, but men of courage, wealth, station, in every vein of political feeling: even oligarchical; the best and most high-principled of that party, shared the same fate. Among the most distinguished sufferers were, Lykurgos, belonging to one of the most eminent sacred gentes in the state; a wealthy man named Antiphon, who had devoted his life to the public service with exemplary patriotism during the years of the war, and had furnished two well-equipped triremes at his own cost; Leon, of Salamis; and even Nikeratos, son of Nikias, who had perished at Syracuse; a man who inherited his father not only a large fortune, but a known repugnance to democratical politics, together with his uncle Eukratês, brother of the same Nikias.² These were only a few among the numerous victims, who were seized, pronounced to be guilty by the senate or by the Thirty themselves, handed over to Satyrus of the Eleven, and condemned to perish by the customary dose of hemlock.

¹ Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 338.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 39-41; Lysias, Orat. xviii, De Bonis Niceratis, sects. 5-8.

The circumstances accompanying the seizure of Leon deserve particular notice. In putting to death him and the other victims, the Thirty had several objects in view, all tending to the stability of their dominion. First, they thus got rid of citizens generally known and esteemed, whose abhorrence they knew themselves to deserve, and whom they feared as likely to head the public sentiment against them. Secondly, the property of these victims, all of whom were rich, was seized along with their persons, and was employed to pay the satellites whose agency was indispensable for such violences, especially Kallibius and the Lacedæmonian hoplites in the acropolis. But, besides murder and spoliation, the Thirty had a farther purpose, if possible, yet more nefarious. In the work of seizing their victims, they not only employed the hands of these paid satellites, but also sent along with them citizens of station and respectability, whom they constrained by threats and intimidation to lend their personal aid in a service so thoroughly odious. By such participation, these citizens became compromised and imbrued in crime, and as it were, consenting parties in the public eye to all the projects of the Thirty; ¹ exposed to the same general hatred as the latter, and interested for their own safety in maintaining the existing dominion. Pursuant to their general plan of implicating unwilling citizens in their misdeeds, the Thirty sent for five citizens to the tholus, or government-house, and ordered them, with terrible menaces, to cross over to Salamis and bring back Leon as prisoner. Four out of the five obeyed; the fifth was the philosopher Sokratês, who refused all concurrence and returned to his own house, while the other four

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sokratês*, c. 20, p. 32. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτὸν μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμῖνιον, ἢ ἀποθάνειν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοί πολλοῖς προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὥς πλείστον ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.

Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, sect. 23, p. 374. ἐνίοις καὶ προσέταττον ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Compare also Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 32.

We learn, from Andokidês de *Myster.* sect. 94, that Melêtus was one of the parties who actually arrested Leon, and brought him up for condemnation. It is not probable that this was the same person who afterwards accused Sokratês. It may possibly have been his father, who bore the same name; but there is nothing to determine the point.

went to Salamis and took part in the seizure of Leon. Though he thus braved all the wrath of the Thirty, it appears that he thought it expedient to leave him untouched. But the fact that they singled him out for such an atrocity, — an old man of virtue, both private and public, and intellectually commanding though at the same time intellectually unpopular, — shows what an extent they carried their system of forcing unwilling participants; while the farther circumstance, that he was the person who had the courage to refuse, among four others who yielded to intimidation, shows that the policy was for the part successful.¹ The inflexible resistance of Sokratēs on this occasion, stands as a worthy parallel to his conduct as prytanis at the public assembly held on the conduct of the generals at the battle of Arginusæ, described in the preceding chapter, wherein he obstinately refused to concur in putting an ill-posed question.

Such multiplied cases of execution and spoliation naturally filled the city with surprise, indignation, and terror. Groups of malcontents got together, and exiles became more and more numerous. All these circumstances furnished ample material for the vehement opposition of Theramenēs, and tended to increase his party: not indeed among the Thirty themselves, but to a certain extent in the senate, and still more among the body of citizens. He warned his colleagues that they were incurring daily an increased amount of public odium, and that their government could not possibly stand, unless they admitted into partnership an adequate number of citizens, with a direct interest in the maintenance. He proposed that all those competent, by property, to serve the state either on horseback or with light armor, should be constituted citizens; leaving all the poor freemen, a far larger number, still disfranchised.³ Kritias

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sokrat. ut sup.*; Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii, 4, 9-23.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii, 3, 17, 19, 48. From sect. 48, we see that Theramenēs actually made this proposition: τὸ μέντοι σὺν τοῖς δυναμένοι μεθ' ἱππῶν καὶ μετ' ἄσπίδων ὠφελεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν, πρόσθεν ἂν ἡγοῦμην εἶναι, καὶ νῦν οὐ μεταβάλλομαι.

This proposition, made by Theramenēs and rejected by the Thirty, explains the comment which he afterwards made, when they drew up a special catalogue or roll of three thousand; which comment otherwise appears unsuitable.

the Thirty rejected this proposition; being doubtless convinced — as the Four Hundred had felt seven years before, when Theramênês demanded of them to convert their fictitious total of Five Thousand into a real list of as many living persons — that “to enroll so great a number of partners, was tantamount to a downright democracy.”² But they were at the same time not insensible to the soundness of his advice: moreover, they began to be afraid of him personally, and to suspect that he was likely to take the lead in a popular opposition against them, as he had previously done against his colleagues of the Four Hundred. They therefore resolved to comply in part with his recommendations, and accordingly prepared a list of three thousand persons to be invested with the political franchise; chosen, as much as possible, from their own known partisans and from oligarchical citizens. Besides this body, they also counted on the adherence of the horsemen, among the wealthiest citizens of the state. These horsemen, or knights, taking them as a class, — the thousand good men of Athens, whose virtues Aristophanês sets forth in hostile antithesis to the alleged demagogic vices of Kleon, — remained steady supporters of the Thirty, throughout all the enormities of their career.³ What privileges or functions were assigned to the chosen three thousand, we do not hear, except that they could not be condemned without the warrant of the senate, while any other Athenian might be put to death by the simple fiat of the Thirty.³

A body of partners thus chosen — not merely of fixed number, but of picked oligarchical sentiments — was by no means the addition which Theramênês desired. While he commented on the folly of supposing that there was any charm in the number three thousand, as if it embodied all the merit of the city, and nothing else but merit, he admonished them that it was still insufficient for their defence; their rule was one of pure force, and yet inferior in force to those over whom it was exercised. Again the Thirty acted upon his admonition, but in a way very different from that which he contemplated. They proclaimed a general muster

¹ Thucyd. viii, 89–92. τὸ μὲν καταστήσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντικρὺς ἂν εἶεν ἡγοούμενοι.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 18, 19; ii, 4, 2, 8, 24. ³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 51.

and examination of arms to all the hoplites in Athens. The Thousand were drawn up in arms all together in the marketplace; but the remaining hoplites were disseminated in scattered companies and in different places. After the rev was over, these scattered companies went home to their n leaving their arms piled at the various places of muster. the adherents of the Thirty, having been forewarned and together, were sent at the proper moment, along with the L dæmonian mercenaries, to seize the deserted arms, which v deposited under the custody of Kallibins in the acropolis. Al hoplites in Athens, except the Three Thousand and the remai adherents of the Thirty, were disarmed by this crafty manoe in spite of the fruitless remonstrance of Theramênês.¹

Kritias and his colleagues, now relieved from all fear eith Theramênês, or of any other internal opposition, gave loose, unsparingly than ever, to their malevolence and rapacity, ting to death both many of their private enemies, and many victims for the purpose of spoliation. A list of suspected pe was drawn up, in which each of their adherents was allow insert such names as he chose, and from which the victims generally taken.² Among informers, who thus gave in nam destruction, Batrachus and Æschylidês³ stood conspicuous. thirst of Kritias for plunder, as well as for bloodshed, on creased by gratification;⁴ and it was not merely to pay mercenaries, but also to enrich themselves separately, the Thirty stretched everywhere their murderous agency, whic mowed down metics as well as citizens. Theognis and P two of the Thirty, affirmed that many of these metics were l

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 20, 41; compare Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Er sect. 41.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 21; Isokratês adv. Euthynum, sect. 5, Isokratês cont. Kallimach. sect. 23, p. 375; Lysias, Or. xxv, Δημ. 'Απολ. sect. 21, p. 173.

The two passages of Isokratês sufficiently designate what this list, (λογος, must have been; but the name by which he calls it — ὁ μετὰ Δυ (or Πεισάνθρωπον) κατάλογος — is not easy to explain.

³ Lysias, Orat. vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 46; Or. xii, cont. Eratosth.

⁴ Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 12. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ κλεπτέρωτός τε καὶ βιαιώτατος ἐγένετο, etc.

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caused his body to be carried away on a hired bier from prison, with covering and a few scanty appurtenances supplied by the sympathy of private friends.¹

Amidst such atrocities, increasing in number and turned more and more to shameless robbery, the party of Theramènes gained ground, even in the senate; many of whose men profited nothing by satiating the private cupidity of the Th and began to be weary of so revolting a system, as well as alarmed at the host of enemies which they were raising up. In preparation for the late seizure of the metics, the Thirty had desired Theramènes to make choice of any victim among that class, to be destroyed and plundered for his own personal benefit. But he rejected the suggestion emphatically, denouncing the enormity of the measure in the indignant terms which it deserved. So much was the antipathy of Kritias and the majority of the Thirty against already acrimonious from the effects of a long course of oppression, exasperated by this refusal; so much did they fear the consequences of incurring the obloquy of such measures for themselves, while Theramènes enjoyed all the credit of opposing them, so satisfied were they that their government could not stand this dissension among its own members; that they resolved to destroy him at all cost. Having canvassed as many of the senators as they could, to persuade them that Theramènes was conspired against the oligarchy, they caused the most daring of their partisans to attend one day in the senate-house, close to the room which fenced in the senators, with daggers concealed under their garments. So soon as Theramènes appeared, Kritias rose and denounced him to the senate as a public enemy, in an harangue which Xenophon gives at considerable length, and which is full of instructive evidence, as to Greek political feeling, that we may extract the main points in abridgment:—

“If any of you imagine, senators, that more people are perishing than the occasion requires, reflect, that this happens every year in a time of revolution, and that it must especially happen

¹ Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosthen. sects. 8, 21. Lysias prosecuted Theramènes before the dikastery some years afterwards, as having caused the death of Polemarchus. The foregoing details are found in the oration, as well as composed by himself.

establishment of an oligarchy at Athens, the most populous city in Greece, and where the population has been longest accustomed to freedom. You know as well as we do, that democracy is to both of us an intolerable government, as well as incompatible with all steady adherence to our protectors, the Lacedæmonians. It is under their auspices that we are establishing the present oligarchy, and that we destroy, as far as we can, every man who stands in the way of it; which becomes most of all indispensable, if such a man be found among our own body. Here stands the man, Theramènes, whom we now denounce to you as your foe not less than ours. That such is the fact, is plain from his unmeasured censures on our proceedings, from the difficulties which he throws in our way whenever we want to despatch any of the demagogues. Had such been his policy from the beginning, he would indeed have been our enemy, yet we could not with justice have proclaimed him a villain. But it is he who first originated the alliance which binds us to Sparta, who struck the first blow at the democracy, who chiefly instigated us to put to death the first batch of accused persons; and now, when you as well as we have thus incurred the manifest hatred of the people, he turns round and quarrels with our proceedings in order to insure his own safety, and leave us to pay the penalty. He must be dealt with not only as an enemy, but as a traitor, to you as well as to us; a traitor in the grain, as his whole life proves. Though he enjoyed, through his father Agnon, a station of honor under the democracy, he was foremost in subverting it, and setting up the Four Hundred; the moment he saw that oligarchy beset with difficulties, he was the first to put himself at the head of the people against them; always ready for change in both directions, and a willing accomplice in those executions which changes of government bring with them. It is he, too, who—having been ordered by the generals after the battle of Arginusæ to pick up the men on the disabled ships, and having neglected the task—accused and brought to execution his superiors, in order to get himself out of danger. He has well earned his surname of The Buskin, fitting both legs, but constant to neither; he has shown himself reckless both of honor and friendship, looking to nothing but his own selfish advancement; and it is for us now to guard against his doublings, in order that he may not play us the same

trick. We cite him before you as a conspirator and a traitor against you as well as against us. Look to your own safety, not to his. For depend upon it, that if you let him off, you hold out powerful encouragement to your worst enemies; and if you condemn him, you will crush their best hopes, both within and without the city."

Theraménès was probably not wholly unprepared for such attack as this. At any rate, he rose up to reply to it once:—

"First of all, senators, I shall touch upon the charge against which Kritias mentioned last, the charge of having accused and brought to execution the generals. It was not I who began the accusation against them, but they who began it against me. They said, that they had ordered me upon the duty, and that I neglected it; my defence was, that the duty could not be executed in consequence of the storm; the people believed and exonerated me, but the generals were rightfully condemned on their accusation, because *they* said that the duty might have been performed, while yet it had remained unperformed. I do not wonder, indeed, that Kritias has told these falsehoods against me; for at the time when this affair happened, he was an exile in Thera, employed in raising up a democracy, and arming the people against their masters. Heaven grant that nothing of what he has perpetrated *there* may occur at Athens! I agree with Kritias, in that, whoever wishes to cut short your government, and strengthen those who conspire against you, deserves justly the severest punishment. But to whom does this charge best apply? To you or to me? Look at the behavior of each of us, and then judge yourselves. At first, we were all agreed, so far as the condemnation of the known and obnoxious demagogues. But when Kritias and his friends began to seize men of station and dignity, it was that I began to oppose them. I knew that the seizure of men like Leon, Nikias, and Antiphon, would make the best men in the city your enemies. I opposed the execution of the metics, aware that all that body would be alienated. I opposed the arming of the citizens, and the hiring of foreign guards. When I saw that enemies at home and exiles abroad were plying against you, I dissuaded you from banishing Thrasybulus and Anytus, whereby you only furnished the exiles with

tent leaders. The man who gives you this advice, and gives it you openly, is he a traitor, or is he not rather a genuine friend? It is you and your supporters, Kritias, who, by your murders and robberies, strengthen the enemies of the government and betray your friends. Depend upon it, that Thrasybulus and Anytus are much better pleased with your policy than they would be with mine. You accuse me of having betrayed the Four Hundred; but I did not desert them until they were themselves on the point of betraying Athens to her enemies. You call me The Buskin, as trying to fit both parties. But what am I to call *you*, who fit neither of them? who, under the democracy, were the most violent hater of the people, and who, under the oligarchy, have become equally violent as a hater of oligarchical merit? I am, and always have been, Kritias, an enemy both to extreme democracy and to oligarchical tyranny. I desire to constitute our political community out of those who can serve it on horseback and with heavy armor; I have proposed this once, and I still stand to it. I side not either with democrats or despots, to the exclusion of the dignified citizens. Prove that I am now, or ever have been, guilty of such crime, and I shall confess myself deserving of ignominious death."

This reply of Theramenês was received with such a shout of applause by the majority of the senate, as showed that they were resolved to acquit him. To the fierce antipathies of the mortified Kritias, the idea of failure was intolerable; indeed, he had now carried his hostility to such a point, that the acquittal of his enemy would have been his own ruin. After exchanging a few words with the Thirty, he retired for a few moments, and directed the Eleven with the body of armed satellites to press close on the railing whereby the senators were fenced round, — while the court before the senate-house was filled with the mercenary hoplites. Having thus got his force in hand, Kritias returned and again addressed the senate: "Senators (said he), I think it the duty of a good president, when he sees his friends around him duped, not to let them follow their own counsel. This is what I am now going to do; indeed, these men, whom you see pressing upon us from without, tell us plainly that they will not tolerate the acquittal of one manifestly working to the ruin of the oligarchy. It is an article of our new constitution, that no man of the select Three

Thousand shall be condemned without your vote ; but that man not included in that list may be condemned by the Ten. Now I take upon me, with the concurrence of all my colleagues, to strike this Theramenês out of that list ; and we, by our authority, condemn him to death."

Though Theramenês had already been twice concerned in bringing down the democracy, yet such was the habit of all Athenians to look for protection from constitutional forms, that he pronounced himself safe under the favorable verdict of the senate and was not prepared for the monstrous and despotic sentence which he now heard from his enemy. He sprang at once to the senatorial hearth, — the altar and sanctuary in the interior of the senate-house, — and exclaimed : "I too, senators, stand as suppliant, asking only for bare justice. Let it be not the power of Kritias to strike out me or any other man who chooses ; let my sentence as well as yours be passed according to the law which these Thirty have themselves prepared. I know but too well, that this altar will be of no avail to me as a defence ; but I shall at least make it plain, that these men are as impious towards the gods as they are nefarious towards men. As for worthy senators, I wonder that you will not stand forward for your own personal safety ; since you must be well aware that your own names may be struck out of the Three Thousand as easily as mine."

But the senate remained passive and stupefied by fear, in the face of these moving words, which perhaps were not perfectly understood, since it could not be the design of Kritias to permit his enemy to speak a second time. It was probably while Theramenês was yet speaking, that the loud voice of the herald was heard, bidding the Eleven to come forward and take him into custody. The Eleven advanced into the senate, headed by their brutal leader Satyrus, and followed by their usual attendants. They went straight up to the altar, from whence Satyrus, aided by the heralds, dragged him by main force, while Kritias said to the Eleven, "We hand over to you this man Theramenês, condemned according to the law. Seize him, carry him off to prison, and do what is the needful." Upon this, Theramenês was dragged out of the senate-house and carried in custody through the market-place, exclaiming with a loud voice against the atrocious treatment.

which he was suffering. "Hold your tongue (said Satyrus to him), or you will suffer for it." "And if I *do* hold my tongue (replied Theramenês), shall not I suffer for it also?"

He was conveyed to prison, where the usual draught of hemlock was speedily administered. After he had swallowed it, there remained a drop at the bottom of the cup, which he jerked out on the floor (according to the playful convivial practice called the Kottabus, which was supposed to furnish an omen by its sound in falling, and after which the person who had just drank handed the goblet to the guest whose turn came next): "Let this (said he) be for the gentle Kritias."¹

The scene just described, which ended in the execution of Theramenês, is one of the most striking and tragical in ancient history; in spite of the bald and meagre way in which it is recounted by Xenophon, who has thrown all the interest into the two speeches. The atrocious injustice by which Theramenês perished, as well as the courage and self-possession which he displayed at the moment of danger, and his cheerfulness even in the prison, not inferior to that of Sokratês three years afterwards, naturally enlist the warmest sympathies of the reader in his favor, and have tended to exalt the positive estimation of his character. During the years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy,² he was extolled and pitied as one of the first martyrs to oligarchical violence: later authors went so far as to number him among the chosen pupils of Sokratês.³ But

¹ Xenoph. Hellen ii, 3, 56.

² See Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 66.

³ Diodor. xiv, 5. Diodorus tells us that Sokratês and two of his friends were the only persons who stood forward to protect Theramenês, when Satyrus was dragging him from the altar. Plutarch (Vit. x, Orat. p. 836) ascribes the same act of generous forwardness to *Isokratês*. There is no good ground for believing it, either of one or of the other. None but senators were present; and as this senate had been chosen by the Thirty, it is not likely that either Sokratês or Isokratês were among its members. If Sokratês had been a member of it, the fact would have been noticed and brought out in connection with his subsequent trial.

The manner in which Plutarch (Consolat. ad Apollon. c. 6, p. 105) states the death of Theramenês, that he was "tortured to death" by the Thirty, is an instance of his loose speaking.

Compare Cicero about the death of Theramenês (Tuscul. Disp. i, 40, 96).

though Theramênês here became the victim of a much man than himself, it will not for that reason be proper to to him our admiration, which his own conduct will not be found to deserve. The reproaches of Kritias against founded on his conduct during the previous conspiracy (Four Hundred, were in the main well founded. After he been one of the foremost originators of that conspiracy deserted his comrades as soon as he saw that it was likely to and Kritias had doubtless present to his mind the fate of phon, who had been condemned and executed under the action of Theramênês, together with a reasonable conviction the latter would again turn against his colleagues in the manner, if circumstances should encourage him to do so. was Kritias wrong in denouncing the perfidy of Theramênê regard to the generals after the battle of Arginusæ, the of whom he was partly instrumental in bringing about, t only as an auxiliary cause, and not with that extreme stren nefarious stratagem, which Xenophon and others have im to him. He was a selfish, cunning, and faithless man, — re enter into conspiracies, yet never foreseeing their consequ —and breaking faith to the ruin of colleagues whom he ha encouraged, when he found them more consistent and thor going in crime than himself.¹

Such high-handed violence, by Kritias and the majority Thirty, — carried though, even against a member of the Board, by intimidation of the senate, — left a feeling of and dissension among their own partisans from which power never recovered. Its immediate effect, however, render them, apparently, and in their own estimation, powerful than ever. All open manifestation of dissent being silenced, they proceeded to the uttermost limits of cruel licentious tyranny. They made proclamation, that every included in the list of Three Thousand, should depart with

His admiration for the manner of death of Theramênês doubtless used to make him rank that Athenian with Themistoklês and Perik Orat. iii, 16, 59).

¹ The epithets applied by Aristophanês to Theramênês (Ran. i) coincide pretty exactly with those in the speech just noticed, which phon ascribes to Kritias against him.

walls, in order that they might be undisturbed masters within the city, a policy before resorted to by Periander of Corinth and other Grecian despots.¹ The numerous fugitives expelled by this order, distributed themselves partly in Peiræus, partly in the various demes of Attica. Both in one and the other, however, they were seized by order of the Thirty, and many of them put to death, in order that their substance and lands might be appropriated either by the Thirty themselves, or by some favored partisan.² The denunciations of Batrachus, Æschylidēs, and other delators, became more numerous than ever, in order to obtain the seizure and execution of their private enemies; and the oligarchy were willing to purchase any new adherent by thus gratifying his antipathies or his rapacity.³ The subsequent orators affirmed that more than fifteen hundred victims were put to death without trial by the Thirty;⁴ on this numerical estimate little stress is to be laid, but the total was doubtless prodigious. It became more and more plain that no man was safe in Attica; so that Athenian emigrants, many in great poverty and destitution, were multiplied throughout the neighboring territories, — in Megara, Thebes, Orôpus, Chalkia, Argos, etc.⁵ It was not everywhere that these distressed persons could obtain reception; for the Lacedæmonian government, at the instance of the Thirty, issued an edict prohibiting all the members of their confederacy from harboring fugitive Athenians; an edict which these cities generously disobeyed,⁶ though probably the smaller Peloponnesian cities complied. Without doubt, this decree was

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 97; Orat. xxxi, cont. Philon. s. 8, 9; Herakleid. Pontic. c. 5; Diogen. Laert. i, 98.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. c. *ἔχον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων, ἐν αἷτοι καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τοῦτον ἀγροὺς ἔχοιεν: φευγόντων δὲ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν πολλοὺς ἄγοντες ἐνέπλησαν Μάγαρα καὶ Θήβας τῶν ὑποχωρούντων.*

³ Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 49; Or. xxv, Democrat. Subvers. Apolog. s. 20; Or. xxvi, cont. Evandr. s. 23.

⁴ Æschinēs, Fals. Legat. c. 24, p. 266, and cont. Ktesiph. c. 86, p. 455; Isokratēs, Or. iv, Panegy. s. 131; Or. vii, Areopag. s. 76.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1; Diodor. xiv, 6; Lysias, Or. xxiv, s. 28; Or. xxxi, cont. Philon. s. 10.

⁶ Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 98, 99: *παντάχοθεν ἐκκηρυττόμενοι*; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 99; Diodor. xiv, 6; Demosth. de Rhod. Libert. c. 10.

procured by Lysander, while his influence still continued unpaired.

But it was not only against the lives, properties, and liberty of Athenian citizens that the Thirty made war. They were less solicitous to extinguish the intellectual force and education of the city; a project so perfectly in harmony both with sentiment and practice of Sparta, that they counted on support of their foreign allies. Among the ordinances which they promulgated was one, expressly forbidding every one to teach the art of words, if I may be allowed to translate literally the Greek expression, which bore a most comprehensive signification, and denoted every intentional communication of logical, rhetorical, or argumentative improvement, — of literary criticism and composition, — and of command over those political and moral topics which formed the ordinary theme of discussion. Such was the species of instruction which Sokratês and the sophists, each in his own way, communicated to the Athenian youth. The great foreign sophists, not Athenian, such as Prodikus and Protagoras had been, — though perhaps neither of these two was now alive, — were doubtless no longer in the city, under the calamitous circumstances which had been weighing upon every citizen since the defeat of Ægospotami. There were abundance of native teachers, or sophists, inferior in merit to these distinguished names, yet still habitually employed with more or less success, in communicating a species of instruction held indispensable to every liberal Athenian. The edict of the Thirty was in fact a general suppression of the higher

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31. *Καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε, λόγων τέλῃ δαδᾶσκειν.* — Isokratês, cont. *Sophist. Or. xiii, s. 12.* *τὴν παιδεύσαν τὸν λόγον.*

Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 19) affirms that the Thirty oligarchs, under their rule, altered the position of the rostrum in the Pnyx, the place where the democratical public assemblies were held: the rostrum had looked towards the sea, but they turned it so as to make it look towards the land, because the maritime service and the associations connected with it were the chief stimulants of democratical sentiment. This statement has been often copied and reasserted, as if it were an undoubted fact. M. Forchhammer (*Topographie von Athen*, p. 289, in Kieler Studien. 1841) has shown it to be untrue and even absurd.

of teachers or professors, above the rank of the elementary teacher of letters, or grammarist. If such an edict could have been maintained in force for a generation, combined with the other mandates of the Thirty, the city out of which Sophoklēs and Euripidēs had just died, and in which Plato and Isokratēs were in vigorous age, the former twenty-five, the latter twenty-nine, would have been degraded to the intellectual level of the meanest community in Greece. It was not uncommon for a Grecian despot to suppress all those assemblies wherein youths came together for the purpose of common training, either intellectual or gymnastic; as well as the public banquets and clubs, or associations, as being dangerous to his authority, and tending to elevation of courage, and to a consciousness of political rights among the citizens.¹

The enormities of the Thirty had provoked severe comments from the philosopher Sokratēs, whose life was spent in conversation on instructive subjects with those young men who sought his society, though he never took money from any pupil. These comments had been made known to Kritias and Chariklēs, who sent for him, reminded him of the prohibitive law, and peremptorily commanded him to abstain for the future from all conversation with youths. Sokratēs met this order by putting some questions to those who gave it, in his usual style of puzzling scrutiny, destined to expose the vagueness of the terms; and to draw the line, or rather to show that no definite line could be drawn, between that which was permitted and that which was forbidden. But he soon perceived that his interrogations produced only a feeling of disgust and wrath, menacing to his own safety. The tyrants ended by repeating their interdict in yet more peremptory terms, and by giving Sokratēs to understand, that they were not ignorant of the censures which he had cast upon them.²

Though our evidence does not enable us to make out the precise dates of these various oppressions of the Thirty, yet it seems probable that this prohibition of teaching must have been among their earlier enactments; at any rate, considerably anterior to the death of Theramenēs, and the general expulsion out of the walls of all except the privileged Three Thousand. Their

¹ Aristot. *Polit.* v, 9, 2.

² Xenoph. *Memorab.* i, 2, 33-39

dominion continued, without any armed opposition made to it about eight months from the capture of Athens by Lysander, is, from about April to December 404 B.C. The measure their iniquity then became full. They had accumulated against themselves, both in Attica and among the exiles in the circumjacent territories, suffering and exasperated enemies, while they had lost the sympathy of Thebes, Megará, and Corinth, and were less heartily supported by Sparta.

During these important eight months, the general feeling throughout Greece had become materially different both towards Athens and towards Sparta. At the moment when the long war was first brought to a close, fear, antipathy, and vengeance against Athens, had been the reigning sentiment, both among the confederates of Sparta and among the revolted members of the extinct Athenian empire; a sentiment which prevailed among them indeed to a greater degree than among the Spartans themselves, who resisted it, and granted to Athens a capitulation at a time when many of their allies pressed for the harshest measures. To this resolution they were determined partly by the still remaining force of ancient sympathy; partly by the odium which would have been sure to follow the act of expelling the Athenians from the Peloponnese; partly too by the policy of Lysander, who contemplated the keeping of Athens in the same dependence on Sparta and on himself, and by the same means, as the other outlying cities in which he had planted his dekadarchies.

So soon as Athens was humbled, deprived of her fleet and her walled port, and rendered innocuous, the great bond of cordship and fear which had held the allies to Sparta disappeared; and the paramount antipathy on the part of those allies towards Athens gradually died away, a sentiment of jealousy and a suspicion of Sparta sprang up in its place, on the part of the leading states among them. For such a sentiment there were more than one reason. Lysander had brought home not only a large sum of money, but valuable spoils of other kind, many captive triremes, at the close of the war. As the success had been achieved by the joint exertions of all the allies, the fruits of it belonged in equity to all of them jointly, not to Sparta alone. The Thebans and Corinthians preferred a formal claim

be allowed to share; and if the other allies abstained from openly backing the demand, we may fairly presume that it was not from any different construction of the equity of the case, but from fear of offending Sparta. In the testimonial erected by Lysander at Delphi, commemorative of the triumph, he had included not only his own brazen statue, but that of each commander of the allied contingents; thus formally admitting the allies to share in the honorary results, and tacitly sanctioning their claim to the lucrative results also. Nevertheless, the demand made by the Thebans and Corinthians was not only repelled, but almost resented as an insult; especially by Lysander, whose influence was at that moment almost omnipotent.¹

That the Lacedæmonians should have withheld from the allies a share in this money, demonstrates still more the great ascendancy of Lysander; because there was a considerable party at Sparta itself, who protested altogether against the reception of so much gold and silver, as contrary to the ordinances of Lykurgus, and fatal to the peculiar morality of Sparta. An ancient Spartan, Skiraphidas, or Phlogidas, took the lead in calling for exclusive adherence to the old Spartan money, heavy iron, difficult to carry; nor was it without difficulty that Lysander and his friends obtained admission for the treasure into Sparta; under special proviso, that it should be for the exclusive purposes of the government, and that no private citizen should ever circulate gold or silver.² The existence of such traditionary repugnance among the Spartans would have seemed likely to induce them to be just towards their allies, since an equitable distribution of the treasure would have gone far to remove the difficulty; yet they nevertheless kept it all.

¹ Justin (vi. 10) mentions the demand thus made and refused. Plutarch (Lysand. c. 27) states the demand as having been made by the Thebans *alone*, which I disbelieve. Xenophon, according to the general disorderly arrangement of facts in his *Hellenika*, does not mention the circumstance in its proper place, but alludes to it on a subsequent occasion as having before occurred (*Hellen.* iii, 5, 5). He also specifies by name no one but the Thebans as having actually made the demand; but there is a subsequent passage, which shows that not only the Corinthians, but other allies also, sympathized in it (iii, 5, 12).

² Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 17; Plutarch, *Institut. Lacon.* p. 239.

But besides this special offence given to the allies, the conduct of Sparta in other ways showed that she intended to turn the victory to her own account. Lysander was at this moment a powerful, playing his own game under the name of Sparta. His position was far greater than that of the regent Pausanias had been after the victory of Plataea; and his talents for making use of the position incomparably superior. The magnitude of his successes, as well as the eminent ability which he had displayed, justified abundant eulogy; but in his case, the eulogy was carried to the length of something like worship. Altars were erected to him; pæans or hymns were composed in his honor; the Ephesians set up his statue in the temple of their goddess Artemis and the Samians not only erected a statue to him at Olympia but even altered the name of their great festival, the *Heræa Lysandria*.¹ Several contemporary poets—Antiloehus, Chœrilus, Nikêratus, and Antimachus—devoted themselves to sing his glories and profit by his rewards.

Such excess of flattery was calculated to turn the head even of the most virtuous Greek: with Lysander, it had the effect of substituting, in place of that assumed smoothness of manner which he began his command, an insulting harshness and arrogance corresponding to the really unmeasured ambition which he cherished.² His ambition prompted him to aggrandize Sparta separately, without any thought of her allies, in order to exercise dominion in her name. He had already established *dekadarchies* or oligarchies of Ten, in many of the insular and Asiatic cities, and an oligarchy of Thirty in Athens; all composed of vehement partisans chosen by himself, dependent upon him for support, devoted to his objects. To the eye of an impartial observer in Greece, it seemed as if all these cities had been converted into dependencies of Sparta, and were intended to be held in that condition; under Spartan authority, exercised by and through Lysander.³ Instead of that general freedom which had been

¹ Pausan. vi, 3, 6. The Samian oligarchical party owed their restoration to Lysander.

² Plutarch. Lysand. c. 18, 19.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 30. Οὕτω δὲ προχωροῦντων, Πανσωνίας ὁ βασις (of Sparta), φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ εἰ κατεργασμένους ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν ἐβόη

promised as an incentive to revolt against Athens, a Spartan empire had been constituted in place of the extinct Athenian, with a tribute, amounting to a thousand talents annually, intended to be assessed upon the component cities and islands.¹ Such at least was the scheme of Lysander, though it never reached complete execution.

It is easy to see that under such a state of feeling on the part of the allies of Sparta, the enormities perpetrated by the Thirty at Athens and by the Lysandrian dekadarchies in the other cities, would be heard with sympathy for the sufferers, and without that strong anti-Athenian sentiment which had reigned a few months before. But what was of still greater importance, even at Sparta itself, opposition began to spring up against the measures and the person of Lysander. If the leading men at Sparta had felt jealous even of Brasidas, who offended them only by unparalleled success and merit as a commander,² much more would the same feeling be aroused against Lysander, who displayed an overweening insolence, and was worshipped with an ostentatious flattery, not inferior to that of Pausanias after the battle of Plataea. Another Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, was now king of Sparta, in conjunction with Agis. Upon him the feeling of jealousy against Lysander told with especial force, as it did afterwards upon Agesilaus, the successor of Agis; not unaccompanied probably with suspicion, which subsequent events justified, that Lysander was aiming at some interference with the regal privileges. Nor is it unfair to suppose that Pausanias was animated by motives more patriotic than mere jealousy, and that the rapacious cruelty, which everywhere dishonored the new oligarchies, both shocked his better feelings and inspired him with fears for the stability of the system. A farther circumstance which weakened the influence

σοι, ἅμα δὲ ἰδίᾳς ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, πείσας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρονῶν. Ἐννείποντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες, πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων. Οὗτοι δ' ἔλεγον μὲν ὅτι οὐ νομίζοιεν εὐορκεῖν ἂν στρατευόμενοι ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους, μηδὲν παράσπονδον ποιοῦντας· ἐπραττον δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐγίγνωσκον Λακεδαιμονίους βουλευμένους τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων χώραν οἰκείαν καὶ πιστὴν ποιήσασθαι. Compare also iii, 5, 12, 13, respecting the sentiments entertained in Greece about the conduct of the Lacedæmonians.

¹ Diodor. xiv, 10-13.

² Thucyd. iv

of Lysander at Sparta was the annual change of ephors, which took place about the end of September or beginning of October. Those ephors under whom his grand success and the capture of Athens had been consummated, and who had lent themselves entirely to his views, passed out of office in September 404 and gave place to others more disposed to second Pausanias.

I remarked, in the preceding chapter, how much more favorable for Sparta, and how much less unfortunate for Athens for the rest of Greece, the close of the Peloponnesian war would have been, if Kallikratidas had gained and survived the battle of Arginusæ, so as to close it then, and to acquire for himself personal ascendancy which the victorious general was susceptible of exercising over the numerous rearrangements consequent on peace. We see how important the personal character of the general placed was, when we follow the proceedings of Lysander during the year after the battle of Ægospotami. His personal virtues were the grand determining circumstance throughout Greece, regulating both the measures of Sparta, and the fate of the conquered cities. Throughout the latter, rapacious and cruel oligarchies were organized, — of Ten in most cities, but of Thirty in Athens, — all acting under the power and protection of Sparta, but in real subordination to his ambition. Because he happened to be under the influence of a selfish thirst for power, the measures of Sparta were divested not merely of all Pan-Hellenic sentiment, but even, to a great degree, of reference to her own confederacy, and concentrated upon the acquisition of imperial preponderance for herself. Now if Kallikratidas had been the ascendant person at this critical juncture, not only such narrow and base impulses would have been comparatively inoperative, but the leading state would have been made to set the example of recommending, of organizing, and if necessary, of enforcing arrangements favorable to Pan-Hellenic brotherhood. Kallikratidas would not only have refused to lend himself to despotism, governing by his force and for his purposes, in the subjugated cities, but he would have discountenanced such conspiracies wherever they tended to arise spontaneously. No ruffian like Kritias, no crafty schemer like Theramenes, would have recurred upon his aid as they presumed upon the friendship of Lysander. Probably he would have left the government of each city

own natural tendencies, oligarchical or democratical; interfering only in special cases of actual and pronounced necessity. Now the influence of an ascendent state, employed for such purposes, and emphatically discarding all private ends for the accomplishment of a stable Pan-Hellenic sentiment and fraternity; employed too thus, at a moment when so many of the Greek towns were in the throes of reorganization, having to take up a new political course in reference to the altered circumstances, is an element of which the force could hardly have failed to be prodigious as well as beneficial. What degree of positive good might have been wrought, by a noble-minded victor under such special circumstances, we cannot presume to affirm in detail. But it would have been no mean advantage, to have preserved Greece from beholding and feeling such enormous powers in the hands of a man like Lysander; through whose management the worst tendencies of an imperial city were studiously magnified by the exorbitance of individual ambition. It was to him exclusively that the Thirty in Athens, and the dekadarchies elsewhere, owed both their existence and their means of oppression.

It has been necessary thus to explain the general changes which had gone on in Greece and in Grecian feeling during the eight months succeeding the capture of Athens in March 404 B.C., in order that we may understand the position of the Thirty oligarchs, or Tyrants, at Athens, and of the Athenian population both in Attica and in exile, about the beginning of December in the same year, the period which we have now reached. We see how it was that Thebes, Corinth, and Megara, who in March had been the bitterest enemies of the Athenians, had now become alienated both from Sparta and from the Lysandrian Thirty, whom they viewed as viceroys of Athens for separate Spartan benefit. We see how the basis was thus laid of sympathy for the suffering exiles who fled from Attica; a feeling which the recital of the endless enormities perpetrated by Kritias and his colleagues inflamed every day more and more. We discern at the same time how the Thirty, while thus incurring enmity both in and out of Attica, were at the same time losing the hearty support of Sparta, from the decline of Lysander's influence, and the growing opposition of his rivals at home.

In spite of formal prohibition from Sparta, obtained doubtless

under the influence of Lysander, the Athenian emigrants obtained shelter in all the states bordering on Attica. It was in Boeotia that they struck the first blow. Thrasybulus, Anytus and Archinus, starting from Thebes with the sympathy of the Theban public, and with substantial aid from Ismenias and other wealthy citizens,—at the head of a small band of exiles stated boldly at thirty, sixty, seventy, or somewhat above one hundred men,¹ — seized Phylæ, a frontier fortress in the mountains north of Attica, lying on the direct road between Athens and Thebes. Probably it had no garrison; for the Thirty, acting in the interest of Lacedæmonian predominance, had dismantled all the lying fortresses in Attica;² so that Thrasybulus accomplished his purpose without resistance. The Thirty marched out from Athens to attack him, at the head of a powerful force, comprising Lacedæmonian hoplites who formed their guard, the Three Hundred and privileged citizens, and all the knights, or horsemen. Probably the small company of Thrasybulus was reinforced by the accessions of exiles, as soon as he was known to have occupied the fort. For by the time that the Thirty with their assembled force arrived, he was in condition to repel a vigorous assault made by the younger soldiers, with considerable loss to the aggressors.

Disappointed in this direct attack, the Thirty laid plans for blockading Phylæ, where they knew that there was no store of provisions. But hardly had their operations commenced, when a snow-storm fell, so abundant and violent, that they were forced to abandon their position and retire to Athens, leaving the greater part of their baggage in the hands of the garrison at Phylæ. In the language of Thrasybulus, this storm was characterized as providential, since the weather had been very fine until the month preceding, and since it gave time to receive reinforcements.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 2; Diodor. xiv, 32; Pausan. i, 29, 3; Lysias, cont. Agoratus, sect. 84; Justin, v, 9; Æschines, cont. Ktesiphon, p. 437; Demosthenes, cont. Timokrat. c. 34, p. 742. Æschines allots more than one hundred followers to the captors of Phylæ.

The sympathy which the Athenian exiles found at Thebes is attested by a fragment of Lysias, ap. Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysia, p. 594 (Fragment ed. Bekker).

² Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosthenes, sect. 41, p. 124.

made him seven hundred strong.¹ Though the weather was such that the Thirty did not choose to keep their main force in the neighborhood of Phylê, and perhaps the Three Thousand themselves were not sufficiently hearty in the cause to allow it, yet they sent their Lacedæmonians and two tribes of Athenian horsemen to restrain the excursions of the garrison. This body Thraasybulus contrived to attack by surprise. Descending from Phylê by night, he halted within a quarter of a mile of their position until a little before daybreak, when the night-watch had just broken up,² and when the grooms were making a noise in rubbing down the horses. Just at that moment, the hoplites from Phylê rushed upon them at a running pace, found every man unprepared, and some even in their beds, and dispersed them with scarcely any resistance. One hundred and twenty hoplites and a few horsemen were slain, while abundance of arms and stores were captured and carried back to Phylê in triumph.³ News of the defeat was speedily conveyed to the city, from whence the remaining horsemen immediately came forth to the rescue, but could do nothing more than protect the carrying off of the dead.

This successful engagement sensibly changed the relative situation of parties in Attica; encouraging the exiles as much as it depressed the Thirty. Even among the partisans of the latter at Athens, dissension began to arise; the minority which had sympathized with Theramenês, as well as that portion of the Three Thousand who were least compromised as accomplices in the recent enormities, began to waver so manifestly in their allegiance, that Kritias and his colleagues felt some doubt of being able to maintain themselves in the city. They resolved to secure Eleusis and the island of Salamis, as places of safety and resource in case of being compelled to evacuate Athens. They accordingly went to Eleusis with a considerable number of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 2, 5, 14.

² See an analogous case of a Lacedæmonian army surprised by the Thebans at this dangerous hour, Xenoph. Hellen. vii, i, 16; compare Xenoph. Magistr. Équit. vii, 12.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 5, 7. Diodorus (xiv, 32, 33) represents the occasion of this battle somewhat differently. I follow the account of Xenophon.

the Athenian horsemen, under pretence of examining into strength of the place and the number of its defenders, so as to determine what amount of farther garrison would be necessary. All the Eleusinians disposed and qualified for armed service were ordered to come in person and give in their names to Thirty,¹ in a building having its postern opening on to sea-beach; along which were posted the horsemen and attendants from Athens. Each Eleusinian hoplite, after having presented himself and returned his name to the Thirty, was ordered to pass out through this exit, where each man successively found himself in the power of the horsemen, and was fettered by the attendants. Lysimachus, the hipparch, or commander of the horsemen, was directed to convey all these prisoners to Athens, and hand them over to the custody of the Eleven. Having thus seized and carried away from Eleusis every citizen whose sentiments or whose energy they suspected, and having left a force of their own adherents in the place, the Thirty returned to Athens. At the same time, it appears, a similar visit and seizure of prisoners was made by some of them at Salamis.³ On the next day, they convoked at Athens all the Three Thousand privileged hoplites—together with all remaining horsemen who had not been employed at Eleusis at Salamis—in the Odeon, half of which was occupied by the Lacedæmonian garrison all under arms. “Gentlemen Kritias, addressing his countrymen), we keep up the government not less for your benefit than for our own. You must therefore share with us in the danger, as well as in the honor, of the position. Here are these Eleusinian prisoners awaiting sentence; you must pass a vote condemning them all to death, in order that your hopes and fears may be identified with ours.” He

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 8. I apprehend that ἀπογράφειν here represents prospective military service; as in vi, 5, 29, and in Cyropæd. ii, 1, 1. The words in the context, πόσης φυλακῆς προσδεήσοιντο, that such is the meaning; though the commentators, and Sturz Lexicon Xenophontæum, interpret differently.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 8.

³ Both Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 58; Orat. xuli, cont. Ag. 47) and Diodorus (xiv, 32) connect together these two similar proceedings at Eleusis and at Salamis. Xenophon mentions only the affair at Eleusis.

pointed to a spot immediately before him and in his view, directing each man to deposit upon it his pebble of condemnation visibly to every one.¹ I have before remarked that at Athens, open voting was well known to be the same thing as voting under constraint; there was no security for free and genuine suffrage except by making it secret as well as numerous. Kritias was obeyed, without reserve or exception; probably any dissentient would have been put to death on the spot. All the prisoners, seemingly three hundred in number,² were condemned by the same vote, and executed forthwith.

Though this atrocity gave additional satisfaction and confidence to the most violent friends of Kritias, it probably alienated a greater number of others, and weakened the Thirty instead of strengthening them. It contributed in part, we can hardly doubt, to the bold and decisive resolution now taken by Thrasybulus, five days after his late success, of marching by night from Phylê to Peiræus.³ His force, though somewhat increased, was still no more than one thousand men; altogether inadequate by itself to any considerable enterprise, had he not counted on positive support and junction from fresh comrades, together with a still greater amount of negative support from disgust or indifference towards the Thirty. He was indeed speedily joined by many sympathizing countrymen; but few of them, since the general disarming manœuvre of the oligarchs, had heavy armor. Some had light shields and darts, but others were wholly unarmed, and could merely serve as throwers of stones.⁴

Peiræus was at this moment an open town, deprived of its fortifications as well as of those Long Walls which had so long connected it with Athens. It was however of large compass, and required an ampler force to defend it than Thrasybulus could

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 9. Δείξας δέ τι χώριον, ἐς τοῦτο ἐκέλευσε φανε-
ρὰν φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον. Compare Lysias, Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. s.
40, and Thucyd. iv, 74, about the conduct of the Megarian oligarchical
leaders: καὶ τούτων περὶ ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὴν διενεγκεῖν,
etc.

² Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 53) gives this number.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 10, 18. ἡμέραν πέμπτην, etc.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 12.

muster. Accordingly, when the Thirty marched out of Athens the next morning to attack him, with their full force of Athenian hoplites and horsemen, and with the Lacedæmonian garb besides, he in vain attempted to maintain against them the carriage-road which led down to Peiræus. He was compelled to concentrate his forces in Munychia, the easternmost portion of the aggregate called Peiræus, nearest to the bay of Phalærus and comprising one of those three ports which had once sustained the naval power of Athens. Thrasybulus occupied the temple of Artemis in Munychia, and the adjoining Bendideion, situated in the midst of Munychia, and accessible only by a street of steep ascent. In the rear of his hoplites, whose files were ten abreast, were posted the darters and slingers: the ascent being so steep that these latter could cast their missiles over the heads of the hoplites in their front. Presently Kritias and the Thirty, having first mustered in the market-place of Peiræus, called the Eremachian agora, were seen approaching with their superior numbers; mounting the hill in close array, with hoplites not less than fifty in depth. Thrasybulus, after an animated exhortation to his soldiers, in which he reminded them of the wrongs which they had to avenge, and dwelt upon the advantages of their position, which exposed the close ranks of the enemy to the destructive effect of missiles, and would force them to pass under their shields so as to be unable to resist a charge with spear in front, waited patiently until they came within distance of standing in the foremost rank with the prophet — having consulted before a battle — by his side. The latter, a brave devoted patriot, while promising victory, had exhorted his comrades not to charge until some one on their own side should be slain or wounded: he at the same time predicted his own death in the conflict. When the troops of the Thirty advanced enough in ascending the hill, the light-armed in the rear of Thrasybulus poured upon them a shower of darts over the heads of their own hoplites, with considerable effect. As they began to waver, seeking to cover themselves with their shields, and not seeing well before them, the prophet, himself seemingly unarmed, set the example of rushing forward, was the first to come in contact with the enemy, and perished in the onset. Thrasybulus, with the main body of hoplites followed him, charged vigorously.

the hill, and after a smart resistance, drove them back in disorder, with the loss of seventy men. What was of still greater moment, Kritias and Hippomachus, who headed their troops on the left, were among the slain; together with Charmidês son of Glaukon, one of the ten oligarchs who had been placed to manage Peiræus.¹

This great and important advantage left the troops of Thrasybulus in possession of seventy of the enemy's dead, whom they stripped of their arms, but not of their clothing, in token of respect for fellow-countrymen.² So disheartened, lukewarm, and disunited were the hoplites of the Thirty, in spite of their great superiority of number, that they sent to solicit the usual truce for burying the dead. This was of course granted, and the two contending parties became intermingled with each other in the performance of the funeral duties. Amidst so impressive a scene, their common feelings as Athenians and fellow-countrymen were forcibly brought back, and many friendly observations were interchanged among them. Kleokritus — herald of the mysts, or communicants in the Eleusinian mysteries, belonging to one of the most respected gentes in the state — was among the exiles. His voice was peculiarly loud, and the function which he held enabled him to obtain silence while he addressed to the citizens serving with the Thirty a touching and emphatic remonstrance: "Why are you thus driving us into banishment, fellow-citizens? Why are you seeking to kill us? We have never done you the least harm; we have partaken with you in religious rites and festivals; we have been your companions in chorus, in school, and in army; we have braved a thousand dangers with you, by land and sea, in defence of our common safety and freedom. I adjure you by our common gods, paternal and maternal, by our common kindred and companionship, desist from thus wronging your country in obedience to these nefarious Thirty, who have slain as many citizens in eight months, for their own private gains, as the Peloponnesians in ten years of war. These are the men who have plunged us into wicked and odious war one against another, when we might live together in peace. Be assured that your slain in this battle have cost us as many tears as they have cost you."³

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 12, 20.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 19; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybul. c. 2.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 22.

Such affecting appeals, proceeding from a man of reputation like Kleokritus, and doubtless from others also, be- work so sensibly on the minds of the citizens from Athens the Thirty were obliged to give orders for immediately ret which Thrasybulus did not attempt to prevent, though i have been in his power to do so.¹ But their ascender received a shock from which it never fully recovered. next day they appeared downcast and dispirited in the which was itself thinly attended; while the privileged Thousand, marshalled in different companies on guard everywhere in discord and partial mutiny. Those amon who had been most compromised in the crimes of the were strenuous in upholding the existing authority; whi as had been less guilty protested against the continuance of unholly war, and declared that the Thirty should not be per to bring Athens to utter ruin. And though the horsemen continued steadfast partisans, resolutely opposing all accom- tion with the exiles,² yet the Thirty were farther weakened the death of Kritias, the ascendent and decisive head, and same time the most cruel and unprincipled among them: that party, both in the senate and out of it, which had fo adhered to Theramenês, now again raised its head. A meeting among them was held, in which what may be cal- opposition-party among the Thirty, that which had oppos extreme enormities of Kritias, became predominant. determined to depose the Thirty, and to constitute a fresh chy of Ten, one from each tribe.³ But the members Thirty were individually reëligible; so that two of them, thenês and Pheidon, if not more, adherents of Therame unfriendly to Kritias and Chariklês,⁴ with others of the sa of sentiment, were chosen among the Ten. Chariklês: more violent members, having thus lost their ascende longer deemed themselves safe at Athens, but retired to which they had had the precaution to occupy beforehand.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 22; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth *μὲν γὰρ ἐκ Πειραιεύς κρείττους ὄντες εἰσῶσαν αὐτοὺς ἀπελθεῖν*, etc.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 24.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i

⁴ Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 55, 56: *οἱ δοκοῦντες εἰ τίσασθαι Σαρικλέϊ καὶ Κριτίᾳ καὶ τῇ τούτων ἑταρείᾳ*, etc.

Such foreign aid became daily more necessary to them, the forces of Thrasybulus in Peiræus grew stronger, before eyes, in numbers, in arms, and in hope of success; ex themselves, with successful energy, to procure additional and shields, though some of the shields, indeed, were no than wood-work or wicker-work whitened over.¹ Many flocked in to their aid, while others sent donations of more arms: among the latter, the orator Lysias stood conspicuous transmitting to Peiræus a present of two hundred shields as well as two thousand drachms in money, and hiring besides three hundred fresh soldiers; while his friend Thrasydæus, the leader of the democratical interest at Elis, was induced to furnish him with two talents.² Others also lent money; some Boeotians furnished two talents, and a person named Gelarchus contributed the large sum of five talents, repaid in after times by the people. A Proclamation was made by Thrasybulus, that all metics who would lend aid should be put on the footing of isotely, or payment of taxes with citizens, exempt from the metical and other special burdens. Within a short time he had got together a considerable force both in heavy-armed and light-armed, and about seventy horsemen; so that he was in condition to make excursions out of Peiræus, and to collect wood and provisions. Nor did he venture to make any aggressive movement out of Athens, so far as to send out the horsemen, who slew or captured a few glers from the force of Thrasybulus. Lysimachus the high-priest, the same who had commanded under the Thirty at the seizure of the Eleusinian citizens, having made prisoners some young Athenians, bringing in provisions from the country for the consumption of the troops in Peiræus, put them to death, in spite of remonstrances from several even of his own men; for which Thrasybulus retaliated, by putting to death a horseman

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 25.

² Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 835; Lysias, Or. xxxi, cont. Philocles 19-34.

Lysias and his brother had carried on a manufactory of shields at Athens. The Thirty had plundered it; but some of the stock had escaped.

³ Demosth. cont. Leptin. c. 32, p. 502; Lysias cont. Nikomach. s. 29.

Kallistratus, made prisoner in one of their marches to the neighboring villages.¹

In the established civil war which now raged in Attica, Thra-sybulus and the exiles in Peiræus had decidedly the advantage; maintaining the offensive, while the Ten in Athens, and the remainder of the Thirty at Eleusis, were each thrown upon their defence. The division of the oligarchical force into these two sections doubtless weakened both, while the democrats in Peiræus were hearty and united. Presently, however, the arrival of a Spartan auxiliary force altered the balance of parties. Lysander, whom the oligarchical envoys had expressly requested to be sent to them as general, prevailed with the ephors to grant their request. While he himself went to Eleusis and got together a Peloponnesian land-force, his brother Eibys conducted a fleet of forty triremes to block up Peiræus, and one hundred talents were lent to the Athenian oligarchs out of the large sum recently brought from Asia into the Spartan treasury.²

The arrival of Lysander brought the two sections of oligarchs in Attica again into coöperation, restrained the progress of Thra-sybulus, and even reduced Peiræus to great straits by preventing all entry of ships or stores. Nor could anything have prevented it from being reduced to surrender, if Lysander had been allowed free scope in his operations. But the general sentiment of Greece had by this time become disgusted with his ambitious policy, and with the oligarchies which he had everywhere set up as his instruments; a sentiment not without influence on the feelings of the leading Spartans, who, already jealous of his ascendancy, were determined not to increase it farther by allowing him to conquer Attica a second time, in order to plant his own creatures as rulers at Athens.³

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 27.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 28; Diodor. xiv, 33; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 60.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 29. Οὕτω δὲ προχωροῦντων, Πανσανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς, φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ, εἰ κατειργασμένος ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εὐδοκμήσοι, ἅμα δὲ ἰδίᾳ ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, πείσας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρουράν.

Diodor. xiv, 33. Πανσανίας δὲ....., φθονῶν μὲν τῷ Λυσάνδρῳ, θεωρῶν δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ἀδοξοῦσαν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, etc.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21.

Under the influence of these feelings, king Pausanias obtained the consent of three out of the five ephors to undertake his expedition into Attica, at the head of the forces of the federacy, for which he immediately issued proclamation. Opposed to the political tendencies of Lysander, he was somewhat inclined to sympathize with the democracy, not merely at Athens elsewhere also, as at Mantinea.¹ It was probably understood that his intentions towards Athens were lenient and anti-Lysanderian, so that the Peloponnesian allies obeyed the summons generally: yet the Boeotians and Corinthians still declined the ground that Athens had done nothing to violate the late convention; a remarkable proof of the altered feelings of Greece during the last year, since, down to the period of that convention, these two states had been more bitterly hostile to Athens than any others in the confederacy. They suspected that even the expedition of Pausanias was projected with selfish Lacedæmonian views, to secure Attica as a separate dependency of Sparta, though detached from Lysander.²

On approaching Athens, Pausanias, joined by Lysander, found the forces already in Attica, encamped in the garden of the Academy, near the city gates. His sentiments were sufficiently known beforehand to offer encouragement; so that the vehement reaction against the atrocities of the Thirty, which the policy of Lysander had doubtless stifled, burst forth without delay. The surviving relatives of the victims slain beset him even at the Academy in his camp, with prayers for protection and revenge against the oligarchs. Among those victims who have already stated, were Nikêratus the son, and Eukratês brother, of Nikias who had perished at Syracuse, the friend and proxenus of Sparta at Athens. The orphan children, Nikêratus and Eukratês, were taken to Pausanias by the slave Diognêtus, who implored his protection for them, recalling at the same time the unmerited execution of their fathers, and setting forth their family claims upon the justice of Sparta. This affecting incident, which has been specially known to us,³ doubtless did not stand alone, among

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 3.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i

³ Lysias, Or. xviii, De Bonis Niciae Frat. sects. 8-10.

families suffering from the same cause. Pausanias was furnished at once with ample grounds, not merely for repudiating the Thirty altogether, and sending back the presents which they tendered to him,¹ but even for refusing to identify himself unservedly with the new oligarchy of Ten which had risen upon their ruins. The voice of complaint — now for the first time set free, with some hopes of redress — must have been violent and unmeasured, after such a career as that of Kritias and his colleagues; while the fact was now fully manifested, which could not well have come forth into evidence before, that the persons despoiled and murdered had been chiefly opulent men, and very frequently even oligarchical men, not politicians of the former democracy. Both Pausanias, and the Lacedæmonians along with him, on reaching Athens, must have been strongly affected by the facts which they learned, and by the loud cry for sympathy and redress which poured upon them from the most innocent and respected families. The predisposition both of the king and the ephors against the policy of Lysander was materially strengthened, as well as their inclination to bring about an accommodation of parties, instead of upholding by foreign force an anti-popular Few.

Such convictions would become farther confirmed as Pausanias saw and heard more of the real state of affairs. At first, he held a language decidedly adverse to Thrasybulus and the exiles, sending to them a herald, and requiring them to disband and go to their respective homes.² The requisition not being obeyed, he made a faint attack upon Peiræus, which had no effect. Next day he marched down with two Lacedæmonian moræ, or large military divisions, and three tribes of the Athenian horsemen, to reconnoitre the place, and see where a line of blockade could be drawn. Some light troops annoyed him, but his troops repulsed

¹ Lysias, *ut sup.* sects. 11, 12. ὁθεν Πανσανίας ἤρξατο εἰνους εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ, παράδειγμα ποιούμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Λακεδαιμονίους τὰς ἡμετέρας συμφορὰς τῆς τῶν τριάκοντα πονηρίας. . . .

Ὅτῳ δ' ἡλεούμεθα, καὶ πᾶσι δεῖν ἐδοκοῦμεν πεπονθέναι, ὥστε Πανσανίας τὰ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τριάκοντα ξένια οὐκ ἠθέλησε λαβεῖν, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐδέξατο.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 31. This seems the meaning of the phrase, ἀπέναι ἐπὶ τὰ ταυτῶν; as we may see by s. 38.

them, and pursued them even as far as the theatre of Peiræus where all the forces of Thrasybulus were mustered, heavy- as well as light-armed. The Lacedæmonians were here in a disadvantageous position, probably in the midst of house-streets, so that all the light-armed of Thrasybulus were enabled to set upon them furiously from different sides, and drove them out again with loss, two of the Spartan polemarchs being slain. Pausanias was obliged to retreat to a little enclava about half a mile off, where he mustered his whole force and formed his hoplites into a very deep phalanx. Thrasybulus on his side was so encouraged by the recent success of his light-armed, that he ventured to bring out his heavy-armed, only a little deep, to an equal conflict on the open ground. But he was completely worsted, and driven back into Peiræus with the loss of one hundred and fifty men; so that the Spartan king was obliged to retire to Athens after a victory, and a trophy erected to commemorate it.¹

The issue of this battle was one extremely fortunate for Thrasybulus and his comrades; since it left the honors of the day with Pausanias, so as to avoid provoking enmity or vengeance on his part, while it showed plainly that the conquest of Peiræus defended by so much courage and military efficiency, was no easy matter. It disposed Pausanias still farther towards accommodation; strengthening also the force of that party at Athens which was favorable to the same object, and against the Ten oligarchs. This opposition-party found decided support with the Spartan king, as well as with the ephor Naufrides who was present along with him. Numbers of Athenians among those Three Thousand by whom the city was now exclusively occupied, came forward to deprecate farther war with Peiræus, and to entreat that Pausanias would settle the matter so as to leave them all at amity with Lacedæmon. Xenophon indeed, according to that narrow and partial spirit which pervades his Hellenica, notices no sentiment in Pausanias except jealousy of Lysander, and treats the opposition against him at Athens as having been got up by his intrigues.² But

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 31-34.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 35. Δίδοται δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἔσται (I) καὶ ἐκέλευε πρὸς σφᾶς προσεῖναι ὡς πλείστους συλλεγεμένους, λέγει

plain that this is not a correct account. Pausanias did not create the discord, but found it already existing, and had to choose which of the parties he would adopt. The Ten took up the oligarchical game after it had been thoroughly dishonored and ruined by the Thirty : they inspired no confidence, nor had they any hold upon the citizens in Athens, except in so far as these latter dreaded reactionary violence, in case Thrasybulus and his companions should reënter by force ; accordingly, when Pausanias was there at the head of a force competent to prevent such dangerous reaction, the citizens at once manifested their dispositions against the Ten, and favorable to peace with Peiræus. To second this pacific party was at once the easiest course for Pausanias to take, and the most likely to popularize Sparta in Greece ; whereas, he would surely have entailed upon her still more bitter curses from without, not to mention the loss of men to herself, if he had employed the amount of force requisite to uphold the Ten, and subdue Peiræus. To all this we have to add his jealousy of Lysander, as an important predisposing motive, but only as auxiliary among many others.

Under such a state of facts, it is not surprising to learn that Pausanias encouraged solicitations for peace from Thrasybulus and the exiles, and that he granted them a truce to enable them to send envoys to Sparta. Along with these envoys went Kephisophon and Melitus, sent for the same purpose of entreating peace, by the party opposed to the Ten at Athens, under the sanction both of Pausanias and of the accompanying ephors. On the other hand, the Ten, finding themselves discountenanced by Pausanias, sent envoys of their own to outbid the others. They tendered themselves, their walls, and their city, to be dealt with as the Lacedæmonians chose ; requiring that Thrasybulus, if he pretended to be the friend of Sparta, should make the same unqualified surrender of Peiræus and Munychia. All the three sets of envoys were heard before the ephors remaining at Sparta and the Lacedæmonian assembly ; who took the best resolution which the case admitted, to bring to pass an amicable settlement between Athens and Peiræus, and to leave the terms to be fixed by fifteen commissioners, who were sent thither forthwith to sit in conjunction with Pausanias. This Board determined, that the exiles in Peiræus should be readmitted to Athens, that an accommodation

should take place, and that no man should be molested in acts, except the Thirty, the Eleven (who had been the instigators of all executions), and the Ten who had governed in Peiræus. But Eleusis was recognized as a government separate from Athens, and left, as it already was, in possession of the land and their coadjutors, to serve as a refuge for all those who felt their future safety compromised at Athens in consequence of their past conduct.¹

As soon as these terms were proclaimed, accepted, and assented to by all parties, Pausanias with all the Lacedæmonians evacuated Attica. Thrasybulus and the exiles marched up in solemn procession from Peiræus to Athens. Their first act was to go to the acropolis, now relieved from its Lacedæmonian garrison, there to offer sacrifice and thanksgiving. On descending thence, a general assembly was held, in which — unani-
mously and without opposition, as it should seem — the democracy was restored. The government of the Ten, which could have retained except the sword of the foreigner, disappeared as a matter of course; but Thrasybulus, while he strenuously enforced upon his comrades from Peiræus a full respect for the oaths which they had sworn, and an unreserved harmony with their newly admitted fellow-citizens, admonished the assembly emphatically as to the lessons of past events. "You city-men (he said), I advise you to take a sober measure of yourselves for the future; and to calculate carefully what ground of superiority you have, so as not to pretend to be over us? Are you juster than we? Why the demos, poorer than you, never at any time wronged you for property plundered; while you, the wealthiest of all, have done many great deeds for the sake of gain. Since then you have no just ground to boast of, are you superior to us on the score of courage? This cannot be a better trial, than the war which has just passed. Again, can you pretend to be superior in policy? you, who have a fortified city, an armed force, plenty of money, and thousands of hoplites for your allies, have been overcome by men of nothing of the kind to aid them? Can you boast of your superiority over the Lacedæmonians? Why, they have just handed you over like a vicious dog with a clog tied to him, to the very

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 39; Diodor. xiv, 33.

whom you have wronged, and are now gone out of the country. But you have no cause to be uneasy for the future. I adjure you, my friends from Peiræus, in no point to violate the oaths which we have just sworn. Show, in addition to your other glorious exploits, that you are honest and true to your engagements."¹

The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, the public assembly, and the dikasteries, appear to have been now revived, as they had stood in the democracy prior to the capture of the city by Lysander. This important restoration seems to have taken place some time in the spring of 403 B.C., though we cannot exactly make out in what month. The first archon now drawn was Eukleidês, who gave his name to this memorable year; a year never afterwards forgotten by Athenians.

Eleusis was at this time, and pursuant to the late convention, a city independent and separate from Athens, under the government of the Thirty, and comprising their warmest partisans. It was not likely that this separation would last; but the Thirty were themselves the parties to give cause for its termination. They were getting together a mercenary force at Eleusis, when the whole force of Athens was marched to forestall their designs. The generals at Eleusis came forth to demand a conference, but were seized and put to death; the Thirty themselves, and a few of the most obnoxious individuals, fled out of Attica; while the rest of the Eleusinian occupants were persuaded by their friends from Athens to come to an equal and honorable accommodation. Again Eleusis became incorporated in the same community with Athens, oaths of mutual amnesty and harmony being sworn by every one.²

We have now passed that short, but bitter and sanguinary interval, occupied by the Thirty, which succeeded so immediately upon the extinction of the empire and independence of Athens

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 40-42.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 43; Justin, v, 11. I do not comprehend the allusion in Lysias, Orat. xxv, Δημ. Καταλ. 'Απολ. sect. 11: *εἰσὶ δὲ οἵτινες τῶν Ἐλευσινιάδων ἀπογραφασμένων, ἐξεληθόντες μεθ' ἑμῶν, ἐπολιορκούντο μετ' ἀλλήλων.*

as to leave no opportunity for pause or reflection. A few respecting the rise and fall of that empire are now required, mingling up as it were the political moral of the events recorded in my last two volumes, between 477 and 405 B.C.

I related, in the forty-fifth chapter, the steps by which Athens first acquired her empire, raised it to its maximum, including maritime and inland dominion, then lost the inland portion of which loss was ratified by the Thirty Years Truce concluded with Sparta and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 445 B.C. Her maritime empire was based upon the confederacy of Delos, formed by the islands in the *Ægean* and the towns on the seaboard immediately after the battles of *Platæa* and *Mykalé*, for the purpose not merely of expelling the Persians from the *Ægean*, but of keeping them away permanently. To the accomplishment of this important object, Sparta was altogether inadequate; nor would it ever have been accomplished, if Athens had not displayed a combination of military energy, naval discipline, power of organization, and honorable devotion to a great Pan-Hellenic purpose, such as had never been witnessed in Grecian history.

The confederacy of Delos was formed by the free and spontaneous association of many different towns, all alike independent; towns which met in synod and deliberated by equal votes, took by their majority resolutions binding upon all, and chose Athens as their chief to enforce these resolutions, as well as to superintend generally the war against the common enemy. It was, from the beginning, a compact which permanently bound each individual state to the remainder. None had liberty to recede, or to withhold the contingent imposed by authority of the common synod, or to take any separate step inconsistent with its obligations to the confederacy. No union less stringent than this could have prevented the renewal of Persian ascendancy in the *Ægean*. Seceding or disobedient states were thus treated as guilty of treason or revolt, which it was the duty of Athens, as their chief, to repress. Her first repressions, against *Naxos* and *Lêros*, were undertaken in prosecution of this duty, in which she had been wanting, the confederacy would have fallen to pieces, and the common enemy would have reappeared.

Now the only way by which the confederacy was saved from falling to pieces, was by being transformed into an A

empire. Such transformation, as Thucydides plainly intimates,¹ did not arise from the ambition or deep-laid projects of Athens, but from the reluctance of the larger confederates to discharge the obligations imposed by the common synod, and from the unwarlike character of the confederates generally, which made them desirous to commute military service for money-payment, while Athens on her part was not less anxious to perform the service and obtain the money. By gradual and unforeseen stages, Athens thus passed from consulate to empire : in such manner that no one could point out the precise moment of time when the confederacy of Delos ceased, and when the empire began. Even the transfer of the common fund from Delos to Athens, which was the palpable manifestation of a change already realized, was not an act of high-handed injustice in the Athenians, but warranted by prudential views of the existing state of affairs, and even proposed by a leading member of the confederacy.²

But the Athenian empire came to include (between 460-446 B.C.) other cities, not parties to the confederacy of Delos. Athens had conquered her ancient enemy the island of Ægina, and had acquired supremacy over Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, and Lokris, and Achaia in Peloponnesus. The Megarians joined her to escape the oppression of their neighbor Corinth : her influence over Bœotia was acquired by allying herself with a democratical party in the Bœotian cities, against Sparta, who had been actively interfering to sustain the opposite party and to renovate the ascendancy of Thebes. Athens was, for the time, successful in all these enterprises ; but if we follow the details, we shall not find her more open to reproach on the score of aggressive tendencies than Sparta or Corinth. Her empire was now at its maximum ; and had she been able to maintain it, — or even to keep possession of the Megarid separately, which gave her the means of barring out all invasions from Peloponnesus, — the future course of Grecian history would have been materially altered. But her empire on land did not rest upon the same footing as her empire at sea. The exiles in Megara and Bœotia, etc., and the anti-Athenian party generally in those places, — combined with

¹ Thucyd. i. 97.

² See vol. v, of this History, ch. xlv, p. 343.

the rashness of her general Tolmidês at Koroneia, — depriving her of all her land-dependencies near home, and even threatening her with the loss of Eubœa. The peace concluded in 445 left her with all her maritime and insular empire, including Eubœa, but with nothing more ; while by the loss of Megara was now open to invasion from Peloponnesus.

On this footing she remained at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards. I have shown that war did not arise, as has been so often asserted, from aggressive or ambitious schemes on the part of Athens, but that, on the contrary, the aggression was all on the side of her enemies ; they were full of hopes that they could put her down with little difficulty while she was not merely conservative and defensive, but discouraged by the certainty of destructive invasion, and dissuaded from concessions, alike imprudent and inglorious. The extraordinary influence and resolute wisdom of Periklês. That great man comprehended well both the conditions and limits of Athenian empire. Athens was now understood, especially since the revolt and reconquest of the powerful island of Samos in 440 B.C., by her subjects and enemies as well as by her own citizens, to be mistress of the sea. It was the care of Periklês to keep that belief within definite boundaries, and to prevent all waste of the force of the city in making remote distant acquisitions which could not be permanently maintained. But it was also his care to enforce upon his countrymen the duty of maintaining their existing empire unimpaired, and shrank from no effort requisite for that end. Though their whole empire was now staked upon the chances of a perilous war, he did not hesitate to promise them success, provided that they adhered to this conservative policy.

Following the events of the war, we shall find that Athens did adhere to it for the first seven years ; years of suffering and trial, from the destructive annual invasion, the yet more destructive pestilence, and the revolt of Mitylênê, but years which left her empire unimpaired, and the promises of Periklês a chance of being realized. In the seventh year of the war occurred the unexpected victory at Sphacteria and the capture of the Lacedæmonian prisoners. This placed in the hands of the Athenians a capital advantage, imparting to them pro-

confidence of future success, while their enemies were in a proportional degree disheartened. It was in this temper that they first departed from the conservative precept of Periklês, and attempted to recover (in 424 B.C.) both Megara and Boeotia. Had the great statesman been alive,¹ he might have turned this moment of superiority to better account, and might perhaps have contrived even to get possession of Megara — a point of unspeakable importance to Athens, since it protected her against invasion — in exchange for the Spartan captives. But the general feeling of confidence which then animated all parties at Athens, determined them in 424 B.C. to grasp at this and much more by force. They tried to reconquer both Megara and Boeotia: in the former they failed, though succeeding so far as to capture Nisaea; in the latter they not only failed, but suffered the disastrous defeat of Delium.

It was in the autumn of that same year 424 B.C., too, that Brasidas broke into their empire in Thrace, and robbed them of Akanthus, Stageira, and some other towns, including their most precious possession, Amphipolis. Again, it seems that the Athenians, partly from the discouragement caused by the disaster at Delium, partly from the ascendancy of Nikias and the peace party, departed from the conservative policy of Periklês; not by ambitious over-action, but by inaction, omitting to do all that might have been done to arrest the progress of Brasidas. We must, however, never forget that their capital loss, Amphipolis, was owing altogether to the improvidence of their officers, and could not have been obviated even by Periklês.

But though that great man could not have prevented the loss, he would assuredly have deemed no efforts too great to recover it; and in this respect his policy was espoused by Kleon, in opposition to Nikias and the peace party. The latter thought it wise to make the truce for a year; which so utterly failed of its effect, that Nikias was obliged, even in the midst of it, to conduct an armament to Pallênê in order to preserve the empire against yet farther losses. Still, Nikias and his friends would hear of nothing but peace; and after the expedition of Kleon against Amphipolis in the ensuing year, which failed partly through his mili-

¹ See vol. vi, ch. lii, p. 353 of this History.

tary incapacity, partly through the want of hearty conc in his political opponents, they concluded what is cal Peace of Nikias in the ensuing spring. In this, too, thei lations are not less signally falsified than in the previou they stipulate that Amphipolis shall be restored, but it from being restored as ever. To make the error still gra more irreparable, Nikias, with the concurrence of Alk contracts the alliance with Sparta a few months after the and gives up the captives, the possession of whom he only hold which Athens as yet had upon the Spartans.

We thus have, during the four years succeeding the b Delium (424-420 B.C.), a series of departures from the co tive policy of Periklēs; departures, not in the way of an over-acquisition, but of languor and unwillingness to mak even for the recovery of capital losses. Those who defects in the foreign policy of the democracy except t over-ambition and love of war, pursuant to the jest of Ari nēs, overlook altogether these opposite but serious blun Nikias and the peace party.

Next comes the ascendancy of Alkibiadēs, leading two years' campaign in Peloponnesus in conjunction with Argos, and Mantinea, and ending in the complete reest ment of Lacedæmonian supremacy. Here was a diver Athenian force from its legitimate purpose of preserving tablishing the empire, for inland projects which Perikl never have approved. The island of Melos undoubt within his general conceptions of tenable empire for But we may regard it as certain that he would have reco ed no new projects, exposing Athens to the reproach of i so long as the lost legitimate possessions in Thrace r unconquered.

We now come to the expedition against Syracuse. : that period, the empire of Athens, except the posses Thrace, remained undiminished, and her general power great as it had ever been since 445 B.C. That expedi the one great and fatal departure from the Periklear bringing upon Athens an amount of disaster from w never recovered; and it was doubtless an error of ot tion. Acquisitions in Sicily, even if made, lay out of t

tions of permanent empire for Athens; and however imposing the first effect of success might have been, they would only have disseminated her strength, multiplied her enemies, and weakened her in all quarters. But though the expedition itself was thus indisputably ill-advised, and therefore ought to count to the discredit of the public judgment at Athens, we are not to impute to that public an amount of blame in any way commensurate to the magnitude of the disaster, except in so far as they were guilty of unmeasured and unconquerable esteem for Nikias. Though Periklēs would have strenuously opposed the project, yet he could not possibly have foreseen the enormous ruin in which it would end; nor could such ruin have been brought about by any man existing, save Nikias. Even when the people committed the aggravated imprudence of sending out the second expedition, Demosthenēs doubtless assured them that he would speedily either take Syracuse or bring back both armaments, with a fair allowance for the losses inseparable from failure; and so he would have done, if the obstinacy of Nikias had permitted. In measuring therefore the extent of misjudgment fairly imputable to the Athenians for this ruinous undertaking, we must always recollect, that first the failure of the siege, next the ruin of the armament, did not arise from intrinsic difficulties in the case, but from the personal defects of the commander.

After the Syracusan disaster, there is no longer any question about adhering to, or departing from, the Periklean policy. Athens is like Patroklos in the *Iliad*, after Apollo has stunned him by a blow on the back and loosened his armor. Nothing but the slackness of her enemies allowed her time for a partial recovery, so as to make increased heroism a substitute for impaired force, even against doubled and tripled difficulties. And the years of struggle which she now went through are among the most glorious events in her history. These years present many misfortunes, but no serious misjudgment, not to mention one peculiarly honorable moment, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred. I have in the two preceding chapters examined into the blame imputed to the Athenians for not accepting the overtures of peace after the battle of Kyzikus, and for dismissing Alkibiadēs after the battle of Notium. On both points their conduct has been shown to be justifiable. And after

all, they were on the point of partially recovering themselves 408 B.C., when the unexpected advent of Cyrus set the seal on their destiny.

The bloodshed after the recapture of Mitylênê and Sâ and still more that which succeeded the capture of Melo disgraceful to the humanity of Athens, and stand in pointed contrast with the treatment of Samos when reconquered by Pericles. But they did not contribute sensibly to break down her power, though, being recollected with aversion after other incidents forgotten, they are alluded to in later times as if they had caused the fall of the empire.¹

I have thought it important to recall, in this short summary of the leading events of the seventy years preceding 405 B.C., in order that it may be understood to what degree Athens was politically or prudentially to blame for the great downfall which she then underwent. That downfall had one great cause—may almost say, one single cause—the Sicilian expedition. The empire of Athens both was, and appeared to be, in exuberant strength when that expedition was sent forth; strength more than sufficient to bear up against all moderate faults or moderate misfortunes, such as no government ever long escapes. But the catastrophe of Syracuse was something overpassing in its calamity all Grecian experience and all power of foresight; it was like the Russian campaign of 1812 to the emperor Napoleon, though by no means imputable, in an equal degree, to vice or to original project. No Grecian power could bear up against a death-wound, and the prolonged struggle of Athens affords not the least wonderful part of the whole war.

Nothing in the political history of Greece is so remarkable as the Athenian empire; taking it as it stood in its complete form from about 460–413 B.C., the date of the Syracusan catastrophe, or still more, from 460–424 B.C., the date when Brasidas effected his conquests in Thrace. After the Syracusan catastrophe the conditions of the empire were altogether changed; it was irretrievably broken up, though Athens still continued an empire.

¹ This I apprehend to have been in the mind of Xenophon, *De Re Militari*, 6. *Ἐπειτ', ἐπεὶ ὡμῶς ἄγαν δόξασα προστατεύειν ἰσχυρότητι τῆς ἀρχῆς*, etc.

struggle to retain some of the fragments. But if we view it as it had stood before that event, during the period of its integrity, it is a sight marvellous to contemplate, and its working must be pronounced, in my judgment, to have been highly beneficial to the Grecian world. No Grecian state except Athens could have sufficed to organize such a system, or to hold in partial though regulated, continuous, and specific communion, so many little states, each animated with that force of political repulsion instinctive in the Grecian mind. This was a mighty task, worthy of Athens, and to which no state except Athens was competent. We have already seen in part, and we shall see still farther, how little qualified Sparta was to perform it, and we shall have occasion hereafter to notice a like fruitless essay on the part of Thebes.

As in regard to the democracy of Athens generally, so in regard to her empire, it has been customary with historians to take notice of little except the bad side. But my conviction is, and I have shown grounds for it, in chap. xlvii, that the empire of Athens was not harsh and oppressive, as it is commonly depicted. Under the circumstances of her dominion, at a time when the whole transit and commerce of the *Ægean* was under one maritime system, which excluded all irregular force; when Persian ships of war were kept out of the waters, and Persian tribute-officers away from the seaboard; when the disputes inevitable among so many little communities could be peaceably redressed by the mutual right of application to the tribunals at Athens, and when these tribunals were also such as to present to sufferers a refuge against wrongs done even by individual citizens of Athens herself, to use the expression of the oligarchical Phrynichus,¹ the condition of the maritime Greeks was materially better than it had been before, or than it will be seen to become afterwards. Her empire, if it did not inspire attachment, certainly provoked no antipathy, among the bulk of the citizens of the subject-communities, as is shown by the party-character of the revolts against her. If in her imperial character she exacted obedience, she also fulfilled duties and insured protection to a degree incomparably greater than was ever

¹ Thucyd. viii, 48

realized by Sparta. And even if she had been ever so n disposed to cramp the free play of mind and purpose among subjects, — a disposition which is no way proved, — the circumstances of her own democracy, with its open antithesi political parties, universal liberty of speech, and manifold vidual energy, would do much to prevent the accomplishment such an end, and would act as a stimulus to the dependent munities, even without her own intention.

Without being insensible either to the faults or to the misd of imperial Athens, I believe that her empire was a great parative benefit, and its extinction a great loss, to her subjects. But still more do I believe it to have been a looked at with reference to Pan-Hellenic interests. Its maintenance furnished the only possibility of keeping out for intervention, and leaving the destinies of Greece to depend native, spontaneous, untrammelled Grecian agencies. The fall of the Athenian empire is the signal for the arms and ruption of Persia again to make themselves felt, and for reënslavement of the Asiatic Greeks under her tribute-off. What is still worse, it leaves the Grecian world in a state pable of repelling any energetic foreign attack, and open to overruling march of "the man of Macedon," half a century wards. For such was the natural tendency of the Grecian to political non-integration or disintegration, that the rise of Athenian empire, incorporating so many states into one sy is to be regarded as a most extraordinary accident. Not but the genius, energy, discipline, and democracy of A could have brought it about; nor even she, unless favore pushed on by a very peculiar train of antecedent events. having once got it, she might perfectly well have kept it had she done so, the Hellenic world would have remain organized as to be able to repel foreign intervention, either Susa or from Pella. When we reflect how infinitely su was the Hellenic mind to that of all surrounding nation races; how completely its creative agency was stifled, as it came under the Macedonian dictation; and how much n might perhaps have achieved, if it had enjoyed another c or half-century of freedom, under the stimulating headship

most progressive and most intellectual of all its separate communities, we shall look with double regret on the ruin of the Athenian empire, as accelerating, without remedy, the universal ruin of Grecian independence, political action, and mental grandeur.

CHAPTER LXVI.

FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY TO THE DEATH OF ALKIBIADES.

THE period intervening between the defeat of *Ægospotami* (October, 405 B.C.) and the reëstablishment of the democracy as sanctioned by the convention concluded with Pausanias, some time in the summer of 403 B.C., presents two years of cruel and multifarious suffering to Athens. For seven years before, indeed ever since the catastrophe at Syracuse, she had been struggling with hardships; contending against augmented hostile force, while her own means were cut down in every way; crippled at home by the garrison of Dekeleia; stripped to a great degree both of her tribute and her foreign trade, and beset by the snares of her own oligarchs. In spite of circumstances so adverse, she had maintained the fight with a resolution not less surprising than admirable; yet not without sinking more and more towards impoverishment and exhaustion. The defeat of *Ægospotami* closed the war at once, and transferred her from her period of struggle to one of concluding agony. Nor is the last word by any means too strong for the reality. Of these two years, the first portion was marked by severe physical privation, passing by degrees into absolute famine, and accompanied by the intolerable sentiment of despair and helplessness against her enemies, after two generations of imperial grandeur, not without a strong chance of being finally consigned to ruin and individual slavery; while the last portion comprised all the tyranny, murders, robberies, and expulsions perpetrated by the Thirty, overthrown only by heroic efforts of patriotism on the part of the

exiles; which a fortunate change of sentiment, on the part of Pausanias, and the leading members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, ultimately crowned with success.

After such years of misery, it was an unspeakable relief to the Athenian population to regain possession of Athens and Attica, to exchange their domestic tyrants for a renovated democratical government, and to see their foreign enemies not merely evacuate the country, but even bind themselves by treaty to future friendly dealing. In respect of power, indeed, Athens was but the shadow of her former self. She had no empire, no tribute, no fleet, no fortifications at Peiræus, no long walls, no single fortified place in Attica except the city itself. Of these losses, however, the Athenians probably made little account, at least at the first epoch of their reestablishment. Intolerable was the pressure which they had just escaped, and so welcome the restitution of comfort, security, property, independence, at home. The very excess of tyranny committed by the Thirty gave a peculiar zest to the recovery of the democracy. In their hands, the oligarchical principle, to borrow an expression from Mr. Burke,¹ "had produced in fact, and instilled the grossest of those evils with which it was pregnant in its nature;" realizing the promise of that plain-spoken oligarch

¹ "I confess, gentlemen, that this appears to me as bad in the principle and far worse in the consequences, than an universal suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. . . . Far from softening the features of the principle, and thereby removing any part of the popular odium or the terrors attending it, I should be sorry that anything framed in contradiction to the spirit of our constitution did not instantly produce, in fact, the grossest of those evils with which it was pregnant in its nature. It is by lying dormant in time, or being at first very rarely exercised, that arbitrary power is so oppressive upon a people. On the next unconstitutional act, all the fashionable philosophers will be ready to say: Your prophecies are ridiculous, your fears are groundless; you see how little of the misfortunes which you formerly foreboded is to pass. Thus, by degrees, that artful softening of all arbitrary power by the alleged infrequency or narrow extent of its operation, will be received as a sort of aphorism; and Mr. Hume will not be singular in telling us that the felicity of mankind is no more disturbed by it, than by earthquakes, thunder, or the other more unusual accidents of nature." (Burke's Speech to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 1777: Burke's Works, vol. iii, pp. 130-131, 10th ed. edit.)

oath, which Aristotle mentions as having been taken in various oligarchical cities, to contrive as much evil as possible to the people.¹ So much the more complete was the reaction of sentiment towards the antecedent democracy, even in the minds of those who had been before discontented with it. To all men, rich and poor, citizens and metics, the comparative excellence of the democracy, in respect of all the essentials of good government, was now manifest. With the exception of those who had identified themselves with the Thirty as partners, partisans, or instruments, there was scarcely any one who did not feel that his life and property had been far more secure under the former democracy, and would become so again if that democracy were revived.²

It was the first measure of Thrasybulus and his companions, after concluding the treaty with Pausanias, and thus reëntering the city, to exchange solemn oaths, of amnesty for the past, with those against whom they had just been at war. Similar oaths of amnesty were also exchanged with those in Eleusis, as soon as that town came into their power. The only persons excepted from this amnesty were the Thirty, the Eleven who had presided over the execution of all their atrocities, and the Ten who had governed in Peiræus. Even these persons were not peremptorily banished: opportunity was offered to them to come in and take their trial of accountability (universal at Athens in the case of every magistrate on quitting office); so that, if acquitted, they would enjoy the benefit of the amnesty as well as all others.³ We know that Eratosthenês, one of the Thirty, afterwards returned to Athens; since there remains a powerful harangue of Lysias, invoking justice against him as having brought to death Polemarchus, the brother of Lysias. Eratosthenês was

¹ Aristot. Polit. v, 7, 19. Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλεύσω δ, τι ἂν ἐγὼ κακόν.

The complimentary epitaph upon the Thirty, cited in the Schol. on Æschinês, — praising them as having curbed, for a short time, the insolence of the accursed Demos of Athens, — is in the same spirit: see K. F. Hermann, Staats-Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 70, note 9.

² Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 324. Καὶ ὁρῶν δὴ πού τοις ἄνδρας ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ χρυσὸν ἀποδείξαντας τὴν ἐμπροσθεν πολιτείαν, etc.

³ Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 90.

one of the minority of the Thirty who sided generally with Theramenes, and opposed to a considerable degree the excesses of Kritias, although personally concerned in the seizure and execution of the rich metics which Theramenes resisted, and which was one of the grossest misdeeds of that dark period. He and Pheidon, being among the named to succeed the Thirty after the death of Kritias, the remaining members of that deposed Board retired to Eleusis and endeavored to maintain themselves as a new oligarchy, rying on war at the same time against Eleusis and against democratical exiles in Peiræus. Failing in this, they retired from the country, at the time when these exiles returned and when the democracy was first reestablished. But at a certain interval, the intense sentiments of the moment somewhat subsided, they were encouraged by their friends to return, and came back to stand their trial of accountability. It was on that occasion that Lysias preferred his accusation against Eratosthenes, the result of which we do not know, though we see plainly, even from the accusatory speech, that the latter had powerful friends to stand by him, and that the dikasts manifested considerable reluctance to condemn.¹ We learn, moreover, from the same speech, that such was the detestation of the Thirty among several of the states surrounding Attica, as to

¹ All this may be collected from various passages of the Orator Lysias. Eratosthenes did not stand alone on his trial, but in conjunction with other colleagues; though of course, pursuant to the *psephismos* of the *dikasts* would be taken about each separately. *ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ τῶν τούτου συναρχόντων δίκην λαμβάνει· ἀποδοῖ μὲν τοῖς τριάκοντα ἐπιβουλεύετε, παρόντας δ' ἀφῆτε· ἡ τύχης, ἣ τούτους παρέδωκε τῇ πόλει, κάκιον ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βοηθήσεται* (80, 81): compare s. 36.

The number of friends prepared to back the defence of Eratosthenes and to obtain his acquittal, chiefly by representing that he had done at least mischief of all the Thirty; that all that he had done had been for the fear of his own life; that he had been the partisan and supporter of Kritias, whose memory was at that time popular, may be seen in s. 51, 56, 65, 87, 88, 91.

There are evidences also of other accusations brought against him before the senate of Areopagus (Lysias, Or. xi, cont. Theomnest. B. s. 12).

formal decrees for their expulsion, or for prohibiting their coming.¹ The sons, even of such among the Thirty as did not return, were allowed to remain at Athens, and enjoy their rights of citizens, unmolested;² a moderation rare in Grecian political warfare.

The first public vote of the Athenians, after the conclusion of peace with Sparta and the return of the exiles, was to restore the former democracy purely and simply, to choose by lot the nine archons and the senate of Five Hundred, and to elect the generals, all as before. It appears that this restoration of the preceding constitution was partially opposed by a citizen named Phormisius, who, having served with Thrasybulus in Peiræus, now moved that the political franchise should for the future be restricted to the possessors of land in Attica. His proposition was understood to be supported by the Lacedæmonians, and was recommended as calculated to make Athens march in better harmony with them. It was presented as a compromise between oligarchy and democracy, excluding both the poorer freemen and those whose property lay either in movables or in land out of Attica; so that the aggregate number of the disfranchised would have been five thousand persons. Since Athens now had lost her fleet and maritime empire, and since the importance of Peiræus was much curtailed not merely by these losses, but by demolition of its separate walls and of the long walls, Phormisius and others conceived the opportunity favorable for striking out the maritime and trading multitude from the roll of citizens. Many of these men must have been in easy and even opulent circumstances, but the bulk of them were poor; and Phormisius had of course at his command the usual arguments, by which it is attempted to prove that poor men have no business with political judgment or action. But the proposition was rejected; the orator Lysias being among its opponents, and composing a speech against it which was either spoken, or intended to be spoken, by some eminent citizen in the assembly.³

Unfortunately, we have only a fragment of the speech remain-

¹ Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 36.

² Demosth. adv. Boeotum de Dote Matern. c. 6, p. 1018.

³ Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysiâ, c. 32, p. 526; Lysias, Orat. xxxiv, Bekk.

ing, wherein the proposition is justly criticized as mischievous and unseasonable, depriving Athens of a large portion of her legitimate strength, patriotism, and harmony, and even of substantial men competent to serve as hoplites or horsemen. At the moment when she was barely rising from absolute prostration. Never, certainly, was the fallacy which connects political depravity or incapacity with a poor station, and political virtue with judgment with wealth, more conspicuously unmasked, than in the reference to the recent experience of Athens. The remark of Thrasybulus was most true,¹ that a greater number of atrocities, both against person and against property, had been committed in a few months by the Thirty, and abetted by the class of rich men, all rich men, than the poor majority of the Democracy sanctioned during two generations of democracy. Moreover, we know, on the authority of a witness unfriendly to the democracy, that the poor Athenian citizens, who served on shipboard or elsewhere, were exact in obedience to their commanders; the richer citizens who served as hoplites and horsemen, and who laid claim to higher individual estimation, were far less exact in the public service.²

The motion of Phormisius being rejected, the ancient democracy was restored without qualification, together with the ordinances of Draco, and the laws, measures, and weights of Solon. But on closer inspection, it was found that this part of the resolution was incompatible with the amnesty which had been just sworn. According to the laws of Solon and Draco, the perpetrators of enormities under the Thirty had declared themselves guilty, and were open to trial. To escape this consequence, a second psephism or decree was passed, by the proposition of Tisamenus, to review the laws of Solon and to reenact them with such additions and amendments as might be deemed expedient. Five hundred citizens had been chosen by the people as nomothetæ, or law-makers, at the time when the senate of Five hundred was taken by lot: now these nomothetæ, the senate now chose a select few, who were to consider all propositions for amendment or addition to the laws of the old democracy, and post them up for

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 41.

² Xenoph. Memor. ii

inspection before the statues of the eponymous heroes, within the month then running.¹ The senate, and the entire body of five hundred nomothetæ, were then to be convened, in order that each might pass in review, separately, both the old laws and the new propositions; the nomothetæ being previously sworn to decide righteously. While this discussion was going on, every private citizen had liberty to enter the senate, and to tender his opinion with reasons for or against any law. All the laws which should thus be approved, first by the senate, and afterwards by the nomothetæ, but no others, were to be handed to the magistrates, and inscribed on the walls of the portico called Peckilæ, for public notoriety, as the future regulators of the city. After the laws were promulgated by such public inscription, the senate of Areopagus was enjoined to take care that they should be duly observed and enforced by the magistrates. A provisional committee of twenty citizens was named, to be generally responsible for the city during the time occupied in this revision.²

As soon as the laws had been revised and publicly inscribed

¹ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 83. 'Ὅπως δ' ἂν προσέξῃ, (νόμων) οἷδε φρημένοι νομοθεταὶ ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἀναγράφοντες ἐν σάνισιν ἐκτιθέντων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπωνύμους, σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλευμένῳ, καὶ παραδιδόντων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐν τῷδε τῷ μηνί. τοὺς δὲ παραδιδόμενους νόμους δοκιμασάτω πρότερον ἢ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ νομοθεταὶ οἱ πεντακόσιοι, οἷς οἱ δημόται εἰλοντο, ἐπειδὴ ὁμωμόκασιν.

Putting together the two sentences in which the nomothetæ are here mentioned, Reiske and F. A. Wolf (Prolegom. ad Demosthen. cont. Leptin p. cxxix), think that there were two classes of nomothetæ; one class chosen by the senate, the other by the people. This appears to me very improbable. The persons chosen by the senate were invested with no final or decisive function whatever; they were simply chosen to consider what new propositions were fit to be submitted for discussion, and to provide that such propositions should be publicly made known. Now any persons simply invested with this character of a preliminary committee, would not, in my judgment, be called nomothetæ. The reason why the persons here mentioned were so called, was, that they were a portion of the five hundred nomothetæ, in whom the power of peremptory decision ultimately rested. A small committee would naturally be intrusted with this preliminary duty; and the members of that small committee were to be chosen *by* one of the bodies with whom ultimate decision rested, but chosen *out of* the other.

² Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sections 81-85.

in the *poekilê*, pursuant to the above decree, two concluding were enacted, which completed the purpose of the citizens.

The first of these laws forbade the magistrates to act upon permit to be acted upon, any law not among those inscribed declared that no psephism, either of the senate or of the people should overrule any law.¹ It renewed also the old prohibition dating from the days of Kleisthenês, and the first origin of democracy, to enact a special law inflicting direct hardship upon any individual Athenian apart from the rest, unless by the vote of six thousand citizens voting secretly.

The second of the two laws prescribed, that all the legal decisions and arbitrations which had been passed under the old democracy should be held valid and unimpeached, and formally annulled all which had been passed under the new. It farther provided, that the laws now revised and enacted should only take effect from the archonship of Eukleidês; that is, from the nomination of archons made after the recent restoration of Thrasybulus and renovation of the democracy.²

¹ Andokidês de *Myster.* s. 87. *ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν, μήτε βουλῆς μήτε (νόμου) κυριώτερον εἶναι.*

It seems that the word *νόμου* ought properly to be inserted here. Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 23, p. 649.

Compare a similar use of the phrase, *μηδὲν κυριώτερον εἶναι*, in I then. cont. Lakrit. c. 9, p. 937.

² Andokidês de *Myster.* s. 87. We see (from Demosthen. cont. Tim. c. 15, p. 718) that Andokidês has not cited the law fully. He has cited the words, *ὅποσα δ' ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐπράχθη, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ εἶναι*, these words not having any material connection with the purpose which he was aiming. Compare Æschines cont. Timarch. c. 9, p. 101. *ἔστω ταῦτα ἄκυρα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, ἢ τὰ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου, ἀλλὰ πῶποτε τοιαύτη ἐγένετο προθεσμία.....*

Tisamenus is probably the same person of whom Lysias speaks continuously, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. s. 36.

Meier (De Bonis Damnatorum, p. 71) thinks that there is a contradiction between the decree proposed by Tisamenus (Andok. de *Myst.* s. 8) and another decree proposed by Dioklês, cited in the Oration of Demosthenes cont. Timokr. c. 11, p. 713. But there is no real contradiction between them, and the only semblance of contradiction that is to be found, arises from the fact that the law of Dioklês is not correctly given as it now stands. It ought to be read thus:—

Διοκλῆς εἶπε, Τούς νόμους τοὺς πρὸ Εὐκλείδου τεθέντας ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ

By these ever-memorable enactments, all acts done prior to the nomination of the archon Eukleidês and his colleagues, in the summer of 403 B.C., were excluded from serving as grounds for criminal process against any citizen. To insure more fully that this should be carried into effect, a special clause was added to the oath taken annually by the senators, as well as to that taken by the Heliastic dikasts. The senators pledged themselves by oath not to receive any impeachment, or give effect to any arrest, founded on any fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidês, excepting only against the Thirty, and the other individuals expressly shut out from the amnesty, and now in exile.¹ To the oath annually taken by the Heliasts, also, was added the clause: "I will not remember past wrongs, nor will I abet any one else who

καὶ ὅσοι ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου ἐτέθησαν, καὶ εἰσὶν, ἀναγεγραμμένοι, [ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου] κυρίους εἶναι· τοὺς δὲ μετ' Εὐκλείδην τεθέντας καὶ τολοιπὸν τιθεμένους, κυρίους εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη, πλὴν εἰ τῷ προσγέγραπται χρόνος ὅντινα δεῖ ἀρχειν. Ἐπιγράψαι δὲ, τοῖς μὲν νῦν κειμένοις, τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς, τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ γραμματέων, προσγραφέτω παραχρῆμα τὸν νόμον κύριον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἐτέθη.

The words ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου, which stand between brackets in the second line, are inserted on my own conjecture; and I venture to think that any one who will read the whole law through, and the comments of the orator upon it, will see that they are imperatively required to make the sense complete. The entire scope and purpose of the law is, to regulate clearly the time from which each law shall begin to be valid.

As the first part of the law reads now, without these words, it has no pertinence, no bearing on the main purpose contemplated by Dioklês in the second part, nor on the reasonings of Demosthenês afterwards. It is easy to understand how the words ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου should have dropped out, seeing that ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου immediately precedes: another error has been in fact introduced, by putting ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου in the former case instead of ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου, which error has been corrected by various recent editors, on the authority of some MSS.

The law of Dioklês, when properly read, fully harmonizes with that of Tisamenus. Meier wonders that there is no mention made of the δοκιμασία νόμων by the nomothetæ, which is prescribed in the decree of Tisamenus. But it was not necessary to mention this expressly, since the words ὅσοι εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι presuppose the foregone δοκιμασία.

¹ Andokidês de Mystériis, s. 91. καὶ οὐ δέξομαι ἐνδείξιν οὐδὲ ἀπαγγελῆν ἕνακα τῶν πρότερον γεγενημένων, πλὴν τῶν φευγόντων.

shall remember them; on the contrary,¹ I will give my vote pursuant to the existing laws;" which laws proclaimed themselves as only taking effect from the archonship of Eukleidês.

A still farther precaution was taken to bar all actions for redress or damages founded on acts done prior to the archonship of Eukleidês. On the motion of Archinus, the principal colleague of Thrasybulus at Phylê, a law was passed, granting leave to any defendant against whom such an action might be brought, to plead an exception in bar, or paragraphê, upon the special ground of the amnesty and the legal prescription connected with it. The legal effect of this paragraphê, or exceptional plea, in Attic procedure, was to increase both the chance of failure, and the pecuniary liabilities in case of failure, on the part of the plaintiff; also, to better considerably the chances of the defendant. This enactment is said to have been moved by Archinus, on seeing that some persons were beginning to institute actions at law, in spite of the amnesty; and for the better prevention of all such claims.²

¹ Andokid. de Mysteriis, s. 91. καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ (sc. ἄλλῳ μνησικακοῦντι) πείσομαι, ψηφισῶμαι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους.

This clause does not appear as part of the Heliastic oath given in Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 36, p. 746. It was extremely significant and valuable for the few years immediately succeeding the renovation of the democracy. But its value was essentially temporary, and it was doubtless dropped within twenty or thirty years after the period to which it specially applied.

² The Orat. xviii, of Isokratês, Paragraphê cont. Kallimachum, informs us on these points, especially sections 1-4.

Kallimachus had entered an action against the client of Isokratês for ten thousand drachmæ (sects. 15-17), charging him as an accomplice of Patroklês, — the king-archon under the Ten, who immediately succeeded the Thirty, prior to the return of the exiles, — in seizing and confiscating a sum of money belonging to Kallimachus. The latter, in commencing this action, was under the necessity of paying the fees called *prytaneia*; a sum proportional to what was claimed, and amounting to thirty drachmæ, when the sum claimed was between one thousand and ten thousand drachmæ. Suppose that action had gone to trial directly, Kallimachus, if he lost his cause, would have to forfeit his *prytaneia*, but he would forfeit no more. Now according to the paragraphê permitted by the law of Archinus, the defendant is allowed to make oath that the action against him is founded upon a fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidês; and a cause is then

By these additional enactments, security was taken that the proceedings of the courts of justice should be in full conformity with the amnesty recently sworn, and that, neither directly nor indirectly, should any person be molested for wrongs done anterior to Eukleidês. And, in fact, the amnesty was faithfully observed: the reëntering exiles from Peiræus, and the horsemen with other partisans of the Thirty in Athens, blended again together into one harmonious and equal democracy.

Eight years prior to these incidents, we have seen the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred for a moment successful, and afterwards overthrown; and we have had occasion to notice, in reference to that event, the wonderful absence of all reactionary violence on the part of the victorious people, at a moment of severe provocation for the past and extreme apprehension for the future. We noticed that Thucydidês, no friend to the Athenian democracy, selected precisely that occasion — on which some manifestation of vindictive impulse might have been supposed likely and natural — to bestow the most unqualified eulogies on their moderate and gentle bearing. Had the historian lived to describe the reign of the Thirty and the restoration which followed it, we cannot doubt that his expressions would have been still warmer and more emphatic in the same sense. Few events in history, either ancient or modern, are more astonishing than the behavior of the Athenian people, on recovering their democracy after the overthrow of the Thirty: and when we view it in conjunction with the like phenomenon after the deposition of the Four Hundred, we see that neither the one nor the other arose from peculiar caprice or accident of the moment; both depended upon permanent attri-

tried first, upon that special issue, upon which the defendant is allowed to speak first, before the plaintiff. If the verdict, on this special issue, is given in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff is not only disabled from proceeding further with his action, but is condemned besides to pay to the defendant the forfeit called *epobely*; that is, one-sixth part of the sum claimed. But if, on the contrary, the verdict on the special issue be in favor of the plaintiff, he is held entitled to proceed farther with his original action, and to receive besides at once, from the defendant, the like forfeit or *epobely*. Information on these regulations of procedure in the Attic *dikasteries* may be found in Meier and Schömann, *Attischer Prozess*, p. 647; Platner, *Prozess und Klagen*, vol. i, pp. 156-162.

butes of the popular character. If we knew nothing else of the events of these two periods, we should be warranted in missing, on that evidence alone, the string of contemptuous epithets, — giddy, irascible, jealous, unjust, greedy, etc., — of which Mr. Mitford so frequently pronounces, and repeats even when he does not pronounce them, respecting the Athenian people.¹ A people, whose habitual temper and policy merited these epithets, could not have acted as the Athenians acted both after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Particular acts may be found in their history which justify censure; but as to the permanent elements of character, moral and intellectual, no population in history has ever afforded stronger evidence than the Athenians on these two memorable occasions.

If we follow the acts of the Thirty, we shall see the horsemen and the privileged three thousand hoplites in the

¹ Wachsmuth — who admits into his work, with little or no reserve, everything which has ever been said against the Athenian people, — indeed against the Greeks generally — affirms, contrary to all evidence and probability, that the amnesty was not really observed at Athens. (V. Hellen. Alterth. ch. ix, sect. 71, vol. ii, p. 267.)

The simple and distinct words of Xenophon, coming as they do from the mouth of so very hostile a witness, are sufficient to refute him : καὶ ὁ δρκοὺς ἢ μὴν μὴ μνησικακήσειν, ἐτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ γε πολιτεύονται, καὶ ὁρκοῖς ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος, Hellen. ii, 4, 43).

The passages to which Wachsmuth makes reference, do not in themselves establish his point. Even if actions at law or accusations had been brought in violation of the amnesty, this would not prove that the people were guilty of it; unless we also knew that the dikastery had affirmed those actions. But he does not refer to any actions or accusations preferred on that ground. He only notices some cases in which, accusation being brought on grounds subsequent to Eukleidēs, the accuser makes allusion to his speech to other matters anterior to Eukleidēs. Now every speaker before the Athenian dikastery thinks himself entitled to call up before the jury the whole past life of his opponent, in the way of analogous evidence, to attest the general character of the latter, good or bad. For the accuser of Sokratēs mentions, as a point going to impeach the character of Sokratēs, that he had been the teacher of Kritias; and the philosopher, in his defence, alludes to his own resolution and virtuous conduct in the assembly by which the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ. Both these allusions come out as evidences to general character.

had made themselves partisans in every species of flagitious crime which could possibly be imagined to exasperate the feelings of the exiles. The latter, on returning, saw before them men who had handed in their relations to be put to death without trial, who had seized upon and enjoyed their property, who had expelled them all from the city, and a large portion of them even from Attica; and who had held themselves in mastery not merely by the overthrow of the constitution, but also by inviting and subsidizing foreign guards. Such atrocities, conceived and ordered by the Thirty, had been executed by the aid, and for the joint benefit, as Kritias justly remarked,¹ of those occupants of the city whom the exiles found on returning. Now Thrasybulus, Anytus, and the rest of these exiles, saw their property all pilaged and appropriated by others during the few months of their absence: we may presume that their lands — which had probably not been sold, but granted to individual members or partisans of the Thirty² — were restored to them; but the movable property could not be reclaimed, and the losses to which they remained subject were prodigious. The men who had caused and profited by these losses³ — often with great brutality towards the wives and families of the exiles, as we know by the case of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 9.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1. ἦγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων (οἱ τριάκοντα) ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τούτων ἀγροὺς ἔχοιεν.

³ Isokratēs cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, sect. 30.

Θρασύβουλος μὲν καὶ Ἄνυτος, μέγιστον μὲν ὀνήμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δὲ ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων, εἰδότες δὲ τοὺς ἀπογράφοντας, ὅμως οὐ τολμῶσιν αὐτοῖς δίκας λαγχάνειν οὐδὲ μνησικακεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἐτέρων δύνανται διαπράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐν περὶ γε τῶν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἴσον ἔχειν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀξιοῦσιν.

On the other hand, the young Alkibiadēs (in the Orat. xvi, of Isokratēs, De Bigis, sect. 56) is made to talk about others recovering their property: τῶν ἄλλων κομιζομένων τὰς οὐσίας. My statement in the text reconciles these two. The young Alkibiadēs goes on to state that the people had passed a vote to grant compensation to him for the confiscation of his father's property, but that the power of his enemies had disappointed him of it. We may well doubt whether such vote ever really passed.

It appears, however, that Batrachus, one of the chief informers who brought in victims for the Thirty, thought it prudent to live afterwards out of Attica (Lysias cont. Andokid. Or. vi, sect. 46), though he would have been legally protected by the amnesty.

the orator Lysias — were now at Athens, all individual known to the sufferers. In like manner, the sons and b of Leon and the other victims of the Thirty, saw before th very citizens by whose hands their innocent relatives ha consigned without trial to prison and execution.¹ The am wrong suffered had been infinitely greater than in the time Four Hundred, and the provocation, on every ground, pub private, violent to a degree never exceeded in history. Y all this sting fresh in their bosoms, we find the victorious tude, on the latter occasion as well as on the former, li the past in an indiscriminate amnesty, and anxious c the future harmonious march of the renovated and all-c comprehensive democracy. We see the sentiment of commo in the Demos, twice contrasted with the sentiment of in an ascendent oligarchy;² twice triumphant over the s counter-motives, over the most bitter recollections of w murder and spoliation, over all that passionate rush of reac appetite which characterizes the moment of political rest. “Bloody will be the reign of that king who comes his kingdom from exile,” says the Latin poet: bloody, had been the rule of Kritias and those oligarchs who h come back from exile: “Harsh is a Demos (observes Æ which has just got clear of misery.”³ But the Athenian on coming back from Peiræus, exhibited the rare phenom a restoration, after cruel wrong suffered, sacrificing all th impulse of retaliation to a generous and deliberate regard future march of the commonwealth. Thucydides rema the moderation of political antipathy which prevailed a after the victory of the people over the Four Hundred, main cause which revived Athens from her great public

¹ Andokidès de Mysteriis, sect. 94. *Μέλητος δ' αὖ οὔτοσ' ἀπὴ των τριάκοντα Λέοντα, ὡς ὑμεῖς ἄπαντες ἴστε, καὶ ἀπέθανεν ἐκεῖν ... Μέλητον τοίνυν τοῖς παῖσι τοῖς τοῦ Λέοντος οὐκ ἔστι φόβου δ τοῖς νόμοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος ἐπεὶ ὡς γε οὐκ ἀπὴ αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγει.*

² Thucyd. vi, 39. *δῆμον, ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ, μέρο*

³ Æschylus, Sept. ad Thebas, v, 1047.

Τραχὺς γε μέντοι δῆμος ἐκφυγὼν κακῶ.

sion and danger.¹ Much more forcibly does this remark apply to the restoration after the Thirty, when the public condition of Athens was at the lowest depth of abasement, from which nothing could have rescued her except such exemplary wisdom and patriotism on the part of her victorious Demos. Nothing short of this could have enabled her to accomplish that partial resurrection — into an independent and powerful single state, though shorn of her imperial power — which will furnish material for the subsequent portion of our History.

While we note the memorable resolution of the Athenian people to forget that which could not be remembered without ruin to the future march of the democracy, we must at the same time observe that which they took special pains to preserve from being forgotten. They formally recognized all the adjudged cases and all the rights of property as existing under the democracy anterior to the Thirty. "You pronounced, fellow-citizens (says Andokidēs), that all the judicial verdicts and all the decisions of arbitrators passed under the democracy should remain valid, in order that there might be no abolition of debts, no reversal of private rights, but that every man might have the means of enforcing contracts due to him by others."² If the Athenian people had been animated by that avidity to despoil the rich, and that subjection to the passion of the moment, which Mr. Mitford imputes to them in so many chapters of his history, neither motive nor opportunity was now wanting for wholesale confiscation, of which the rich themselves, during the dominion of the Thirty, had set abundant example. The amnesty as to political wrong, and the indelible memory as to the rights of property, stand alike conspicuous as evidences of the real character of the Athenian Demos.

If we wanted any farther proof of their capacity of taking the largest and soundest views on a difficult political situation, we should find it in another of their measures at this critical period.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 97.

² Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 88. *Τὰς μὲν δίκας, ὧ ἀνδρες, καὶ τὰς διαίτας ἐποιήσατε κυρίας εἶναι, ὅσσαι ἐν δημοκρατουμένη τῇ πόλει ἐγένοντο, ὅπως μήτε χρέων ἀποκοπαὶ εἶεν μήτε δίκαι ἐν᾿ ἄλκοι γένοιντο, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων αἱ πράξεις εἶεν.*

The Ten who had succeeded to the oligarchical presidency at Athens after the death of Kritias and the expulsion of the Thirty had borrowed from Sparta the sum of one hundred talents for the express purpose of making war on the exiles in Peloponnese. After the peace, it was necessary that such sum should be repaid, and some persons proposed that recourse should be had to the property of those individuals and that party who had borrowed the money. The apparent equity of the proposition was doubtless felt with peculiar force at a time when the public treasury was at the extreme of poverty. But nevertheless both the democratic leaders and the people decidedly opposed it, resolving to repay the debt as a public charge; in which capacity it was afterwards liquidated, after some delay arising from an unsupplied treasury.

All that was required from the horsemen, or knights, who had been active in the service of the Thirty, was that they should repay the sums which had been advanced to them by the state as outfit. Such advance to the horsemen, subject to subsequent repayment, and seemingly distinct from the regular military equipment, appears to have been a customary practice under the pre-republican democracy;¹ but we may easily believe that the Thirty had carried it to an abusive excess, in their anxiety to enlist or stimulate partisans, when we recollect that they resorted to means nefarious for the same end. There were of course great individual differences among these knights, as to the degree in which each had lent himself to the misdeeds of the oligarchy. Even the most guilty of them were not molested, and they were sen-

¹ Isokratēs, Areopagit. Or. vii, sect. 77; Demosth. cont. Leptin. p. 460.

² Lysias pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi, sects. 6-8. I accept substantially the explanation which Harpokration and Photius give of the word *κατάστασις* in spite of the objections taken to it by M. Boeckh, which appear to be founded upon any adequate ground. I cannot but think that Reiske is right in distinguishing *καταστάσις* from the pay, *μισθός*.

See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. ii, sect. 19, p. 250. In the Appendix to this work, which is not translated into English along with the work itself, he farther gives the Fragment of an inscription, which is supposed to bear upon this resumption of *καταστάσις* from the horsemen, after the Thirty. But the Fragment is so very imperfect that nothing can be affirmed with any certainty concerning it: see the *haush. der Athener*, Appendix, vol. ii, pp. 207, 208.

years afterwards, to serve with Agesilaus in Asia, at a time when the Lacedæmonians required from Athens a contingent of cavalry ;¹ the Demos being well-pleased to be able to provide for them an honorable foreign service. But the general body of knights suffered so little disadvantage from the recollection of the Thirty, that many of them in after days became senators, generals, hipparchs, and occupants of other considerable posts in the state.²

Although the decree of Tisamenus—prescribing a revision of the laws without delay, and directing that the laws, when so revised, should be posted up for public view, to form the sole and exclusive guide of the dikasteries—had been passed immediately after the return from Peiræus and the confirmation of the amnesty, yet it appears that considerable delay took place before such enactment was carried into full effect. A person named Nikomachus was charged with the duty, and stands accused of having performed it tardily as well as corruptly. He, as well as Tisamenus,³ was a scribe, or secretary ; under which name were included a class of paid officers, highly important in the detail of business at Athens, though seemingly men of low birth, and looked upon as filling a subordinate station, open to sneers from unfriendly orators. The boards, the magistrates, and the public bodies were so frequently changed at Athens, that the continuity of public business could only have been maintained by paid secretaries of this character, who devoted themselves constantly to the duty.⁴

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 4.

² Lysias, Or. xvi, pro Mantitheo, sects. 9, 10 ; Lysias, cont. Evandr. Or. xxvi, sects. 21–25.

We see from this latter oration (sect. 26) that Thrasybulus helped some of the chief persons, who had been in the city, and had resisted the return of the exiles, to get over the difficulties of the dokimasy, or examination into character, previously to being admitted to take possession of any office, to which a man had been either elected or drawn by lot, in after years. He spoke in favor of Evander, in order that the latter might be accepted as king-archon.

³ I presume confidently that Tisamenus the scribe, mentioned in Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 37, is the same person as Tisamenus named in Andokidēs de Mysteriis (sect. 83) as the proposer of the memorable psephism.

⁴ See M. Boeckh's Public Economy of Athens, b. ii, c. 8, p. 186, Eng. Tr., for a summary of all that is known respecting these γραμματεῖς, or secretaries.

The expression in Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 38, *ὅτι ὑπογραμματεύσαι αὐτὸν ἐξέστῃ δις τὸν αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ αὐτῇ*, is correctly explained by M. Boeckh

Nikomachus had been named; during the democracy and to the Thirty, for the purpose of preparing a fair transcript of posting up afresh, probably in clearer characters, and in a more convenient for public view, the old laws of Solon. We well understand that the renovated democratical feeling, burst out after the expulsion of the Four Hundred, and did the vehement psephism of Demophantus, might naturally produce such a commission as this, for which Nikomachus as one of the public scribes, or secretaries, and as an able speaker was a suitable person. His accuser, for whom Lysias contains his thirtieth oration, now remaining, denounces him as having not only designedly lingered in the business, for the purpose of prolonging the period of remuneration, but even as having contemplated tampering with the old laws, by new interpolations, as well as omissions. How far such charges may have been merited, we have no means of judging; but even assuming Nikomachus to have been both honest and diligent, he would find no small difficulty in properly discharging his duty of anagrapheus, or "writer-up" of all the old laws of Athens, from Solon downwards. Both the phraseology of these old laws, and the alphabet in which they were written, were in many cases antiquated and obsolete, while there were doubtless also cases in which one law varied in variance, wholly or partially, with another. Now such corrections and archaisms would be likely to prove offensive, if introduced in a fresh place, and with clean, new characters; while Nikomachus had no authority to make the smallest alteration, and

as having a very restricted meaning, and as only applying to two successive years. And I think we may doubt whether, in practice, it was rigorously adhered to; though it is possible to suppose that these secretaries alternated among themselves, from one board or office to another. Their greatness consisted in the fact that they were constantly in the service, and kept up the continuous march of the details.

¹ Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sect. 32.

² Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sect. 33. Wachsmuth calls him erroneously antigraphheus instead of anagrapheus (Hellen. Alterth. vol. ii, ix).

It seems by Orat. vii, of Lysias (sects. 20, 36, 39) that Nikomachus was at enmity with various persons who employed Lysias as their logographer or speech-writer.

³ Lysias, Or. x, cont. Theomnest. A. sects. 16-20.

naturally therefore be tardy in a commission which did not promise much credit to him in its result.

These remarks tend to show that the necessity of a fresh collection and publication, if we may use that word, of the laws, had been felt prior to the time of the Thirty. But such a project could hardly be realized without at the same time revising the laws, as a body, removing all flagrant contradictions, and rectifying what might glaringly displease the age, either in substance or in style. Now the psephism of Tisamenus, one of the first measures of the renewed democracy after the Thirty, both prescribed such revision and set in motion a revising body; but an additional decree was now proposed and carried by Archinus, relative to the alphabet in which the revised laws should be drawn up. The Ionic alphabet — that is, the full Greek alphabet of twenty-four letters, as now written and printed — had been in use at Athens universally, for a considerable time, apparently for two generations; but from tenacious adherence to ancient custom, the laws had still continued to be consigned to writing in the old Attic alphabet of only sixteen or eighteen letters. It was now ordained that this scanty alphabet should be discontinued, and that the revised laws, as well as all future public acts, should be written up in the full Ionic alphabet.¹

Partly through this important reform, partly through the revising body, partly through the agency of Nikomachus, who was still continued as anagrapheus, the revision, inscription, and publication of the laws in their new alphabet was at length completed. But it seems to have taken two years to perform, or at least two years elapsed before Nikomachus went through his trial of accountability.² He appears to have made various new propositions of his own, which were among those adopted by the nomothetæ: for these his accuser attacks him, on the trial of accountability, as well as on the still graver allegation, of having corruptly falsified the decisions of that body; writing up what

¹ See Taylor, *Vit. Lysiae*, pp. 53, 54; Franz, *Element Epigraphicæ Græc.* Introd. pp. 18-24.

² *Lysias cont. Nikom.* sect. 3. His employment had lasted six years altogether: four years before the Thirty, two years after them, sect. 7. At least, this seems the sense of the orator.

they had not sanctioned, or suppressing that which they sanctioned.¹

The archonship of Eukleidês, succeeding immediately anarchy, — as the archonship of Pythodôrus, or the period Thirty, was denominated, — became thus a cardinal point or in Athenian history. We cannot doubt that the laws came out of this revision considerably modified, though unhappy possess no particulars on the subject. We learn that the franchise was, on the proposition of Aristophon, so far reserved for the future, that no person could be a citizen by birth, but the son of citizen-parents, on both sides; whereas previously had been sufficient if the father alone was a citizen.² The Lysias, by station a metic, had not only suffered great loss, nearly escaping death from the Thirty, who actually put to death his brother Polemarchus, but had contributed a large sum to the armed efforts of the exiles under Thrasybulus in Persia. As a reward and compensation for such antecedents, he proposed that the franchise of citizen should be conferred on him; but we are told that this decree, though adopted by the people, was afterwards indicted by Archinus as illegal or unconstitutional and cancelled. Lysias, thus disappointed of the citizenship, spent the remainder of his life as an isoteles, or non-freeman on that condition, exempt from the peculiar burdens upon the citizens and metics.³

Such refusal of citizenship to an eminent man like Lysias had both acted and suffered in the cause of the democracy, combined with the decree of Aristophon above noticed, with a degree of augmented strictness which we can only partly explain. It was not merely the renewal of her democracy which Athens had now to provide. She had also to accommodate her legislation and administration to her future march

¹ I presume this to be the sense of sect. 21 of the Oration of Lysias to him: *εἰ μὲν νόμους ἐτίθην περὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς*, etc.; also sects. 33–4 *καλοῦμεν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τιμωρεῖσθαι τοὺς τὴν ὑμετέραν νομοθεσίαν ἀφαιρῆσαι*, etc.

The tenor of the oration, however, is unfortunately obscure.

² Isæus, Or. viii, De Kiron. Sort. sect. 61; Demosthen. cont. Eubul. p. 1307.

³ Plutarch, Vit. x, Orat. (Lysias) p. 836. Taylor, Vit. Lysias, p.

isolated state, without empire or foreign dependencies. For this purpose, material changes must have been required: among others, we know that the Board of Hellenotamiae — originally named for the collection and management of the tribute at Delos, but attracting to themselves gradually more extended functions, until they became ultimately, immediately before the Thirty, the general paymasters of the state — was discontinued, and such among its duties as did not pass away along with the loss of the foreign empire, were transferred to two new officers, the treasurer at war, and the manager of the theōrikon, or religious festival-fund.¹ Respecting these two new departments, the latter of which especially became so much extended as to comprise most of the disbursements of a peace-establishment, I shall speak more fully hereafter; at present, I only notice them as manifestations of the large change in Athenian administration consequent upon the loss of the empire. There were doubtless many other changes arising from the same cause, though we do not know them in detail; and I incline to number among such the alteration above noticed respecting the right of citizenship. While the Athenian empire lasted, the citizens of Athens were spread over the Ægean in every sort of capacity, as settlers, merchants, navigators, soldiers, etc.; which must have tended materially to encourage intermarriages between them and the women of other Grecian insular states. Indeed, we are even told that an express permission of connubium with Athenians was granted to the inhabitants of Eubœa,² a fact, noticed by Lysias, of some moment in illustrating the tendency of the Athenian empire to multiply family ties between Athens and the allied cities. Now, according to the law which prevailed before Eukleidēs, the son of every such marriage was by birth an Athenian citizen, an arrangement at that time useful to Athens, as strengthening the bonds of her empire, and eminently useful in a larger point of view, among the causes of Pan-Hellenic sympathy. But when Athens was deprived both of her empire and her fleet, and confined within the limits of Attica,

¹ See respecting this change Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, ii, 7, p. 180, *seq.*, Eng. Tr.

² Lysias, *Fragm. Or.* xxxiv, *De non dissolvendâ Republicâ*, sect. 3: ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὐβοέσων ἐπιγαμίαν ἐποιούμεθα, etc.

there no longer remained any motive to continue such a regu so that the exclusive city-feeling, instinctive in the Grecian again became predominant. Such is, perhaps, the explanat the new restrictive law proposed by Aristophon.

Thrasybulus and the gallant handful of exiles who ha seized Phylê, received no larger reward than one the drachmæ for a common sacrifice and votive offering, to with wreaths of olive as a token of gratitude from their co men.¹ The debt which Athens owed to Thrasybulus was i such as could not be liquidated by money. To his ipdi patriotism, in great degree, we may ascribe not only the r tion of the democracy, but its good behavior when re How different would have been the consequences of the r tion and the conduct of the people, had the event been b about by a man like Alkibiadês, applying great abilities pally to the furtherance of his own cupidity and power!

At the restoration of the democracy, however, Alkibiad already no more. Shortly after the catastrophe at Ægosp he had sought shelter in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, no thinking himself safe from Lacedæmonian persecution forts on the Thracian Chersonese. He carried with him deal of property, though he left still more behind him, in forts; how acquired, we do not know. But having apparently to Asia by the Bosphorus, he was plundered Thracians in Bithynia, and incurred much loss before h reach Pharnabazus in Phrygia. Renewing the tie of p hospitality which he had contracted with Pharnabazus fo before,² he now solicited from the satrap a safe-conduc Susa. The Athenian envoys — whom Pharnabazus, a former-pacification with Alkibiadês in 408 B.C., had eng escort to Susa, but had been compelled by the mandate o to detain as prisoners — were just now released from the years' detention, and enabled to come down to the Pro and Alkibiadês, by whom this mission had originally be

¹ Æschinês, cont. Ktesiphon. c. 62, p. 437; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybulus.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 12. τὸν τε κοινὸν ὄρκον καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀλλήλο ἐποιούντο.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 7.

jected, tried to prevail on the satrap to perform the promise which he had originally given, but had not been able to fulfil. The hopes of the sanguine exile, reverting back to the history of Themistoklès, led him to anticipate the same success at Susa as had fallen to the lot of the latter; nor was the design impracticable, to one whose ability was universally renowned, and who had already acted as minister to Tissaphernès.

The court of Susa was at this time in a peculiar position. King Darius Nothus, having recently died, had been succeeded by his eldest son Artaxerxes Mnemon;¹ but the younger son Cyrus, whom Darius had sent for during his last illness, tried after the death of the latter to supplant Artaxerxes in the succession, or at least was suspected of so trying. Being seized and about to be slain, the queen-mother Parysatis prevailed upon Artaxerxes to pardon him, and send him again down to his satrapy along the coast of Ionia, where he labored strenuously, though secretly, to acquire the means of dethroning his brother; a memorable attempt, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. But his schemes, though carefully masked, did not escape the observation of Alkibiadès, who wished to make a merit of revealing them at Susa, and to become the instrument of defeating them. He communicated his suspicions as well as his purpose to Pharnabazus; whom he tried to awaken by alarm of danger to the empire, in order that he might thus get himself forwarded to Susa as informant and-auxiliary.

Pharnabazus was already jealous and unfriendly in spirit towards Lysander and the Lacedæmonians, of which we shall soon see plain evidence, and perhaps towards Cyrus also, since such were the habitual relations of neighboring satraps in the Persian empire. But the Lacedæmonians and Cyrus were now all-powerful on the Asiatic coast, so that he probably did not dare to exasperate them, by identifying himself with a mission so hostile and an enemy so dangerous to both. Accordingly, he refused compliance with the request of Alkibiadès; granting him, nevertheless, permission to live in Phrygia, and even assigning to him a revenue. But the objects at which the exile was aiming soon became more or less fully divulged, to those against

¹ Xenoph. Anab. i, 1; Diodor. xiii, 108.

whom they were intended. His restless character, enterprise and capacity, were so well known as to raise exaggerated as well as exaggerated hopes. Not merely Cyrus, but the Lacedæmonians, closely allied with Cyrus, and the dekarchi whom Lysander had set up in the Asiatic Grecian cities, who held their power only through Lacedæmonian support, were uneasy at the prospect of seeing Alkibiadês again in command, amidst so many unsettled elements. Nor is it without doubt that the exiles whom these dekarchies had banished, and the disaffected citizens who remained at home under a government in fear of banishment or death, kept up correspondence with him, and looked to him as a probable liberator. Moreover, the Spartan king, Agis, still retained the same personal antipathy against him, which had already some years before procured the order to be despatched, from Sparta to Athens, to assassinate him. Here are elements enough, of hostility, vengeance, and apprehension, afloat against Alkibiadês, to believe the story of Plutarch, that Kritias and the Thirty, to apprise Lysander that the oligarchy at Athens could not so long as Alkibiadês was alive. The truth is, that though the Thirty had included him in the list of exiles,¹ they had less to dread from his assaults or plots, in Attica, than the Lacedæmonian dekarchies in the cities of Asia. Moreover, he was not popular even among the Athenian democrats, as is shown hereafter, when we come to recount the trial of Socrates. Probably, therefore, the alleged intervention of Kritias and the Thirty, to procure the murder of Alkibiadês, is a fiction of the subsequent encomiasts of the latter at Athens, in order to give for him claims to esteem as a friend and fellow-sufferer in the democracy.

A special despatch, or *skytalê*, was sent out by the Spartan authorities to Lysander in Asia, enjoining him to procure that Alkibiadês should be put to death. Accordingly, Lysander communicated this order to Pharnabazus, within whose dominions Alkibiadês was residing, and requested that it might be executed. The whole character of Pharnabazus shows

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 42; Isokrates, Or. xvi, De Bigis, s. 4.
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would not perpetrate such a deed, towards a man with whom he had contracted ties of hospitality, without sincere reluctance and great pressure from without; especially as it would have been easy for him to connive underhand at the escape of the intended victim. We may therefore be sure that it was Cyrus, who, informed of the revelations contemplated by Alkibiadès, enforced the requisition of Lysander; and that the joint demand of the two was too formidable even to be evaded, much less openly disobeyed. Accordingly, Pharnabazus despatched his brother Magæus and his uncle Sisamithres with a band of armed men, to assassinate Alkibiadès in the Phrygian village where he was residing. These men, not daring to force their way into his house, surrounded it and set it on fire; but Alkibiadès, having contrived to extinguish the flames, rushed out upon his assailants with a dagger in his right hand, and a cloak wrapped round his left to serve as a shield. None of them dared to come near him; but they poured upon him showers of darts and arrows until he perished, undefended as he was either by shield or by armor. A female companion with whom he lived, Timandra, wrapped up his body in garments of her own, and performed towards it all the last affectionate solemnities.¹

Such was the deed which Cyrus and the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to enjoin, nor the uncle and brother of a Persian satrap to execute, and by which this celebrated Athenian perished, before he had attained the age of fifty. Had he lived, we cannot doubt that he would again have played some conspicuous part,—for neither his temper nor his abilities would have allowed him to remain in the shade,—but whether to the advantage of Athens or not, is more questionable. Certain it is, that taking his life throughout, the good which he did to her bore no

¹ I put together what seems to me the most probable account of the death of Alkibiadès from Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 38, 39; Diodorus, *xiv*, 11 (who cites Ephorus, compare Ephor. *Fragm.* 126, ed. Didot); Cornelius Nepos, *Alkibiad.* c. 10; Justin, *v*, 8; Isokratès, *Or.* *xvi*, *De Bigis*, s. 50.

There were evidently different stories, about the antecedent causes and circumstances, among which a selection must be made. The extreme perfidy ascribed by Ephorus to Pharnabazus appears to me not at all in the character of that satrap.

proportion to the far greater evil. Of the disastrous Sicilian expedition, he was more the cause than any other individual, though that enterprise cannot properly be said to have been caused by any individual, but rather to have emanated from national impulse. Having first, as a counsellor, contributed more than any other man to plunge the Athenians into this imprudent adventure, he next, as an exile, contributed more than any other man, except Nikias, to turn that adventure into ruin, and the consequences of it into still greater ruin. Without him, Gylippus would not have been sent to Syracuse, Dekeleia would not have been fortified, Chios and Milêtus would not have revolted, the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred would not have been originated. Nor can it be said that his first three years' political action as Athenian leader, in a speculation peculiar to his own, — the alliance with Argos, and the campaigns in the Peloponnesus, — proved in any way advantageous to his country. On the contrary, by playing an offensive game where he had hardly sufficient force for a defensive, he enabled the Lacedæmonians completely to recover their injured reputation and ascendancy through the important victory of Mantinea. The period of his life really serviceable to his country, and really glorious to himself, was that of three years ending with his return to Athens in 407 B.C. The results of these three years of success were frustrated by the unexpected coming down of Cyrus the satrap: but, just at the moment when it behooved Alkibiades to put forth a higher measure of excellence, in order to realize his own promises in the face of this new obstacle, at that critical moment we find him spoiled by the unexpected welcome which he had recently greeted him at Athens, and falling miserably even of the former merit whereby that welcome had been earned.

If from his achievements we turn to his dispositions, his aims, and his means, there are few characters in Grecian history which present so little to esteem, whether we look at him as a public man, or as a private man. His ends are those of exorbitant ambition and vanity, his means rapacious as well as reckless, from the first dealing with Sparta and the Spartan envoys, down to the end of his career. The manœuvres whereby his private enemies first procured his exile were indeed base and guilty to a high degree; but we must recollect that if his enemies

more numerous and violent than those of any other politician in Athens, the generating seed was sown by his own overweening insolence, and contempt of restraints, legal as well as social.

On the other hand, he was never once defeated either by land or sea. In courage, in ability, in enterprise, in power of dealing with new men and new situations, he was never wanting; qualities, which, combined with his high birth, wealth, and personal accomplishments, sufficed to render him for the time the first man in every successive party which he espoused; Athenian, Spartan, or Persian; oligarchical or democratical. But to none of them did he ever inspire any lasting confidence; all successively threw him off. On the whole, we shall find few men in whom eminent capacities for action and command are so thoroughly marred by an assemblage of bad moral qualities, as Alkibiadês.¹

¹ Cornelius Nepos says (Alcib. c. 11) of Alkibiadês: "Hunc infamatam a plerisque tres gravissimi historici summis laudibus extulerunt: Thucydides, qui ejusdem ætatis fuit; Theopompus, qui fuit post aliquando natus; et Timæus: qui quidem duo maledicentissimi, nescio quo modo, in illo uno laudando conscierunt."

We have no means of appreciating what was said by Theopompus and Timæus. But as to Thucydides, it is to be recollected that he extols only the capacity and warlike enterprise of Alkibiadês, nothing beyond; and he had good reason for doing so. His picture of the dispositions and conduct of Alkibiadês is the reverse of eulogy.

The Oration xvi, of Isokratês, De Bigis, spoken by the son of Alkibiadês, goes into a labored panegyric of his father's character, but is prodigiously inaccurate, if we compare it with the facts stated in Thucydides and Xenophon. But he is justified in saying: οὐδέποτε τοῦ πατρὸς ἡγεμένου τρόπαιον ἡμῶν ἔστησαν οἱ πολέμοι (s. 23).

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE DRAMA.—RHETORIC AND DIALECTICS.—THE SOPHISTS.

RESPECTING the political history of Athens during the years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy we have unfortunately little or no information. But in the spring of 399 B.C., between three and four years after the ending of the archonship of Eukleidês, an event happened of paramount interest to the intellectual public of Greece as well as to philosophy generally, the trial, condemnation, and execution of Sokratês. Before I recount that memorable incident, it will be proper to say a few words on the literary and philosophical character of the age in which it happened. Though literature and philosophy are now becoming separate departments in Greece, each exercises a marked influence on the other, and the state of dramatic literature will be seen to be one of the most directly contributing to the fate of Sokratês.

During the century of the Athenian democracy beginning with Kleisthenês and Eukleidês, there had been produced a development of dramatic genius, tragic and comic, never paralleled before or afterwards. Æschylus, the creator of the Greek drama, or at least the first composer who rendered it illustrious, had been a combatant both at Marathon and Salamis. Sophoklês and Euripidês, his two eminent followers, the latter one of the generals of the Athenian armament against Sparta in 440 B.C., expired both of them only a year before the battle of Ægospotami, just in time to escape the bitter humiliation and suffering of that mournful period. Out of the once numerous compositions of these poets we possess only a few, yet sufficient to enable us to appreciate in some degree the grandeur of the Attic drama; and when we learn that they were frequently beaten, even with the best of their dramas now remaining, in a fair competition for the prize against other poets whose works have only reached us, we are warranted in presuming that

project was realized before the invasion of Xerxes, we accurately know; but after his destructive occupation of the theatre, if any existed previously, would have to be or renovated along with other injured portions of the city.

It was under that great development of the power of which followed the expulsion of Xerxes, that the theatre and appurtenances attained full magnitude and elaboration, and tragedy its maximum of excellence. Sophoklēs gained his victory over Æschylus in 468 B.C.: the first exhibition of Euripidēs was in 455 B.C. The names, though unhappily the alone, of many other competitors have reached us: Phrynichos who gained the prize even over the Œdipus Tyrannus of Æschylus; Euphorion son of Æschylus, Xenoklēs, and Nikomachos known to have triumphed over Euripidēs; Neophron, Aischylos, Agathon, and many more. The continuous stream of tragedy, poured out year after year, was something new in the history of the Greek mind. If we could suppose all the poets contending for the prize every year, there would be ten tetralogies — or sets of four dramas each, three tragedies and one satyr play — at the Dionysiac festival, and as many at the Lenææ great a number as sixty new tragedies composed every year.

¹ The careful examination of Welcker (Griech. Tragödie. vol. i.) makes out the titles of eighty tragedies unquestionably belonging to Euripidēs, over and above the satyrical dramas in his tetralogies. We considerably cut down the number admitted by previous authors, Fabricius as high as one hundred and seventy-eight, and even, but as high as one hundred and nine (Welcker, *ut sup.* p. 62).

The number of dramas ascribed to Euripidēs is sometimes nine, sometimes seventy-five. Elmsley, in his remarks on the Argonauts of Medea, p. 72, thinks that even the larger of these numbers is somewhat Euripidēs probably composed; since the poet continued to compose for fifty years, from 455 to 405 B.C., and was likely during each year to compose one, if not two, tetralogies; if he could prevail upon to grant him a chorus, that is, the opportunity of representing. The kalies took no account of any except such as gained the first, second, or third prize. Welcker gives the titles, and an approximative of contents, of fifty-one lost tragedies of the poet, besides the seventy-five (p. 443).

Aristarchus the tragedian is affirmed by Suidas to have composed many tragedies, of which only two gained the prize. As many as a hundred

not to be thought of; yet we do not know what was the usual number of competing tetralogies: it was at least three; since the first, second, and third are specified in the *didaskalies*, or theatrical records, and probably greater than three. It was rare to repeat the same drama a second time unless after considerable alterations; nor would it be creditable to the liberality of a chorêgus to decline the full cost of getting up a new tetralogy. Without pretending to determine with numerical accuracy how many dramas were composed in each year, the general fact of unexampled abundance in the productions of the tragic muse is both authentic and interesting.

Moreover, what is not less important to notice, all this abundance found its way to the minds of the great body of the citizens, not excepting even the poorest. For the theatre is said to have accommodated thirty thousand persons:¹ here again it is unsafe to rely upon numerical accuracy, but we cannot doubt that it was sufficiently capacious to give to most of the citizens, poor as well as rich, ample opportunity of profiting by these beautiful compositions. At first, the admission to the theatre was gratuitous; but as the crowd of strangers as well as freemen, was found both excessive and disorderly, the system was adopted of asking a price, seemingly at the time when the permanent theatre was put in complete order after the destruction caused by Xerxes. The theatre was let by contract to a manager, who engaged to defray, either in whole or part, the habitual cost incurred by the state in the representation, and who was allowed to sell tickets of admission. At first, it appears that the price of tickets was not fixed, so that the poor citizens were overbid, and could not get places. Accordingly, Periklês introduced a new system, fixing the price of places at three oboli, or half a drachma, for the better, and one obolus for the less good. As there were two days of representation, tickets covering both days were sold respectively for a drachma and two oboli. But in order that the poor citizens might be enabled to attend, two oboli were given out from the public treasure to each citizen — rich as well as poor, if they chose to

twenty compositions are ascribed to Neophron, forty-four to Achaëus, forty to Ion (Welcker, *ib.* p. 889).

¹ Plato, *Symposium*, c. 3, p. 175.

receive it — on the occasion of the festival. A poor man was furnished with the means of purchasing his place and going to the theatre without cost, on both days, if he chose; or, if he preferred it, he might go on one day only; or might even stay away altogether, and spend both the two oboli in any other manner. The higher price obtained for the better seats purchased by the citizens, is here to be set against the sum disbursed to the poor, but we have no data before us for striking the balance, and we tell how the finances of the state were affected by it.¹

Such was the original *theôrikon*, or festival-pay, introduced by Periklês at Athens; a system of distributing the public money gradually extended to other festivals in which there was dramatic representation, and which in later times reached a ruinous excess; having begun at a time when Athens drew in money from foreign tribute, and continuing, with increasing demand at a subsequent time, when she was comparatively poor and without extraneous resources. It is to be remembered that all these festivals were portions of the ancient religion, and according to the feelings of that time, cheerful and multitudinous assemblages were essential to the satisfaction of the god in whose honor the festival was celebrated. Such disbursements were a portion of the religious, even more than of the civil establishment. Of the abusive excess which they afterwards reached, however, I shall speak in a future volume: at present, I deal with the *theôrikon* only in its primitive function and effect, of enabling the Athenians indiscriminately to witness the representation of tragedies.

We cannot doubt that the effect of these compositions upon the public sympathies, as well as upon the public judgment and intelligence, must have been beneficial and moralizing in a high degree. Though the subjects and persons are legendary, the relations between them are all human and simple, exalted above

¹ For these particulars, see chiefly a learned and valuable compendium by G. C. Schneider, *Das Attische Theater-Wesen*, Weimar, 1835 — furnished with copious notes; though I do not fully concur in all his details, and differ from him on some points. I cannot think that more than one seat was given to any one citizen at the same festival; at least, not until the distribution became extended, in times posterior to the Thirty Tyrants. Schneider's book, p. 17; also Notes, 29-196.

level of humanity only in such measure as to present a stronger claim to the hearer's admiration or pity. So powerful a body of poetical influence has probably never been brought to act upon the emotions of any other population; and when we consider the extraordinary beauty of these immortal compositions, which first stamped tragedy as a separate department of poetry, and gave to it a dignity never since reached, we shall be satisfied that the tastes, the sentiments, and the intellectual standard, of the Athenian multitude, must have been sensibly improved and exalted by such lessons. The reception of such pleasures through the eye and the ear, as well as amidst a sympathizing crowd, was a fact of no small importance in the mental history of Athens. It contributed to exalt their imagination, like the grand edifices and ornaments added during the same period to their acropolis. Like them, too, and even more than they, tragedy was the monopoly of Athens; for while tragic composers came thither from other parts of Greece — Achæus from Eretria, and Ion from Chios, at a time when the Athenian empire comprised both those places — to exhibit their genius, nowhere else were original tragedies composed and acted, though hardly any considerable city was without a theatre.¹

The three great tragedians — Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês — distinguished above all their competitors, as well by contemporaries as by subsequent critics, are interesting to us, not merely from the positive beauties of each, but also from the differences between them in handling, style, and sentiment, and from the manner in which these differences illustrate the insensible modification of the Athenian mind. Though the subjects, persons, and events of tragedy always continued to be borrowed from the legendary world, and were thus kept above the level of contemporaneous life,² yet the dramatic manner of handling them is sensibly modified, even in Sophoklês as compared with Æschylus; and still more in Euripidês, by the atmosphere of democracy, political and judicial contention, and philosophy, encompassing and acting upon the poet.

¹ See Plato, *Lachês*, c. 6, p. 183, B.; and Welcker, *Griech. Tragöd.* p. 930.

² Upon this point, compare Welcker, *Griech. Tragöd.* vol. ii, p. 1102.

In Æschylus, the ideality belongs to the handling not to the subjects: the passions appealed to are the masculine, violent, to the exclusion of Aphroditê and her inspirations: figures are vast and majestic, but exhibited only in half-light in shadowy outline: the speech is replete with boldness and abrupt transition, "grandiloquent even to a fault," as Attilian remarks, and often approaching nearer to Orientalism than to Grecian perspicuity. In Sophoklês, there is even a closer approach to reality and common life: the range of emotions is more varied, the figures are more distinctly seen, the action more fully and conspicuously worked out. Not only does he have a more elaborate dramatic structure, but a more extended dialogue, and a comparative simplicity of speech like that of the Greeks: and we find too a certain admixture of rhetorical ornamentation, amidst the greatest poetical beauty which the Greek drama ever attained. But when we advance to Euripides, the rhetorical element becomes still more prominent and developed. The ultra-natural sublimity of the legendary characters disappears: love and compassion are invoked to a degree which Æschylus would have deemed inconsistent with the dignity of a heroic person: moreover, there are appeals to the reason, and argumentative controversies, which that grandiloquent poet would have despised as petty and forensic cavils. And — what is worse still, judging from the Æschylean point of view — there was a certain novelty of speculation, an intimation of dissenting reigning opinions, and an air of scientific refinement, often at the expense of the poetical effect.

Such differences between these three great poets are doubtless referable to the working of Athenian politics and Athenian philosophy on the minds of the two later. In Sophoklês, we may trace the companion of Herodotus;¹ in Euripidês, the he-

¹ See Aristophan. *Ran.* 1046. The *Antigone* (780, *seq.*) and the *Philoctetes* (498) are sufficient evidence that Sophoklês did not agree with Herodotus in this renunciation of Aphroditê.

² The comparison of Herodot. iii, 119 with Soph. *Antig.* 905, shows a community of thought which seems to me hardly explicable in any other way. Which of the two obtained the thought from the other, we cannot determine.

The reason given, by a woman whose father and mother were

Anaxagoras, Sokratēs, and Prodikos;¹ in both, the familiarity with that wide-spread popularity of speech, and real, serious debate of politicians and competitors before the dikastery, which both had ever before their eyes, but which the genius of Sophoklēs knew how to keep in due subordination to his grand poetical purpose.

The transformation of the tragic muse from Æschylus to Euripidēs is the more deserving of notice, as it shows us how Attic tragedy served as the natural prelude and encouragement to the rhetorical and dialectical age which was approaching. But the democracy, which thus insensibly modified the tragic drama, imparted a new life and ampler proportions to the comic; both the one and the other being stimulated by the increasing prosperity and power of Athens during the half century following 480 B.C. Not only was the affluence of strangers and visitors to Athens continually augmenting, but wealthy men were easily found to incur the expense of training the chorus and actors. There was no manner of employing wealth which seemed so appropriate to procure influence and popularity to its possessors, as that of contributing to enhance the magnificence of the national and religious festivals.² This was the general sentiment both among rich and

preferring a brother either to husband or child,—that she might find another husband and have another child, but could not possibly have another brother,—is certainly not a little far-fetched.

¹ See Valckenaer, *Diatribæ in Eurip.* frag. c. 23. Quintilian, who had before him many more tragedies than those which we now possess, remarks how much more useful was the study of Euripidēs, than that of Æschylus or Sophoklēs, to a young man preparing himself for forensic oratory:—

“*Illud quidem nemo non fateatur, iis qui se ad agendum comparaverint, utiliorem longe Euripidem fore. Namque is et vi et sermone (quo ipsum reprehendunt quibus gravitas et cothurnus et sonus Sophoclis videtur esse sublimior) magis accedit oratorio generi: et sententiis densus, et rebus ipsis; et in iis quæ a sapientibus tradita sunt, pæne ipsis par; et in dicendo et respondendo cuilibet eorum, qui fuerunt in foro disertis, comparandus. In affectibus vero tum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui miseratione constant, facile præcipuus.*” (Quintil. *Inst. Orat.* x, l.)

² Aristophan. *Plutus*, 1160:—

Πλούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο συμφερότατον,
Ποιεῖν ἀγῶνας γυμνικοῦς καὶ μουσικοῦς.

Compare the speech of Alkibiadēs, *Thuc.* vi, 16, and Theophrastus ap. *Cic. de Officiis*, ii, 16.

among poor; nor is there any criticism more unfounded which represents such an obligation as hard and oppress rich men. Most of them spent more than they were compelled to spend in this way, from the desire of exalt popularity. The only real sufferers were the people, or as interested in a just administration of law; since it was a practice which enabled many rich men to acquire importance, had no personal qualities to deserve it, and which provided with a stock of factitious merits to be pleaded before the jury, as a set-off against substantive accusations.

The full splendor of the comic muse was considerably less than that of the tragic. Even down to 460 B.C. (about the time when Periklēs and Ephialtēs introduced their constitutional reforms) there was not a single comic poet of eminence at Athens. At that date, which survived to the times of the Alexandrian poets, there was there apparently a single undisputed Athenian comic poet, Magnes, Kratēs, and Kratinus — probably also Chionidēs Ekphantidēs¹ — all belong to the period beginning about 480 or 460 B.C.; that is, the generation preceding Anaxagoras, whose first composition dates in 427 B.C. The origin and growth of Attic comedy before this period seems to have been unknown even to Aristotle, who intimates that comedy did not begin to grant a chorus for comedy, or to number among the authoritative solemnities of the festival, until long after the practice had been established for tragedy. Thus the chorus in that early time consisted of volunteers, without any one publicly assigned to bear the expense of teaching them to sing up the piece; so that there was little motive for authors to care or genius in the preparation of their song, dance, or comic monody, or dialogue. The exuberant revelry of the comic festival and procession, with full license of scoffing and jest, which the god Dionysus was supposed to preside over, with the most plain-spoken grossness as well in language and ideas, formed the primitive germ, which under Athenian

¹ See Meineke, *Hist. Critic. Comicor. Græcor.* vol. i, p. 26, seq. Grysar and Mr. Clinton, following Suidas, place Chionidēs Persian invasion; but the words of Aristotle rather countenance the date (Poetic. c. 3).

ripened into the old comedy.¹ It resembled in many respects the satyric drama of the tragedians, but was distinguished from it by dealing not merely with the ancient mythical stories and persons, but chiefly with contemporary men and subjects of common life; dealing with them often, too, under their real names, and with ridicule the most direct, poignant, and scornful. We see clearly how fair a field Athens would offer for this species of composition, at a time when the bitterness of political contention ran high, — when the city had become a centre for novelties from every part of Greece, — when tragedians, rhetors, and philosophers, were acquiring celebrity and incurring odium, — and when the democratical constitution laid open all the details of political and judicial business, as well as all the first men of the state, not merely to universal criticism, but also to unmeasured libel.

¹ See respecting these licentious processions, in connection with the iambus and Archilochus, vol. iv, of this History, ch. xxix, p. 81.

Aristotle (Poetic. c. 4) tells us that these phallic processions, with liberty to the leaders (*οἱ ἐξάρχοντες*) of scoffing at every one, still continued in many cities of Greece in his time: see Herod. v, §3, and Sémus apud Athenæum, xiv, p. 622; also the striking description of the rural Dionysia in the *Acharneis* of Aristophanês, 235, 255, 1115. The scoffing was a part of the festival, and supposed to be agreeable to Dionysus: *ἐν τοῖς Διονυσίοις ἐφεμμένον αὐτὸ δρᾶν καὶ τὸ σκῶμμα μέρος τι ἐδόκει τῆς ἑορτῆς καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἰσως χαίρει, φιλογέλως τις ὧν* (Lucian, *Piscator*, c. 25). Compare Aristophanês, *Ranæ*, 367, where the poet seems to imply that no one has a right to complain of being ridiculed in the *πατρίους τελεταῖς Διονύσου*.

The Greek word for comedy — *κωμῳδία*, τὸ *κωμῳδεῖν* — at least in its early sense, had reference to a bitter, insulting, criminitive ridicule: *κωμῳδεῖν καὶ κακῶς λέγειν* (Xenophon, *Repub. Ath.* ii, 23) — *κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντάς ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντάς* (Plato de *Repub.* iii, 8, p. 332). A remarkable definition of *κωμῳδία* appears in Bekker's *Anecdota Græca*, ii, 747, 10: *Κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν μέσῳ λαῶν κατηγορία, ἡγουν δημοσίαις;* "public exposure to scorn before the assembled people:" and this idea of it as a penal visitation of evil-doers is preserved in Platonius and the anonymous writers on comedy, prefixed to Aristophanês. The definition which Aristotle (Poetic. c. 11) gives of it, is too mild for the primitive comedy; for he tells us himself that *Kratês*, immediately preceding Aristophanês, was the first author who departed from the *ιαμβικὴ ἰδέα*: this "iambic vein" was originally the common character. It doubtless included every variety of ridicule, from innocent mirth to scornful contempt and odium; but the predominant character tended decidedly to the latter.

Out of all the, once abundant compositions of Attic nothing has reached us except eleven plays of Aristophanes. That poet himself singles out Magnês, Kratês, and Epicharmus among predecessors whom he describes as numerous, for able mention; as having been frequently, though not unsuccessfull. Kratinus appears to have been not only the most copious, but also the most distinguished, among all those who preceded Aristophanês, a list comprising Hermippus, Teleclides, and the other bitter assailants of Periklês. It was Kratinus first extended and systematized the license of the phallic and the "careless laughter of the festive crowd,"¹ into a comedy of regular structure, with actors three in number, according to the analogy of tragedy. Standing forward, against persons exhibited or denounced by their names, with a boldness of personal slander not inferior to the iambist Archilochus, with an abrupt and dithyrambic style somewhat resembling Æschylus, Kratinus made an epoch in comedy as the latter made in tragedy; but was surpassed by Aristophanês, as Æschylus had been surpassed by Sophoklês. We find that his compositions were not only more rudely bitter and more sively libellous than those of Aristophanês,² but also destitute of that richness of illustration and felicity of expression which pervades all the wit of the latter, whether good-natured or malicious. In Kratinus, too, comedy first made herself felt as a sub-agent and partisan in the political warfare of Athens. He espoused the cause of Kimon against Periklês;³ eulogized

Compare Will. Schneider, *Attisches Theater-Wesen*, Notes, p. 292. Bernhardt, *Griechische Literatur*, sect. 67, p. 292.

¹ Χαῖρ', ὧ μέγ' ἀχρειογέλως ὅμιλε ταῖς ἐπιβδαῖς,

Τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτῆς ἄριστε πάντων, etc.

Kratini Fragm. Incert. 51; Meineke, *Fr. Com. Græcor.* ii, p. 193.

² Respecting Kratinus, see Platonius and the other writers on comedy, prefixed to Aristophanês in Bekker's edition, pp. vi, ix, etc.; also Meineke, *Historia Comic. Græc.* vol. i, p. 50, seq.

..... Οὐ γὰρ, ὥσπερ Ἀριστοφάνης, ἐπιτρέχειν τὴν χάριν τοῖς ποιεῖ (Κρατίνος), ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, γυμνοῦσα τὴν τίθεισι τὰς βλασφημίας κατὰ τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων.

³ See Kratinus — Ἀρχιλοχοί — Frag. 1, and Plutarch, *Kimæ κωμῳδία πολυτεύεται ἐν τοῖς δράμασι καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ, ἢ τῶν περὶ τὸν καὶ Ἀριστοφάνη καὶ Εὐπόλιν*, etc. (Dionys. Halikarn. *Ars Rhet.*

former, while he bitterly derided and vituperated the latter Hermippus, Telekleidês, and most of the contemporary comic writers followed the same political line in assailing that great man, together with those personally connected with him, Aspasia and Anaxagoras: indeed, Hermippus was the person who indicted Aspasia for impiety before the dikastery. But the testimony of Aristophanês¹ shows that no comic writer, of the time of Periklês, equalled Kratinus, either in vehemence of libel or in popularity.

It is remarkable that, in 440 B.C., a law was passed forbidding comic authors to ridicule any citizen by name in their compositions; which prohibition, however, was rescinded after two years, an interval marked by the rare phenomenon of a lenient comedy from Kratinus.² Such enactment denotes a struggle in the Athenian mind, even at that time, against the mischief of making the Dionysiac festival an occasion for unmeasured libel against citizens publicly named and probably themselves present. And there was another style of comedy taken up by Kratês, distinct from the iambic or Archilochian vein worked by Kratinus, in which comic incident was attached to fictitious characters and woven into a story, without recourse to real individual names or direct personality. This species of comedy, analogous to that which Epicharmus had before exhibited at Syracuse, was continued by Pherekratês as the successor of Kratês. Though for a long time less popular and successful than the poignant food served up by Kratinus and others, it became finally predominant after the close of the Peloponnesian war, by the gradual transition of what is called the Old Comedy into the Middle and New Comedy.

But it is in Aristophanês that the genius of the old libellous comedy appears in its culminating perfection. At least we have

¹ Aristophan. *Equit.* 525, *seq.*

² A comedy called 'Ὀδυσσεύς' (plur. numb. corresponding to the title of another of his comedies, 'Ἀρχιλόχοι'). It had a chorus, as one of the Fragments shows, but few or no choric songs; nor any parabasis, or address by the chorus, assuming the person of the poet, to the spectators.

See Bergk, *De Reliquiis Comœd. Antiq.* p. 142, *seq.*; Meineke, *Frag. Cratini*, vol. ii, p. 93, 'Ὀδυσσεύς': compare also the first volume of the same work, p. 43: also Runkel, *Cratini Fragm.* p. 38 (Leips. 1827).

before us enough of his works to enable us to appreciate merits; though perhaps Eupolis, Ameipsias, Phrynichus (Comicus), and others, who contended against him at the with alternate victory and defeat, would be found to deserve equal praise, if we possessed their compositions. Never will the full and unshackled force of comedy be so seen again. Without having Aristophanes actually before us, have been impossible to imagine the unmeasured and unlimited license of attack assumed by the old comedy upon the gods, institutions, the politicians, philosophers, poets, private citizens, especially named, and even the women, whose life was entirely typical, of Athens. With this universal liberty in respect of there is combined a poignancy of derision and satire, a freedom of imagination and variety of turns, and a richness of expression, such as cannot be surpassed, and such as explains the admiration expressed for him by the philosophers who in other respects must have regarded him with unqualified disapprobation. His comedies are popular in the sense of the word, addressed to the entire body of male on a day consecrated to festivity, and providing for them amusement or derision with a sort of drunken abundance, of persons or things standing in any way prominent before public eye. The earliest comedy of Aristophanes was exhibited 427 B.C., and his muse continued for a long time producing two of the dramas now remaining belong to an epoch years after the Thirty and the renovation of the democracy about 392 B.C. After that renovation, however, as I have remarked, the unmeasured sweep and libellous personal attack of old comedy was gradually discontinued: the comic character first cut down, and afterwards suppressed, so as to usher in what is commonly termed the Middle Comedy, without any real break. The "Plutus" of Aristophanes indicates some approach to this new phase; but his earlier and more numerous comedies, from the "Acharneis," in 425 B.C. to the "Frogs," in only a few months before the fatal battle of Ægospotami, show the continuous, unexhausted, untempered flow of the stream opened by Kratinus.

Such abundance both of tragic and comic poetry, each of great excellence, formed one of the marked features of

life, and became a powerful instrument in popularizing new combinations of thought with variety and elegance of expression. While the tragic muse presented the still higher advantage of inspiring elevated and benevolent sympathies, more was probably lost than gained by the lessons of the comic muse; not only bringing out keenly all that was really ludicrous or contemptible in the phenomena of the day, but manufacturing scornful laughter, quite as often, out of that which was innocent or even meritorious, as well as out of boundless private slander. The "Knights" and the "Wasps" of Aristophanês, however, not to mention other plays, are a standing evidence of one good point in the Athenian character; that they bore with good-natured indulgence the full outpouring of ridicule and even of calumny interwoven with it, upon those democratical institutions to which they were sincerely attached. The democracy was strong enough to tolerate unfriendly tongues either in earnest or in jest: the reputations of men who stood conspicuously forward in politics, on whatever side, might also be considered as a fair mark for attacks; inasmuch as that measure of aggressive criticism which is tutelary and indispensable, cannot be permitted without the accompanying evil, comparatively much smaller, of excess and injustice;¹ though even here we may remark that excess of bitter personality is among the most conspicuous sins of Athenian literature generally. But the warfare of comedy, in the persons of Aristophanês and other composers, against philosophy, literature, and eloquence, in the name of those good old times of ignorance, "when an Athenian seaman knew nothing more than how to call for his barley-cake, and cry, Yo-ho!"²

¹ Aristophanês boasts that he was the first comic composer who selected great and powerful men for his objects of attack: his predecessors, he affirms, had meddled only with small vermin and rags: *ἐς τὰ ῥάκια σκώπτοντας ἀεὶ, καὶ τοῖς φθειροῖν πολεμοῦντας* (Pac. 724-736; Vesp. 1030).

But this cannot be true in point of fact, since we know that no man was more bitterly assailed by the comic authors of his day than Periklês. It ought to be added, that though Aristophanês doubtless attacked the powerful men, he did not leave the smaller persons unmolested.

² Aristoph. Ran. 1067; also Vesp. 1095. Æschylus reproaches Euripidês:—

Εἰτ' αὖ λαλίαν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι καὶ στωμυλίαν ἐδίδαξας,
Ἥ' ἔκεκνωσεν τὰς τε καλαίστρας, καὶ τὰς πυγὰς ἐνέτριψε
Τῶν μειρακίων στωμυλλομένων, καὶ τοὺς παράλους ἀνέπεισεν

and the retrograde spirit which induces them to exhibit turpitude as the natural consequence of the intellectual of the age, are circumstances going far to prove an unfavourable and degrading influence of comedy on the Athenian mind.

In reference to individual men, and to Sokratês¹ especially, the Athenians seem to have been unfavorably biased by the applied wit and genius of Aristophanês, in "The Clouds," and other comedies of Eupolis, and Ameipsias and Eupolis; the general march of politics, philosophy, or letters, the posers had little influence. Nor were they ever regarded at in the light in which they are presented to us by modern as men of exalted morality, stern patriotism, and genuine ment of the true interests of their country; as animated and steady views of improving their fellow-citizens, but con-

¹ Ἀνταγορεύειν τοῖς ἀρχουσιν. Καίτοι τότε γ', ἥνίκ' ἐγὼ ζῶν,
Οὐκ ἠπίσταντ' ἀλλ' ἡ μᾶζαν καλέσαι καὶ ρυππακαὶ

Τὸ ρυππακαὶ seems to have been the peculiar cry or chorus of seamen on shipboard, probably when some joint pull or effort of required: compare *Vespæ*, 909.

¹ See about the effect on the estimation of Sokratês, Ranka, *Comedie de Vitâ Aristophanis*, p. cdxli.

Compare also the remarks of Cicero (*De Repub.* iv, 11; vol. iv, 1, Orell.) upon the old Athenian comedy and its unrestrained license; laws of the Twelve Tables at Rome condemned to death any one who proposed and published libellous verses against the reputation of another.

Among the constant butts of Aristophanês and the other comedians, was the dithyrambic poet Kinesias, upon whom they discharged wit and bitterness, not simply as an indifferent poet, but also on account of his alleged impiety, his thin and feeble bodily frame, and his ill health. We see the effect of such denunciations in a speech of Lysias; composed on behalf of Phanias, against whom Kinesias had an indictment, or *graphê paranomôn*. Phanias treats these abuses as if they were good evidence against the character of Kinesias: *μᾶζω δ' εἰ μὴ βαρέως φέρετε διὰ Κινησίας ἐστὶν ὁ τοῖς νόμοις βοηθὸς πάντες ἐπίστασθε ἀσεβέστατον ἀπάντων καὶ παρανομώτατον γεγονός· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιαῦτα περὶ θεοῦ ἐξαμαρτάνων, ὃ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις αἰσχρολογεῖν, τῶν κωμικοδοδιδασκάλων δ' ἀκούετε καθ' ἑνὶ αὐτόν;* see *Lysias*, *Fragm.* 31, ed. Bekker; *Athenæus*, xii.

Dr. Thirlwall estimates more lightly than I do the effect of the abundant libels of the old comedy: see his review of the *Attic tragedy*, comedy, in a very excellent chapter of his *History of Greece*, vol. iii, p. 42.

in consequence of prejudice or opposition, to disguise a far-sighted political philosophy under the veil of satire; as good judges of the most debatable questions, such as the prudence of making war or peace, and excellent authority to guide us in appreciating the merits or demerits of their contemporaries, insomuch that the victims of their lampoons are habitually set down as worthless men.¹ There cannot be a greater misconception of the old comedy

¹ The view which I am here combating, is very general among the German writers; in proof of which, I may point to three of the ablest recent critics on the old comedy, Bergk, Meineke, and Ranke; all most useful writers for the understanding of Aristophanês.

Respecting Cratinus, Bergk observes: "*Erat enim Cratinus, pariter atque ceteri principes antiquæ comedix, vir egregie moratus, idemque antiqui moris tenax. . . . Cum Cratinus quasi divinitus videret ex hac libertate mox tanquam ex stirpe aliquâ nimiam licentiam existere et nasci, statim his initis graviter adversatus est, videturque Cimonem tanquam exemplum boni et honesti civis proposuisse.*" etc.

"Nam Cratinus cum esset magno ingenio et *eximiâ* morum gravitate, sagerime talit rem publicam præcepit in perniciem ruere: omnem igitur operam atque omne studium eo contulit, ut *imagine ipsius viles ante oculos positi omnes et res divinx et humanæ emendarentur, hominumque animi ad honestatem colendam incenderentur.* Hoc sibi primus et proposuit Cratinus, et propositum strenue persecutus est. *Sed si ipsam Veritatem, cujus imago oculis observabatur, oculis subjecisset, verendum erat ne tedio obrueret eos qui spectarent, nihilque prorsus eorum, quæ summo studio persequeretur, obtineret.* Quare *eximiâ* quâdam arte pulchram effigiem hilaremque formam finxit, ita tamen ut ad veritatem sublimemque ejus speciem referret omnia: sic cum ludicris miscet seria, ut et vulgus haberet qui delectaretur; et qui plus ingenio valerent, ipsam veritatem, quæ ex omnibus fabularum partibus perlucet, mente et cogitatione comprehenderent." "Jam vero Cratinum in fabulis componendis id *unice spectavisse quiddam esset verum*, ne veteres quidem latuit. . . . Aristophanes autem *idem et secutus semper est et sæpe professus.*" (Bergk, *De Reliquiis Comæd. Antiq.* pp. 1, 10, 20, 233, etc.)

The criticism of Ranke (*Commentatio de Vitâ Aristophanis*, pp. cxxli, cccxiv, cccxlii, cclxix, cclxxiii, cdxxxiv, etc.) adopts the same strain of eulogy as to the lofty and virtuous purposes of Aristophanês. Compare also the eulogy bestowed by Meineke on the monitorial value of the old comedy (*Historia Comic. Græc.* pp. 39, 50, 165, etc.), and similar praises by Westermann; *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom.* sect. 36.

In one of the arguments prefixed to the "Pax" of Aristophanês, the author is so full of the conception of these poets as public instructors or advisers, that he tells us, absurdly enough, they were for that reason called *διδασκαλοι*: *οὐδὲν γὰρ συμβούλων διέτερον· ὅθεν αὐτοὺς καὶ διδά-*

than to regard it in this point of view ; yet it is astonishing how many subsequent writers, from Diodorus and Plutarch down to

κάλους ὀνόμαζον· διὰ πάντα τὰ πρόσφορα διὰ δραμάτων αὐτοῦ ἐδίδασκον (p. 244, ed. Bekk.).

"Eupolis, atque Cratinus, Aristophanesque poetæ,
Atque alii, quorum Comoedia prisca virorum est,
Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus, aut fur,
Aut mæchus foret, aut sicarius, aut alioqui
Famosus, multâ cum libertate notabant."

This is the early judgment of Horace (Serm. i, 4, 1) : his later opinion on the *Fescennina licentia*, which was the same in spirit as the old Grecian comedy, is much more judicious (Epistol. ii, 1, 145) : compare Art. Poetic. 224. To assume that the persons derided or vilified by these comic authors must always have deserved what was said of them, is indeed a striking evidence of the value of the maxim : "Fortiter calumniare ; semper aliquid restat." Without doubt, their indiscriminate libel sometimes wounded a suitable subject ; in what proportion of cases, we have no means of determining : but the perusal of Aristophanês tends to justify the epithets which Lucian puts into the mouth of *Dialogus* respecting Aristophanês and Eupolis — not to favor the opinions of the authors whom I have cited above (Lucian, *Jov. Accus.* vol. ii, p. 832). He calls Eupolis and Aristophanês *δεινὸς ἀνδρας ἐπικερτομήσαι τὰ σεμνὰ καὶ χλευάσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα*.

When we notice what Aristophanês himself says respecting the other comic poets, his predecessors and contemporaries, we shall find it far from countenancing the exalted censorial function which Bergk and others ascribe to them (see the *Parabasis* in the *Nubes*, 530, *seq.*, and in the *Pax*, 723). It seems especially preposterous to conceive Kratinus in that character ; of whom what we chiefly know, is his habit of drunkenness, and the downright, unadorned vituperation in which he indulged : see the *Fragments* and story of his last play, *Πυρίνη* (in *Meineke*, vol. ii, p. 116 ; also *Meineke*, vol. i, p. 48, *seq.*).

Meineke copies (p. 46) from *Suidas* a statement (v. Ἐπειὸν δειλότερος) to the effect that Kratinus was *ραξίαρχος τῆς Οἰνητῆδος φυλῆς*. He construes this as a real fact : but there can hardly be a doubt that it is only a joke made by his contemporary comedians upon his fondness for wine ; and not one of the worst among the many such jests which seem to have been then current. *Runkel* also, another editor of the *Fragments* of Kratinus (*Cratini Fragment.*, Leips. 1827, p. 2, *M. M. Runkel*), construes this *ραξίαρχος τῆς Οἰνητῆδος φυλῆς*, as if it were a serious function ; though he tells us about the general character of Kratinus : "De vitâ ipsâ et moribus pæne nihil dicere possumus : hoc solum constat, *Cratinum poculis et puerorum amorî valde deditum fuisse*."

Great numbers of Aristophanic jests have been transcribed as serious

the present day, have thought themselves entitled to deduce their facts of Grecian history, and their estimate of Grecian men, events, and institutions, from the comedies of Aristophanês. Standing pre-eminent as the latter does in comic genius, his point of view is only so much the more determined by the ludicrous associations suggested to his fancy, so that he thus departs the more widely from the conditions of a faithful witness or candid critic. He presents himself to provoke the laugh, mirthful or spiteful, of the festival crowd, assembled for the gratification of these emotions, and not with any expectation of serious or reasonable impressions.¹ Nor does he at all conceal how much he is mortified by failure; like the professional jester, or "laughter-maker," at the banquets of rich Athenian citizens;² the parallel of Aristophanês as to purpose, however unworthy of comparison in every other respect.

This rise and development of dramatic poetry in Greece — so abundant, so varied, and so rich in genius — belongs to the fifth century B.C. It had been in the preceding century nothing more than an unpretending graft upon the primitive chorus, and was then even denounced by Solon, or in the dictum ascribed to Solon, as a vicious novelty, tending — by its simulation of a

matter-of-fact, and have found their way into Grecian history. Whoever follows chapter vii of K. F. Hermann's *Griechische Staats-Alterthümer*, containing the *Innere Geschichte* of the Athenian democracy, will see the most sweeping assertions made against the democratical institutions, on the authority of passages of Aristophanês: the same is the case with several of the other most learned German manuals of Grecian affairs.

¹ Horat. de Art. Poetic. 212-224.

"Indoctus quid enim saperet, liberque laborum,
Rusticus urbano confusus, turpis honesto ?....
Illecebris erat et gratâ novitate morandus
Spectator, functusque sacris, et potus, et exlex."

² See the Parabasis of Aristophanês in the *Nûbes* (535, seq.) and in the *Vespæ* (1015-1045).

Compare also the description of Philippus the γελοιοποιός, or Jester, in the Symposium of Xenophon; most of which is extremely Aristophanic, ii, 10, 14. The comic point of view is assumed throughout that piece; and Sokratês is introduced on one occasion as apologising for the intrusion of a serious reflection (τὸ σπουδαιολογεῖν, viii, 41). The same is the case throughout much of the Symposium of Plato; though the scheme and purpose of this latter are very difficult to follow.

false character, and by its effusion of sentiments not genuine — to corrupt the integrity of human dealings ;¹ a source of corruption, not unlike that which Aristophanês worked a century afterwards, in his "Clouds," against physics, rhetoric, and dialectics, in the person of Sokratês. But the power of the graft had overpowered and subordinated those of the old system ; so that dramatic poetry was now a distinct form, with laws of its own, and shining with splendor equal, if superior, to the elegiac, choric, lyric, and epic poetry which constituted the previous stock of the Grecian world.

Such transformations in the poetry, or, to speak more fully, in the literature — for before the year 500 B.C. the two expressions were equivalent — of Greece, were at once products, mainstays, and auxiliaries, in the expansion of the national mind. Our moderns have now become familiar with dramatic combinations, and have ceased to be peculiar to any special form or condition of political society. But if we compare the fifth century B.C. with that which preceded it, the recently born drama will be found to have been a most important and impressive novelty : assuredly it would have been regarded by Solon, the legislator of his own age, if he could have risen again, a century and a quarter after his death, to witness the *Antigonê* of Sophoklês, the *Medea* of Euripidês, or the *Acharneis* of Aristophanês.

Its novelty does not consist merely in the high order of intellect and judgment required for the construction of a drama, but at once regular and effective. This, indeed, is no small thing to Grecian poetical celebrity as it stood in the days of Alkæus, Sappho, and Stesichorus : but we must remember that the epical structure of the *Odyssey*, so ancient and long a part of the Hellenic world, implies a reach of architectonic skill quite equal to that exhibited in the most symmetrical drama of Sophoklês. The great innovation of the dramatists consisted in the rhetorical, the dialectical, and the ethical spirit which they breathed into their poetry. Of all this, the undeveloped mind doubtless existed in the previous epic, lyric, and gnomic poetry ; but the drama stood distinguished from all the

¹ Plutarch, Solon, c. 29. See the previous volumes of this History, vol. ii, p. 145 ; ch. xxix, vol. iv, pp. 83, 84.

bringing it out into conspicuous amplitude, and making it the substantive means of effect. Instead of recounting exploits achieved, or sufferings undergone by the heroes,—instead of pouring out his own single-minded impressions in reference to some given event or juncture,—the tragic poet produces the mythical persons themselves to talk, discuss, accuse, defend, confute, lament, threaten, advise, persuade, or appease; among one another, but before the audience. In the *drama*, a singular misnomer, nothing is actually done: all is talk; assuming what is done, as passing, or as having passed, elsewhere. The dramatic poet, speaking continually, but at each moment through a different character, carries on the purpose of each of his characters by words calculated to influence the other characters, and appropriate to each successive juncture. Here are rhetorical exigencies from beginning to end:¹ while, since the whole interest of the piece turns upon some contention or struggle carried on by speech; since debate, consultation, and retort, never cease; since every character, good or evil, temperate or violent, must be supplied with suitable language to defend his proceedings, to attack or repel opponents, and generally to make good the relative importance assigned to him, here again dialectical skill in no small degree is indispensable.

Lastly, the strength and variety of ethical sentiment infused into the Grecian tragedy, is among the most remarkable characteristics which distinguish it from the anterior forms of poetry. "To do or suffer terrible things," is pronounced by Aristotle to be its proper subject-matter; and the internal mind and motives of the doer or sufferer, on which the ethical interest fastens, are laid open by the Greek tragedians with an impressive minuteness which neither the epic nor the lyric could possibly parallel. Moreover, the appropriate subject-matter of tragedy is pregnant not only with ethical sympathy, but also with ethical debate and speculation. Characters of mixed good and evil; distinct rules of duty, one conflicting with the other; wrong done, and justified to the conscience of the doer, if not to that of the spectator, by

¹ Respecting the rhetorical cast of tragedy, see Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 57, p. 502, D.

Plato disapproves of tragedy on the same grounds as of rhetoric.

previous wrong suffered, all these are the favorite the *Æschylus* and his two great successors. *Klytæmnestra* her husband *Agamemnôn* on his return from *Troy*: her del that he had deserved this treatment at her hands for hav rificed his own and her daughter, *Iphigeneia*. Her son kills her, under a full conviction of the duty of aven father, and even under the sanction of *Apollo*. The re *Eumenides* pursue him for the deed, and *Æschylus* b the parties before the court of *Areopagus*, with *Athênê* a dent, where the case is fairly argued, with the *Eume acusers*, and *Apollo* as counsel for the prisoner, and en equality of votes in the court: upon which *Athênê* gi casting-vote to absolve *Orestês*. Again; let any man i conflicting obligations which *Sophoklês* so forcibly bring his beautiful drama of the *Antigonê*. *Kreon* directs body of *Polyneikês*, as a traitor and recent invader of t try, shall remain unburied: *Antigonê*, sister of *Po denounces* such interdict as impious, and violates it, u overruling persuasion of fraternal duty. *Kreon* having her to be buried alive, his youthful son *Hæmon*, her lover, is plunged into a heart-rending conflict between rence of such cruelty on the one side, and submission father on the other. *Sophoklês* sets forth both these co rules of duty in an elaborate scene of dialogue bet father and the son. Here are two rules both sacred and able, but the one of which cannot be observed without the other. Since a choice must be made, which of ought a good man to obey? This is a point which poet is well pleased to leave undetermined. But if the among the audience in whom the least impulse of in speculation is alive, he will by no means leave it so some mental effort to solve the problem, and to disc grand and comprehensive principle from whence all rules emanate; a principle such as may instruct his c in those cases generally, of not unfrequent occurrence two obligations conflict with each other. The tragediar appeals more powerfully to the ethical sentiment tha had ever done before, but also, by raising these grave s

ing questions, addresses a stimulus and challenge to the intellect, spurring it on to ethical speculation.

Putting all these points together, we see how much wider was the intellectual range of tragedy, and how considerable is the mental progress which it betokens, as compared with the lyric and gnomic poetry, or with the Seven Wise Men and their authoritative aphorisms, which formed the glory, and marked the limit, of the preceding century. In place of unexpanded results, or the mere communication of single-minded sentiment, we have even in *Æschylus*, the earliest of the great tragedians, a large latitude of dissent and debate, a shifting point of view, a case better or worse, made out for distinct and contending parties, and a divination of the future advent of sovereign and instructed reason. It was through the intermediate stage of tragedy that Grecian literature passed into the rhetoric, dialectics, and ethical speculation, which marked the fifth century B.C.

Other simultaneous causes, arising directly out of the business of real life, contributed to the generation of these same capacities and studies. The fifth century B.C. is the first century of democracy at Athens, in Sicily, and elsewhere: moreover, at that period, beginning from the Ionic revolt and the Persian invasions of Greece, the political relations between one Grecian city and another became more complicated, as well as more continuous; requiring a greater measure of talent in the public men who managed them. Without some power of persuading or confuting,—of defending himself against accusation, or in case of need, accusing others,—no man could possibly hold an ascendent position. He had probably not less need of this talent for private, informal, conversations to satisfy his own political passions, than for addressing the public assembly formally convoked. Even as commanding an army or a fleet, without any laws of war or habits of professional discipline, his power of keeping up the good-humor, confidence, and prompt obedience of his men, depended not a little on his command of speech.¹ Nor was it only to the leaders in political life that such an accomplishment was indispensable. In all the democracies,—and probably in

¹ See the discourse of Sokratês, insisting upon this point, as part of the duties of a commander (*Xen. Mem.* iii, 3, 11).

several governments which were not democracies, but olig of an open character,—the courts of justice were more numerous, and the procedure oral and public: in Athens ially, the dikasteries — whose constitution has been explained in a former chapter — were both very numerous, and of great attendance. Every citizen had to go before them in person, without being able to send a paid advocate in his place; either required redress for wrong offered to himself, or accused of wrong by another.¹ There was no man, therefore, who might not be cast or condemned, or fail in his own suit, even if he was right on his side, unless he possessed some powers of speech to unfold his case to the dikasts, as well as to confute the charges of his accusers, and disentangle the sophistry, of an opponent. For even, to any man of known family and station, it would be a humiliation hardly less painful than the loss of the citizenship, to stand before the dikastery with friends and enemies around him, and find himself unable to carry on the thread of a defence without halting or confusion. To meet such liabilities, which no citizen, rich or poor, was exempt, a certain training in speech became not less essential than a certain training in arms. Without the latter, he could not do his duty as an hoplite in the ranks for the defence of his country; without the former, he could not escape danger to his fortune or honor, and humiliation in the eyes of his friends, if called before a dikastery, nor lend aid to any of those friends who might be placed under a similar necessity.

Here then were ample motives, arising out of practical necessity, not less than from the stimulus of ambition, to cultivate power both of continuous harangue, and of concise argumentation, or interrogation and reply:² motives for all, to secure

¹ This necessity of some rhetorical accomplishments, is enforced emphatically by Aristotle (*Rhetoric*. i, 1, 3,) than by Kalliklès in the *Gorgias* of Plato, c. 91, p. 486, B.

² See the description which Cicero gives, of his own laborious training: —

“Ego hoc tempore omni, noctes et dies, in omnium doctrinarum ratione versabar. Eram cum Stoico Diodoto, qui cum habitavisset mechanicumque vixisset, nuper est domi mea mortuus. A quo quodcumque rebus, tum studiosissime in dialecticâ versabar; quæ quasi contract

certain moderate aptitude in the use of these weapons; for the ambitious few, to devote much labor and to shine as accomplished orators.

Such political and social motives, it is to be remembered, though acting very forcibly at Athens, were by no means peculiar to Athens, but prevailed more or less throughout a large portion of the Grecian cities, especially in Sicily, when all the governments became popularized after the overthrow of the Gelonian dynasty. And it was in Sicily and Italy, that the first individuals arose, who acquired permanent name both in rhetoric and dialectics: Empedoklës of Agrigentum in the former; Zeno of Elea, in Italy, in the latter.¹

Both these distinguished men bore a conspicuous part in politics, and both on the popular side; Empedoklës against an oligarchy, Zeno against a despot. But both also were yet more distinguished as philosophers, and the dialectical impulse in Zeno, if not the rhetorical impulse in Empedoklës, came more from his philosophy than from his politics. Empedoklës (about 470-440 B.C.) appears to have held intercourse at least, if not partial communion of doctrine, with the dispersed philosophers of the Pythagorean league; the violent subversion of which, at Kroton and elsewhere, I have related in a previous chapter.² He constructed a system of physics and cosmogony, distinguished for first broaching the doctrine of the Four elements, and set forth in a poem composed by himself: besides which he seems to have had much of the mystical tone and miraculous pretensions of Pythagoras; professing not only to cure pestilence and other distempers, but to teach how old age might be averted and the dead raised from Hades; to prophesy, and to raise and calm the winds at his pleasure. Gorgias, his pupil, deposed to having been present at the magical ceremonies of Empedoklës.³ The

eloquentia putanda est; sine quâ etiam tu, Brute, judicavisti, te illam justam eloquentiam, quam dialecticam dilatatam esse putant, consequi non posse. Huic ego doctore, et ejus artibus variis et multis, ita eram tamen deditus, ut ab exercitationibus oratoriis nullus dies vacaret." (Cicero, Brutus, 90, 309.)

¹ Aristotel. ap. Diog. Laërt. viii, 57.

² See my preceding vol. iv, ch. xxxvii.

³ Diogen. Laërt. viii, 58, 59, who gives a remarkable extract from the poem of Empedoklës, attesting these large pretensions.

impressive character of his poem is sufficiently attested by the admiration of Lucretius,¹ and the rhetoric ascribed to it is supposed to have consisted mainly in oral teaching or exposition of doctrines. Tisias and Korax of Syracuse, who are mentioned as the first teachers of rhetoric, and the first who are known to have given any precepts about the rhetorical practice, were temporaries; and the celebrated Gorgias was his pupil.

The dialectical movement emanated at the same time from the Eleatic school of philosophers, — Zeno, and his contemporary Samian Melissus, 460–440, — if not from their common ancestor Parmenidēs. Melissus also, as well as Zeno and Empedocles, was a distinguished citizen as well as a philosopher; having been in command of the Samian fleet at the time of the revolt of Samos from Athens, and having in that capacity gained a victory over the Athenians.

All the philosophers of the fifth century B.C., prior to Plato, inheriting from their earliest poetical predecessors the habit of posing unmeasured problems which had once been solved by the suggestion of divine or superhuman agents, contemplated the world as a physical and moral, all in a mass, and applied their mind to the discovery of some hypothesis which would give them an explanation of the totality,² or at least appease curiosity by something which might pass like an explanation. What were the elements out of which all visible things were made? What was the initial cause of the change? What was the principle of those changes which appeared to our senses?

See Brandis, Handbuch der Gr. Röm. Philos. part i. sects. 47, 48; Sturz. ad Empedoclis Frag. p. 36.

¹ De Rerum Naturâ, i, 719.

² Some striking lines of Empedoklēs are preserved by Sextus in his *adv. Mathemat.* vii, 115; to the effect that every individual man spends his short life, with no more knowledge than is comprised in his small fraction of observation and experience: he struggles in vain to explain the totality; but neither eye, nor ear, nor reason can help him: —

Παῦρον δὲ ζωῆς ἄβιον μέρος ἀθρήσαντες,
Ὀκύμοροι, καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες, ἀπέπταν
Αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῃ προσέκυρσεν ἑκαστος
Πάντος ἑλαννόμενοι. Τὸ δὲ οὐλον ἐπεύχεται εὐρεῖν
Αὐτὼς οὐτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν, οὐτ' ἐπακουστὰ,
Οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτὰ.

change?—was it generation of something integrally new and destruction of something preëxistent,—or was it a decomposition and recombination of elements still continuing. The theories of the various Ionic philosophers, and of Empedoklès after them, admitting one, two, or four elementary substances, with Friendship and Enmity to serve as causes of motion or change; the Homœomeries of Anaxagoras, with Nous, or Intelligence, as the stirring and regularizing agent; the atoms and void of Leukippus and Demokritus, all these were different hypotheses answering to a similar vein of thought. All of them, though assuming that the sensible appearances of things were delusive and perplexing, nevertheless, were borrowed more or less directly from some of these appearances, which were employed to explain and illustrate the whole theory, and served to render it plausible when stated as well as to defend it against attack. But the philosophers of the Eleatic school—first Xenophanès, and after him Parmenidès—took a distinct path of their own. To find that which was real, and which lay as it were concealed behind or under the delusive phenomena of sense, they had recourse only to mental abstractions. They supposed a Substance or Something not perceivable by sense, but only cogitable or conceivable by reason; a One and All, continuous and finite, which was not only real and self-existent, but was the only reality; eternal, immovable, and unchangeable, and the only matter knowable. The phenomena of sense, which began and ended one after the other, they thought, were essentially delusive, uncertain, contradictory among themselves, and open to endless diversity of opinion.¹ Upon these, nevertheless, they announced an opinion; adopting two elements, heat and cold, or light and darkness.

Parmenidès set forth this doctrine of the One and All in a poem, of which but a few fragments now remain, so that we understand very imperfectly the positive arguments employed to recommend it. The matter of truth and knowledge, such as he

¹ See Parmenidis Fragmenta, ed. Karsten, v, 30, 55, 60: also the Dissertation annexed by Karsten, sects. 3, 4, p. 148, *seq.*; sect. 19, p. 221, *seq.*

Compare also Mullach's edition of the same Fragments, annexed to his edition of the Aristotelian treatise, *De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia*, p. 144.

alone admitted, was altogether removed from the sense vested of sensible properties, so as to be conceived of as *Ens Rationis*, and described and discussed only in the general words of the language. The exposition given by Parmenides in his poem,¹ though complimented by Plato, was vehemently controverted by others, who deduced from it many contradictions and absurdities. As a part of his reply, and doubtless the chief part, Parmenides retorted upon his adversaries; and was followed by his pupil Zeno with still greater acuteness. Those who controverted his ontological theory, that the real, ultra-phenomenal substance was One, affirmed that it was not One, but Many; divisible, movable, changeable, and he attacked this latter theory, and proved that it led to contradictions and absurdities still greater than those involved in the proposition of Parmenides.² He impugned the testimony affirming that it furnished premises for conclusions which contradicted each other, and that it was unworthy of trust.³ Parmenides⁴ had denied that there was any such thing as rest, either of place or color: Zeno maintained change of motion, to be impossible and self-contradictory; and pointed out many logical difficulties, derived from the infinite divisibility of matter, against some of the most obvious affirmations of sensible phenomena. Melissus appears to have argued in a manner similar to that of Zeno, though with much less acuteness, by demonstrating indirectly the doctrine of Parmenides, by deducing possible inferences from the contrary hypothesis.⁵

¹ Plato, *Parmenidês*, p. 128, B. οὐ μὲν (Parmenidês) γὰρ ἐμασιν ἐν φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχεις καλῶς ἰ

² See the remarkable passage in the *Parmenidês* of Plato, p.

³ Ἐστὶ δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῶδειν, ὡς εἰ ἐν ἔστι, πολλὴ συμβαίνει πᾶσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐνάντια αὐτῷ. Ἀντιλέγει δὴ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι πλεῖον, τοῦτο βουλούμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἐτι γελοιότερα ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις—ἢ εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶν—ἢ ἢ τοῖς εἰ τις ἰκανῶς ἐπεξίει.

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, c. 44, p. 261, D. See the citations in *Bruder Gr. Röm. Philosophie*, part i, p. 417, *seq.*

⁵ *Parmenid.* *Fragm.* v, 101, ed. Mullach.

⁶ See the *Fragments of Melissus* collected by Mullach, in *h* cited in a previous note, p. 81, *seq.*

Zeno published a treatise to maintain the thesis above described, which he also upheld by personal conversations and discussions, in a manner doubtless far more efficacious than his writing; the oral teaching of these early philosophers being their really impressive manifestation. His subtle dialectic arguments were not only sufficient to occupy all the philosophers of antiquity, in confuting them more or less successfully, but have even descended to modern times as a fire not yet extinguished.¹ The great effect produced among the speculative minds of Greece by his writing and conversation, is attested both by Plato and Aristotle. He visited Athens, gave instruction to some eminent Athenians, for high pay, and is said to have conversed both with Periklēs and with Sokratēs, at a time when the latter was very young; probably between 450–440 B.C.²

¹ The reader will see this in Bayle's Dictionary, article, Zeno of Elea.

Simplicius (in his commentary on Aristot. Physic. p. 255) says that Zeno first composed written dialogues, which cannot be believed without more certain evidence. He also particularizes a puzzling question addressed by Zeno to Protagoras. See Brandis, *Gesch. der Griech. Röm. Philos.* i, p. 409. Zeno *ἰδίον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξέθετο* (sc. *περὶ τῶν πάντων*), *διηπόρησε δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλείον*. Plutarch. ap. Eusebium, *Præpar. Evangel.* i, 23, D.

² Compare Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 3; Plato, *Parmenidēs*, pp. 126, 127; Plato, *Alkibiad.* i, ch. 14, p. 119, A.

That Sokratēs had in his youth conversed with Parmenidēs, when the latter was an old man, is stated by Plato more than once, over and above his dialogue called *Parmenidēs*, which professes to give a conversation between the two, as well as with Zeno. I agree with Mr. Fynes Clinton, Brandis, and Karsten, in thinking that this is better evidence, about the date of Parmenidēs than any of the vague indications which appear to contradict it, in Diogenes Laërtius and elsewhere. But it will be hardly proper to place the conversation between Parmenidēs and Sokratēs — as Mr. Clinton places it, *Fast. H.* vol. ii, App. c. 21, p. 364 — at a time when Sokratēs was only fifteen years of age. The ideas which the ancients had about youthful propriety, would not permit him to take part in conversation with an eminent philosopher at so early an age as fifteen, when he would not yet be entered on the roll of citizens, or be qualified for the smallest function, military or civil. I cannot but think that Sokratēs must have been more than twenty years of age when he thus conversed with Parmenidēs.

Sokratēs was born in 469 B.C. (perhaps 468 B.C.); he would therefore be twenty years of age in 449: assuming the visit of Parmenidēs to Athens to have been in 448 B.C., since he was then sixty-five years of age, he would be born in 513 B.C. It is objected that, if this date be admitted, Parmenidēs

His appearance constitutes a remarkable era in Grecian philosophy, because he first brought out the extraordinary aggressive negative force of the dialectic method. In this disconcerting the One and the Many, positive grounds on either side were alike scanty: each party had to set forth the conclusions deducible from the opposite hypothesis, and Zeno proved to show that those of his opponents were the more flagrant. Thus we see that, along with the methodized question and answer, the dialectic method, employed from henceforward more and more in philosophical inquiries, comes out at the same time the tendency, the probing, testing, and scrutinizing force, of speculation. The negative side of Grecian speculation is quite as prominently marked, and occupies as large a measure of the intellectual force of their philosophers, as the positive. It is not simply to arrive at a conclusion, sustained by the measure of plausible premise,—and then to proclaim an authoritative dogma, silencing or disparaging all objections. Grecian speculation aspires. To unmask not only positive error, but even affirmation without evidence, exaggeration in what was only doubtful, and show of knowledge of the reality; to look at a problem on all sides, and set forth the difficulties attending its solution; to take account of the negative as well as the affirmative evidence, even in the case of conclusions accepted as true upon the balance, all this will be found in the march of their greatest thinkers. As a condition of progressive philosophy, it is not less essential that the ground of negation should be freely exposed, than the grounds of affirmation. We shall find the two going hand in hand, and in the same vein, indeed, the more impressive and characteristic of the two, from Zeno downwards in our history. In one of the memoranda illustrative of Grecian dialectics,—the scene in which Plato represents Parmenidès and Zeno as bringing their mantle to the youthful Sokratès, and giving him the opportunity for successfully prosecuting those researches which his inquisitive impulse promised,—this large and com-

could not have been a pupil of Xenophanès: we should thus be obliged to admit, which perhaps is the truth, that he learned the doctrine of Xenophanès at second-hand.

point of view is emphatically inculcated. He is admonished to set before him both sides of every hypothesis, and to follow out both the negative and the affirmative chains of argument with equal perseverance and equal freedom of scrutiny; neither daunted by the adverse opinions around him, nor deterred by sneers against wasting time in fruitless talk; since the multitude are ignorant that without thus travelling round all sides of a question, no assured comprehension of the truth is attainable.¹

We thus find ourselves, from the year 450 B.C., downwards, in presence of two important classes of men in Greece, unknown to Solon or even to Kleisthenês, the Rhetoricians, and the Dialecticians; for whom, as has been shown, the ground had been gradually prepared by the politics, the poetry, and the speculation, of the preceding period.

Both these two novelties — like the poetry and other accomplishments of this memorable race — grew up from rude indigenous beginnings, under native stimulus unborrowed and unassisted from without. The rhetorical teaching was an attempt to assist and improve men in the power of continuous speech as addressed to assembled numbers, such as the public assembly or the *dikastery*; it was therefore a species of training sought for by men of active pursuits and ambition, either that they might succeed in public life, or that they might maintain their rights and dignity

¹ Plato, *Parmenid*, pp. 135, 136.

Parmenidês speaks to *Sokratês*: Καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἰσθί, ἡ ὁρμὴ, ἣν ὁρμῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γυμνᾶσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἐτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι (τὸν Σωκράτη), ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; Οὗτος, εἰπεῖν (τὸν Παρμενίδην) ὅνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος.....Χρὴ δὲ καὶ τότε ἐτι πρὸς τοῦτω σκοπεῖν, μὴ μόνον, εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ὑποτιθέμενον, σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως—ἀλλὰ καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτό, ὑποτίθεσθαι—εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι..... Ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. See also Plato's *Kratylus*, p. 428, E, about the necessity of the investigator looking both before and behind—ἀμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω.

See also the *Parmenidês*, p. 130, E,—in which *Sokratês* is warned respecting the *ἑνθρόπων δόξας*, against enslaving himself to the opinions of men—compare Plato, *Sophistes*, p. 227, B. C.

if called before the court of justice. On the other dialectic business had no direct reference to public judicial pleading, or to any assembled large number. dialogue carried on by two disputants, usually before hearers, to unravel some obscurity, to reduce the resistance and contradiction, to exercise both parties in the subject, or to sift the consequences of some previous assumption. It was spontaneous conversation¹ system turned into some predetermined channel; furnishing to thought, and a means of improvement not attainable in other manner; furnishing to some, also, a source of display. It opened a line of serious intellectual pursuit of a speculative or inquisitive turn, who were deficient in boldness, in continuous memory, for public speaking desired to keep themselves apart from the political animosities of the moment.

Although there were numerous Athenians, who in various proportions, speculative with practical study, generally speaking, the two veins of intellectual movement towards active public business, the other towards entertainments and greater command of speculative truth, with its — continued simultaneous and separate. There subsisted among them a standing polemical controversy and a spirit of detraction. If Plato despised the sophists and Isokratês thinks himself not less entitled to disparage those who employed their time in debating upon the unity or plurality of virtue.² Even among different teachers, in the same school, also, there prevailed but too often an acrimony of personal rivalry, which laid them all so much the

¹ See Aristotel. *De Sophist. Elenchis*, c. 11, p. 172, ed. Bekker. *Topica*, ix, 5, p. 154; where the different purposes of dialogues are stated and distinguished.

² See Isokratês, *Orat. x*; *Helene's Encomium*, sects. 2-7; c. xv, *De Permutatione*, of the same author, s. 90.

I hold it for certain, that the first of these passages is a criticism upon the Platonic dialogues (as in *Or. v*; and probably the second passage also. Isokratês, evidently a cautious man, avoids mentioning the names of contemporaries, that he may avoid the less animosity.

to assault from the common enemy of all mental progress; a feeling of jealous ignorance, stationary or wistfully retrospective, of no mean force at Athens, as in every other society, and of course blended at Athens with the indigénous democratical sentiment. This latter sentiment¹ of antipathy to new ideas, and new mental accomplishments, has been raised into factitious importance by the comic genius of Aristophanês, whose point of view modern authors have too often accepted; thus allowing some of the worst feelings of Grecian antiquity to influence their manner of conceiving the facts. Moreover, they have rarely made any allowance for that force of literary and philosophical antipathy, which was no less real and constant at Athens than the political; and which made the different literary classes or individuals perpetually unjust one towards another.² It was the blessing and the glory of Athens, that every man could speak out his sentiments and his criticisms with a freedom unparalleled in the ancient world, and hardly paralleled even in the modern, in which a vast body of dissent both is, and always has been, condemned to absolute silence. But this known latitude of censure ought to have imposed on modern authors a peremptory

¹ Isokratês alludes much to this sentiment, and to the men who looked upon gymnastic training with greater favor than upon philosophy, in the *Orat. xv, De Permutatione*, s. 267, *et seq.* A large portion of this oration is in fact a reply to accusations, the same as those preferred against mental cultivation by the Δίκαιος Λόγος in the *Nubes* of Aristophanês, 947, *seq.*; favorite topics in the mouths of the pugilists "with smashed ears." (Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 71, p. 515, E; τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεργότων.)

² There is but too much evidence of the abundance of such jealousies and antipathies during the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Isokrates; see *Stahr's Aristotelia*, ch. iii, vol. i, pp. 37, 68.

Aristotle was extremely jealous of the success of Isokratês, and was himself much assailed by pupils of the latter, Kephisodôrus and others, as well as by Dikæarchus, Eubulidês, and a numerous host of writers in the same tone: στρατὸν ὅλον τῶν ἐπιθεμένων Ἀριστοτέλει; see the *Fragments* of Dikæarchus, vol. ii, p. 225, ed. Didot. "De ingenio ejus (observes Cicero, in reference to Epicurus, de *Finibus*, ii, 25, 80) in his disputationibus, non de moribus, quaeritur. Sit ista in Græcorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate dissentiunt." This is a taint no way peculiar to *Grecian* philosophical controversy; but it has nowhere been more infectious than among the Greeks, and modern *sto-*
rians cannot be too much on their guard against it.

necessity of not accepting implicitly the censure of where the party inculpated has left no defence; at least, of construing the censure strictly, and allowing point of view from which it proceeds. From inattention, almost all the things and persons of Greece are presented to us on their bad side; the libels of Aristotle, the sneers of Plato and Xenophon, even the interestings of a plaintiff or defendant before the dikastery, as with little cross-examination as authentic materials for

If ever there was need to invoke this rare sentiment it is when we come to discuss the history of the persophists, who now for the first time appear as of note; cal teachers of Athens and of Greece, misconceived misesteemed.

The primitive education at Athens consisted of two gymnastics, for the body; music, for the mind. The is not to be judged according to the limited significance now bears. It comprehended, from the beginning, appertaining to the province of the Nine Muses; learning the use of the lyre, or how to bear part in a also the hearing, learning, and repeating, of poetical tions, as well as the practice of exact and elegant pronunciation, which latter accomplishment, in a language like the C long words, measured syllables, and great diversity of tion between one word and another, must have been difficult to acquire than it is in any modern European. As the range of ideas enlarged, so the words *music* as teachers acquired an expanded meaning, so as to c matter of instruction at once ampler and more diversifying the middle of the fifth century B.C., at Athens, there to be found, among the musical teachers, men of the distinguished abilities and eminence; masters of all the accomplishments of the age, teaching what was known of astronomy, geography, and physics, and capable of holding discussions with their pupils, upon all the various problems afloat among intellectual men. Of this character were Agathoklès, Pythokleidès, Damon, etc. The two last instructors of Periklès; and Damon was even rendered famous at Athens, partly by his large and free speculation

through the political enemies of his great pupil, that he was ostracized, or at least sentenced to banishment.¹ Such men were competent companions for Anaxagoras and Zeno, and employed in part on the same studies; the field of acquired knowledge being not then large enough to be divided into separate, exclusive compartments. While Euripidēs frequented the company, and acquainted himself with the opinions, of Anaxagoras, Ion of Chios, his rival as a tragic poet, as well as the friend of Kimon, bestowed so much thought upon physical subjects, as then conceived, that he set up a theory of his own, propounding the doctrine of three elements in nature; ² air, fire, and earth.

[Now such musical teachers as Damon and the others above mentioned, were sophists, not merely in the natural and proper Greek sense of that word, but, to a certain extent, even in the special and restricted meaning which Plato afterwards thought proper to confer upon it.³ A sophist, in the genuine sense of the word, was a wise man, a clever man; one who stood prominently before the public as distinguished for intellect or talent of some kind. Thus Solon and Pythagoras are both called sophists;

¹ See Plato (Protagoras, c. 8, p. 316, D.; Laches, c. 3, p. 180, D.; Menæxenus, c. 3, p. 236, A; Alkibiad. i, c. 14, p. 118, C); Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 4. Periklēs had gone through dialectic practice in his youth (Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 46).

² Isokratēs, Or. xv, De Permutat. sect. 287.

Compare Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie, part i, sect. 48, p. 196.

³ Isokratēs calls both Anaxagoras and Damon, sophists (Or. xv, De Perm. sect. 251); Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 4. 'Ο δὲ Δάμων ἔσκεν, ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστής, καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα, ἐπικρυπτόμενος πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς τὴν δεινότητα.

So Protagoras too (in the speech put into his mouth by Plato, Protag. c. 8, p. 316) says, very truly, that there had been sophists from the earliest times of Greece. But he says also, what Plutarch says in the citation just above, that these earlier men refused, intentionally and deliberately, to call themselves sophists, for fear of the odium attached to the name; and that he, Protagoras, was the first person to call himself openly a sophist.

The denomination by which a man is known, however, seldom depends upon himself, but upon the general public, and upon his critics, friendly or hostile. The unfriendly spirit of Plato did much more to attach the title of sophists specially to these teachers, than any assumption of their own.

Thamyras the skilful bard, is called a sophist:¹ Sokratês denominated, not merely by Aristophanês, but by Æschylus; Aristotle himself calls Aristippus, and Xenophon calls Anaxagoras, both of them disciples of Sokratês, by that name:² Xenophon, in describing a collection of instructive books, calls the writings of the old poets and sophists," meaning by the word prose-writers generally: Plato is alluded to as a sophist even by Isokratês:³ Isokratês himself was harshly criticised as a sophist, and defends both himself and his profession. Timon, the friend and admirer of Pyrrho, about 300 B.C., who bitterly satirized all the philosophers, designated them as sophists, including Plato and Aristotle, by the general name of sophists.

¹ Herodot. i, 29; ii, 49; iv, 95. Diogenês of Apollonia, contem-
porary of Herodotus, called the Ionic philosophers or physiologists by
sophists: see Brandis, Geschich. der Griech. Röm. Philosoph. c.
O. About Thamyras, see Welcker, Griech. Tragöd., Sophoklès,
Εἰτ' οὖν σοφιστῆς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυον, etc.

The comic poet Kratinus called all the poets, including Homer, sophists, σοφισταί: see the Fragments of his drama Ἀρχιλοχοί in
Fragm. Comicor. Græcor. vol. ii, p. 16.

² Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 34. Æschinês calls Demosthenes a
sophist, c. 27.

We see plainly from the terms in Plato's Politicus, c. 30, μετα-
ωρολόγον, ἀδόλεσχόν τινα σοφιστήν, that both Sokratês and
himself were designated as sophists by the Athenian public.

³ Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii, 2, p. 996; Xenophon, Sympos. iv,

Aristippus is said to have been the first of the disciples of Sokratês
who took money for instruction (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 65).

⁴ Xenoph. Memor. iv, 2, 1. γράμματα πολλά συνειλεγμένον ποιῶν
σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκίμωνάτων.

The word σοφιστῶν is here used just in the same sense as τοῦ
τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὗς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίῳ
etc. (Memor. i, 6, 14.) It is used in a different sense in another
place (L. 11), to signify teachers who gave instruction on physical and
mathematical subjects, which Sokratês and Xenophon both disapproved.

⁵ Isokratês, Orat. v, ad Philipp. sect. 14: see Heindorf's note on
Enthydemus of Plato, p. 305, C. sect. 79.

⁶ Diogen. Laërt. ix, 65. Ἐσπετε νῦν μοι, ὅσοι πολυπράγμονες
σοφισταί (Diogen. Laërt. viii, 74).

Demetrius of Troezen numbered Empedoklès as a sophist.
He speaks of Empedoklès, Ion, Alkmæon, Parmenidès, Melissus, (as
οἱ παλαιοὶ σοφισταί; all as having taught different περιττολὰ
the elements of the physical world (Isok. de Permut. sect. 288).

In this large and comprehensive sense the word was originally used, and always continued to be so understood among the general public. But along with this idea, the title sophist also carried with it or connoted a certain invidious feeling. The natural temper of a people generally ignorant towards superior intellect, — the same temper which led to those charges of magic so frequent in the Middle Ages, — appears to be a union of admiration with something of an unfavorable sentiment; ¹ dislike, or apprehension, as the case may be, unless where the latter element has become neutralized by habitual respect for an established profession or station: at any rate, the unfriendly sentiment is so often intended, that a substantive word, in which it is implied without the necessity of any annexed predicate, is soon found convenient. Timon, who hated the philosophers, thus found the word sophist exactly suitable, in sentiment as well as meaning, to his purpose in addressing them.

Now when (in the period succeeding 450 B.C.) the rhetorical and musical teachers came to stand before the public at Athens in such increased eminence, they of course, as well as other men intellectually celebrated, became designated by the appropriate name of sophists. But there was one characteristic peculiar to themselves, whereby they drew upon themselves a double measure of that invidious sentiment which lay wrapped up in the name. They taught for pay: of course, therefore, the most eminent among them taught only the rich, and earned large sums; a fact naturally provocative of envy, to some extent, among the many who benefited nothing by them, but still more among the inferior members of their own profession. But even great minds, like Sokratēs and Plato, though much superior to any such envy, cherished in that age a genuine and vehement repugnance against receiving pay for teaching. We read in Xen-

¹ Eurip. Med. 289: —

Χρὴ δ' οὐποθ' ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ,
 Παιδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι σοφούς.
 Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης, ἣς ἔχουσιν, ἀργίας,
 Φθόνον πρὸς ἑστέων ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῇ.

The words ὁ περισσῶς σοφός seem to convey the same unfriendly sentiment as the word σοφιστής.

sophon,¹ that Sokratēs considered such a bargain as not less than servitude, robbing the teacher of all free choice as to whether he should accept or proceed; and that he assimilated the relation of teacher and pupil to that between two lovers or two friends; which was thoroughly dishonored, robbed of its reciprocity, and prevented from bringing about its legitimate reward of attachment and devotion, by the intervention of payment. However little in harmony with modern ideas was the conscientious sentiment of Sokratēs and Plato, they therefore considered the name sophists, denoting intelligence and celebrity combined with an odious association, as preëminently suitable to the leading teachers for pay. The splendid example of Sokratēs, and the reiterated polemics, of Plato stamped it upon the men against whom he wrote as if it were their recognized, legitimate, and peculiar designation: it is certain, that if, in the middle of the Peloponnesian War, an Athenian had been asked, "Who are the principal sophists of your city?" he would have named Sokratēs among the first.

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 6. In another passage, the sophist Antiphanes, whether this is the celebrated Antiphan of the deme Bhamnus, is described as conversing with Sokratēs, and saying that Sokratēs of course must imagine his oration to be worth nothing, since he asked no price from his scholars; to which Sokratēs replies:—

Ὁ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται, τὴν ὄραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν καλὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν, διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. Τὴν τε γὰρ ὄραν, ἀργυρίου πωλὴ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν· ἐὰν δέ τις καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὦντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἐαυτῷ ποιῇται, σώζει. Καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνοισι ἀποκαλοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ ἀνὴρ γνῶν εὐφραδὲς ὦντα, διδάσκων δὲ, τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθόν, φίλον ποιεῖται νομίζομεν, ὃ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 13).

As an evidence of the manners and sentiment of the age, this is extremely remarkable. Various parts of the oration of Æschines against Timarchus, and the Symposium of Plato, pp. 217, 218, both give light to it.

Among the numerous passages in which Plato expresses his contempt of teaching for money, see his Sophistes, c. 9, p. 230; he indeed, thought that it was unworthy of a virtuous man to accept the discharge of any public duty: see the Republic, i, 19, p. 34.

Sokratês was at once eminent as an intellectual teacher and personally unpopular, not because he received pay, but on other grounds, which will be hereafter noticed: and this was the precise combination of qualities which the general public naturally expressed by a sophist. Moreover, Plato not only stole the name out of general circulation, in order to fasten it specially upon his opponents, the paid teachers, but also connected with it express discreditable attributes, which formed no part of its primitive and recognized meaning, and were altogether distinct from, though grafted upon, the vague sentiment of dislike associated with it. Aristotle, following the example of his master, gave to the word sophist a definition substantially the same as that which it bears in the modern languages: ¹ "an impostrous pretender to knowledge; a man who employs what he knows to be fallacy, for the purpose of deceit and of getting money." And he did this at a time when he himself, with his estimable contemporary Isokratês, were considered at Athens to come under the designation of sophists, and were called so by every one who disliked either their profession or their persons.²

Great thinkers and writers, like Plato and Aristotle, have full right to define and employ words in a sense of their own, provided they give due notice. But it is essential that the reader

¹ Aristot. Rhetoric. i, 1, 4; where he explains the sophist to be a person who has the same powers as the dialectician, but abuses them for a bad purpose: *ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει...* 'Εκεῖ δὲ, σοφιστὴς μὲν, κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. Again, in the first chapter of the treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis: *ὁ σοφιστὴς, χρηματιστὴς ὑπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίας, etc.*

² Respecting Isokratês, see his Orat. xv, De Permutatione, wherein it is evident that he was not only ranked as a sophist by others, but also considered himself as such, though the appellation was one which he did not like. He considers himself as such, as well as Gorgias: *οἱ καλούμενοι σοφισταί;* sects. 166, 169, 213, 231.

Respecting Aristotle, we have only to read not merely the passage of Timon cited in a previous note, but also the bitter slander of Timæus (Frag. 70. ed. Didot, Polybius, xii, 8), who called him *σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ πολυτίμητον λατρεῖον ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλεικότα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτὸν καὶ σκῆνην ἐμπεπηδῶκότα πρὸς δὲ, γαστρίμα γγον, ὑφαρτέτην, ἐπὶ στόμα φερόμενον ἐν πᾶσι.*

should keep in mind the consequences of such change mistake a word used in a new sense for a new fact or person. The age with which we are now dealing, the last of the fifth century B.C., is commonly distinguished in the history of philosophy as the age of Sokratês and the sophists; the sophists are spoken of as a new class of men, or some new language which implies a new doctrinal sect, or school, and which then sprang up in Greece for the first time; ostentatious in their manners, flattering and duping the rich youth for their own personal gain, undermining the morality of Athens, public and private, by encouraging their pupils to the unscrupulous prosecution of their ambition and cupidity. They are even affirmed to have succeeded in corrupting the general morality, so that Athens had become miserably degenerated and vicious in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, as compared with what she was in the days of Miltiadês and Aristeidês. Sokratês, on the contrary, is usually described as a holy man combating and exposing the false prophets, standing up as the champion of morality against their insidious artifices.¹ Now though the appearance of Sokratês was so very original as Sokratês was a new fact of unusual importance, the appearance of the sophists was not so; what was new was the peculiar use of an old word, which he took out of its usual meaning, and fastened upon the eminent teachers of the Sokratic age.

The paid teachers, with whom, under the name of Sophists, he brings Sokratês into controversy, were Protagoras of Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Agrigentum, and Hippias of Elis, Prodikus of Keos, Thrasymachus of Chalkêdôn, and Dionysodôrus of Chios; to whom Xenophanes, Antiphon of Athens. These men — whom modern writers look down as the sophists, and denounce as the moral enemies of their age — were not distinguished in any marked way from their predecessors. Their vocation was to

¹ In the general point of view here described, the sophists are treated by *Ritter*, *Geschichte der Griech. Philosophie*, vol. i, book vi, ch. 577, *seq.*, 629, *seq.*; by *Brandis*, *Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos.* sec. lxxxvii, vol. i, p. 516, *seq.*; by *Zeller*, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. i, p. 69, 165, etc.; and, indeed, by almost all who treat of the sophists.

youth for the duties, the pursuits, and the successes, of active life, both private and public. Others had done this before; but these teachers brought to the task a larger range of knowledge with a greater multiplicity of scientific and other topics; not only more impressive powers of composition and speech, serving as a personal example to the pupil, but also a comprehension of the elements of good speaking, so as to be able to give him precepts conducive to that accomplishment;¹ a considerable treasure of accumulated thought on moral and political subjects, calculated to make their conversation very instructive, and discourse ready prepared, on general heads or *common places*, for their pupils to learn by heart.² But this, though a very important extension, was nothing more than an extension, differing merely in degree of that which Damon and others had done before them. It arose from the increased demand which had grown up among the Athenian youth, for a larger measure of education and other accomplishments; from an elevation in the standard of what was required from every man who aspired to occupy a place in the eyes of his fellow-citizens. Protagoras, Gorgias, and the rest, supplied this demand with an ability and success unknown before their time; hence they gained a distinction such as none of their predecessors had attained, were prized all over Greece, travelled from city to city with general admiration, and obtained considerable pay. While such success, among men personally strangers to them, attests unequivocally their talent and personal dignity, of course it also laid them open to increased jealousy, as well from inferior teachers as from the lovers of ignorance generally: such jealousy manifesting itself, as I have before explained, by a greater readiness to stamp them with the obnoxious title of sophists.

The hostility of Plato against these teachers, — for it is he, and not Sokratês, who was peculiarly hostile to them, as may be seen by the absence of any such marked antithesis in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, — may be explained without at all supposing in them that corruption which modern writers have been so ready not only to admit but to magnify. It arose from

¹ Compare Isokratês, Orat. xiii, cont. Sophistas, sects. 12-21.

² Aristot. Sophist. Elench. c. 33; Cicero, Brut. c. 12.

the radical difference between his point of view and that of the Sophists. Plato was a great reformer and theorist; they undertook to educate young men for doing themselves credit, and rendering credit to others, in active Athenian life. Not only is there room for the concurrent operation of both these veins of thought and action in every progressive society, but the intellectual output of any society can never be complete without the one as well as the other. It was the glory of Athens that both were there. Plato was equally represented, at the period which we have now reached. Whoever peruses Plato's immortal work, "The Republic," will see that he dissented from society, both democratical and aristocratical, on some of the most fundamental points of public and private morality; and throughout most of his dialogues, his quarrel is not less with the statesmen, past as well as present, than with the paid teachers of Athens. Besides this, he had a desire for radical reform of the state, on principles of justice quite distinct from every recognized political party or creed, and he was also unrivalled as a speculative genius and as a dialectician. Both of which capacities he put forth, to amplify and illustrate his ethical theory and method first struck out by Sokrates, and then as to establish comprehensive generalities of his own.

Now his reforming, as well as his theorizing tendency, brought him into polemical controversy with all the practical agents by whom the business of practical life at Athens was carried on. In so far as Protagoras or Gorgias taught in the language of theory, they were doubtless much inferior to Plato, nor would their doctrines be likely to hold against his dialectics. But it was neither their duty, nor their engagement, to reform the state, or discover and vindicate the best theory of ethics. They professed to qualify young Athenians for a successful and honorable life, private as well as public, *in Athens*, or in any other given city; they taught them "to think, speak, and act wisely, *in Athens*"; they of course accepted, as the basis of their teaching, that type of character which estimable men exhibited and which the public approved, *in Athens*; not undertaking to create a new type, but to arm it with new capacities and adorn it with new accomplishments. Their direct business was with ethics, not with ethical theory; all that was required of them, in the latter, was, that their theory should be sufficiently sound.

to such practical precepts as were accounted virtuous by the most estimable society in *Athenæ*. It ought never to be forgotten, that those who taught for active life were bound, by the very conditions of their profession, to adapt themselves to the place and the society as it stood. With the theorist Plato, not only there was no such obligation, but the grandeur and instructiveness of his speculations were realized only by his departing from it, and placing himself on a loftier pinnacle of vision; and he himself not only admits, but even exaggerates, the unfitness and repugnance of men, taught in his school, for practical life and duties.

To understand the essential difference between the practical and the theoretical point of view, we need only look to *Isokratês*, the pupil of *Gorgias*, and himself a sophist. Though not a man of commanding abilities, *Isokratês* was one of the most estimable men of Grecian antiquity. He taught for money; and taught young men to "think, speak, and act," all with a view to an honorable life of active citizenship; not concealing his marked disparagement² of speculative study and debate, such as the dialogues

¹ See a striking passage in Plato, *Theætet.* c. 24, pp. 173, 174.

² *Isokratês*, *Orat.* v (ad. Philip.), sect. 14; *Orat.* x (*Enc. Hel.*), sect. 2; *Orat.* xiii (adv. Sophist.), sect. 9 (compare Heindorf's note ad *Platon. Euthydem.* sect. 79); *Orat.* xii (*Panath.*), sect. 126; *Orat.* xv (*Perm.*), sect. 90.

Isokratês, in the beginning of his *Orat.* x, *Encom. Helenæ*, censures all the speculative teachers; first, *Antisthenês* and Plato (without naming them, but identifying them sufficiently by their doctrines; next, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Melissus*, *Zeno*, etc., by name, as having wasted their time and teaching on fruitless paradox and controversy. He insists upon the necessity of teaching with a view to political life and to the course of actual public events, abandoning these useless studies (sect. 6).

It is remarkable that what *Isokratês* recommends is just what *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* are represented as actually doing — each doubtless in his own way — in the dialogues of Plato, who censures them for being too practical; while *Isokratês*, commenting on them from various publications which they left, treats them only as teachers of useless speculations.

In the *Oration De Permutatione*, composed when he was eighty-two years of age (sect. 10, the orations above cited are earlier compositions, especially *Orat.* xiii, against the sophists, see sect. 206), *Isokratês* stands upon the defensive, and vindicates his profession against manifold aspersions. It is a most interesting oration, as a defence of the educators of Athens generally, and would serve perfectly well as a vindication of the teaching of *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Hippias*, etc., against the reproaches of Plato.

of Plato and the dialectic exercises generally. He def profession much in the same way as his master Gorgias, tagoras, would have defended it, if we had before us vind from their pens. Isokratês at Athens, and Quintilian, equally estimable at Rome, are, in their general type of cl and professional duty, the fair counterpart of those who arraigns as the sophists.

We know these latter chiefly from the evidence of Pla pronounced enemy; yet even his evidence, when constr didly and taken as a whole, will not be found to jus charges of corrupt and immoral teaching, impostrous pre

This oration should be read, if only to get at the genuine Athen of the word sophists, as distinguished from the technical sense wh and Aristotle fasten upon it. The word is here used in its largest distinguished from *ιδιώταις* (sect. 159): it meant, literary men o phers generally, but especially the professional teachers: it carried, an obnoxious sense, and was therefore used as little as possible selves; as much as possible by those who disliked them.

Isokratês, though he does not willingly call himself by this u name, yet is obliged to acknowledge himself unreservedly as one c fession, in the same category as Gorgias (sects. 165, 179, 211, 213, and defends the general body as well as himself; distinguishing l course from the bad members of the profession, those who preter sophists, but devoted themselves to something different in reality (

This professional teaching, and the teachers, are signified indisc by these words: *οἱ σοφισταί — οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διατρίβοι φιλοσοφίαν ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένην* (sects. 44, 157, 159, 179, 211, 21 ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία — ἡ τῶν λόγων μελέτη — ἡ φιλοσοφία — ἡ τῆς ἀσκήσεις — τῆς ἐμῆς, εἴτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμει, εἴτε φιλοσοφία τριβῆς (sects. 53, 187, 189, 193, 196). All these expressions mean process of training; that is, general mental training as opposed (sects. 194, 199), and intended to cultivate the powers of thoug and action: *πρὸς τὸ λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν — τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ λ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν* (sects. 221, 261, 285, 296, 330).

Isokratês does not admit any such distinction between the p and dialectician on the one side, and the sophist on the othe and Aristotle contend for. He does not like dialectical exerci admits them to be useful for youth, as a part of intellectual traini dition that all such speculations shall be dropped, when the youth active life (sects. 280, 287).

This is the same language as that of Kalliklês in the Gorgi c. 40, p. 484.

knowledge, etc., which the modern historians pour forth in loud chorus against them. I know few characters in history who have been so hardly dealt with as these so-called sophists. They bear the penalty of their name, in its modern sense; a misleading association, from which few modern writers take pains to emancipate either themselves or their readers, though the English or French word sophist is absolutely inapplicable to Protagoras or Gorgias, who ought to be called rather "professors, or public teachers." It is really surprising to read the expositions prefixed by learned men like Stallbaum and others, to the Platonic dialogues entitled Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydēmus, Theætētus, etc., where Plato introduces Sokratēs either in personal controversy with one or other of these sophists, or as canvassing their opinions. We continually read from the pen of the expositor, such remarks as these: "Mark, how Plato puts down the shallow and worthless sophist;" the obvious reflection, that it is Plato himself who plays both games on the chess-board, being altogether overlooked. And again: "This or that argument, placed in the mouth of Sokratēs, is not to be regarded as the real opinion of Plato: he only takes it up and enforces it at this moment, in order to puzzle and humiliate an ostentatious pretender;"¹ a remark which con-

¹ Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon. Protagor. p. 23: "Hoc vero ejus judicio ita utitur Socrates, ut eum dehinc dialecticā subtilitate in summam consilii inopiam conjiciat. Colligit enim inde *satis captiose* rebus ita comparatis justitiam, quippe quæ a sanctitate diversa sit, plane nihil sanctitatis habituram, ac vicissim sanctitati nihil fore commune cum justitiā. Respondet quidem ad hæc Protagoras, justitiam ac sanctitatem non per omnia sibi similes esse, nec tamen etiam prorsus dissimiles videri. Sed etsi *verissima est hæc ejus sententia*, tamen comparatione illā a partibus faciei repetitā, in *fraudem* inductus, et quid sit, in quo omnis virtutis natura contineatur, ignarus, sese ex his difficultatibus adeo non potest expedire," etc.

Again, p. 24: "Itaque Socrates, missā hujus rei disputatione, *repente ad alia progreditur*, scilicet *similibus laqueis hominem deinceps denuo irretiturus*." "Nemini facile obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco, Protagoram *argutis conclusiunculis deludi atque callide eo permoveri*," etc. p. 25: "Quanquam nemo erit, quin videat *callide deludi Protagoram*," etc. p. 34: "Quod si autem ea, quæ in Protagorā *Sophistæ ridendi causâ* e vulgi atque sophistarum ratione disputantur, in Gorgiā ex ipsius philosophi mente et sententiā vel brevius proponuntur vel copiosius disputantur," etc.

Compare similar observations of Stallbaum, in his Prolegom. ad Theætet. pp. 12, 22; ad Menon. p. 16; ad Euthydēmum, pp. 26, 30; ad Lachetem, p. 11; ad Lysidem, pp. 79, 80, 87; ad Hippiam Major. pp. 154-156.

verts Plato into an insincere disputant, and a sophist in modern sense, at the very moment when the commentator is his pure and lofty morality as an antidote against the corruption of Gorgias and Protagoras.

Plato has devoted a long and interesting dialogue in inquiry, What is a sophist?¹ and it is curious to observe the definition which he at last brings out suits Sokratēs intellectually speaking, better than any one else whom Cicero defines the sophist to be one who pursues philosophy for the sake of ostentation or of gain;² which, if it is to be a reproach, will certainly bear hard upon the great body of teachers, who are determined to embrace their profession to discharge its important duties, like other professional men, in prospect either of deriving an income or of making a figure or both, whether they have any peculiar relish for the occupation or not. But modern writers, in describing Protagoras as one who teaches for pay, low purposes, tricks to get money from the rich, terms which lead the reader to believe that there was something in these sophists peculiarly greedy, exorbitant, and that something beyond the mere fact of asking and receiving money for instruction. Now not only there is no proof that any of them were thus dishonest or exorbitant, but in the case of Protagoras his enemy Plato furnishes a proof that he was not so.

"Facile apparet Socratem argutū, quæ verbo φαίμεσθα inest, dīlocutorem (Hippiam Sophistam) in fraudem inducere."...."Illud certo et explorato habemus, non serio sed ridendi vezandique Sop gravissimam illam sententiam in dubitationem vocari, ideoque iis concubefactari, quas quilibet paulo attentior facile intelligat non ad verum, sed ad lūsum jocumque, esse comparatas."

¹ Plato, *Sophistes*, c. 52, p. 268.

² Cicero, *Academ.* iv, 23. Xenophon, at the close of his treatise on Education (c. 13), introduces a sharp censure upon the sophists, with that is specific or distinct. He accuses them of teaching an artifice of words, instead of communicating useful maxims; of serving the purposes of deceit, or for their own profit, and addressing themselves to pupils for pay; while the philosopher gives his lessons to every man, without distinction of persons. This is the same distinction taken by Sokratēs and Plato, between the sophist and the philosopher. compare Xenoph. *De Vectigal.* v, 4.

Platonic dialogue termed *Protagoras*, that sophist is introduced as describing the manner in which he proceeded respecting remuneration from his pupils. "I make no stipulation beforehand: when a pupil parts from me, I ask from him such a sum as I think the time and the circumstances warrant; and I add, that if he deems the demand too great, he has only to make up his own mind what is the amount of improvement which my company has procured to him, and what sum he considers an equivalent for it. I am content to accept the sum so named by himself, only requiring him to go into a temple and make oath that it is his sincere belief."¹ It is not easy to imagine a more dignified way of dealing than this, nor one which more thoroughly attests an honorable reliance on the internal consciousness of the scholar, on the grateful sense of improvement realized, which to every teacher constitutes a reward hardly inferior to the payment that proceeds from it, and which, in the opinion of Sokratês, formed the only legitimate reward. Such is not the way in which the corruptors of mankind go to work.

That which stood most prominent in the teaching of Gorgias and the other sophists, was, that they cultivated and improved the powers of public speaking in their pupils; one of the most essential accomplishments to every Athenian of consideration. For this, too, they have been denounced by Ritter, Brandis, and other learned writers on the history of philosophy, as corrupt and immoral. "Teaching their pupils rhetoric (it has been said), they only enabled them to second unjust designs, to make the worse appear the better reason, and to delude their hearers, by trick and artifice, into false persuasion and show of knowledge without

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 16, p. 328, B. Diogenes Laërtius (ix, 58) says that Protagoras demanded one hundred minæ as pay: little stress is to be laid upon such a statement, nor is it possible that he could have had one fixed rate of pay. The story told by Aulus Gellius (v, 10) about the suit at law between Protagoras and his disciple Euathlus, is at least amusing and ingenious. Compare the story of the rhetor Skopelianus, in Philostratus, *Vit. Sophist.* i, 21, 4.

Isokratês (*Or.* xv, de Perm. sect. 166) affirms that the gains made by Gorgias, or by any of the eminent sophists, had never been very high; that they had been greatly and maliciously exaggerated; that they were very inferior to those of the great dramatic actors (sect. 168).

reality. Rhetoric (argues Plato, in the dialogue called *Protagoras*) is no art whatever, but a mere unscientific knack, enslaving dominant prejudices, and nothing better than an imitation and parody on the true political art." Now though Aristotle, in the Platonic vein, calls this power of making things appear the better reason, "the promise of Protagoras' accusation ought never to be urged as if it bore special weight against the teachers of the Sokratic age. It is an argument against rhetorical teaching generally; against all the most distinguished teachers of pupils for active life, throughout the ancient world from Protagoras, Gorgias, Isokratês, etc., down to Quintilian. Not only does the argument bear equally against all, but it is actually urged against all. Isokratês² and Quintilian both defend themselves against it: Aristotle replies to it in the beginning of his treatise on rhetoric: nor was there ever any man against whom it was pressed with greater bitterness of argument than Sokratês, by Aristophanês, in his comedy of the *Clouds*, as well as by other comic composers. Sokratês complains of his defence before his judges;³ characterizing such ac-

¹ Aristot. Rhetoric. ii, 26. Ritter (p. 582) and Brandis (p. 521) unfairly the evidence of the "Clouds" of Aristophanês, as establishing a charge, and that of corrupt teaching generally, against the *sofists*. If Aristophanês is a witness against any one, he is a witness against Sokratês, who is the person singled out for attack in the *Clouds*. These authors, not admitting Aristophanês as an evidence against whom he *does* attack, nevertheless quote him as an evidence against a like Protagoras and Gorgias, whom he *does not* attack.

² Isokratês, Or. xv, (De Permut.) sect. 16, *vñv δὲ λέγει μὲν (τὸν) ὡς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἡττοὺς λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν*, etc.

Ibid. sect. 32. *πειρᾶται με διαβάλλειν, ὡς διαφθεῖρω τοὺς νεογένην διδασκῶν καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν*, etc.

Again, sects. 59, 65, 95, 98, 187 (where he represents himself, *lil* in his Defence, as vindicating philosophy generally against the charge of corrupting youth), 233, 256.

³ Plato, Sok. Apolog. c. 10, p. 23, D. *τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσόφων πράγματα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν (διδάσκω)*. Compare expression in Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 31. *τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον*, etc.

The same unfairness, in making this point tell against the *sofists* only, is to be found in Westermann, *Geschichte der Griech. Be.* sects. 30, 64.

in their true point of view, as being "the stock reproaches against all who pursue philosophy." They are indeed only one of the manifestations, ever varying in form though the same in spirit, of the antipathy of ignorance against dissenting innovation or superior mental accomplishments; which antipathy, intellectual men themselves, when it happens to make on their side in a controversy, are but too ready to invoke. Considering that we have here the materials of defence, as well as of attack, supplied by Sokratês and Plato, it might have been expected that modern writers would have refrained from employing such an argument to discredit Gorgias or Protagoras; the rather, as they have before their eyes, in all the countries of modern Europe, the profession of lawyers and advocates, who lend their powerful eloquence without distinction to the cause of justice or injustice, and who, far from being regarded as the corrupters of society, are usually looked upon, for that very reason among others, as indispensable auxiliaries to a just administration of law.

Though writing was less the business of these sophists than personal teaching, several of them published treatises. Thrasy-machus and Theodôrus both set forth written precepts on the art of rhetoric;¹ precepts which have not descended to us, but which appear to have been narrow and special, bearing directly upon practice, and relating chiefly to the proper component parts of an oration. To Aristotle, who had attained that large and comprehensive view of the theory of rhetoric which still remains to instruct us in his splendid treatise, the views of Thrasy-machus appeared unimportant, serving to him only as hints and materials. But their effect must have been very different when they first appeared, and when young men were first enabled to analyze the parts of an harangue, to understand the dependence of one upon the other, and call them by their appropriate names; all illustrated, let us recollect, by oral exposition on the part of the master, which was the most impressive portion of the whole.

Prodikus, again, published one or more treatises intended to

¹ See the last chapter of Aristotle *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. He notices these early rhetorical teachers, also, in various parts of the treatise on rhetoric.

Quintilian, however, still thought the precepts of Theodôrus and Thrasy-machus worthy of his attention (*Inst. Orat.* iii, 3).

elucidate the ambiguities of words, and to point out the significations of terms apparently, but not really, &c. For this Plato often ridicules him, and the modern his philosophy generally think it right to adopt the same. Whether the execution of the work was at all adequate for its purpose, we have no means of judging; but assuredly the purpose was one preëminently calculated to aid Grecian and dialecticians; for no man can study their philosophy seeing how lamentably they were hampered by enslaving the popular phraseology, and by inferences founded on verbal analogy. At a time when neither dictionary nor grammar existed, a teacher who took care, even punctilious care, of the meaning of important words of his discourse, must be considered as guiding the minds of his hearers in a salutary direction; salutary, we may add, even to Plato himself, whose calculations would most certainly have been improved by hints from such a monitor.

Protagoras, too, is said to have been the first who invented and gave names to the various modes and forms of analysis, an analysis well calculated to assist his lessons on right thinking; he appears also to have been the first who distinguished the genders of nouns. We hear further of a treatise which was on wrestling, or most probably on gymnastics generally, as a collection of controversial dialogues.² But his most celebrated treatise was one entitled "Truth," seemingly on philosophy generally. Of this treatise, we do not even know the genre or purport. In one of his treatises, he confessed his inability to satisfy himself about the existence of the gods, in these words: "Respecting the gods, I neither know whether they

¹ Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* iii, 4, 10; *Aristot. Rhetor.* iii, 5. See also cited in Preller, *Histor. Philos.* ch. iv, p. 132, note d, who affirms of Protagoras: "alia inani grammaticorum principiorum ostentatione conabatur," which the passages cited do not prove.

² *Isokratēs, Or. x, Encom. Helen.* sect. 3; *Diogen. Laërt.* ix, 1.

³ *Diogen. Laërt.* ix, 51; *Sext. Empir. adv. Math.* ix, 56. *Π. οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, οὐτε εἰ εἰσιν, οὐθ' ὁποῖοι τινές εἰσι· πολλὰ γὰρ εἰδέναι, ἢ τε ἀσέληότης, καὶ βραχύς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.*

I give the words partly from Diogenes, partly from Sextus, as they would be most likely to stand.

what are their attributes: the uncertainty of the subject, the shortness of human life, and many other causes, debar me from this knowledge." That the believing public of Athens were seriously indignant at this passage, and that it caused the author to be threatened with prosecution, and forced to quit Athens, we can perfectly understand; though there seems no sufficient proof of the tale that he was drowned in his outward voyage. But that modern historians of philosophy, who consider the pagan gods to be fictions, and the religion to be repugnant to any reasonable mind, should concur in denouncing Protagoras on this ground as a corrupt man, is to me less intelligible. Xenophanês,¹ and probably many other philosophers, had said the same thing before him. Nor is it easy to see what a superior man was to do, who could not adjust his standard of belief to such fictions; or what he could say, if he said anything, less than the words cited above from Protagoras; which appear, as far as we can appreciate them, standing without the context, to be a brief mention, in modest and circumspect phrases, of the reason why he said nothing about the gods, in a treatise where the reader would expect to find much upon the subject.² Certain it is that in the Platonic dialogue, called "Protagoras," that sophist is introduced speaking about the gods exactly in the manner that any orthodox pagan might naturally adopt.

The other fragment preserved of Protagoras, relates to his view of the cognitive process, and of truth generally. He taught, that "Man is the measure of all things; both of that which exists, and of that which does not exist:" a doctrine canvassed and controverted by Plato, who represents that Protagoras affirmed knowledge to consist in sensation, and considered the sensations of each individual man to be, to him, the

¹ Xenophanês ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii, 49.

² The satirical writer Timon (ap. Sext. Emp. ix, 57), speaking in very respectful terms about Protagoras, notices particularly the guarded language which he used in this sentence about the gods; though this precaution did not enable him to avoid the necessity of flight. Protagoras spoke:—

Πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπεικείης· τὰ μὲν οὐ οἱ
Χραίσμησ', ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπεμαίετο ὄφρα μὴ οὕτως
Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πέτον 'Αἶδα δόη.

It would seem, by the last line, as if Protagoras had survived Sokratês.

on and measure of truth. We know scarce any elucidations or limitations with which Protagoras accompanied his general position: and if even Plato, good means of knowing them, felt it ungenerous to orphan doctrine whose father was recently dead, and longer defend it,¹ much more ought modern authors, with mere scraps of evidence before them, to be careful they heap upon the same doctrine insults much beyond which Plato recognizes. In so far as we can pretend to stand the theory, it was certainly not more incorrect than others then afloat, from the Eleatic school and others; while it had the merit of bringing into force, though in an erroneous manner, the essentially relative of cognition,² relative, not indeed to the sensitive fac-

¹ Plato, *Theætet.* 18, p. 164, E. Οὐτι ἂν, εἰμαι, ὃ φίλε, εἶπερ τοῦ ἑτέρου λόγου ἐξη—ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὁρῶσαν ἡμεῖς προσηλακίζομεν... ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν καί οἱ ἐνεκ' αὐτῶ βοηθεῖν.

This theory of Protagoras is discussed in the dialogue called p. 152, *seq.*, in a long but desultory way.

See Sextus Empiric. *Pyrrhonic. Hypol.* i, 216–219, et *contra* *icos*, vii, 60–64. The explanation which Sextus gives of the Protagorean doctrine, in the former passage, cannot be derived from the Protagoras himself; since he makes use of the word *ἐλη* in the ical sense, which was not adopted until the days of Plato and Aristotle.

It is difficult to make out what Diogenes Laërtius states as tenets of Protagoras, and to reconcile them with the doctrine being the measure of all things," as explained by Plato (*Diogenes* 51, 57).

² Aristotle (in one of the passages of his *Metaphysica*, which cusses the Protagorean doctrine, x, i, p. 1053, B.) says that it comes to nothing more than saying, that man, so far as cognizer, or percipient, is the measure of all things; in other words, sense, or perception, is the measure of all things. This, Aristotle, and of no value, though it sounds like something of Protagoras: *ὁ ἀνθρώπινος φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰς μὴν εἰπὼν ὅτι τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· τοῦτον δ' ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν ἐπιστήμη· ὃ φαμεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν ὑποκειμένων. Οὐδὲν δὲ λέγειται· τι λέγειν.*

It appears to me, that to insist upon the essentially relative cognizable truth, was by no means a trivial or unimportant doctrine; Aristotle pronounces it to be; especially when we compare

but to that reinforced and guided by the other faculties of man, memorial and ratiocinative. And had it been even more incorrect than it really is, there would be no warrant for those imputations which modern authors build upon it, against the morality of Protagoras. No such imputations are countenanced in the discussion which Plato devotes to the doctrine: indeed, if the vindication which he sets forth against himself on behalf of Protagoras be really ascribable to that sophist, it would give an exaggerated importance to the distinction between Good and Evil, into which the distinction between Truth and Falsehood is considered by the Platonic Protagoras as resolvable. The subsequent theories of Plato and Aristotle respecting cognition, were much more systematic and elaborate, the work of men greatly superior in speculative genius to Protagoras: but they would not have been what they were, had not Protagoras, as well as others gone before them, with suggestions more partial and imperfect.

From Gorgias there remains one short essay, preserved in one of the Aristotelian, or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatises,¹ on a metaphysical thesis. He professes to demonstrate that nothing exists that if anything exist, it is unknowable; and granting it even to exist and to be knowable by any one man, he could never communicate it to others. The modern historians of philosophy here prefer the easier task of denouncing the skepticism of the

unmeasured conceptions of the objects and methods of scientific research, which were so common in the days of Protagoras.

Compare *Metaphysic.* iii, 5, pp. 1008, 1009, where it will be seen how many other thinkers of that day carried the same doctrine, seemingly, further than Protagoras.

Protagoras remarked that the observed movements of the heavenly bodies did not coincide with that which the astronomers represented them to be, and to which they applied their mathematical reasonings. This remark was a criticism on the mathematical astronomers of his day — *ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρους* (Aristot. *Metaph.* iii, 2, p. 998, A). We know too little how far his criticism may have been deserved, to assent to the general strictures of Bitter, *Gesch. der Phil.* vol. i, p. 633.

¹ See the treatise entitled *De Melisso, Xenophane. et Gorgia* in Bekker's edition of Aristotle's Works, vol. i, p. 979, *seq.*; also the same treatise, with a good preface and comments, by Mullach, p. 62, *seq.*: compare Sextus *Emp. adv. Mathemat.* vii, 65, 87.

for the duties of an active citizen.¹ Nor must we forget that Sokratês himself discouraged physical speculations even more decidedly than either of them.

If the censures cast upon the alleged skepticism of Gorgias and Protagoras are partly without sufficient warrant, partly without any warrant at all, much more may the same remark be made respecting the graver reproaches heaped upon their teaching on the score of immorality or corruption. It has been common with recent German historians of philosophy to translate from Plato and dress up a fiend called "Die Sophistik," (Sophistic,) whom they assert to have poisoned and demoralized, by corrupt teaching, the Athenian moral character, so that it became degenerate at the end of the Peloponnesian war, compared with what it had been in the time of Miltiadês and Aristeidês.

Now, in the first place, if the abstraction "Die Sophistik" is to have any definite meaning, we ought to have proof that the persons styled sophists had some doctrines, principles, or method, both common to them all and distinguishing them from others. But such a supposition is untrue: there were no such common doctrines, or principles, or method, belonging to them; even the name by which they are known did not belong to them, any more than to Sokratês and others; they had nothing in common except their profession, as paid teachers, qualifying young men "to think, speak, and act," these are the words of Isokratês, and better words it would not be easy to find, with credit to themselves as citizens. Moreover, such community of profession did not at that time imply near so much analogy of character as it does now, when the path of teaching has been beaten into a broad and visible high road, with measured distances and stated intervals: Protagoras and Gorgias found predecessors, indeed, but no binding precedents to copy; so that each struck out more or less a road of his own. And accordingly, we find Plato, in his dialogue called "Protagoras," wherein Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias, are all introduced, imparting a distinct type of character and distinct method to each, not without a strong admixture of reciprocal jealousy between them; while Thrasymachus, in the Republic,

¹ Isokratês De Permutatione, Or. xv, s. 287; Xenoph. Memorab. i, 1, 14.

and Euthydēmus, in the dialogue so called, are again each with colors of his own, different from all the then named. We have not the least reason for presuming they agreed in the opinion of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things;" and we may infer, even from Plato himself, that Protagoras would have opposed the views expressed by Isokrates in the first book of the Republic. It is therefore to predicate anything concerning doctrines, maxims, tendencies, common and peculiar to all the sophists. There is none such; nor has the abstract word, "Die Sophistik," any meaning, except such qualities, whatever they may be, inseparable from the profession or occupation of public teacher. And if, at present, every candid critic would be ashamed of wholesale aspersions on the entire body of professional teachers, much more is such censure unbecoming in reference to ancient sophists, who were distinguished from each other by stronger individual peculiarities.

If, then, it were true that in the interval between 480 and the end of the Peloponnesian war, a great moral deterioration had taken place in Athens and in Greece generally, we should be obliged to search for some other cause than this imaginary one, called sophistic. But — and this is the second point — the charge of fact here alleged is as untrue, as the cause alleged. Athens, at the close of the Peloponnesian war, was not more corrupt than Athens in the days of Miltiadēs and Aristeidēs. If we revert to that earlier period, we shall find that scarcely any of the Athenian people have drawn upon them sharper rebukes — in my judgment, unmerited — than their treatment of the very two statesmen; the condemnation of Miltiadēs, and the ostracism of Aristeidēs. In writing my history of the Peloponnesian war, from finding previous historians disposed to give the credit for public virtue, I have been compelled to counterbalance a body of adverse criticism, imputing to them gross errors and injustice. Thus the contemporaries of Miltiadēs and Aristeidēs, when described as matter of present history, are not in anything but flattering colors; except their valor at Marathon and Salamis, which finds one unanimous voice of encomium. When these same men have become numbered among the recollections and fancies belonging to the past, — when

generation comes to be present, with its appropriate stock of complaint and denunciation,—then it is that men find pleasure in dressing up the virtues of the past, as a count in the indictment against their own contemporaries. Aristophanês,¹ writing during the Peloponnesian war, denounced the Demos of his day as degenerated from the virtue of that Demos which had surrounded Miltiadês and Aristeidês : while Isokratês,² writing as an old man, between 350–340 B.C., complains in like manner of his own time, boasting how much better the state of Athens had been in his youth : which period of his youth fell exactly during the life of Aristophanês, in the last half of the Peloponnesian war.

Such illusions ought to impose on no one without a careful comparison of facts ; and most assuredly that comparison will not bear out the allegation of increased corruption and degeneracy, between the age of Miltiadês and the end of the Peloponnesian war. Throughout the whole of Athenian history, there are no acts which attest so large a measure of virtue and judgment pervading the whole people, as the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nor do I believe that the contemporaries of Miltiadês would have been capable of such heroism ; for that appellation is by no means too large for the case. I doubt whether they would have been competent to the steady self-denial of retaining a large sum in reserve during the time of peace, both prior to the Peloponnesian war and after the Peace of Nikias ; or of keeping back the reserve fund of one thousand talents, while they were forced to pay taxes for the support of the war ; or of acting upon the prudent, yet painfully trying, policy recommended by Periklês, so as to sustain an annual invasion without either going out to fight or purchasing peace by ignominious concessions. If bad acts such as Athens committed during the later years of the war, for example, the massacre of the Melian population, were not done equally by the contemporaries of Miltiadês, this did not arise from any superior humanity or principle on their part, but from the fact that they were not exposed to the like temptation, brought upon them by the possession of imperial power. The condemnation of the six generals

¹ Aristophan. Equit. 1316–1321.

² Isokratês, Or. xv, De Permutation. s. 170.

after the battle of Arginusæ, if we suppose the same their part to have occurred in 490 B.C., would have been more rapidly and more unceremoniously than it was decreed in 406 B.C. For at that earlier date there was no psephism of Kannônus, surrounded by prescriptive *graphê paranomôn*; no such habits of established *dikastrai*; no *dikastery* solemnly sworn, with full notice to defend a time of defence measured by the clock; none of those which a long course of democracy had gradually worked into the public morality of every Athenian, and which, as we saw in the former chapter, interposed a serious barrier to the impulsive moment, though ultimately overthrown by its fiercer and less violent impulse would have sufficed for the same in 490 B.C., when no such barriers existed. Lastly, if we take as a measure of the appreciating sentiment of the Athenians towards a strict and decorous morality in the narrow middle of the Peloponnesian war, we have only to consider the manner in which they dealt with Nikias. I have shown in describing the Sicilian expedition, that the gravest error of the Athenians ever committed, that which shipwrecked their armament at Syracuse and their power at home, arose from an unmeasured esteem for the respectable and pious Nikias, which blinded them to the grossest defects of generalship and conduct. Disastrous as such misjudgment was, it could be taken as a proof that the moral corruption alleged to have begun in their characters, is a mere fiction. Nor let it be supposed that the nerve and resolution which once animated the conduct at Marathon and Salamis, had disappeared in the latter part of the Peloponnesian war. On the contrary, the energy and protracted struggle of Athens, after the irreparable calamity of the Sicilian expedition, forms a worthy parallel to her resistance in the Persian war. Xerxes, and maintained unabated that distinctive attitude which Periklês had set forth as the main foundation of her policy, of never giving way before misfortune.¹ Without an allusion to the armament at Salamis, we may remember the patriotism of the fleet at Samos, which rescued Ath-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 64. γνῶτε δ' ὅνομα μέγιστον αὐτῶν (τὴν πόλιν) πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, διὰ τὸ ταῖς συμφοραῖς μὴ εἶκιν.

Four Hundred, was equally devoted and more intelligent; and that the burst of effort, which sent a subsequent fleet to victory at Arginusæ, was to the full as strenuous.

If, then, we survey the eighty-seven years of Athenian history, between the battle of Marathon and the renovation of the democracy after the Thirty, we shall see no ground for the assertion, so often made, of increased and increasing moral and political corruption. It is my belief that the people had become both morally and politically better, and that their democracy had worked to their improvement. The remark made by Thucydides, on the occasion of the Korkyrean bloodshed,—on the violent and reckless political antipathies, arising out of the confluence of external warfare with internal party-feud,¹—wherever else it may find its application, has no bearing upon Athens: the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty prove the contrary. And while Athens may thus be vindicated on the moral side, it is indisputable that her population had acquired a far larger range of ideas and capacities than they possessed at the time of the battle of Marathon. This, indeed, is the very matter of fact deplored by Aristophanes, and admitted by those writers, who, while denouncing the sophists, connect such enlarged range of ideas with the dissemination of the pretended sophistical poison. In my judgment, not only the charge against the sophists as poisoners, but even the existence of such poison in the Athenian system, deserves nothing less than an emphatic denial.

Let us examine again the names of these professional teachers, beginning with Prodikus, one of the most renowned. Who is there that has not read the well-known fable called "The Choice of Hercules," which is to be found in every book professing to

¹ Thucydides (iii, 82) specifies very distinctly the cause to which he ascribes the bad consequences which he depicts. He makes no allusion to sophists or sophistical teaching; though Brandis (*Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos.* i, p. 518, not. f.) drags in "the sophistical spirit of the statesmen of that time," as if it were the cause of the mischief, and as if it were to be found in the speeches of Thucydides, i, 76, v, 105.

There cannot be a more unwarranted assertion; nor can a learned man like Brandis be ignorant, that such words as "the sophistical spirit," (*Der sophistische Geist*,) are understood by a modern reader in a sense totally different from its true Athenian sense.

collect impressive illustrations of elementary morality does not know that its express purpose is, to kindle the passions of youth in favor of a life of labor for noble objects against a life of indulgence? It was the favorite theme Prodikus lectured, and on which he obtained the large audience.¹ If it be of striking simplicity and effect even to the reader, how much more powerfully must it have worked on the audience for whose belief it was specially adapted, when by the oral expansions of its author! Xenophon would have the Athenian dikasts deal with Sokratês as a corruptor — Isokratês wondered that a portion of the public made a mistake about him, — and I confess my wonder to be that not only Aristophanês,² but even the modern Western Grecian philosophy, should rank Prodikus in the same honorable catalogue. This is the only composition³ remaining of him; indeed, the only composition remaining from any of the sophists, excepting the thesis of Gorgias, above now preserved, not merely as a vindication of Prodikus against reproach, but also as a warning against implicit confidence in the sarcastic remarks of Plato, — which include Prodikus and the other sophists, — and in the doctrines which he put in the mouth of the sophists generally, in order that Sokratês might refute them. The commonest candor would teach us that a polemical writer of dialogue chooses to put indefensible

¹ Xenoph. Memor. ii, 1, 21-34. *Καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὁ περὶ δὲ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται*, etc.

Xenophon here introduces Sokratês himself as bestowing much on the moral teaching of Prodikus.

² See Fragment iii, of the *Ταγηνιστὰι* of Aristophanês, *Memorabilia*. Aristoph. p. 1140.

³ Xenophon gives only the substance of Prodikus's lecture, not the words. But he gives what may be called the whole substance, in that we can appreciate the scope as well as the handling of the author. I may say the same of an extract given (in the *Pseudo-Platonic Dialogues*, c. 7, 8) from a lecture said to have been delivered by Prodikus respecting the miseries of human life, pervading all the various conditions and occupations. It is impossible to make out distinctly, either what really belongs to Prodikus, or what was his scope and purpose in the lecture was really delivered.

into the mouth of the opponent, we ought to be cautious of condemning the latter upon such very dubious proof.

Welcker and other modern authors treat Prodikus as "the most innocent" of the sophists, and except him from the sentence which they pass upon the class generally. Let us see, therefore, what Plato himself says about the rest of them, and first about Protagoras. If it were not the established practice with readers of Plato to condemn Protagoras beforehand, and to put upon every passage relating to him not only a sense as bad as it will bear, but much worse than it will fairly bear, they would probably carry away very different inferences from the Platonic dialogue called by that sophist's name, and in which he is made to bear a chief part. That dialogue is itself enough to prove that Plato did not conceive Protagoras either as a corrupt, or unworthy, or incompetent teacher. The course of the dialogue exhibits him as not master of the theory of ethics, and unable to solve various difficulties with which that theory is expected to grapple; moreover, as no match for Sokratês in dialectics, which Plato considered as the only efficient method of philosophical investigation. In so far, therefore, as imperfect acquaintance with the science or theory upon which rules of art, or the precepts bearing on practice, repose, disqualifies a teacher from giving instruction in such art or practice, to that extent Protagoras is exposed as wanting. And if an expert dialectician, like Plato, had passed Isokratês or Quintilian, or the large majority of teachers past or present, through a similar cross-examination as to the theory of their teaching, an ignorance not less manifest than that of Protagoras would be brought out. The antithesis which Plato sets forth, in so many of his dialogues, between precept or practice, accompanied by full knowledge of the scientific principles from which it must be deduced, if its rectitude be disputed, — and unscientific practice, without any such power of deduction or defence, is one of the most valuable portions of his speculations: he exhausts his genius to render it conspicuous in a thousand indirect ways, and to shame his readers, if possible, into the loftier and more rational walk of thought. But it is one thing to say of a man, that he does not know the theory of what he teaches, or of the way in which he teaches; it is another thing to say, that he actually teaches that which scientific theory would

not prescribe as the best ; it is a third thing, graver than the first, to say that his teaching is not only below the exigencies of the age, but even corrupt and demoralizing. Now of these three things the first is the first only which Plato in his dialogue makes Protagoras affirm : even the second, he neither affirms nor denies ; and as to the third, not only he never glances at it, even to hint at the contrary conclusion. As if sensible that when an eminent man was to be depicted as puzzled and irritated by the dialectics, it was but common fairness to set forth his merits also, Plato gives a fable, and expository harangue from the mouth of Protagoras,¹ upon the question whether man is teachable. This harangue is, in my judgment, very strikingly instructive ; and so it would have been probably acknowledged by commentators had not read it with a preëstablished prejudice that whatever came from the lips of a sophist must be ridiculous or immoral.² It is the only part of the dialogue wherein any account is rendered of the growth of this uncultivated, self-propagating body of opinion, upon which the cross-examining analysis of Sokratês is brought to bear, and which is seen in the following chapter.

Protagoras professes to teach his pupils "good conduct in their domestic and family relations, as well as how to behave in the most effective manner for the weal of the city." This comes from Protagoras, the commentators of Plato say that it is to be miserable morality ; but it coincides, almost to a hair, with that which Sokratês describes himself as teaching afterwards, and substantially even with that which Sokratês represents Sokratês as teaching ; nor is it easy to

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 320, D. c. 11, *et seq.*, especially p. 320. Protagoras lays it down that no man is fit to be a member of a community, who has not in his bosom both *dike* and *aidos*, — that is, reciprocal obligation and right between himself and others, — a willingness to esteem or reproach from others. He lays these down as attributes down as what a good ethical theory must assume every man.

² Of the unjust asperity and contempt with which the Platonists treat the sophists, see a specimen in Ast, *Ueber Platons Schriften*, pp. 70, 71, where he comments on Protagoras and the

in a few words, a larger scheme of practical duty.¹ And if the measure of practical duty, which Protagoras devoted himself to teach, was thus serious and extensive, even the fraction of theory

¹ Protagoras says: Τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν, εὐβουλία περί τε τῶν οἰκείων ὅπως ἂν ἔρισται τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περί τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. (Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318, E.)

A similar description of the moral teaching of Protagoras and the other sophists, yet comprising a still larger range of duties, towards parents, friends, and fellow-citizens in their private capacities, is given in Plato, Meno. p. 91, B, E.

Isokratēs describes the education which he wished to convey, almost in the same words: Τὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνοντας καὶ μελετῶντας ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικῆσουσιν, ὥνπερ ἔνεκα καὶ πονητέον καὶ φιλοσοφητέον καὶ πάντα πρακτέον ἐστὶ (Or. xv, De Permutat. s. 304; compare 289).

Xenophon also describes, almost in the same words, the teaching of Sokratēs. Kriton and others sought the society of Sokratēs: οὐκ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γένοντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοὶ τε καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γινόμενοι, καὶ αἰσῶ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιτο καλῶς χρῆσθαι (Memor. i, 2, 48). Again, i, 2, 64: Φανερόν ἦν Σωκράτους τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πονηρὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας, τοῦτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς, ἥ πόλεις τε καὶ οἶκοι εὖ οἰκοῦσι, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμεῖν. Compare also i, 6, 15; ii, 1, 19; iv, 1, 2; iv, 5, 10.

When we perceive how much analogy Xenophon establishes — so far as regards practical precept, apart from theory or method — between Sokratēs, Protagoras, Prodikos, etc., it is difficult to justify the representations of the commentators respecting the sophists; see Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon Menon. p. 8. "Etenim virtutis nomen, eum propter ambitus magnitudinem valde esset ambiguum et obscurum, sophistæ interpretabantur sic, ut, missa veræ honestatis et probitatis vi, unice de prudentiâ civili ac domesticâ cogitari vellent, eoque modo totam virtutem ad callidum quoddam utilitatis vel privatim vel publice consequendæ artificium revocarent." . . . "Pervidit hanc opinionis istius perversitatem, ejusque turpitudinem intimo sensit pectore, vir sanctissimi animi, Sokratēs, etc." Stallbaum speaks to the same purpose in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, pp. 10, 11; and to the Euthydemus, pp. 21, 22.

Those who, like these censors on the sophists, think it base to recommend virtuous conduct by the mutual security and comfort which it procures to all parties, must be prepared to condemn on the same ground a large portion of what is said by Sokratēs throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon, Μὴ καταφρόνει τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν, etc. (iii, 4, 12); see also his Œconomic. xi, 10.

assigned to him in his harangue, includes some points but that of Plato himself. For Plato seems to have conceived the ethical end, to each individual, as comprising nothing but his own permanent happiness and moral health; and in the very dialogue, he introduces Sokratês as maintaining that the end consist only in a right calculation of a man's own personal interest and misery. But here we find Protagoras speaking in a way which implies a larger, and, in my opinion, a juster conception of the ethical end, as including not only reference to a man's own happiness, but also obligations towards the interests of others. Without at all agreeing in the harsh terms in which various critics pronounce upon that theory which is made to set forth in the Platonic Protagoras, I cannot but regard the conception of the ethical end essentially narrow and not capable of being made to serve as basis for deducing the best ethical precepts. Yet such is the prejudice with which the history of the sophists has been written, that the common opinion on Plato accuse the sophists of having originated the ignorant term, "the base theory of utility," here probably by Sokratês himself; complimenting the latter on his setting forth those larger views which in this dialogue belong to Protagoras.¹

¹ Stallbaum, Prolegomena ad Platonis Menonem, p. 9: "Etenim quum virtutis exercitationem et ad utilitates externas referent, quâdam atque consuetudine ejus, quod utile videretur, reperire statuerent,—Socrates ipse, rejectâ utilitatis turpitudine, vim virtutis unice ad id quod bonum honestumque est, revocavisse in eo, ut quis recti bonique sensu ac scientiâ polleret, ad quod ad certissimam normam atque regulam actiones suas omnino atque poneret."

Whoever will compare this criticism with the Protagoras of 37, especially p. 357, B, wherein Sokratês identifies good with pleasure and evil with pain, and wherein he considers right conduct to consist in calculating the items of pleasure and pain one against the other, *τὴν τέρψην*, will be astonished how a critic on Plato could have been above cited. I am aware that there are other parts of Plato's works in which he maintains a doctrine different from that just alluded to; but Stallbaum (in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, p. 10) says that Plato is here setting forth a doctrine not his own, but is setting forth the principles of Protagoras, for the purpose of entrapping and refuting him: "Quæ hic de fortitudine disseruntur, ea item caverit

So far as concerns Protagoras, therefore, the evidence of Plato himself may be produced to show that he was not a corrupt teacher, but a worthy companion of Prodikus; worthy also of that which we know him to have enjoyed, the society and conversation of Periklēs. Let us now examine what Plato says about a third sophist, Hippias of Elis; who figures both in the dialogue called "Protagoras," and in two distinct dialogues known by the titles of "Hippias Major and Minor." Hippias is represented as distinguished for the wide range of his accomplishments, of which in these dialogues he ostentatiously boasts. He could teach astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic, which subjects Protagoras censured him for enforcing too much upon his pupils; so little did these sophists agree in any one scheme of doctrine or education. Besides this, he was a poet, a musician, an expositor of the poets, and a lecturer with a large stock of composed matter,—on sub-

protenus pro decretis mere Platonicis habeantur. Disputat enim Socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ, ita quidem ut eum per suam ipsius rationem in fraudem et errorem inducat."

I am happy to be able to vindicate Plato against the disgrace of so dishonest a spirit of argumentation as that which Stallbaum ascribes to him. Plato most certainly does not reason here upon the doctrines or principles of Protagoras; for the latter begins by positively denying the doctrine, and is only brought to admit it in a very qualified manner, c. 35, p. 351, D. He says, in reply to the question of Sokratēs: Οὐκ οἶδα ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ὥς σὺ ἔρωτῆς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστίν, ὥς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιάρῃ κακὰ· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμὸν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ δὲ αὐ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιάρων οὐκ ἐστὶ κακὰ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἃ ἐστὶ, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθὰ.

There is something peculiarly striking in this appeal of Protagoras to his whole past life, as rendering it impossible for him to admit what he evidently looked upon as a *base theory*, as Stallbaum pronounces it to be. Yet the latter actually ventures to take it away from Sokratēs, who not only propounds it confidently, but reasons it out in a clear and forcible manner, and of fastening it on Protagoras, who first disclaims it and then only admits it under reserve! I deny the theory to be *base*, though I think it an imperfect theory of ethics. But Stallbaum, who calls it so, was bound to be doubly careful in looking into his proof before he ascribed it to any one. What makes the case worse is, that he fastens it not only on Protagoras, but on the sophists collectively, by that monstrous fiction which treats them as a doctrinal sect.

jects moral, political, and even legendary,—treasured very retentive memory. He was a citizen much employed by his fellow-citizens: to crown all, his manual was such that he professed to have made with his own the attire and ornaments which he wore on his person. sufficiently probable, he was a vain and ostentatious man, facts not excluding an useful and honorable career,—at the same time give him credit for a variety of accomplishments such as to explain a certain measure of vanity.¹ The Hippias which Plato handles is very different from that which he treats Protagoras. It is full of sneer and contemptuousness, insomuch that even Stallbaum,² after having repeated a great number of times that this was a vile sophist, who deserved no better treatment, is forced to admit that the petulance is carried too far, and to suggest that the dialogue must have been a work of Plato. Be this as it may, amidst so much unskillful handling, not only we find no imputation against Hippias, but he is preached a low or corrupt morality, but Plato in which furnishes good, though indirect, proof of the contrary. Hippias is made to say that he had already delivered a lecture, about to deliver again, a lecture composed by himself with great care, wherein he enlarged upon the aims and pursuits which a young man ought to follow. The scheme of his discourse is that after the capture of Troy, the youthful Neoptolomus is introduced as asking the advice of Nestor about his conduct; in reply to which, Nestor sets forth to him the plan of life incumbent on a young man of honor and high talents, and unfolds to him the full details of regulated and virtuous conduct by which it ought to be filled up.³ The selection of such names, among the most venerated in all Grecian history, as a monitor and pupil, is a stamp clearly attesting the vein of sentiment which animated the composition. Morality preached by Nestor for the edification of Neoptolemus, might possibly

¹ See about Hippias, Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318, E.; Stallbaum, *legom. ad Platon. Hipp. Maj.* p. 147, *seq.*; Cicero, *de Orator. ii. Hipp. Minor*, c. 10, p. 368, B.

² Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Plat. Hipp. Maj.* p. 150.

³ Plato, *Hippias Major*, p. 286, A, B.

comfort consists in establishing laws to restrain this strong man, reinforced by a moral sanction of praise and blame devoted to the same general end. They catch him, like a young lion, whilst his mind is yet tender, and fascinate him by talk and training into a disposition conformable to that measure and equality which the law enjoins. Here, then, is justice according to the law of society; a factitious system, built up by the many for their own protection and happiness, to the subversion of the law of nature, which arms the strong man with a right to encroachment and license. Let a fair opportunity occur, and the favorite of Nature will be seen to kick off his harness, tread down the laws, break through the magic circle of opinion around him, and stand forth again as lord and master of the many; regaining that glorious position which nature has assigned to him as his right. Justice by nature, and justice by law and society, are thus, according to Kalliklès, not only distinct, but mutually contradictory. He accuses Sokratès of having jumbled the two together in his argument.¹

It has been contended by many authors that this anti-social reasoning — true enough, in so far as it states simple² matter of fact and probability; immoral, in so far as it erects the power of the strong man into a right; and inviting many comments, if I could find a convenient place for them — represents the morality commonly and publicly taught by the persons called sophists at Athens.³ I deny this assertion emphatically. Even if I had no

¹ This doctrine asserted by Kalliklès will be found in Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 39, 40, pp. 483, 484.

² See the same matter of fact strongly stated by Sokratès in the *Memo-
rab.* of Xenophon, ii, 1, 13.

³ Schleiermacher (in the *Prolegomena* to his translation of the *Theætetus*, p. 183) represents that Plato intended to refute Aristippus in the person of Kalliklès; which supposition he sustains, by remarking that Aristippus affirmed that there was *no such thing as justice by nature*, but only by law and convention. But the affirmation of Kalliklès is the direct contrary of that which Schleiermacher ascribes to Aristippus. Kalliklès not only does not deny justice by nature, but affirms it in the most direct manner, — explains what it is, that it consists in the right of the strongest man to make use of his strength without any regard to others, — and puts it above the justice of law and society, in respect to authority.

Ritter and Brand's are yet more incorrect in their accusations of the

other evidence to sustain my denial, except what has been extracted, from the unfriendly writings of Plato himself in Protagoras and Hippias, — with what we know from Protagoras about Prodikus, — I should consider my case mainly vindicating the sophists generally from such an accusa-
 refutation to the doctrine of Kalliklēs were needed, it
 obtained quite as efficaciously from Prodikus and Protagoras
 from Sokratēs and Plato.

But this is not the strongest part of the vindication.

First, Kalliklēs himself is not a sophist, nor represents
 Plato as such. He is a young Athenian citizen, of the deme
 Acharnæ, belonging to the deme Acharnæ; he is intimate with
 other young men of condition in the city, has recently
 entered into active political life, and bends his whole soul towards
 disparaging philosophy, and speaks with utter contempt of
 sophists.¹ If, then, it were even just, which I do not
 infer from opinions put into the mouth of one sophist,

sophists, founded upon this same doctrine. The former says (p. 521)
 is affirmed as a common tenet of the sophists, there is no right
 but only by convention;” compare Brandis, p. 521. The very phrase
 which these writers refer, as far as they prove anything, prove the
 of what they assert; and Preller actually imputes the contrary to
 sophists (Hist. Philosoph. c. 4, p. 130, Hamburg, 1838) with just
 authority. Both Ritter and Brandis charge the sophists with
 for this alleged tenet; for denying that there was any right by
 allowing no right except by convention; a doctrine which had
 obtained before them by Archelaus (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 16). Now Preller
 x, p. 889), whom these writers refer to, charges certain wise men
ιδιώτας τε καὶ ποιητὰς (he does not mention sophists) — with
 but on the ground directly opposite; because they did acknowledge
 nature, of greater authority than the right laid down by the legis-
 because they encouraged pupils to follow this supposed right of
 obeying the law; interpreting the right of nature as Kalliklēs
 Gorgias!

Teachers are thus branded as wicked men by Ritter and Brandis
 negative, and by Plato, if he here means the sophists, for the
 doctrine.

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 37, p. 481, D; c. 41, p. 485, B, D; c. 42, p. 487, B, D; c. 50, p. 495, B; c. 70, p. 515, A. *ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει πρῶτον πόλεως πράγματα*; compare c. 55, p. 500, C. His contempt for
 c. 75, p. 519, F, with the note of Heindorf.

same were held by another or by all of them, it would not be the less unjust to draw the like inference from opinions professed by one who is not a sophist, and who despises the whole profession.

Secondly, if any man will read attentively the course of the dialogue, he will see that the doctrine of Kalliklês is such as no one dared publicly to propound. So it is conceived both by Kalliklês himself, and by Sokratês. The former first takes up the conversation, by saying that his predecessor Pôlus had become entangled in a contradiction, because he had not courage enough openly to announce an unpopular and odious doctrine; but he, Kalliklês, was less shamefaced, and would speak out boldly that doctrine which others kept to themselves for fear of shocking the hearers. "Certainly (says Sokratês to him) your audacity is abundantly shown by the doctrine which you have just laid down; you set forth plainly that which other people think, but do not choose to utter!"¹ Now, opinions of which Pôlus, an insolent young man, was afraid to proclaim himself the champion, must have been revolting indeed to the sentiments of hearers. How then can any reasonable man believe, that such opinions were not only openly propounded, but seriously inculcated as truth upon audiences of youthful hearers, by the sophists? We know that the teaching of the latter was public in the highest degree; publicity was pleasing as well as profitable to them; among the many disparaging epithets heaped upon them, ostentation and vanity are two of the most conspicuous. Whatever they taught, they taught publicly; and I contend, with full conviction, that, had they even agreed with Kalliklês in this

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 38, p. 482, E. ἐκ τούτης γὰρ αὐτῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη (Polus), αἰσχυνομένης δ' ἐνδὲι εἰπεῖν· σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἀγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν. . . . ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐνάντια λέγειν.

Καὶ μὴν (says Sokratês to Kalliklês, c. 42, p. 487, D.) ὅτι γε οἷός ἐστι παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνεσθαι, αὐτὸς τε φῆς, καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. Again, c. 47, p. 492, D. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλικλέης, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ὅτι οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι.

Again, from Kalliklês, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, c. 46, p. 491, E.

opinion, they could neither have been sufficiently audacious enough to be their own enemies, to make it a part of their teaching; but would have acted like Pólus, and kept their doctrine to themselves.

Thirdly, this latter conclusion will be rendered doubly when we consider of what city we are now speaking. In places in the world, the democratical Athens is the last place in which the doctrine advanced by Kalliklès could possibly have been professed by a public teacher; or even by Kalliklès himself in a public meeting. It is unnecessary to remind the reader that the soundly democratical was the sentiment and morality of the Athenians,—how much they loved their laws, their constitution, and their political equality,—how jealous their apprehension of any nascent or threatening despotism. All this is now admitted, but even exaggerated, by Mr. Mitford, Wachsmuth, and other anti-democratical writers, who often draw from it arguments for their abundant censures. Now the very point which is at issue in this dialogue, called “Gorgias,” seeks to establish that Kalliklès, against the rhetors, and against the sophists whom they courted, flattered, and truckled to the sentiment of the Athenian people, with degrading subservience; that they had not the immediate gratification simply, and not to permanent improvement of the people; that they had not courage to dress to them any unpalatable truths, however salutary, but to shift and modify opinions in every way, so as to escape offence;¹ that no man who put himself prominently forward in Athens had any chance of success, unless he became a flatterer and assimilated, from the core, to the people and their

¹ This quality is imputed by Sokratès to Kalliklès in a remark in the *Gorgias*, c. 37, p. 481, D, E, the substance of which is stated by Stallbaum in his note: “*Carpit Socrates Calliclia mobili populi turbæ nunquam non blandientis et adulantis.*”

It is one of the main points of Sokratès in the dialogue, to maintain the practice, for he will not call it an art, of sophists, as well as aims at nothing but the immediate gratification of the people, with regard to their ultimate or durable benefit; that they are but a widely-extended knack of flattery (*Gorgias*, c. 19, p. 464, D; c. 56, p. 501, C; c. 75, p. 520, B).

sentiment.¹ Granting such charges to be true, how is it conceivable that any sophist, or any rhetor, could venture to enforce upon an Athenian public audience the doctrine laid down by Kallikles? To tell such an audience: "Your laws and institutions are all violations of the law of nature, contrived to disappoint the Alkibiadês or Napoleon among you of his natural right to become your master, and to deal with you petty men as his slaves. All your unnatural precautions, and conventional talk, in favor of legality and equal dealing, will turn out to be nothing better than pitiful impotence,² as soon as *he* finds a good opportunity of standing forward in his full might and energy, so as to put you into your proper places, and show you what privileges Nature intends for her favorites!" Conceive such a doctrine propounded by a lecturer to assembled Athenians! A doctrine just as revolting to Nikias as to Kleon, and which even Alkibiadês would be forced to affect to disapprove; since it is not simply anti-popular, not simply despotic, but the drunken extravagance of despotism. The Great man, as depicted by Kalliklês, stands in the same relation to ordinary mortals, as Jonathan Wild the Great, in the admirable parody of Fielding.

That sophists, whom Plato accuses of slavish flattery to the democratical ear, should gratuitously insult it by the proposition of such tenets, is an assertion not merely untrue, but utterly absurd. Even as to Sokratês, we know from Xenophon how much the Athenians were offended with him, and how much it was urged by the accusers on his trial, that in his conversations he was wont to cite with peculiar relish the description, in the second book of the Iliad, of Odysseus following the Grecian crowd, when running away from the agora to get on shipboard, and prevailing upon them to come back, by gentle words ad-

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 68, p. 513. Οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοφύως ὁμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ δῆμῳ. . . . "Ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιώτατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὥς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικός εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικὸν τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡθεὶ λεγόμενων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται.

² Plato, Gorgias, c. 46, p. 492, C (the words of Kalliklês). Τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ξυνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ὕψια.

dressed to the chiefs, but by blows of his stick, accompanied with contemptuous reprimand, to the common people. Indirect evidence thus afforded, that Sokratês could not be unequal dealing and ill usage towards the many, to the disadvantage of the few, against him in the minds of the dikasts. What would be felt then towards a sophist who publicly professed the morality of Kalliklês? The truth is, not only was it in that any such morality, or anything of the same type even diluted, could find its way into the educational lectures of the sophists at Athens, but the fear would be in the opposite direction. If the sophist erred in either way, it would be in the direction of the few. Sokratês imputes, by making his lectures over-demanding. Nay, if we suppose any opportunity to have arisen of the doctrine of Kalliklês, he would hardly omit to flatter the surrounding democrats by enhancing the beneficence of legality and equal dealing, and by denouncing this "despot," or undisclosed Napoleon, as one who must either find his place under such restraints, or find a place in some other world.

I have thus shown, even from Plato himself, that the doctrine ascribed to Kalliklês neither did enter, nor could have entered into the lectures of a sophist or professed teacher. The conclusion may be maintained respecting the doctrine of Thrasymachus in the first book of the "Republic." Thrasymachus was a rhetorical teacher, who had devised precepts respecting the construction of an oration and the training of young men in public speaking. It is most probable that he confined himself like Gorgias, to this department, and that he did not give moral lectures, like Protagoras and Prodikos. If we suppose him to have given such, he would not talk about the way in which Plato makes him talk, if he desired any satisfaction to an Athenian audience. The mere and ferocious impudence of demeanor even to exaggeration which Plato invests him, is in itself a strong proof that the doctrine, ushered in with such a preface, was not that of an acceptable teacher, winning favor in public audience. He defines justice to be "the interest of the superior power in every society, the dominant power prescribe for its own advantage." A man is just, he says, for the sake of another, not for his own: he is weak, cannot he

and must submit to that which the stronger authority, whether despot, oligarchy, or commonwealth, commands.

This theory is essentially different from the doctrine of Kalliklès, as set forth a few pages back; for Thrasymachus does not travel out of society to insist upon anterior rights dating from a supposed state of nature; he takes societies as he finds them, recognizing the actual governing authority of each as the canon and constituent of justice or injustice. Stallbaum and other writers have incautiously treated the two theories as if they were the same; and with something even worse than want of caution, while they pronounce the theory of Thrasymachus to be detestably immoral, announce it as having been propounded not by him only, but by *The Sophists*; thus, in their usual style, dealing with the sophists as if they were a school, sect, or partnership with mutual responsibility. Whoever has followed the evidence which I have produced respecting Protagoras and Prodikus, will know how differently these latter handled the question of justice.

But the truth is, that the theory of Thrasymachus, though incorrect and defective, is not so detestable as these writers represent. What makes it seem detestable, is the style and manner in which he is made to put it forward; which causes the just man to appear petty and contemptible, while it surrounds the unjust man with enviable attributes. Now this is precisely the circumstance which revolts the common sentiments of mankind, as it revolts also the critics who read what is said by Thrasymachus. The moral sentiments exist in men's minds in complex and powerful groups, associated with some large words and emphatic forms of speech. Whether an ethical theory satisfies the exigencies of reason, or commands and answers to all the phenomena, a common audience will seldom give themselves the trouble to consider with attention; but what they imperiously exact, and what is indispensable to give the theory any chance of success, is, that it shall exhibit to their feelings the just man as respectable and dignified, and the unjust man as odious and repulsive. Now that which offends in the language ascribed to Thrasymachus is, not merely the absence, but the reversal, of this condition; the presentation of the just man as weak and silly, and of injustice in all the *prestige* of triumph and dignity. And for this very reason, I venture to infer that such a theory

was never propounded by Thrasymachus to any public in the form in which it appears in Plato. For Thras was a rhetor, who had studied the principles of his art know that these common sentiments of an audience, cisely what the rhetors best understood, and always conciliate. Even from the time of Gorgias, they practice of composing beforehand declamations upon the heads of morality, which were ready to be introduced in speeches as occasion presented itself, and in which made to the moral sentiments foreknown as common, or less of modification, to all the Grecian assemblies.

Thrasymachus, addressing any audience at Athens, would have wounded these sentiments, as the Platonic Thras is made to do in the "Republic." Least of all would he have done this, if it be true of him, as Plato asserts of the sophists generally, that they thought about nothing but ing popularity, without any sincerity of conviction.

Though Plato thinks fit to bring out the opinion of Thrasymachus with accessories unnecessarily offensive, and to enhance the dialectical triumph of Sokratês by the brutality of the adversary, he was well aware that he had not done to the opinion itself, much less confuted it. The proposition that in the second book of the "Republic," after Thrasymachus disappeared, the very same opinion is taken up by Glauk and Adeimantus, and set forth by both of them, though they entertain it as their own, as suggesting grave doubts and difficulties which they desire to hear solved by Sokrates. who read attentively the discourses of Glaukon and Adeimantus will see that the substantive opinion ascribed to Thrasymachus apart from the brutality with which he is made to utter it, does not even countenance the charge of immoral teaching against him, much less against the sophists generally. Hardly any opinion in Plato's compositions is more powerful than those of Thrasymachus. They present, in a perspicuous and forcible manner, the most serious difficulties with which ethical theory is then in a grapple. And Plato can answer them only in one way: by dividing society to pieces, and reconstructing it in the form of an ideal or any republic. The speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus are the immediate preface to the striking and elaborated

which he goes through, of his new state of society, nor do they receive any other answer than what is implied in that description. Plato indirectly confesses that he cannot answer them, assuming social institutions to continue unreformed: and his reform is sufficiently fundamental.¹

¹ I omitted to notice the Dialogue of Plato entitled *Euthydemus*, wherein Sokratēs is introduced in conversation with the two persons called sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who are represented as propounding a number of verbal quibbles, assertions of double sense, arising from equivocal grammar or syntax,—fallacies of mere diction, without the least plausibility as to the sense,—specimens of jests and hoax, p. 278, B. They are described as extravagantly conceited, while Sokratēs is painted with his usual affectation of deference and modesty. He himself, during a part of the dialogue, carries on conversation in his own dialectical manner with the youthful Kleinias; who is then handed over to be taught by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; so that the contrast between their style of questioning, and that of Sokratēs, is forcibly brought out.

To bring out this contrast, appears to me the main purpose of the dialogue, as has already been remarked by Socher and others (see Stallbaum, *Prolegom. ad Euthydem.* pp. 15–65): but its construction, its manner, and its result, previous to the concluding conversation between Sokratēs and Kriton separately, is so thoroughly comic, that Ast, on this and other grounds, rejects it as spurious and unworthy of Plato (see Ast, *über Platons Leben und Schriften*, pp. 414–418).

Without agreeing in Ast's inference, I recognize the violence of the caricature which Plato has here presented under the characters of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. And it is for this reason, among many others, that I protest the more emphatically against the injustice of Stallbaum and the commentators generally, who consider these two persons as disciples of Protagoras, and samples of what is called "*Sophistia*," the sophistical practice, the sophists generally. There is not the smallest ground for considering these two men as disciples of Protagoras, who is presented to us, even by Plato himself, under an aspect as totally different from them as it is possible to imagine. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described, by Plato himself in this very dialogue, as old men who had been fencing-masters, and who had only within the last two years applied themselves to the eristic or controversial dialogue (*Euthyd.* c. 1, p. 272, C.; c. 3, p. 273, E). Schleiermacher himself accounts their personal importance so mean, that he thinks Plato could not have intended to attack them, but meant to attack Antisthenēs and the Megaric school of philosophers (*Prolegom. ad Euthydem.* vol. iii, pp. 403, 404, of his translation of Plato). So contemptible does Plato esteem them, that Krito blames Sokratēs for having so far degraded himself as to be seen talking with them before many persons (p. 305, B, c. 30).

I call particular attention to this circumstance, without which we cannot fairly estimate the sophists, or practical teachers of Athens, face to face with their accuser-general, Plato. He was a great and systematic theorist, whose opinions on ethics, politics, cognition, religion, etc., were all wrought into harmony by his own mind, and stamped with that peculiarity which is the mark of an original intellect. So splendid an effort of speculative genius is among the marvels of the Grecian world. His dissent from all the societies which he saw around him, not merely democratical, but oligarchical and despotic also, was of the deepest and most radical character. Nor did he delude himself by the belief, that any partial amendment of that which he saw around could bring about the end which he desired: he looked to nothing short of a new genesis of the man and the citizen, with institutions calculated from the beginning to work out the full measure of perfectibility. His fertile scientific imagination realized this idea in the "Republic." But that very systematic and original char-

The name of Protagoras occurs only once in the dialogue, in reference to the doctrine, started by Euthydemus, that false propositions or contradictory propositions were impossible, because no one could either think about or talk about *that which was not*, or *the non-existent* (p. 284, A; 286, C). This doctrine is said by Sokratēs to have been much talked of "by Protagoras, and by men yet earlier than he." It is idle to infer from such a passage, any connection or analogy between these men and Protagoras, as Stallbaum labors to do throughout his Prolegomena; affirming (in his note on p. 286, C,) most incorrectly, that Protagoras maintained this doctrine about $\tau\delta \mu\eta \delta\upsilon$, or the non-existent, because he had *too great faith* in the evidence of the senses; whereas we know from Plato that it had its rise with Parmenidēs, who rejected the evidence of the senses entirely (see Plato, Sophist. 24, p. 237, A, with Heindorf and Stallbaum's notes). Diogenes Laërtius (ix, 8, 53) falsely asserts that Protagoras was the *first* to broach the doctrine, and even cites as his witness Plato in the Euthydemus, where the exact contrary is stated. Whoever broached it first, it was a doctrine following plausibly from the then received Realism, and Plato was long perplexed before he could solve the difficulty to his own satisfaction (Theætet. p. 187, D).

I do not doubt that there were in Athens persons who abused the dialectical exercise for frivolous puzzles, and it was well for Plato to compose dialogue exhibiting the contrast between these men and Sokratēs. But treat Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as samples of "The Sophists altogether unwarranted."

acter, which lends so much value and charm to the substantive speculations of Plato, counts as a deduction from his trustworthiness as critic or witness, in reference to the living agents whom he saw at work in Athens and other cities, as statesmen, generals, or teachers. His criticisms are dictated by his own point of view, according to which the entire society was corrupt, and all the instruments who carried on its functions were of essentially base metal. Whoever will read either the "Gorgias" or the "Republic," will see in how sweeping and indiscriminate a manner he passes his sentence of condemnation. Not only all the sophists and all the rhetors,¹ but all the musicians and dithyrambic or tragic poets; all the statesmen, past as well as present, not excepting even the great Periklês, receive from his hands one common stamp of dishonor. Every one of these men are numbered by Plato among the numerous category of flatterers, who minister to the immediate gratification and to the desires of the people, without looking to their permanent improvement, or making them morally better. "Periklês and Kimon (says Sokratês in the "Gorgias") are nothing but servants or ministers who supply the immediate appetites and tastes of the people; just as the baker and the confectioner do in their respective departments, without knowing or caring whether the food will do any real good, a point which the physician alone can determine. As ministers, they are clever enough: they have provided the city amply with tribute, walls, docks, ships, and *such other follies*: but I (Sokratês) am the only man in Athens who aim, so far as my strength permits, at the true purpose of politics, the mental improvement of the people."² So wholesale a condemna-

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 57, 58; pp. 502, 503.

² Plato, Gorgias, c. 72, 73, p. 517 (Sokratês speaks): 'Αληθεῖς ἄρα οἱ ἐμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένᾳ ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικά ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει.

Ὡ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους (Periklês and Kimon) ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἰοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. Ἄλλα γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἐμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι. ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολιτοῦ.

Ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, λιμένων καὶ τείχων καὶ ναυρίων καὶ

tion betrays itself as the offspring, and the consistent offspring, of systematic peculiarity of vision, the prejudice of a great and able mind.

It would be not less unjust to appreciate the sophists or the statesmen of Athens from the point of view of Plato, than the present teachers and politicians of England or France from that of Mr. Owen or Fourier. Both the one and the other class labored for society as it stood at Athens: the statesmen carried on the business of practical politics, the sophist trained up youth for practical life in all its departments, as family men, citizens, and leaders, to obey as well as to command. Both accepted the system as it stood, without contemplating the possibility of a new birth of society: both ministered to certain exigences, held their anchorage upon certain sentiments, and bowed to a certain morality, actually felt among the living men around them. That which Plato says of the statesmen of Athens is perfectly true, that they were only servants or ministers of the people. He, who tried the people and the entire society by comparison with an imaginary standard of his own, might deem all these ministers worthless in the lump, as carrying on a system too bad to be mended; but, nevertheless, the difference between a competent and an incompetent minister, between Periklēs and Nikias, was of unspeakable moment to the security and happiness of the Athenians. What the sophists on their part undertook was, to educate young men so as to make them better qualified for statesmen or ministers; and Protagoras would have thought it sufficient honor to himself, — as well as sufficient benefit to Athens, which assuredly it would have been, — if he could have inspired any young Athenian with the soul and the capacities of his friend and companion Periklēs.

So far is Plato from considering the sophists as the corruptors of Athenian morality, that he distinctly protests against that

φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν (c. 74, p. 519, A).

Οἶμαι (says Sokratēs, c. 77, p. 521, D.) μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολλὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν, ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους εἴη λέγω ἐκάστ ἄλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, etc.

supposition, in a remarkable passage of the "Republic." It is, he says, the whole people, or the society, with its established morality, intelligence, and tone of sentiment, which is intrinsically vicious; the teachers of such a society must be vicious also, otherwise their teaching would not be received; and even if their private teaching were ever so good, its effect would be washed away, except in some few privileged natures, by the overwhelming deluge of pernicious social influences.¹ Nor let any one imagine, as modern readers are but too ready to understand it, that this poignant censure is intended for Athens so far forth as a democracy. Plato was not the man to preach king-worship, or wealth-worship, as social or political remedies: he declares emphatically that not one of the societies then existing was such that a truly philosophical nature could be engaged in active functions under it.² These passages would be alone sufficient to repel the assertions of those who denounce the sophists as poisoners of Athenian morality, on the alleged authority of Plato.

Nor is it at all more true that they were men of mere words, and made their pupils no better, — a charge just as vehemently pressed against Sokratês as against the sophists, — and by the same class of enemies, such as Anytus,³ Aristophanês, Eupolis, etc. It was mainly from sophists like Hippias that the Athenian youth learned what they knew of geometry, astronomy, and

¹ This passage is in *Republ.* vi, 6, p. 492, *seq.* I put the first words of the passage (which is too long to be cited, but which richly deserves to be read, entire) in the translation given by Stallbaum in his note.

Sokratês says to Adeimantus: "An tu quoque putas esse quidem sophistas, homines privatos, qui corrumpunt juventutem in quâcunque re mentione dignâ; nec illud tamen animadvertisti et tibi persuasisti, quod multo magis debebas, ipsos Athenienses turpissimos esse aliorum corruptores?"

Yet the commentator who translates this passage, does not scruple (in his *Prolegomena* to the *Republic*, pp. xlv, xlv, as well as to the *Dialogues*) to heap upon the sophists aggravated charges, as the actual corruptors of Athenian morality.

² Plato, *Repub.* vi, 11, p. 497, B. *μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν καταστάσει τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως*, etc.

Compare Plato, *Epistol.* vii, p. 325, A.

³ Anytus was the accuser of Sokratês: his enmity to the sophists may be seen in Plato, *Meno.* p. 91, C.

arithmetic: but the range of what is called special science, possessed even by the teacher, was at that time very limited; and the matter of instruction communicated was expressed under the general title of "Words, or Discourses," which were always taught by the sophists, in connection with thought, and in reference to a practical use. The capacities of thought, speech, and action, are conceived in conjunction by Greeks generally, and by teachers like Isokratēs and Quintilian especially; and when young men in Greece, like the Bœotian Proxenus, put themselves under training by Gorgias or any other sophist, it was with a view of qualifying themselves, not merely to speak, but to act.¹

Most of the pupils of the sophists, as of Sokratēs² himself, were young men of wealth; a fact, at which Plato sneers, and others copy him, as if it proved that they cared only about high pay. But I do not hesitate to range myself on the side of Isokratēs,³ and to contend that the sophist himself had much to lose by corrupting his pupils, — an argument used by Sokratēs in defending himself before the dikastery, and just as valid in defence of Protagoras or Prodikus,⁴ — and strong personal interest in sending them forth accomplished and virtuous; that the best-taught youth were decidedly the most free from crime and the most active towards good; that among the valuable ideas and feelings which a young Athenian had in his mind, as well as among the good pursuits which he followed, those which he learned from the sophists counted nearly as the best; that, if the contrary had been the fact, fathers would not have continued so to send their sons, and pay their money. It was not merely

¹ Xenoph. Anab. ii, 6. Πρόξενος — εὐθὺς μείρακιον ὡν ἐπεθύμει γενέσθαι ἄνθρω τὰ μέγαλα πράττειν ἱκανός· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔδωκε Γοργία ἀργύριον τῷ Λεοντίνῳ. . . . Τοσούτων δ' ἐπιθυμῶν, σφόδρα ἐνόηλον αὐ καὶ τοῦτο εἶχεν, ὅτι τούτων οὐδὲν ἂν θέλοι κτᾶσθαι μετὰ ἀδικίας, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ φετο δεῖν τούτων τυγχάνειν, ἀνευ δὲ τούτων μή.

Proxenus, as described by his friend Xenophon, was certainly a man who did not dishonor to the moral teaching of Gorgias.

The connection between thought, speech, and action, is seen even in the jests of Aristophanēs upon the purposes of Sokratēs and the sophists: —

Νικᾶν πάντων καὶ βουλευῶν καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ πολεμίζων (Nubes, 418).

² Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 10, p. 23, C; Protagoras, p. 328, C.

³ See Isokr. Or. xv, De Perm. sects. 218, 233, 235, 245, 254, 257

⁴ Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 13, p. 25, D.

that these teachers countervailed in part the temptations to dissipated enjoyment, but also that they were personally unconcerned in the acrimonious slander and warfare of party in his native city; that the topics with which they familiarized him were, the general interests and duties of men and citizens; that they developed the germs of morality in the ancient legends, as in Prodikus's fable, and amplified in his mind all the undefined cluster of associations connected with the great words of morality; that they vivified in him the sentiment of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood; and that, in teaching him the art of persuasion,¹ they could not but make him feel the dependence in which he stood towards those who were to be persuaded, together with the necessity under which he lay of so conducting himself as to conciliate their good-will.

The intimations given in Plato, of the enthusiastic reception which Protagoras, Prodikus, and other sophists² met with in the various cities; the description which we read, in the dialogue called Protagoras, of the impatience of the youthful Hippokratês, on hearing of the arrival of that sophist, insomuch that he awakens Sokratês before daylight, in order to obtain an introduction to the new-comer and profit by his teaching; the readiness of such rich young men to pay money, and to devote time and trouble, for the purpose of acquiring a personal superiority apart from their wealth and station; the ardor with which Kallias is represented as employing his house for the hospitable entertainment, and his fortune for the aid, of the sophists; all this makes upon my mind an impression directly the reverse of that ironical and contemptuous phraseology with which it is set forth by Plato. Such sophists had nothing to recommend them except superior knowledge and intellectual force, combined with an imposing personality, making itself felt in their lectures and conversation. It is to this that the admiration was shown; and the fact that it was so shown, brings to

¹ See these points strikingly put by Isokratês, in the *Orat.* xv, *De Permutatione*, throughout, especially in sects. 294, 297, 305, 307; and again by Xenoph. *Memorab.* i, 2, 10, in reference to the teaching of Sokratês.

² See a striking passage in Plato's *Republic*, x, c, 4, p. 600, C.

view the best attributes of the Greek, especially the Athenian mind. It exhibits those qualities of which Periklēs made emphatic boast in his celebrated funeral oration; ¹ conception of public speech as a practical thing, not meant as an excuse for inaction, but combined with energetic action, and turning it to good account by full and open discussion beforehand; profound sensibility to the charm of manifested intellect, without enervating the powers of execution or endurance. Assuredly, a man like Protagoras, arriving in a city with all this train of admiration laid before him, must have known very little of his own interest or position, if he began to preach a low or corrupt morality. If it be true generally, as Voltaire has remarked, that "any man who should come to preach a relaxed morality would be pelted," much more would it be true of a sophist like Protagoras, arriving in a foreign city with all the prestige of a great intellectual name, and with the imagination of youths on fire to hear and converse with him, that any similar doctrine would destroy his reputation at once. Numbers of teachers have made their reputation by inculcating overstrained asceticism; it will be hard to find an example of success in the opposite vein.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

SOKRATES.

THAT the professional teachers called sophists, in Greece, were intellectual and moral corruptors, and that much corruption grew up under their teaching in the Athenian mind, are common statements, which I have endeavored to show to be erroneous. Corresponding to these statements is another, which repre-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 40. φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας — οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἐγὼις βλαβὴν ἡγοῦμενοι — διαφερόντως δὲ καὶ τότε ἔχομεν, ὥστε τολμᾶν τε αἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι.

sents Sokratês as one whose special merit it was to have rescued the Athenian mind from such demoralizing influences ; a reputation which he neither deserves nor requires. In general, the favorable interpretation of evidence, as exhibited towards Sokratês, has been scarcely less marked than the harshness of presumption against the sophists. Of late, however, some authors have treated his history in an altered spirit, and have manifested a disposition to lower him down to that which they regard as the sophistical level. M. Forchhammer's treatise : "The Athenians and Sokratês, or Lawful Dealing against Revolution," goes even further, and maintains confidently that Sokratês was most justly condemned as an heretic, a traitor, and a corrupter of youth. His book, the conclusions of which I altogether reject, is a sort of retribution to the sophists, as extending to their alleged opponent the same bitter and unfair spirit of construction with that under which they have so long unjustly suffered. But when we impartially consider the evidence, it will appear that Sokratês deserves our admiration and esteem ; not, indeed, as an anti-sophist, but as combining with the qualities of a good man, a force of character and an originality of speculation as well as of method, and a power of intellectually working on others, generically different from that of any professional teacher, without parallel either among contemporaries or successors.

The life of Sokratês comprises seventy years, from 469 to 399 B.C. His father, Sophroniskus, being a sculptor, the son began by following the same profession, in which he attained sufficient proficiency to have executed various works ; especially a draped group of the Charites, or Graces, preserved in the acropolis, and shown as his work down to the time of Pausanias.¹ His mother, Phænaretê, was a midwife, and he had a brother by the mother's side named Patroklês.² Respecting his wife Xanthippê, and his three sons, all that has passed into history is the violent temper of the former, and the patience of her husband in enduring it. The position and family of Sokratês, without being absolutely poor, were humble and unimportant but he

¹ Pausanias, i, 22, 8 ; ix, 35, 2.

² Plato, Euthydem. c. 24, p. 297, D.

was of genuine Attic breed, belonging to the ancient gens Dædalidæ, which took its name from Dædalus, the mythical artist as progenitor.

The personal qualities of Sokratēs, on the other hand, were marked and distinguishing, not less in body than in mind. His physical constitution was healthy, robust, and enduring, to an extraordinary degree. He was not merely strong and active as an hoplite on military service, but capable of bearing fatigue or hardship, and indifferent to heat or cold, in a measure which astonished all his companions. He went barefoot in all seasons of the year, even during the winter campaign at Potidæa, under the severe frosts of Thrace; and the same homely clothing sufficed to him for winter as well as for summer. Though his diet was habitually simple as well as abstemious, yet there were occasions, of religious festival or friendly congratulation, on which every Greek considered joviality and indulgence to be becoming. On such occasions, Sokratēs could drink more wine than any guest present, yet without being overcome or intoxicated.¹ He abstained, on principle, from all extreme gymnastic training, which required, as necessary condition, extraordinary abundance of food.² It was his professed purpose to limit, as much as possible, the number of his wants, as a distant approach to the perfection of the gods, who wanted nothing, to control such as were natural, and prevent the multiplication of any that were artificial.³ Nor can there be any doubt that his admirable

¹ See the Symposium of Plato as well as that of Xenophon, both of which profess to depict Sokratēs at one of these jovial moments. Plato, Symposium, c. 31, p. 214, A; c. 35, etc., 39, *ad finem*; Xenoph. Symp. ii, 26, where Sokratēs requests that the wine may be handed round in small glasses, but that they may succeed each other quickly, like drops of rain in a shower.

The view which Plato takes of indulgence in wine, as affording a sort of test of the comparative self-command of individuals, and measuring the facility with which any man may be betrayed into folly and extravagance, and the regulation to which he proposes to submit the practice, may be seen in his treatise De Legibus, i, p. 649; ii, pp. 671-674. Compare Xenophi Memorab. i, 2, 1; i, 6, 10.

² Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 4. τὸ μὲν ὑπερσοθῖαντα ὑπερπνεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, etc.

³ Xenoph. Mem. i, 6, 10. Even Antisthenēs (disciple of Sokratēs, and the originator of what was called the Cynic philosophy), while he prv-

bodily temperament contributed materially to facilitate such a purpose, and assist him in the maintenance of that self-mastery, contented self-sufficiency, and independence of the favor¹ as well as of the enmity of others, which were essential to his plan of intellectual life. His friends, who communicate to us his great bodily strength and endurance, are at the same time full of jests upon his ugly physiognomy; his flat nose, thick lips, and prominent eyes, like a satyr, or silenus.² Nor can we implicitly trust the evidence of such very admiring witnesses, as to the philosopher's exemption from infirmities of temper; for there seems good proof that he was by natural temperament violently irascible; a defect which he generally kept under severe control, but which occasionally betrayed him into great improprieties of language and demeanor.³

Of those friends, the best known to us are Xenophon and Plato, though there existed in antiquity various dialogues com-

nounced virtue to be self-sufficient for conferring happiness, was obliged to add that the strength and vigor of Sokratēs were required as a farther condition: *αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ τῆς Σωκρατικῆς λαχρῆς*; Winckelman, Antisthen. Fragment. p. 47; Diog. Laërt. vi, 11.

¹ See his reply to the invitation of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, indicating the repugnance to accept favors which he could not return (Aristot. Rhetor. ii, 24).

² Plato, Sympos. c. 32, p. 215, A; Xenoph. Sympos. c. 5; Plato, Theætet. p. 143, D.

³ This is one of the traditions which Aristoxenus, the disciple of Aristotle, heard from his father Spintharus, who had been in personal communication with Sokratēs. See the Fragments of Aristoxenus, Fragm. 27, 28; ap. Frag. Hist. Græc. p. 280, ed. Didot.

It appears to me that Frag. 28 contains the statement of what Aristoxenus really said about the irascibility of Sokratēs; while the expressions of Fragm. 27, ascribed to that author by Plutarch, are unmeasured. ▲

Fragm. 28 also substantially contradicts Fragm. 26, in which Diogenes asserts, on the authority of Aristoxenus, — what is not to be believed, even if Aristoxenus had asserted it, — that Sokratēs made a regular trade of his teaching, and collected perpetual contributions: see Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 6; i, 5, 6.

I see no reason for the mistrust with which Preller (Hist. Philosophie, c. v, p. 139) and Ritter (Geschich. d. Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 11) regard the general testimony of Aristoxenus about Sokratēs.

posed, and memoranda put together, by other hearers of Sokratês, respecting his conversations and teaching, which are all now lost.¹ The "Memorabilia" of Xenophon profess to record actual conversations held by Sokratês, and are prepared with the announced purpose of vindicating him against the accusations of Melêtus and his other accusers on the trial, as well as against unfavorable opinions, seemingly much circulated respecting his character and purposes. We thus have in it a sort of partial biography, subject to such deductions from its evidentiary value as may be requisite for imperfection of memory, intentional decoration, and partiality. On the other hand, the purpose of Plato, in the numerous dialogues wherein he introduces Sokratês, is not so clear, and is explained very differently by different commentators. Plato was a great speculative genius, who came to form opinions of his own distinct from those of Sokratês, and employed the name of the latter as spokesman for these opinions in various dialogues. How much, in the Platonic Sokratês, can be safely accepted either as a picture of the man or as a record of his opinions, — how much, on the other hand, is to be treated as Platonism; or in what proportions the two are intermingled, — is a point not to be decided with certainty or rigor. The "Apology of Sokratês," the "Kriton," and the "Phædon," — in so far as it is a moral picture, and apart from the doctrines advocated in it, — appear to belong to the first category; while the political and social views of the "Republic" and of the treatise "De Legibus," the cosmic theories in the "Timæus," and the hypothesis of Ideas, as substantive existences apart from the phenomenal world, in the various dialogues wherever it is stated, certainly belong to the second. Of the ethical dialogues, much

¹ Xenophon (Mem. i, 4, 1) alludes to several such biographers, or collectors of anecdotes about Sokratês. Yet it would seem that most of these *Socratici viri* (Cicer. ad Attic. xiv, 9, 1) did not collect anecdotes or conversations of the master, after the manner of Xenophon; but composed dialogues, manifesting more or less of his method and *ἥθος*, after the type of Plato. Simon the leather-cutter, however, took memoranda of conversations held by Sokratês in his shop, and published several dialogues purporting to be such. (Diog. Laërt. ii, 123.) The *Socratici viri* are generally praised by Cicero (Tus. D. ii, 3, 8) for the elegance of their style.

may be probably taken to represent Sokratês, more or less Platonized.

But though the opinions put by Plato into the mouth of Sokratês are liable to thus much of uncertainty, we find, to our great satisfaction, that the pictures given by Plato and Xenophon of their common master are in the main accordant; differing only as drawn from the same original by two authors radically different in spirit and character. Xenophon, the man of action, brings out at length those conversations of Sokratês which had a bearing on practical conduct, and were calculated to correct vice or infirmity in particular individuals; such being the matter which served his purpose as an apologist, at the same time that it suited his intellectual taste. But he intimates, nevertheless, very plainly, that the conversation of Sokratês was often, indeed usually, of a more negative, analytical, and generalizing tendency; ¹ not destined for the reproof of positive or special defect, but to awaken the inquisitive faculties and lead to the rational comprehension of vice and virtue as referable to determinate general principles. Now this latter side of the master's physiognomy, which Xenophon records distinctly, though without emphasis or development, acquires almost exclusive prominence in the Platonic picture. Plato leaves out the practical, and consecrates himself to the theoretical, Sokratês; whom he divests in part of his identity, in order to enrol him as chief speaker in certain larger theoretical views of his own. The two pictures, therefore, do not contradict each other, but mutually supply each other's defects, and admit of being blended into one consistent whole. And respecting the method of Sokratês, a point more characteristic than either his precepts or his theory, — as well as respecting the effect of that method on the minds of hearers, — both Xenophon and Plato are witnesses substantially in unison: though, here again, the latter has made the method his own,

¹ Xenophon, Memor. i, 1, 16. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβὲς, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἀδίκον· τί ἀνδρία, τί δειλία· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, etc

Compare i, 2, 50; iii, 8, 3, 4; iii, 9; iv, 4, 5; iv, 6, 1. σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῖσι, τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν δυνάτων, οὐδέ ποτ' ἐληγε.

worked it out on a scale of enlargement and perfection, and given to it a permanence which it could never have derived from its original author, who only talked and never wrote. It is fortunate that our two main witnesses about him, both speaking from personal knowledge, agree to so great an extent.

Both describe in the same manner his private life and habits; his contented poverty, justice, temperance in the largest sense of the word, and self-sufficing independence of character. On most of these points too, Aristophanês and the other comic writers, so far as their testimony counts for anything, appear as confirmatory witnesses; for they abound in jests on the coarse fare, shabby and scanty clothing, bare feet, pale face, poor and joyless life, of Sokratês.¹ Of the circumstances of his life we are almost wholly ignorant: he served as an hoplite at Potidæa, at Delium, and at Amphipolis; with credit apparently in all, though exaggerated encomiums on the part of his friends provoked an equally exaggerated skepticism on the part of Athenæus and others. He seems never to have filled any political office until the year (B.C. 406) in which the battle of Arginusæ occurred, in which year he was member of the senate of Five Hundred, and one of the prytanes on that memorable day when the proposition of Kallixenus against the six generals was submitted to the public assembly: his determined refusal, in spite of all personal hazard, to put an unconstitutional question to the vote, has been already recounted. That during his long life he strictly obeyed the laws,² is proved by the fact that none of his numerous enemies ever arraigned him before a court of justice: that he discharged all the duties of an upright man and a brave as well as pious citizen, may also be confidently asserted. His friends lay especial stress upon his piety; that is, upon his exact discharge

¹ Aristoph. *Nubes*, 105, 121, 362, 414; *Aves*, 1282; *Eupolis*, Fragment. Incert. ix, x, xi, ap. Meineke, p. 552; *Ameipsias*, *Fragmenta*, Konnus, p. 703, Meineke; *Diogen. Laërt.* ii, 28.

The later comic writers ridiculed the Pythagoreans, as well as Zeno the Stoic, on grounds very similar: see *Diogenes Laërt.* vii, 1, 24.

² Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* c. l. Νῦν τὴν πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα ἐτη γερωνός πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.

of all the religious duties considered as incumbent upon an Athenian.¹

Though these points are requisite to be established, in order that we may rightly interpret the character of Sokratēs, it is not from them that he has derived his eminent place in history. Three peculiarities distinguish the man. 1. His long life passed in contented poverty, and in public, apostolic dialectics. 2. His strong religious persuasion, or belief, of acting under a mission and signs from the gods; especially his *dæmon*, or genius; the special religious warning of which he believed himself to be frequently the subject. 3. His great intellectual originality, both of subject and of method, and his power of stirring and forcing the germ of inquiry and ratiocination in others. Though these three characteristics were so blended in Sokratēs that it is not easy to consider them separately; yet, in each respect, he stood distinguished from all Greek philosophers before or after him.

At what time Sokratēs relinquished his profession as a statuary we do not know; but it is certain that all the middle and later part of his life, at least, was devoted exclusively to the self-imposed task of teaching; excluding all other business, public or private, and to the neglect of all means of fortune. We can hardly avoid speaking of him as a teacher, though he himself disclaimed the appellation:² his practice was to talk or converse, or to *prattle without end*,³ if we translate the derisory word by which the enemies of philosophy described dialectic conversation. Early in the morning he frequented the public walks, the gymnasia for bodily training, and the schools where youths were receiving instruction: he was to be seen in the market-place at the hour when it was most crowded, among the booths and tables where goods were exposed for sale: his whole day was usually spent in this

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 2-20; i, 3, 1-3.

² Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 21, p. 33, A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδύσκαλος μὲν οὐδένος πρόποτε γεγονόμην: compare c. 4, p. 19, E.

Xenoph. Memor. iii, 11, 16. Sokratēs: ἐπισκώπτων τὴν ταυτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην; Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 31, B.

³ Ἀδόλεσχεῖν; see Ruhnken's Animadversiones in Xenoph. Memor. p. 293, of Schneider's edition of that treatise. Compare Plato, Sophistēs, c. 23, p. 225, E.

public manner.¹ He talked with any one, young or old, rich or poor, who sought to address him, and in the hearing of all who chose to stand by: not only he never either asked or received any reward, but he made no distinction of persons, never withheld his conversation from any one, and talked upon the same general topics to all. He conversed with politicians, sophists, military men, artisans, ambitious or studious youths, etc. He visited all persons of interest in the city, male or female: his friendship with Aspasia is well known, and one of the most interesting chapters² of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* recounts his visit to and dialogue with Theodotê, a beautiful hetæra, or female companion. Nothing could be more public, perpetual, and indiscriminate as to persons than his conversation. But as it was engaging, curious, and instructive to hear, certain persons made it their habit to attend him in public as companions and listeners. These men, a fluctuating body, were commonly known as his disciples, or scholars; though neither he nor his personal friends ever employed the terms *teacher* and *disciple* to describe the relation between them.³ Many of them came, attracted by his reputation,

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 10; Plato, Apol. Sok. 1, p. 17, D; 18, p. 31, A. *ολον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγειρῶν καὶ πείθων, καὶ δειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον, οὐδὲν παύομαι, τὴν ἡμέραν δὲ πᾶντα τοῦ προσκαθίζων.*

² Xen. Mem. iii, 11.

³ Xenophon in his *Memorabilia* speaks always of the *companions* of Sokratês, not of his *disciples*: *οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ* — *οἱ συνουσίασται* (i, 6, 1) — *οἱ συνδιατρέβοντες* — *οἱ συγγενόμενοι* — *οἱ ἑταῖροι* — *οἱ ὁμιλοῦντες αὐτῷ* — *οἱ συνήθεις* (iv, 8, 2) — *οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ* (iv, 2, 1) — *οἱ ἐπιθύμηται*. (i, 2, 60). Aristippus also, in speaking to Plato, talked of Sokratês as *ὁ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν*; Aristot. Rhetor. ii, 24. His enemies spoke of his *disciples*, in an invidious sense; Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 21, p. 33, A.

It is not to be believed that any companions can have made frequent visits, either from Megara and Thebes, to Sokratês at Athens, during the last years of the war, before the capture of Athens in 404 B.C. And in point of fact, the passage of the Platonic Theætetus represents Eukleïdês of Megara as alluding to his conversations with Sokratês only a short time before the death of the latter (Plato, Theætetus, c. 2, p. 142, E). The story given by Aulus Gellius — that Eukleïdês came to visit Sokratês by night, in women's clothes, from Megara to Athens — seems to me an absurdity, though Deycks (*De Megaricarum Doctrinâ*, p. 5) is inclined to believe it.

during the later years of his life, from other Grecian cities ; Megara, Thebes, Elis, Kyrênê, etc.

Now no other person in Athens, or in any other Grecian city, appears ever to have manifested himself in this perpetual and indiscriminate manner as a public talker for instruction. All teachers either took money for their lessons, or at least gave them apart from the multitude in a private house or garden, to special pupils, with admissions and rejections at their own pleasure. By the peculiar mode of life which Sokratês pursued, not only his conversation reached the minds of a much wider circle, but he became more abundantly known as a person. While acquiring a few attached friends and admirers, and raising a certain intellectual interest in others, he at the same time provoked a large number of personal enemies. This was probably the reason why he was selected by Aristophanês and the other comic writers, to be attacked as a general representative of philosophical and rhetorical teaching ; the more so, as his marked and repulsive physiognomy admitted so well of being imitated in the mask which the actor wore. The audience at the theatre would more readily recognize the peculiar figure which they were accustomed to see every day in the market-place, than if Prodikus or Protagoras, whom most of them did not know by sight, had been brought on the stage ; nor was it of much importance, either to them or to Aristophanês, whether Sokratês was represented as teaching what he did really teach, or something utterly different.

This extreme publicity of life and conversation was one among the characteristics of Sokratês, distinguishing him from all teachers either before or after him. Next, was his persuasion of a special religious mission, restraints, impulses, and communications, sent to him by the gods. Taking the belief in such supernatural intervention generally, it was indeed noway peculiar to Sokratês : it was the ordinary faith of the ancient world ; insomuch that the attempts to resolve phenomena into general laws were looked upon with a certain disapprobation, as indirectly setting it aside. And Xenophon¹ accordingly avails himself of this general fact, in replying to the indictment for religious innovation, of which

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 2, 3.

his master was found guilty, to affirm that the latter pretended to nothing beyond what was included in the creed of every pious man. But this is not an exact statement of the matter in debate; for it slurs over at least, if it does not deny, that speciality of inspiration from the gods, which those who talked with Sokratēs — as we learn even from Xenophon — believed, and which Sokratēs himself believed also.¹ Very different is his own representation, as put forth in the defence before the dikastery. He had been accustomed constantly to hear, even from his childhood, a divine voice, interfering, at moments when he was about to act, in the way of restraint, but never in the way of instigation. Such prohibitory warning was wont to come upon him very frequently, not merely on great, but even on small occasions, intercepting what he was about to do or to say.² Though later writers speak

¹ See the conversation of Sokratēs (reported by Xenophon, *Mem.* i, 4, 15) with Aristodemus, respecting the gods: "What will be sufficient to persuade you (asks Sokratēs) that the gods care about you?" "When they send me special monitors, as you say that they do to you (replies Aristodemus); to tell me what to do, and what not to do." To which Sokratēs replied, that they answer the questions of the Athenians, by replies of the oracle, and that they send prodigies (τίματα) by way of information to the Greeks generally. He further advises Aristodemus to pay assiduous court (θεραπεύειν) to the gods, in order to see whether they will not send him monitory information about doubtful events (i, 4, 18).

So again in his conversation with Euthydemus, the latter says to him: Σοὶ δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκάσκειν ἐτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρήσθαι, εἶγε μὴδ' ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσιν, ἅτε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἀμὴ (iv, 3, 12).

Compare i, 1, 19; and iv, 8, 11, where this perpetual communication and advice from the gods is employed as an evidence to prove the superior piety of Sokratēs.

² Plato, *Ap. Sok.* c. 19, p. 31, D. Τοῦτον δὲ αἰτίον ἐστίν (that is, the reason why Sokratēs had never entered on public life) ὅ ἡμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλὰκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίνεται, δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτον δ' ἢν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ ὅποτε. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν.

Again, c. 31, p. 40, A, he tells the dikasts, after his condemnation: Ἥ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ μικροῖς ἐναντιούμενη, εἰ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. Νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκε

of this as the daemon or genius of Sokratês, he himself does not personify it, but treats it merely as a "divine sign, a prophetic or supernatural voice."¹ He was accustomed not only to obey it implicitly, but to speak of it publicly and familiarly to others, so that the fact was well known both to his friends and to his enemies. It had always forbidden him to enter on public life; it forbade him, when the indictment was hanging over him, to take any thought for a prepared defence;² and so completely did he march with a consciousness of this bridle in his mouth, that when he felt no check, he assumed that the turning which he was about to take was the right one. Though his persuasion on the subject was unquestionably sincere, and his obedience constant, yet he never dwelt upon it himself as anything grand, or awful, or entitling him to peculiar deference; but spoke of it often in his usual strain of familiar playfulness. To his friends generally, it seems to have constituted one of his titles to reverence, though neither Plato nor Xenophon scruple to talk of it in that jesting

μοι, ὅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταυτὶ, ὃ γε δὴ οἰηθεῖν ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐτε ἐξίοντι ἔωθεν οἰκοθεν ἡφανίσθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὐτε ἥνικα ἀνέβαινον ἐντανθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον οὐτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καί τοις ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπεσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ.

He goes on to infer that his line of defence has been right, and that his condemnation is no misfortune to him, but a benefit, seeing that the sign has not manifested itself.

I agree in the opinion of Schleiermacher (in his Preface to his translation of the *Apology of Sokratês*, part i, vol. ii, p. 185, of his general translation of Plato's works), that this defence may be reasonably taken as a reproduction by Plato of what Sokratês actually said to the dikasts on his trial. In addition to the reasons given by Schleiermacher there is one which may be noticed. Sokratês predicts to the dikasts that, if they put him to death, a great number of young men will forthwith put themselves forward to take up the vocation of cross-questioning, who will give them more trouble than he has ever done (*Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 30, p. 39, D*). Now there is no reason to believe that this prediction was realized. If, therefore, Plato puts an erroneous prophecy into the mouth of Sokratês, this is probably because Sokratês really made one.

¹ The words of Sokratês plainly indicate this meaning: see also a good note of Schleiermacher, appended to his translation of the *Platonic Apology*, *Platons Werke*, part i, vol. ii, p. 432.

² *Xenoph. Mem. iv, 8, 5.*

way which doubtless they caught from himself.¹ But to his enemies and to the Athenian public, it appeared in the light of an offensive heresy; an impious-innovation on the orthodox creed, and a desertion of the recognized gods of Athens.

Such was the *dæmon* or genius of Sokratês, as described by himself and as conceived in the genuine Platonic dialogues; a voice always prohibitory, and bearing exclusively upon his own personal conduct.² That which Plutarch and other admirers of Sokratês conceived as a *dæmon*, or intermediate being between gods and men, was looked upon by the fathers of the Christian church as a devil; by LeClerc, as one of the fallen angels; by some other modern commentators, as mere ironical phraseology on the part of Sokratês himself.³ Without presuming to determine the question raised in the former hypotheses, I believe the last to be untrue, and that the conviction of Sokratês on the point was quite sincere. A circumstance little attended to, but deserving peculiar notice, and stated by himself, is, that the restraining voice began when he was a child, and continued even down to the end of his life: it had thus become an established persuasion, long before his philosophical habits began. But though this peculiar form of inspiration belonged exclusively to him, there were

¹ Xenoph. Sympos. viii, 5; Plato, Euthydem. c. 5, p. 272, E.

² See Plato (Theætet. c. 7, p. 151, A; Phædrus, c. 20, p. 242, C; Republic, vi, 10, p. 496, C)—in addition to the above citations from the Apology.

The passage in the Euthyphron (c. 2, p. 3, B) is somewhat less specific. The Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Theagês, retains the strictly prohibitory attribute of the voice, as never in any case impelling; but extends the range of the warning, as if it was heard in cases not simply personal to Sokratês himself, but referring to the conduct of his friends also (Theagês, c. 11, 12, pp. 128, 129).

Xenophon also neglects the specific attributes, and conceives the voice generally as a divine communication with instruction and advice to Sokratês, so that he often prophesied to his friends, and was always right (Memor. i, 1, 2-4; iv, 8, 1).

³ See Dr. Forster's note on the Euthyphron of Plato, c. 2, p. 3.

The treatise of Plutarch (De Genio Socratis) is full of speculation on the subject, but contains nothing about it which can be relied upon as matter of fact. There are various stories about prophecies made by Sokratês, and verified by the event, c. 11, p. 582.

See also this matter discussed, with abundant references, in Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, v. ii, pp. 25-28.

also other ways in which he believed himself to have received the special mandates of the gods, not simply checking him when he was about to take a wrong turn, but spurring him on, directing, and peremptorily exacting from him, a positive course of proceeding. Such distinct mission had been imposed upon him by dreams, by oracular intimations, and by every other means which the gods employed for signifying their special will.¹

Of these intimations from the oracle, he specifies particularly one, in reply to a question put at Delphi, by his intimate friend, and enthusiastic admirer, Chærephon. The question put was, whether any other man was wiser than Sokratês; to which the Pythian priestess replied, that no other man was wiser.² Sokratês affirms that he was greatly perplexed on hearing this declaration from so infallible an authority, being conscious to himself that he possessed no wisdom on any subject, great or small. At length, after much meditation and a distressing mental struggle, he resolved to test the accuracy of the infallible priestess, by taking measure of the wisdom of others as compared with his own. Selecting a leading politician, accounted wise both by others and by himself, he proceeded to converse with him and put scrutinizing questions; the answers to which satisfied him that this man's supposed wisdom was really no wisdom at all. Having made such a discovery, Sokratês next tried to demonstrate to the politician himself how much he wanted of being wise; but this was impossible; the latter still remained as fully persuaded of his own wisdom as before. "The result which I acquired (says Sokratês) was, that I was a wiser man than he, for neither he nor I knew anything of what was truly good and honorable; but the difference between us was, that he fancied he knew them, while I was fully conscious of my own ignorance; I was thus wiser than he, inasmuch as I was exempt from that capital error." So far, therefore, the oracle was proved to be right.

¹ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 22, p. 33, C. Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέταται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πύρρειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥπὲρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὀριῶν προσέταξε πύρρειν.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 21, A. Sokratês offers to produce the testimony of the brother of Chærephon, the latter himself being dead, to attest the reality of this question and answer.

Sokratês repeated the same experiment successively upon a great number of different persons, especially those in reputation for distinguished abilities; first, upon political men and rhetors, next upon poets of every variety, and upon artists as well as artisans. The result of his trial was substantially the same in all cases. The poets, indeed, composed splendid verses, but when questioned even about the words, the topics, and the purpose, of their own compositions, they could give no consistent or satisfactory explanations; so that it became evident that they spoke or wrote, like prophets, as unconscious subjects under the promptings of inspiration. Moreover, their success as poets filled them with a lofty opinion of their own wisdom on other points also. The case was similar with artists and artisans; who, while highly instructed, and giving satisfactory answers, each in his own particular employment, were for that reason only the more convinced that they also knew well other great and noble subjects. This great general mistake more than countervailed their special capacities, and left them, on the whole, less wise than Sokratês.¹

"In this research and scrutiny (said Sokratês, on his defence) I have been long engaged, and am still engaged. I interrogate every man of reputation; I prove him to be defective in wisdom; but I cannot prove it so as to make him sensible of the defect. Fulfilling the mission imposed upon me, I have thus established the veracity of the god, who meant to pronounce that human wisdom was of little reach or worth; and that he who, like Sokratês, felt most convinced of his own worthlessness, as to wisdom, was really the wisest of men.² My service to the god has not only constrained me to live in constant poverty³ and neglect of political estimation, but has brought upon me a host

¹ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 7, 8, p. 22.

² Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9, p. 23. I give here the sense rather than the exact words: Οὗτος ὑμῶν σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνώκεν διὸ οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταυτ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστών καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τίνα οἶμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τὴ θεῷ βουλήν ἐνδείκνυμαι δι' οὐκ ἐστι σοφός.

³ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9, p. 23, A-C.

ἐν πενίᾳ ὑπὲρ εἰμὶ, διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

of bitter enemies in those whom I have examined and exposed while the bystanders talk of me as a wise man, because they give me credit for wisdom respecting all the points on which my exposure of others turns." — "Whatever be the danger and obloquy which I may incur, it would be monstrous indeed, if, having maintained my place in the ranks as an hoplite under your generals at Delium and Potidæa, I were now, from fear of death or anything else, to disobey the oracle and desert the post which the god has assigned to me, the duty of living for philosophy and cross-questioning both myself and others.¹ And should you even now offer to acquit me, on condition of my renouncing this duty, I should tell you, with all respect and affection, that I will obey the god rather than you, and that I will persist, until my dying day, in cross-questioning you, exposing your want of wisdom and virtue, and reproaching you until the defect be remedied.² My mission as your monitor is a mark of the special favor of the god to you; and if you condemn me, it will be your loss; for you will find none other such.³ Perhaps you will ask me, Why cannot you go away, Sokratēs, and live among us in peace and silence? This is the hardest of all questions for me to answer to your satisfaction. If I tell you that silence on my part would be disobedience to the god, you will think me in jest, and not believe me. You will believe me still less, if I tell you that the greatest blessing which can happen to man is, to carry on discussions every day about virtue and those other matters which you hear me canvassing when I cross-examine myself as well as others; and that life, without such examination, is no life at all. Nevertheless, so stands the fact, incredible as it may seem to you."⁴

¹ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 17, p. 29. Τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην καὶ υπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν, καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.

² Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, C.

³ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, D.

⁴ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 28, p. 38, A. 'Εάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ὑπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τούτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτα, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγόμενον καὶ ἑμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος — ὁ δὲ ἀνεξεταστὸς βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ (these last striking words are selected

I have given rather ample extracts from the Platonic Apology, because no one can conceive fairly the character of Sokratēs who does not enter into the spirit of that impressive discourse. We see in it plain evidence of the marked supernatural mission which he believed himself to be executing, and which would not allow him to rest or employ himself in other ways. The oracular answer brought by Chærephon from Delphi, was a fact of far more importance in his history than his so-called dæmon, about which so much more has been said. That answer, together with the dreams and other divine mandates concurrent to the same end, came upon him in the middle of his life, when the intellectual man was formed, and when he had already acquired a reputation for wisdom among those who knew him. It supplied a stimulus which brought into the most pronounced action a pre-existing train of generalizing dialectics and Zenonian negation, an intellectual vein with which the religious impulse rarely comes into confluence. Without such a motive, to which his mind was peculiarly susceptible, his conversation would probably have taken the same general turn, but would assuredly have been restricted within much narrower and more cautious limits. For nothing could well be more unpopular and obnoxious than the task which he undertook of cross-examining, and convicting of ignorance, every distinguished man whom he could approach. So violent, indeed, was the enmity which he occasionally provoked, that there were instances, we are told, in which he was struck or maltreated,¹ and very frequently laughed to scorn. Though he acquired much admiration from auditors, especially youthful auditors, and from a few devoted adherents, yet the philosophical motive alone would not have sufficed to prompt him to that systematic, and even obtrusive, cross-examination which he adopted as the business of his life.

This, then, is the second peculiarity which distinguishes Sokratēs, in addition to his extreme publicity of life and indiscriminate conversation. He was not simply a philosopher, but a religious missionary doing the work of philosophy; "an elench-

by Dr. Hutcheson, as the motto for his *Synopsis Philosophiæ Moralis*) —
αὐτὰ δὲ ἐν ἡττον πείσεσθαι μοι λέγοντι.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ii, 21.

tic,—or cross-examining god,—to use an expression which Plato puts into his mouth respecting an Eleatic philosopher going about to examine and convict the infirm in reason.”¹ Nothing of this character belonged either to Parmenidēs and Anaxagoras before him, or to Plato and Aristotle after him. Both Pythagoras and Empedoklēs did, indeed, lay claim to supernatural communications, mingled with their philosophical teaching. But though there be thus far a general analogy between them and Sokratēs, the modes of manifestation were so utterly different, that no fair comparison can be instituted.

The third and most important characteristic of Sokratēs—that, through which the first and second became operative—was his intellectual peculiarity. His influence on the speculative mind of his age was marked and important; as to subject, as to method, and as to doctrine.

He was the first who turned his thoughts and discussions distinctly to the subject of ethics. With the philosophers who preceded him, the subject of examination had been Nature, or the Kosmos,² as one undistinguishable whole, blending together cosmogony, astronomy, geometry, physics, metaphysics, etc. The Ionic as well as the Eleatic philosophers, Pythagoras as well as Empedoklēs, all set before themselves this vast and undefined problem; each framing some system suited to his own vein of imagination; religious, poetical, scientific, or skeptical. According to that honorable ambition for enlarged knowledge, however, which marked the century following 480 B.C., and of which the professional men called sophists were at once the products and the instruments, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, as much as was then known, were becoming so far detached sciences as to

¹ Plato, *Sophistēs*, c. 1, p. 216; the expression is applied to the Eleatic stranger, who sustains the chief part in that dialogue: *Τάχ' ἂν οὖν καὶ σοὶ τις οὗτος τῶν κρείττωνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποφύμενος καὶ ἐλέγξων, θεὸς ὢν τις ἐλεγκτικός.*

² Xenoph. *Mem.* i, 1, 11. *Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διελέγετο, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν Κόσμος ἔχει, etc.*

Plato, *Phædon*, c. 45, p. 96, B. *ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν.*

be taught separately to youth. Such appears to have been the state of science when Sokratēs received his education. He received at least the ordinary amount of instruction in all:¹ he devoted himself as a young man to the society and lessons of the physical philosopher Archelaus,² the disciple of Anaxagoras, whom he accompanied from Athens to Samos; and there is even reason to believe that, during the earlier part of his life, he was much devoted to what was then understood as the general study of Nature.³ A man of his earnest and active intellect was likely first to manifest his curiosity as a learner: "to run after and track the various discourses of others, like a Laconian hound," if I may borrow an expression applied to him by Plato,⁴ before he

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv, 7, 3-5.

² Ion, Chius, Fragm. 9. ap. Didot. Fragm. Historic. Græcor. Diogen. Laërt. ii, 16-19.

Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 19) calls in question the assertion that Sokratēs received instruction from Archelaus; in my judgment, without the least reason, since Ion of Chios is a good contemporary witness. He even denies that Sokratēs received any instruction in philosophy at all, on the authority of a passage in the Symposium of Xenophon, where Sokratēs is made to speak of himself as *ἡμᾶς δὲ ὅπως αὐτοῦργους τινὰς τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὄντας* (1, 5). But it appears to me that that expression implies nothing more than a sneering antithesis, so frequent both in Plato and Xenophon, with the costly lessons given by Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodikus. It cannot be understood to deny instruction given to Sokratēs in the earlier portion of his life.

³ I think that the expression in Plato's Phædo, c. 102, p. 96, A, applies to Sokratēs himself, and not to Plato: *τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη*, means the mental tendencies of Sokratēs when a young man.

Respecting the physical studies probably sought and cultivated by Sokratēs in the earlier years of his life, see the instructive Dissertation of Tychsen, Ueber den Prozess des Sokratēs, in the Bibliothek der Alten Literatur und Kunst; Erstes Stück, p. 43.

⁴ Plato, Parmenid. p. 128, C. *καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναὶ σκύλακες, εἰ μεταθεῖς καὶ ληνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα*, etc.

Whether Sokratēs can be properly said to have been the pupil of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, is a question of little moment, which hardly merited the skepticism of Bayle (Anaxagoras, note R; Archelaus, note A: compare Schanbach, Anaxagoræ Fragmenta, pp. 23, 27). That he would seek to acquaint himself with their doctrines, and improve himself by communicating personally with them, is a matter so probable, that the slenderest testimony suffices to make us believe it. Moreover, as I have before

struck out any novelties of his own. And in Plato's dialogue called "Parmenidès," Sokratès appears as a young man full of ardor for the discussion of the Parmenidean theory, looking up with reverence to Parmenidès and Zeno, and receiving from them instructions in the process of dialectical investigation. I have already, in the preceding chapter,¹ noted the tenor of that dialogue, as illustrating the way in which Grecian philosophy presents itself, even at the first dawn of dialectics, as at once negative and positive, recognizing the former branch of method no less than the latter as essential to the attainment of truth. I construe it as an indication respecting the early mind of Sokratès, imbibing this conviction from the ancient Parmenidès and the mature and practised Zeno, and imposing upon himself, as a condition of assent to any hypothesis or doctrine, the obligation of setting forth conscientiously all that could be said against it, not less than all that could be said in its favor: however laborious such a process might be, and however little appreciated by the multitude.² Little as we know the circumstances which went to form the remarkable mind of Sokratès, we may infer from this dialogue that he owes in part his powerful negative vein of dialectics to "the double-tongued and all-objecting Zeno."³

To a mind at all exigent on the score of proof, physical science as handled in that day was indeed likely to appear not only unsatisfactory, but hopeless; and Sokratès, in the maturity of his life, deserted it altogether. The contradictory hypotheses which he heard, with the impenetrable confusion which overhung the subject, brought him even to the conviction, that the gods intended the machinery by which they brought about astronomical and physical results to remain unknown, and that it was impious, as

remarked, we have here a good contemporary witness, Ion of Chios, to the fact of his intimacy with Archelans. In no other sense than this could a man like Sokratès be said to be the *pupil* of any one.

¹ See the chapter immediately preceding, p. 472.

² See the remarkable passage in Plato's Parmenidès, p. 135, C to 136, E, of which a portion has already been cited in my note to the preceding chapter, referred to in the note above.

³ Timon the Sillographer ap. Diogen. Laërt. ix, 25.

⁴ Ἀμφοτερογλώσσου δὲ μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπατὸν
Ζήνωνος, πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος, etc.

well as useless, to pry into their secrets.¹ His master Archelaus, though mainly occupied with physics, also speculated more or less concerning moral subjects; concerning justice and injustice, the laws, etc.; and is said to have maintained the tenet, that justice and injustice were determined by law or convention, not by nature. From him, perhaps, Sokratês may have been partly led to turn his mind in this direction. But to a man disappointed with physics, and having in his bosom a dialectical impulse powerful, unemployed, and restless, the mere realities of Athenian life, even without Archelaus, would suggest human relations, duties, action and suffering, as the most interesting materials for contemplation and discourse. Sokratês could not go into the public assembly, the dikastery, or even the theatre, without hearing discussions about what was just or unjust, honorable or base, expedient or hurtful, etc., nor without having his mind conducted to the inquiry, what was the meaning of these large words which opposing disputants often invoked with equal reverential confidence. Along with the dialectic and generalizing power of Sokratês, which formed his bond of connection with such minds as Plato, there was at the same time a vigorous practicality, a large stock of positive Athenian experience, with which Xenophon chiefly sympathized, and which he has brought out in his "Memorabilia." Of these two intellectual tendencies, combined with a strong religious sentiment, the character of Sokratês is composed; and all of them were gratified at once, when he devoted himself to admonitory interrogation on the rules and purposes of human life; from which there was the less to divert him, as he had neither talents nor taste for public speaking.

That "the proper study of mankind is man,"² Sokratês was the first to proclaim: he recognized the security and happiness of man both as the single end of study, and as the limiting principle

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 6. "Ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ἥ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα, ἀ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. Κινδυνεύσαι δ' ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν, ὁ τὰ μέγιστα φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

² Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 16. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, etc. Compare the whole of this chapter.

whereby it ought to be circumscribed. In the present state to which science has attained, nothing is more curious than to look back at the rules which this eminent man laid down. Astronomy — now exhibiting the maximum of perfection, with the largest and most exact power of predicting future phenomena which human science has ever attained — was pronounced by him to be among the divine mysteries which it was impossible to understand, and madness to investigate, as Anaxagoras had foolishly pretended to do. He admitted, indeed, that there was advantage in knowing enough of the movements of the heavenly bodies to serve as an index to the change of seasons, and as guides for voyages, journeys by land, or night-watches: but thus much, he said, might easily be obtained from pilots and watchmen, while all beyond was nothing but waste of valuable time, exhausting that mental effort which ought to be employed in profitable acquisitions. He reduced geometry to its literal meaning of land-measuring, necessary so far as to enable any one to proceed correctly in the purchase, sale, or division of land, which any man of common attention might do almost without a teacher; but silly and worthless, if carried beyond, to the study of complicated diagrams.¹ Respecting arithmetic, he gave the same qualified permission of study; but as to general physics, or the study of Nature, he discarded it altogether: “Do these inquirers (he asked) think that they already know *human affairs* well enough, that they thus begin to meddle with *divine*? Do they think that they shall be able to excite or calm the winds and the rain at pleasure, or have they no other view than to gratify an idle curiosity? Surely, they must see that such matters are beyond human investigation. Let them only recollect how much the greatest men, who have attempted the investigation, differ in their pretended results, holding opinions extreme and opposite to each other, like those of madmen!” Such was the view which Sokratēs took of physical science and its prospects.² It is the

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 5.

² Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 12–15. Plato entertained much larger views on the subject of physical and astronomical studies than either Sokratēs or Xenophon: see Plato, Phædrus, c. 120, p. 270, A; and Republic, vii, c. 6–11 p. 523, seq.

very same skepticism in substance, and carried farther in degree, though here invested with a religious coloring, for which Ritter and others so severely denounce Gorgias. But looking at matters as they stood in 440-430 B.C., it ought not to be accounted even surprising, much less blamable. To an acute man of that day, physical science as then studied may well be conceived to have promised no result; and even to have seemed worse than barren, if, like Sokratês, he had an acute perception how much of human happiness was forfeited by immorality, and by corrigible ignorance; how much might be gained by devoting the same amount of earnest study to this latter object. Nor ought we to omit remarking, that the objection of Sokratês: "You may judge how unprofitable are these studies, by observing how widely the students differ among themselves," remains in high favor down to the present day, and may constantly be seen employed against theoretical men, or theoretical arguments, in every department.

Sokratês desired to confine the studies of his hearers to *human* matters as distinguished from *divine*, the latter comprehending astronomy and physics. He looked at all knowledge from the point of view of human practice, which had been assigned by the gods to man as his proper subject for study and learning, and with reference to which, therefore, they managed all the current phenomena upon principles of constant and intelligible sequence, so that every one who chose to learn, might learn, while those who took no such pains suffered for their neglect. Even in these, however, the most careful study was not by itself completely sufficient; for the gods did not condescend to submit *all* the phenomena to constant antecedence and consequence, but reserved to themselves the capital turns and junctures for special sentence.¹ Yet here again, if a man had been diligent in learning all that

His treatise *De Legibus*, however, written in his old age, falls below this tone.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 7. Καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκῆσειν, μαντικῆς ἐφη προσδεῖσθαι. Τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ, ἢ χαλκευτικὸν, ἢ γεωργικὸν, ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν, ἢ λογιστικὸν, ἢ οἰκονομικὸν, ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι — πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μεθ' ἡμᾶτα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη αἰρετέα ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. Τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἐφη τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὥς ἰδὲ δὴλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, etc.

the gods permitted to be learned; and if, besides, he was assiduous in pious court to them, and in soliciting special information by way of prophecy, they would be gracious to him, and signify beforehand how they intended to act in putting the final hand and in settling the undecipherable portions of the problem.¹ The kindness of the gods in replying through their oracles, or sending information by sacrificial signs or prodigies, in cases of grave difficulty, was, in the view of Sokratēs, one of the most signal evidences of their care for the human race.² To seek access to these prophecies, or indications of special divine intervention to come, was the proper supplementary business of any one who had done as much for himself as could be done by patient study.³ But as it was madness in a man to solicit special information from the gods on matters which they allowed him to learn by his own diligence, so it was not less madness in him to investigate as a learner that which they chose to keep back for their own specialty of will.⁴

Such was the capital innovation made by Sokratēs in regard to the subject of Athenian study, bringing down philosophy, to use the expression of Cicero,⁵ from the heavens to the earth; and such his attempt to draw the line between that which was, and was not, scientifically discoverable; an attempt remarkable, inasmuch as it shows his conviction that the scientific and the religious point of view mutually excluded one another, so that where the latter began, the former ended. It was an innovation, inestimable, in respect to the new matter which it let in; of little import, as regards that which it professed to exclude. For in point of fact, physical science, though partially discouraged, was never absolutely excluded, through any prevalence of that systematic disapproval which he, in common with the multitude of his day,

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 9-19. Ἐφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἐδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, κειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ θεοὺς, οἷς ἂν ἰλέψῃ ὥς, σημαίνειν.

² Xenoph. Mem. i, 4, 15; iv, 3, 12. When Xenophon was deliberating whether he should take military service under Cyrus the younger, he consulted Sokratēs, who advised him to go to Delphi and submit the case to the oracle (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5).³ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 10.

⁴ Xenoph. Mem. i, 9; iv, 7, 6.

⁵ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 4, 10

entertained: if it became comparatively neglected, this arose rather from the greater popularity, and the more abundant and accessible matter, of that which he introduced. Physical or astronomical science was narrow in amount, known only to few, and even with those few it did not admit of being expanded, enlivened, or turned to much profitable account in discussion. But the moral and political phenomena on which Sokratês turned the light of speculation were abundant, varied, familiar, and interesting to every one; comprising—to translate a Greek line which he was fond of quoting—"all the good and evil which has befallen you in your home;"¹ connected too, not merely with the realities of the present, but also with the literature of the past, through the gnostic and other poets.

The motives which determined this important innovation, as to the subject of study, exhibits Sokratês chiefly as a religious man and a practical, philanthropic preceptor, the Xenophontic hero. His innovations, not less important, as to method and doctrine, place before us the philosopher and dialectician; the other side of his character, or the Platonic hero; faintly traced, indeed, yet still recognized and identified by Xenophon.

"Sokratês," says the latter,² "continued incessantly discussing human affairs (the sense of this word will be understood by what has been said above, page 420); investigating: What is piety? What is impiety? What is the honorable and the base? What is the just and the unjust? What is temperance or unsound mind? What is courage or cowardice? What is a city? What is the character fit for a citizen? What is authority over men? What is the character befitting the exercise of such authority? and other similar questions. Men who knew these matters he accounted good and honorable; men who were ignorant of them he assimilated to slaves."

Sokratês, says Xenophon again, in another passage, considered that the *dialectic process* consisted in coming together and taking common counsel, to distinguish and distribute things into genera, or families, so as to learn what each separate thing really was. To go through this process carefully was indispensable, as the

¹ ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται.

² Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 16.

only way of enabling a man to regulate his own conduct, aiming at good objects and avoiding bad. To be so practised as to be able to do it readily, was essential to make a man a good leader or adviser of others. Every man who had gone through the process, and come to know what each thing was, could also of course define it and explain it to others; but if he did not know, it was no wonder that he went wrong himself, and put others wrong besides.¹ Moreover, Aristotle says: "To Sokratês we may unquestionably assign two novelties; inductive discourses, and the definitions of general terms."²

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 5, 11, 12. Ἄλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκράτεσι μόνους ἐξεστί σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι. Καὶ οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἀνδράς γίγνεσθαι, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους. Ἐφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι, ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα· δεῖν οὖν πειράσθαι διτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἔτοιμον ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, καὶ τοῦτον μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἀνδράς ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

Surely, the etymology here given by Xenophon or Sokratês, of the word διαλέγεσθαι, cannot be considered as satisfactory!

Again, iv, 6, 1. Σωκράτης δὲ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότες τί ἕκαστον εἰς τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότες, οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλlein. Ὡν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν οὖν τοῖς συνοδοῖσι, τι ἕκαστον εἰς τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτε ἔλαγε· Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ᾧ διωρίζετο, πολλὰ ἂν ἔργον εἰς διεξελεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

² Aristot. Metaphys. i, 6, 3, p. 987, b. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἡθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδὲν — ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητούντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρῶτον τὴν διάνοιαν, etc. Again, xiii, 4, 6-8, p. 1078, b. Δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς ἑ' ἐπακτικὸς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου: compare xiii, 9, 35, p. 1086, b; Cicero, Topic. x, 42.

These two attributes, of the discussions carried on by Sokratês, explain the epithet attached to him by Timon the Sillographer, that he was the leader and originator of the accurate talkers: —

Ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινε λιθοξόος, ἐννομολέσχης,

Ἑλλήνων ἑπαιδοῦς ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφύνας,

Μεκτήρ, ῥητορόμυκτος, ὑπακτικὸς, εἰρωνεύτης.

(ap. Diog. Laërt. ii, 19.)

To a large proportion of hearers of that time, as of other times, accurate thinking and talking appeared petty and in bad taste: ἡ ἀκριβελογία

I borrow here intentionally from Xenophon in preference to Plato; since the former, tamely describing a process which he imperfectly appreciated, identifies it so much the more completely with the real Sokratês, and is thus a better witness than Plato, whose genius not only conceived but greatly enlarged it, for didactic purposes of his own. In our present state of knowledge, some mental effort is required to see anything important in the words of Xenophon; so familiar has every student been rendered with the ordinary terms and gradations of logic and classification,—such as genus, definition, individual things as comprehended in a genus; what each thing is, and to what genus it belongs, etc. But familiar as these words have now become, they denote a mental process, of which, in 440–430 B.C., few men besides Sokratês had any conscious perception. Of course, men conceived and described things in classes, as is implied in the very form of language, and in the habitual junction of predicates with subjects in common speech. They explained their meaning clearly and forcibly in particular cases: they laid down maxims, argued questions, stated premises, and drew conclusions, on trials in the dikastery, or debates in the assembly: they had an abundant poetical literature, which appealed to every variety of emotion: they were beginning to compile historical narrative, intermixed with reflection and criticism. But though all this was done, and often admirably well done, it was wanting in that analytical consciousness which would have enabled any one to describe, explain, or vindicate what he was doing. The ideas of men—speakers as well as hearers, the productive minds as well as the recipient multitude—were associated together in groups favorable rather to emotional results, or to poetical, rhetorical narrative and descriptive effect, than to methodical generalization, to scientific conception, or to proof either inductive or deductive. That reflex act of attention which enables men to understand, compare, and rectify their own mental process, was only just beginning. It was a recent novelty on the part of the rhetorical teachers, to analyze

μικροπρεπές (Aristot. *Ethic. Nikomach.* iv, 4, p. 1122, b; also Aristot. *Metaphys.* ii, 3, p. 993, a). Even Plato thinks himself obliged to make a sort of apology for it (*Theætet.* c. 102, p. 184, C). No doubt Timon used the word *ἀκριβολόγους* in a sneering sense.

the component parts of a public harangue, and to propound some precepts for making men tolerable speakers. Protagoras was just setting forth various grammatical distinctions, while Prodikus discriminated the significations of words nearly equivalent and liable to be confounded. All these proceedings appeared then so new¹ as to incur the ridicule even of Plato: yet they were branches of that same analytical tendency which Sokratês now carried into scientific inquiry. It may be doubted whether any one before him ever used the words *genus* and *species*, originally meaning family and form, in the philosophical sense now exclusively appropriated to them. Not one of those many names—called by logicians *names of the second intention*—which imply distinct attention to various parts of the logical process, and enable us to consider and criticize it in detail, then existed. All of them grew out of the schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the subsequent philosophers, so that we can thus trace them in their beginning to the common root and father, Sokratês.

To comprehend the full value of the improvements struck out by Sokratês, we have only to examine the intellectual paths pursued by his predecessors or contemporaries. He set to himself distinct and specific problems: "What is justice? What is piety, courage, political government? What is it which is really denoted by such great and important names, bearing upon the conduct or happiness of man?" Now it has been already remarked that Anaxagoras, Empedoklês, Demokritus, the Pythagoreans, all had still present to their minds those vast and undivided problems which had been transmitted down from the old poets; bending their minds to the invention of some system which would explain them all at once, or assist the imagination in conceiving both how the Kosmos first began, and how it continued to move on.² Ethics and physics, man and nature, were all

¹ How slowly grammatical analysis proceeded among the Greeks, and how long it was before they got at what are now elementary ideas in every instructed man's mind, may be seen in Gräfenhahn *Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie im Alterthum*, sects. 89–92, etc. On this point, these sophists seem to have been decidedly in advance of their age.

² This same tendency, to break off from the vague aggregate then conceived as physics, is discernible in the Hippocratic treatises, and even in the treatise *De Antiquâ Medicinâ*, which M. Littre places first in his edition,

blended together; and the Pythagoreans, who explained all nature by numbers and numerical relations, applied the same explanation to moral attributes, considering justice to be symbolized by a perfect equation, or by four, the first of all square numbers.¹ These early philosophers endeavored to find out the beginnings, the component elements, the moving cause or causes, of things in the mass;² but the logical distribution into genus, species, and individuals, does not seem to have suggested itself to them, or to have been made a subject of distinct attention by any one before Sokratēs. To study ethics, or human dispositions and ends, apart from the physical world, and according to a theory of their own, referring to human good and happiness as the sovereign and

and considers to be the production of Hippokratēs himself, in which case it would be contemporary with Sokratēs. On this subject of authorship, however, other critics do not agree with him: see the question examined in his vol. i, ch. xii, p. 295, *seq.*

Hippokratēs, if he be the author, begins by deprecating the attempt to connect the study of medicine with physical or astronomical hypothesis (c. 2), and he farther protests against the procedure of various medical writers and sophists, or philosophers, such as Empedoklēs, who set themselves to make out "what man was from the beginning, how he began first to exist, and in what manner he was constructed," (c. 20.) This does not belong, he says, to medicine, which ought indeed to be studied as a comprehensive whole, but as a whole determined by and bearing reference to its own end: "You ought to study the nature of man; what he is with reference to that which he eats and drinks, and to all his other occupations or habits, and to the consequences resulting from each." *ὁ, τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενα καὶ πινόμενα, καὶ ὁ, τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ὁ, τι ἀφ' ἐκάστου ἐκάστω ξυμβήσεται.*

The spirit, in which Hippokratēs here approaches the study of medicine, is exceedingly analogous to that which dictated the innovation of Sokratēs in respect to the study of ethics. The same character pervades the treatise, *De Aëre, Locis et Aquis*, a definite and predetermined field of inquiry, and the Hippocratic treatises generally.

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* i, 5, p. 985, 986. *τὸ μὲν τοιόνδε τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθος δικαιοσύνη, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε ψυχῇ καὶ νοῦς, ἕτερον δὲ καιρὸς, etc.* *Ethica Magna*, i, l. ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκης ἰσός: see Brandis, *Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos.* lxxxii, lxxxiii, p. 492.

² Aristotel. *Metaphys.* iii, 3, p. 998, A. Οἶον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τούτων, σ τ ο ι χ ε ῖ ᾧ φησιν εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα ἐνυπαρχόντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὥς γένη λέγει τὰυτα τῶν ὄντων. That generic division and subdivision was unknown or unpractised by these early men, is noticed by Plato (*Sophist.* c. 114, p. 267, D.)

comprehensive end;¹ to treat each of the great and familiar words designating moral attributes, as logical aggregates comprehending many judgments in particular cases, and connoting a certain harmony or consistency of purpose among the separate judgments, to bring many of these latter into comparison, by a scrutinizing dialectical process, so as to test the consistency and completeness of the logical aggregate or general notion, as it stood in every man's mind: all these were parts of the same forward movement which Sokratês originated.

It was at that time a great progress to break down the unwieldy mass conceived by former philosophers as science; and to study ethics apart, with a reference, more or less distinct, to their own appropriate end. Nay, we see, if we may trust the "Phædon" of Plato,² that Sokratês, before he resolved on such pronounced severance, had tried to construct, or had at least yearned after, an undivided and reformed system, including physics also under the ethical end; a scheme of optimistic physics, applying the general idea, "*What was best*," as the commanding principle, from whence physical explanations were

Aristotle thinks that the Pythagoreans had some faint and obscure notion of the logical genus, *περὶ τοῦ τί ἐστὶν ἡρξάντο μὲν λέγειν καὶ ὀρίεσθαι, λίαν δὲ ἀπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν* (Metaphys. i, 5, 29, p. 986, B). But we see by comparing two other passages in that treatise (xiii, 4, 6, p. 1078, b, with i, 5, 2, p. 985, b) that the Pythagorean definitions of *καὶρὸς*, τὸ δίκαιον, etc., were nothing more than certain numerical fancies; so that these words cannot fairly be said to have designated, in their view, logical genera. Nor can the ten Pythagorean *σοστοιχίαι*, or parallel series of contraries, be called by that name; arranged in order to gratify a fancy about the perfection of the number ten, which fancy afterwards seems to have passed to Aristotle himself, when drawing up his ten predicaments.

See a valuable Excursus upon the Aristotelian expressions *τί ἐστι* — *τί ἦν εἶναι*, etc., appended to Schwegler's edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysica*, vol. ii, p. 369, p. 378.

About the few and imperfect definitions which Aristotle seems also to ascribe to Demokritus, see Trendelenburg, *Comment. ad Aristot. De Animâ*, p. 212.

¹ Aristotle remarks about the Pythagoreans, that they referred the virtues to number and numerical relations, not giving to them a theory of their own: *τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκεῖαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο* (Ethic. Magn. i, 1).

² Plato, *Phædon*, c. 102, seq., pp. 96, 97.

to be deduced; which he hoped to find, but did not find, in Anaxagoras. But it was a still greater advance to seize, and push out in conscious application, the essential features of that logical process, upon the correct performance of which all our security for general truth depends. The notions of genius, subordinate genera, and individuals as comprehended under them, — we need not here notice the points on which Plato and Aristotle differed from each other and from the modern conceptions on that subject, — were at that time newly brought into clear consciousness in the human mind. The profusion of logical distribution employed in some of the dialogues of Plato, such as the *Sophistês* and the *Politicus*, seems partly traceable to his wish to familiarize hearers with that which was then a novelty, as well as to enlarge its development, and diversify its mode of application. He takes numerous indirect opportunities of bringing it out into broad light, by putting into the mouths of his dialogists answers implying complete inattention to it, exposed afterwards in the course of the dialogue by Sokratês.¹ What was now begun by Sokratês, and improved by Plato, was embodied as part in a comprehensive system of formal logic by the genius of Aristotle; a system which was not only of extraordinary value in reference to the processes and controversies of its time, but which also, having become insensibly worked into the minds of instructed men, has contributed much to form what is correct in the habits

¹ As one specimen among many, see Plato, *Theætet.* c. 11, p. 146, D. It is maintained by Brandis, and in part by C. Heyder (see Heyder, *Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik*, part i, pp. 85, 129), that the logical process, called division, is not to be considered as having been employed by Sokratês along with definition, but begins with Plato: in proof of which they remark that, in the two Platonic dialogues called *Sophistês* and *Politicus*, wherein this process is most abundantly employed, Sokratês is not the conductor of the conversation.

Little stress is to be laid on this circumstance, I think; and the terms in which Xenophon describes the method of Sokratês (*διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα*, *Mem.* iv, 5, 12) seem to imply the one process as well as the other: indeed, it was scarcely possible to keep them apart, with so abundant a talker as Sokratês. Plato doubtless both enlarged and systematized the method in every way, and especially made greater use of the process of division, because he pushed the dialogue further into positive scientific research than Sokratês.

of modern thinking. Though it has been now enlarged and recast, by some modern authors — especially by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his admirable *System of Logic* — into a structure commensurate with the vast increase of knowledge and extension of positive method belonging to the present day, we must recollect that the distance, between the best modern logic and that of Aristotle, is hardly so great as that between Aristotle and those who preceded him by a century, Empedoklēs, Anaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans; and that the movement in advance of these latter commences with Sokratēs.

By Xenophon, by Plato, and by Aristotle, the growth as well as the habitual use of logical classification is represented as concurrent with and dependent upon dialectics. In this methodized discussion, so much in harmony with the marked sociability of the Greek character, the quick recurrence of short question and answer was needful as a stimulus to the attention, at a time when the habit of close and accurate reflection on abstract subjects had been so little cultivated. But the dialectics of Sokratēs had far greater and more important peculiarities than this. We must always consider his method in conjunction with the subjects to which he applied it. As those subjects were not recondite or special, but bore on the practical life of the house, the market-place, the city, the dikastery, the gymnasium, or the temple, with which every one was familiar, so Sokratēs never presented himself as a teacher, nor as a man having new knowledge to communicate. On the contrary, he disclaimed such pretensions, uniformly and even ostentatiously. But the subjects on which he talked were just those which every one professed to know perfectly and thoroughly, and on which every one believed himself in a condition to instruct others, rather than to require instruction for himself. On such questions as these: What is justice? What is piety? What is a democracy? What is a law? every man fancied that he could give a confident opinion, and even wondered that any other person should feel a difficulty. When Sokrates, professing ignorance, put any such question, he found no difficulty in obtaining an answer, given off-hand, and with very little reflection. The answer purported to be the explanation or definition of a term — familiar, indeed, but of wide and comprehensive import — given by one who had never before tried to

render to himself an account of what it meant. Having got this answer, Sokratês put fresh questions, applying it to specific cases, to which the respondent was compelled to give answers inconsistent with the first ; thus showing that the definition was either too narrow, or too wide, or defective in some essential condition. The respondent then amended his answer ; but this was a prelude to other questions, which could only be answered in ways inconsistent with the amendment ; and the respondent, after many attempts to disentangle himself, was obliged to plead guilty to the inconsistencies, with an admission that he could make no satisfactory answer to the original query, which had at first appeared so easy and familiar. Or, if he did not himself admit this, the hearers at least felt it forcibly. The dialogue, as given to us, commonly ends with a result purely negative, proving that the respondent was incompetent to answer the question proposed to him, in a manner consistent and satisfactory even to himself. Sokratês, as he professed from the beginning to have no positive theory to support, so he maintains to the end the same air of a learner, who would be glad to solve the difficulty if he could, but regrets to find himself disappointed of that instruction which the respondent had promised.

We see by this description of the cross-examining path of this remarkable man, how intimate was the bond of connection between the dialectic method and the logical distribution of particulars into species and genera. The discussion first raised by Sokratês turns upon the meaning of some large generic term ; the queries whereby he follows it up, bring the answer given into collision with various particulars which it ought not to comprehend, yet does ; or with others, which it ought to comprehend, but does not. It is in this manner that the latent and undefined cluster of association, which has grown up round a familiar term, is as it were penetrated by a fermenting leaven, forcing it to expand into discernible portions, and bringing the appropriate function which the term ought to fulfil, to become a subject of distinct consciousness. The inconsistencies into which the hearer is betrayed in his various answers, proclaim to him the fact that he has not yet acquired anything like a clear and full conception of the common attribute which binds together the various particulars embraced under some term which is ever upon his lips or perhaps enable him to detect a different fact, not less impor-

tant, that there is no such common attribute, and that the generalization is merely nominal and fallacious. In either case, he is put upon the train of thought which leads to a correction of the generalization, and lights him on to that which Plato¹ calls, seeing the one in the many, and the many in the one. Without any predecessor to copy, Sokratês, fell as it were instinctively into that which Aristotle² describes as the double track of the dialectic process; breaking up the one into many, and recombining the many into one; the former duty, at once the first and the most essential, Sokratês performed directly by his analytical string of questions; the latter, or synthetical process, was one which he did not often directly undertake, but strove so to arm and stimulate the hearer's mind, as to enable him to do it for himself. This one and many denote the logical distribution of a multifarious subject-matter under generic terms, with clear understanding of the attributes implied or connoted by each term, so as to discriminate those particulars to which it really applies. At a moment when such logical distribution was as yet novel as a subject of consciousness, it could hardly have been probed and laid out in the mind by any less stringent process than the cross-examining dialectics of Sokratês, applied to the analysis of some attempts at definition hastily given by respondents; that "inductive discourse and search for (clear general notions or) definitions of general terms," which Aristotle so justly points out as his peculiar innovation.

I have already adverted to the persuasion of religious mission under which Sokratês acted in pursuing this system of conversation and interrogation. He probably began it in a tentative way,³

¹ Plato, Phædrus, c. 109, p. 265, D: Sophistês, c. 83, p. 253, E.

² Aristot. Topic. viii, 14, p. 164, b. 2. 'Ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικός, ὁ προτατικός καὶ ἐνστατικός. 'Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν προτείνειν, ἐν ποιεῖν τὰ πλεῖω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ὅλῳ ληφθῆναι πρὸς δ' ὁ λόγος) τὸ δ' ἐνίστασθαι, τὸ ἐν πολλὰ ἢ γὰρ διαίρει ἢ ἀναιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδόνς, τὸ δ' οὐ, τῶν προτεινομένων.

It was from Sokratês that dialectic skill derived its great extension and development (Aristot. Metaphys. xiii, 4, p. 1078, b).

³ What Plato makes Sokratês say in the Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 11, D, 'Ἄκων εἰμι σοφός, etc., may be accounted as true at least in the beginning of the active career of Sokratês; compare the Hippias Minor, c. 18, p. 376, B; Lachês, c. 33, p. 200, E.

upon a modest scale, and under the pressure of logical embarrassment weighing on his own mind. But as he proceeded, and found himself successful, as well as acquiring reputation among a certain circle of friends, his earnest soul became more and more penetrated with devotion to that which he regarded as a duty. It was at this time probably, that his friend Chærephon came back with the oracular answer from Delphi, noticed a few pages above, to which Sokratês himself alludes as having prompted him to extend the range of his conversation, and to question a class of persons whom he had not before ventured to approach, the noted politicians, poets, and artisans. He found them more confident than humbler individuals in their own wisdom, but quite as unable to reply to his queries without being driven to contradictory answers.

Such scrutiny of the noted men in Athens is made to stand prominent in the "Platonic Apology," because it was the principal cause of that unpopularity which Sokratês at once laments and accounts for before the dikasts. Nor can we doubt that it was the most impressive portion of his proceedings, in the eyes both of enemies and admirers, as well as the most flattering to his own natural temper. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to present this part of the general purpose of Sokratês — or of his divine mission, if we adopt his own language — as if it were the whole; and to describe him as one standing forward merely to unmask select leading men, politicians, sophists, poets, or others, who had acquired unmerited reputation, and were puffed up with foolish conceit of their own abilities, being in reality shallow and incompetent. Such an idea of Sokratês is at once inadequate and erroneous. His conversation, as I have before remarked, was absolutely universal and indiscriminate; while the mental defect which he strove to rectify was one not at all peculiar to leading men, but common to them with the mass of mankind, though seeming to be exaggerated in them, partly because more is expected from them, partly because the general feeling of self-estimation stands at a higher level, naturally and reasonably, in their bosoms, than in those of ordinary persons. That defect was, the "seeming and conceit of knowledge without the reality," on human life with its duties, purposes, and con-

ditions ; the knowledge of which Sokratēs called emphatically "human wisdom," and regarded as essential to the dignity of a freeman ; while he treated other branches of science as above the level of man,¹ and as a stretch of curiosity, not merely superfluous, but reprehensible. His warfare against such false persuasion of knowledge, in one man as well as another, upon those subjects — for with him, I repeat, we must never disconnect the method from the subjects — clearly marked even in Xenophon, is abundantly and strikingly illustrated by the fertile genius of Plato, and constituted the true missionary scheme which pervaded the last half of his long life ; a scheme far more comprehensive, as well as more generous, than those anti-sophistic polemics which are assigned to him by so many authors as his prominent object.²

In pursuing the thread of his examination, there was no topic upon which Sokratēs more frequently insisted, than the contrast

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 12-16. Πότερόν ποτε νομίσαντες Ικανῶς ἥδη τὰνθρώπεια εἶδέναι ἔρχονται (the physical philosophers) ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν· ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σκοποῦντες, ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν..... Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς διελέγετο σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβὲς, τί ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδῶδεις ἀνδικαίως κεκλησθαι.

Plato, Apolog. Sok. c. 5, p. 20, D. ἡπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία· τῇ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν, οὗς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπου σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, etc. Compare c. 9, p. 23, A.

² It is this narrow purpose that Plutarch ascribes to Sokratēs, *Questiones Platonicae*, p. 999, E ; compare also Tennemann, *Geschicht. der Philos.* part ii, art. i, vol. ii, p. 81.

Amidst the customary outpouring of groundless censure against the sophists, which Tennemann here gives, one assertion is remarkable. He tells us that it was the more easy for Sokratēs to put down the sophists, since their shallowness and worthlessness, after a short period of vogue, had already been detected by intelligent men, and was becoming discredited.

It is strange to find such an assertion made, for a period between 420-399 B.C., the era when Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, etc., reached the maximum of celebrity.

And what are we to say about the statement, that Sokratēs put down the sophists, when we recollect that the Megaric school and Antisthenēs, both emanating from Sokratēs, are more frequently attacked than any one else in the dialogues of Plato, as having all those skeptical and disputatious propensities with which the sophists are reproached ?

between the state of men's knowledge on the general topics of man and society, and that which artists or professional men possessed in their respective special crafts. So perpetually did he reproduce this comparison, that his enemies accused him of wearing it threadbare.¹ Take a man of special vocation — a carpenter, a brazier, a pilot, a musician, a surgeon — and examine him on the state of his professional knowledge, you will find him able to indicate the persons from whom and the steps by which he first acquired it: he can describe to you his general aim, with the particular means which he employs to realize the aim, as well as the reason why such means must be employed and why precautions must be taken to combat such and such particular obstructions: he can teach his profession to others: in matters relating to his profession, he counts as an authority, so that no extra-professional person thinks of contesting the decision of a surgeon in case of disease, or of a pilot at sea. But while such is the fact in regard to every special art, how great is the contrast in reference to the art of righteous, social, and useful living, which forms, or ought to form, the common business alike important to each and to all! On this subject, Sokratēs² remarked that every

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 101, p. 491, A.

Kalliklēs. Ὅς αἰεὶ ταῦτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Sokratēs. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλικλείης, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Kalliklēs. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε αἰεὶ σκυτέας καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγεῖρους λέγων καὶ λατροὺς, οὐδὲν παύῃ. Compare Plato, *Symposion*, p. 221, E; also Xenoph. *Memor.* i, 2, 37; iv, 5, 5.

² It is not easy to refer to specific passages in manifestation of the contrast set forth in the text, which, however, runs through large portions of many Platonic dialogues, under one form or another: see the *Menon*, c. 27–33, pp. 90–94; *Protagoras*, c. 28, 29, pp. 319, 320; *Politicus*, c. 38, p. 299, D; *Lachēs*, c. 11, 12, pp. 185, 186; *Gorgias*, c. 121, p. 501, A; *Alkibiadēs*, i, c. 12–14, pp. 108, 109, 110; c. 20, p. 113, C, D.

Xenoph. *Mem.* iii, 5, 21, 22; iv, 2, 20–23; iv, 4, 5; iv, 6, 1. Of these passages, iv, 2, 20, 23 is among the most remarkable.

It is remarkable that Sokratēs (in the Platonic *Apology*, c. 7, p. 22), when he is describing his wanderings (πλάνην) to test supposed knowledge, first in the statesmen, next in the poets, lastly in the artisans and craftsmen, finds satisfaction only in the answers which these latter made to him on matters concerning their respective trades or professions. They would have been wise men, had it not been for the circumstance that, because they knew these particular things, they fancied that they knew other things also.

one felt perfectly well-informed, and confident in his own knowledge; yet no one knew from whom, or by what steps, he had learned: no one had ever devoted any special reflection either to ends, or means, or obstructions: no one could explain or give a consistent account of the notions in his own mind, when pertinent questions were put to him: no one could teach another, as might be inferred, he thought, from the fact that there were no professed teachers, and that the sons of the best men were often destitute of merit: every one knew for himself, and laid down general propositions confidently, without looking up to any other man as knowing better; yet there was no end of dissension and dispute on particular cases.¹

Such was the general contrast which Sokratês sought to impress upon his hearers by a variety of questions bearing on it, directly or indirectly. One way of presenting it, which Plato devoted much of his genius to expand in dialogue, was, to discuss, Whether virtue be really teachable. How was it that superior men, like Aristeidês and Periklês,² acquired the eminent qualities essential for guiding and governing Athens, since they neither learned them under any known master, as they had studied music and gymnastics, nor could insure the same excellences to their sons, either through their own agency or through that of any master? Was it not rather the fact that virtue, as it was never expressly taught, so it was not really teachable; but was vouchsafed or withheld according to the special volition and grace of the gods? If a man has a young horse to be broken, or trained, he finds without difficulty a professed trainer, thoroughly conversant with the habits of the race,³ to communicate to the animal the excellence required; but whom can he find to teach virtue to his sons, with the like preliminary knowledge and assured result? Nay, how can any one either teach virtue, or affirm virtue to be teachable, unless he be prepared to explain what virtue is, and what are the points of analogy and difference between its various branches; justice, temperance, fortitude, prudence, etc.? In several of the Platonic dialogues, the discussion turns on the

¹ Plato, *Euthyphrôn*, c. 8, p. 7, D; *Xen. Mem.* iv, 4, 8.

² *Xenoph. Mem.* iv, 2, 2; Plato, *Meno*, c. 33, p. 94.

³ Compare Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 4, p. 20, A; *Xen. Mem.* iv, 2, 25.

analysis of these last-mentioned words: the "Lachês" and "Protagoras" on courage, the "Charmidês" on temperance, the "Euthyphrôn" on holiness.

By these and similar discussions did Sokratês, and Plato amplifying upon his master, raise indirectly all the important questions respecting society, human aspirations and duties, and the principal moral qualities which were accounted virtuous in individual men. As the general terms, on which his conversation turned, were among the most current and familiar in the language, so also the abundant instances of detail, whereby he tested the hearer's rational comprehension and consistent application of such large terms, were selected from the best known phenomena of daily life;¹ bringing home the inconsistency, if inconsistency there was, in a manner obvious to every one. The answers made to him,—not merely by ordinary citizens, but by men of talent and genius, such as the poets or the rhetors, when called upon for an explanation of the moral terms and ideas set forth in their own compositions,²—revealed alike that state of mind against which his crusade, enjoined and consecrated by the Delphian oracle, was directed, the semblance and conceit of knowledge without real knowledge. They proclaimed confident, unhesitating persuasion, on the greatest and gravest questions concerning man and society, in the bosoms of persons who had never bestowed upon them sufficient reflection to be aware that they involved any difficulty. Such persuasion had grown up gradually and unconsciously, partly by authoritative communication, partly by insensible transference, from others; the process beginning antecedent to reason as a capacity, continuing itself with little aid and no control from reason, and never being finally revised. With the great terms and current propositions concerning human life and society, a complex body of association had become accumulated from countless particulars, each separately trivial and lost to the memory, knit together by a powerful sentiment, and imbibed as it were by each man from the atmosphere of authority and example around

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv, 6, 15. "Ὅποτε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου· τοιγαροῦν πολλὰ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρείχε." *Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 7, p. 22, C: compare Plato, Ion. pp. 533, 534.*

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 7, p. 22, C: compare Plato, Ion. pp. 533, 534.

him. Upon this basis the fancied knowledge really rested ; and reason, when invoked at all, was called in simply as an handmaid, expositor, or apologist of the preëxisting sentiment ; as an accessory after the fact, not as a test or verification. Every man found these persuasions in his own mind, without knowing how they became established there ; and witnessed them in others, as portions of a general fund of unexamined common-place and credence. Because the words were at once of large meaning, embodied in old and familiar mental processes, and surrounded by a strong body of sentiment, the general assertions in which they were embodied appeared self-evident and imposing to every one : so that, in spite of continual dispute in particular cases, no one thought himself obliged to analyze the general propositions themselves, or to reflect whether he had verified their import, and could apply them rationally and consistently.¹

The phenomenon here adverted to is too obvious, even at the present day, to need further elucidation as matter of fact. In morals, in politics, in political economy, on all subjects relating to man and society, the like confident persuasion of knowledge without the reality is sufficiently prevalent : the like generation and propagation, by authority and example, of unverified convictions, resting upon strong sentiment, without consciousness of the steps or conditions of their growth ; the like enlistment of reason as the one-sided advocate of a preëstablished sentiment ; the like illusion, because every man is familiar with the language, that therefore every man is master of the complex facts, judgments, and tendencies, involved in its signification, and competent both to apply comprehensive words and to assume the truth or falsehood of large propositions, without any special analysis or study.²

¹ Ἄλλὰ τὰτα μὲν (says Sokratēs to Euthydēmus) ἴσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέναι, οὐδ' ἐκέψω (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 36) : compare Plato, Alkibiad. i, c. 14, p. 110, A.

² "Moins une science est avancée, moins elle a été bien traitée, et plus elle a besoin d'être enseignée. C'est ce qui me fait beaucoup désirer qu'on ne renonce pas en France à l'enseignement des sciences idéologiques, morales, et politiques ; qui, après tout, sont des sciences comme les autres — à la différence près, que ceux qui ne les ont pas étudiées sont persuadés de si bonne foi de les savoir, qu'ils se croient en état d'en décider. (Destutt de Tracy, *Elémens d'Idéologie*, Préface, p. xxxiv, ed. Paris, 1827.)

There is one important difference, however, to note, between our time and that of Sokratês. In his day, the impressions not only respecting man and society, but also respecting the physical world, were of this same self-sown, self-propagating, and unscientific character. The popular astronomy of the Sokratic age was an aggregate of primitive, superficial observations and imaginative inferences, passing unexamined from elder men to younger, accepted with unsuspecting faith, and consecrated by intense sentiment. Not only men like Nikias, or Anytus and Melêtus, but even Sokratês himself, protested against the impudence of Anaxagoras, when he degraded the divine Helios and Selênê into a sun and moon of calculable motions and magnitudes. But now, the development of the scientific point of view, with the vast increase of methodized physical and mathematical knowledge, has taught every one that such primitive astronomical and physical convictions were nothing better than "a fancy of knowledge without the reality."¹ Every one renounces them without hesitation, seeks his conclusions from the scientific teacher, and looks to the proofs alone for his guarantee. A man who has never bestowed special study on astronomy, knows that he is ignorant of it: to fancy that he knows it, without such preparation, would be held an absurdity. While the scientific point of view has thus acquired complete predominance in reference to the physical world, it has made little way comparatively on topics regarding man and society, wherein "fancy of knowledge without the

¹ "There is no science which, more than astronomy, stands in need of such a preparation, or draws more largely on that intellectual liberality which is ready to adopt whatever is demonstrated, or concede whatever is rendered highly probable, however new and uncommon the points of view may be, in which objects the most familiar may thereby become placed. Almost all its conclusions stand in open and striking contradiction with those of superficial and vulgar observation, and with what appears to every one, until he has understood and weighed the proofs to the contrary, the most positive evidence of his senses. Thus the earth on which he stands, and which has served for ages as the unshaken foundation of the firmest structures either of art or nature, is divested by the astronomer of its attribute of fixity, and conceived by him as turning swiftly on its centre, and at the same time moving onward through space with great rapidity, etc." (Sir John Herschel, *Astronomy*, Introduction, sect. 2.)

reality" continues to reign, not without criticism and opposition, yet still as a paramount force. And if a new Sokratês were now to put the same questions in the market-place to men of all ranks and professions, he would find the like confident persuasion and unsuspecting dogmatism as to generalities; the like faltering, blindness, and contradiction, when tested by cross-examining details.

In the time of Sokratês, this last comparison was not open; since there did not exist, in any department, a body of doctrine scientifically constituted: but the comparison which he actually took, borrowed from the special trades and professions, brought him to an important result. He was the first to see, and the idea pervades all his speculations, that as in each art or profession there is an end to be attained, a theory laying down the means and conditions whereby it is attainable, and precepts deduced from that theory, such precepts collectively taken directing and covering nearly the entire field of practice, but each precept separately taken liable to conflict with others, and therefore liable to cases of exception; so all this is not less true, or admits not less of being realized, respecting the general art of human living and society. There is a grand and all-comprehensive End,—the security and happiness, as far as practicable, of each and all persons in the society:¹ there may be a theory, laying

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv, 1, 2. Ἐτεκμαίρετο (Sokratês) δὲ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις, ἐκ τοῦ ταχύ τε μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιεν, καὶ μνημονεύειν ἃ ἀν μάθοιεν, καὶ ἐπιθυμῆν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων, δι' ὃν ἐστὶν οἰκίαν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους πράγμασιν εὖ χρῆσθαι. Τοὺς γὰρ τοιοῦτους ἡγεῖτο παιδευθέντας οὐκ ἂν μόνον αὐτοὺς τε εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι.

Ib. iii, 2, 4. Καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν, τίς εἴη ἀγαθὸς ἡγεμόνος ἀρετῇ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιήρει, κατέλειπε δὲ, τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν, ὃν ἂν ἡγήται.

Ib. iii, 8, 3, 4, 5; iv, 6, 8. He explains τὸ ἀγαθὸν to mean τὸ ὠφέλιμον—μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεπεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξήκει τοῖς συνοῦσι (iv, 7, 8). Compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 66, 67, p. 474, D; 475, A.

Things are called ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ on the one hand, and κακὰ καὶ αἰσχροὶα on the other, in reference each to its distinct end, of averting or mitigating in the one case, of bringing on or increasing in the other, different modes of human suffering. So again, iii, 9, 4, we find the phrases: ἃ δεῖ πράττειν—

down those means and conditions under which the nearest approach can be made to that end: there may also be precepts, prescribing to every man the conduct and character which best enables him to become an auxiliary towards its attainment, and imperatively restraining him from acts which tend to hinder it; precepts deduced from the theory, each one of them separately

ὁρθῶς πράττειν — τὰ συμφερότατα αὐτοῖς πράττειν, all used as equivalents.

Plato, *Symposion*, p. 205, A. Κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εὐδαίμονες ἔσονται — καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρεῖσθαι, ἵνα τι δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι; ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἢ ἀπόκρισις: compare *Euthydēm.* c. 20, p. 279, A; c. 25, p. 281, D.

Plato, *Alkibiadēs*, ii, c. 13, p. 145, C. Ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἢ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη — αὐτῇ δ' ἦν ἢ αὐτῇ δὴ πονοῦν ἢ περ καὶ ἢ τοῦ ὠφελίμου — φρόνιμον γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρῶντα ξύμβουλον, καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ· τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιοῦντα, τάναντία τούτων: compare Plato, *Republic*, vi, p. 504, E. The fact that this dialogue, called *Alkibiadēs II*, was considered by some as belonging not to Plato, but to Xenophor. or *Æschinēs Socraticus*, does not detract from its value as evidence about the speculations of Sokratēs (see *Diogen*, *Laërt.* ii, 61, 62; *Athenæus*, v, p. 220).

Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 17, p. 30, A. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πρᾶττων περιέρχομαι, ἢ πεῖθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους, μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μήτε οὕτω σφόδρα, ὥς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὥς ἀρίστη ἔσται· λέγων οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. ii, pp. 61–64) admits as a fact this reference of the Sokratic ethics to human security and happiness as their end; while Brandis (*Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosoph.* ii, p. 40, *seq.*) resorts to inadmissible suppositions, in order to avoid admitting it, and to explain away the direct testimony of Xenophon. Both of these authors consider this doctrine as a great taint in the philosophical character of Sokratēs. Zeller even says, what he intends for strong censure, that “the eudæmonistic basis of the Sokratic ethics differs from the *sophistical moral philosophy*, not in principle, but only in result,” (p. 61.)

I protest against this allusion to a *sophistical moral philosophy*, and have shown my grounds for the protest in the preceding chapter. There was no such thing as *sophistical moral philosophy*. Not only the sophists were no sect or school, but farther, not one of them ever aimed, so far as we know, at establishing any ethical theory: this was the great innovation of Sokratēs. But it is perfectly true that, between the preceptorial exhortation of Sokratēs, and that of Protagoras or Prodikus, there was no great or material difference; and this Zeller seems to admit.

taken being subject to exceptions, but all of them taken collectively governing practice, as in each particular art.¹ Sokratês and Plato talk of "the art of dealing with human beings," "the art of behaving in society," "that science which has for its object to make men happy:" and they draw a marked distinction between art, or rules of practice deduced from a theoretical survey of the subject-matter and taught with precognition of the end, and mere artless, irrational knack, or dexterity, acquired by simple copying, or assimilation, through a process of which no one could render account.²

Plato, with that variety of indirect allusion which is his characteristic, continually constrains the reader to look upon human and social life as having its own ends and purposes no less than each separate profession or craft; and impels him to transfer to the former that conscious analysis as a science, and intelligent practice as an art, which are known as conditions of success in the latter.³ It was in furtherance of these rational conceptions, "Science and Art," that Sokratês carried on his crusade against

¹ The existence of cases forming exceptions to each separate moral precept, is brought to view by Sokratês in Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 15-19; Plato, Republic, i, 6, p. 331, C, D, E; ii, p. 382, C.

² Plato, Phædon, c. 88, p. 89, E. *ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τάνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· εἰ γὰρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρητο, ὥσπερ ἐχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, etc. ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη, Protagor. c. 27, p. 319, A; Gorgias, c. 163, p. 521, D.*

Compare Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A, B; Euthydêmus, c. 50, p. 292, E: *τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη, ἥ ἡμᾶς ἐδδαίμονας ποιήσειεν; ...*

The marked distinction between *τέχνη*, as distinguished from *ἄτεχνος* *τριβὴ* — *ἄλογος* *τριβὴ* or *ἐμπειρία*, is noted in the Phædrus, c. 95, p. 260, E, and in Gorgias, c. 42, p. 463, B; c. 45, p. 465, A; c. 121, p. 501, A, a remarkable passage. That there is in every art some assignable end, to which its precepts and conditions have reference, is again laid down in the Sophistês, c. 37, p. 232, A.

³ This fundamental analogy, which governed the reasoning of Sokratês, between the special professions and social living generally, — transferring to the latter the idea of a preconceived end, a theory, and a regulated practice, or art, which are observed in the former, — is strikingly stated in one of the aphorisms of the emperor Marcus Antoninus, vi, 35: *Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς οἱ βάνανου τεχνῖται ἀρμόζονται μὲν ἄχρι τινὸς πρὸς τοῦς ἰδιώτας, οὐδὲν ἥσσον μέντοι ἀντέχονται τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τοῦτον ἀποσπῆναι οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν; Οὐ δεινὸν, εἰ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων, καὶ ὁ λατρός,*

"that conceit of knowledge without reality," which reigned undisturbed in the moral world around him, and was only beginning to be slightly disturbed even as to the physical world. To him the precept, inscribed in the Delphian temple, "Know Thyself," was the holiest of all texts, which he constantly cited, and strenuously enforced upon his hearers; interpreting it to mean, Know what sort of a man thou art, and what are thy capacities, in reference to human use.¹ His manner of enforcing it was alike original and effective, and though he was dexterous in varying his topics² and queries according to the individual person with whom he had to deal, it was his first object to bring the hearer to take just measure of his own real knowledge or real ignorance. To preach, to exhort, even to confute particular errors, appeared to Sokratês useless, so long as the mind lay wrapped up in its habitual mist or illusion of wisdom: such mist must be dissipated before any new light could enter. Accordingly, the hearer being usually forward in announcing positive declarations on those general doctrines, and explanations of those terms, to which he was most attached and in which he had the most implicit confidence, Sokratês took them to pieces, and showed that they involved contradiction and inconsistency; professing himself to be without any positive opinion, nor ever advancing any until the hearer's mind had undergone the proper purifying cross-examination.³

μᾶλλον αἰδέσονται τὸν τῆς ἰδίας τέχνης λόγον, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὃς αὐτῷ κοινός ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς;

¹ Plato (Phædr. c. 8, p. 229, E; Charmidês, c. 26, p. 164, E; Alkibiad. i, p. 124, A; 129, A; 131, A.

Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 24-26. οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρειαίαν, ἐγνώκε τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Cicero (de Legib. i, 22, 59) gives a paraphrase of this well-known text, far more vague and tumid than the conception of Sokratês.

² See the striking conversations of Sokratês with Glaukon and Charmidês, especially that with the former, in Xen. Mem. iii, c. 6, 7.

³ There is no part of Plato in which this doxosophy, or false conceit of wisdom, is more earnestly reprobated than in the Sophistês, with notice of the elenchus, or cross-examining exposure, as the only effectual cure for such fundamental vice of the mind; as the true purifying process (Sophistês, c. 33-35, pp. 230, 231).

See the same process illustrated by Sokratês, after his questions put to

It was this indirect and negative proceeding, which, though only a part of the whole, stood out as his most original and most conspicuous characteristic, and determined his reputation with a large number of persons who took no trouble to know anything else about him. It was an exposure no less painful than surprising to the person questioned, and produced upon several of them an effect of permanent alienation, so that they never came near him again,¹ but reverted to their former state of mind without any permanent change. But on the other hand, the ingenuity and novelty of the process was highly interesting to hearers, especially youthful hearers, sons of rich men, and enjoying leisure; who not only carried away with them a lofty admiration of Sokratēs, but were fond of trying to copy his negative polemics.² Probably men like Alkibiadēs and Kritias frequented his society chiefly for the purpose of acquiring a quality which they might turn to some account in their political career. His constant habit of never suffering a general term to remain undetermined, but applying it at once to particulars; the homely and effective instances of

the slave of Menon (Plato, Menon, c. 18, p. 84, B; Charmidēs, c. 30, p. 166, D).

As the Platonic Sokratēs, even in the Defence, where his own personality stands most manifest, denounces as the worst and deepest of all mental defects, this conceit of knowledge without reality, ἡ ἀμαθία αὐτῇ ἡ ἐπανεϊδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι ἀ οὐκ οἶδεν, c. 17, p. 29, B,—so the Xenophontic Sokratēs, in the same manner, treats this same mental infirmity as being near to madness, and distinguishes it carefully from simple want of knowledge, or conscious ignorance: Μανίαν γε μὴν ἐνάντιον μὲν ἐφη εἶναι σοφίᾳ, οὐ μέντοι γε τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζεν. Τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ ἀ μὴ τις οἶδε δοξάζειν, καὶ οἰεσθαι γινώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι (Mem. iii, 9, 6). This conviction thus stands foremost in the mental character of Sokratēs, and on the best evidence, Plato and Xenophon united.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσήεσαν, οὐδὲ καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 9, p. 23, A. Οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἀ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.

Ibid. c. 10, p. 23, C. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμουμένται, εἴτα σκιχευροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν, etc.

Compare also ibid. c. 22, p. 33, C; c. 27, p. 37, D.

which he made choice; the string of interrogatories each advancing towards a result, yet a result not foreseen by any one; the indirect and circuitous manner whereby the subject was turned round, and at last approached and laid open by a totally different face, all this constituted a sort of prerogative in Sokratês, which no one else seems to have approached. Its effect was enhanced by a voice and manner highly plausible and captivating, and to a certain extent by the very eccentricity of his silenic physiognomy.¹ What is termed "his irony," or assumption of the character of an ignorant learner, asking information from one who knew better than himself, while it was essential² as an excuse for his practice as a questioner, contributed also to add zest and novelty to his conversation; and totally banished from it both didactic pedantry and seeming bias as an advocate; which, to one who talked so much, was of no small advantage. After he had acquired celebrity, this uniform profession of ignorance in debate was usually construed as mere affectation; and those who merely heard him occasionally, without penetrating into his intimacy, often suspected that he was amusing himself with ingenious paradox.³ Timon the Satirist, and Zeno the Epicurean, accordingly described him as a buffoon, who turned every one into ridicule, especially men of eminence.⁴

¹ This is an interesting testimony preserved by Aristoxenus, on the testimony of his father Spintharus, who heard Sokratês (Aristox. Frag. 28, ed. Didot). Spintharus said, respecting Sokratês: *ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκὼς εἶη· τοιαύτην εἶναι τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφανόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι τε τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν τοῦ εἶδους ὁδότητα.*

It seems evident also, from the remarkable passage in Plato's Symposium, c. 39, p. 215, A, that he too must have been much affected by the singular physiognomy of Sokratês: compare Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 19.

² Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 32, p. 183, b. 6. Compare also Plutarch, Quæst. Platonic. p. 999, E. *Τὸν οὖν ἐλεγκτικὸν λόγον ὥσπερ καθαρτικὸν ἔχων φάρμακον, ὁ Σωκράτης ἀξιόπιστος ἦν ἑτέροις ἐλέγχων, τῷ μὴδὲν ἀποφάνεσθαι· καὶ μᾶλλον ἤπτετο, δοκῶν ζητεῖν κοινῇ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ βoηθεῖν.*

³ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 4, 9.

Plato, Gorgias, c. 81, p. 481, B. *σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;* Republic, i, c. 11, p. 337, A. *αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἡ εὐθυσία εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους,* etc. (Apol. Sok. c. 28, p. 38, A.)

⁴ Diog. Laërt. ii, 16; Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i, 34, 93. Cicero (Brutus,

It is by Plato that the negative and indirect vein of Sokratēs has been worked out and immortalized; while Xenophon, who sympathized little in it, complains that others looked at his master too exclusively on this side, and that they could not conceive him as a guide to virtue, but only as a stirring and propulsive force.¹ One of the principal objects of his "Memorabilia" is, to show that Sokratēs, after having worked upon novices sufficiently with the negative line of questions, altered his tone, desisted from embarrassing them, and addressed to them precepts not less plain and simple than directly useful in practice.² I do not at all doubt that this was often the fact, and that the various dialogues in which Xenophon presents to us the philosopher inculcating self-control, temperance, piety, duty to parents, brotherly love, fidelity in friendship, diligence, benevolence, etc., on positive grounds, are a faithful picture of one valuable side of his character, and an essential part of the whole. Such direct admonitory influence was common to Sokratēs with Prodikus and the best of the sophists.

It is, however, neither from the virtue of his life, nor from the

85, 292) also treats the irony of Sokratēs as intended to mock and humiliate his fellow-dialogists, and it sometimes appears so in the dialogues of Plato. Yet I doubt whether the real Sokratēs could have had any pronounced purpose of this kind.

¹ The beginning of Xen. Mem. i, 4, 1, is particularly striking on this head: *Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν (ὥς ἐνιοὶ γράφουσι τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι) προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δὲ ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν—σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνδιημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσιν, δοκιμαζόντων, εἰ ἱκανὸς ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας.*

² Xenophon, after describing the dialogue wherein Sokratēs cross-examines and humiliates Euthydēmus, says at the end: *Ὁ δὲ (Sokratēs) ὥς ἔγνω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἡκιστα μὲν αὐτὸν διετάραττεν, ἀπλούστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα ἐξηγεῖτο ἃ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν καὶ ἃ ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.*

Again, iv, 7, 1. *Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων εἶναι, etc.*

His readers were evidently likely to doubt, and required proof, that Sokratēs could speak *plainly, directly, and positively*: so much better known was the other side of his character.

goodness of his precepts — though both were essential features in his character — that he derives his peculiar title to fame, but from his originality and prolific efficacy in the line of speculative philosophy. Of that originality, the first portion, as has been just stated, consisted in his having been the first to conceive the idea of an ethical science with its appropriate end, and with precepts capable of being tested and improved; but the second point, and not the least important, was, his peculiar method, and extraordinary power of exciting scientific impulse and capacity in the minds of others. It was not by positive teaching that this effect was produced. Both Sokratês and Plato thought that little mental improvement could be produced by expositions directly communicated, or by new written matter lodged in the memory.¹ It was necessary that mind should work upon mind, by short question and answer, or an expert employment of the dialectic process,² in order to generate new thoughts and powers; a process which Plato, with his exuberant fancy, compares to copulation and pregnancy, representing it as the true way, and the only effectual way, of propagating the philosophic spirit.

We should greatly misunderstand the negative and indirect vein of Sokratês, if we suppose that it ended in nothing more than simple negation. On busy or ungifted minds, among the indiscriminate public who heard him, it probably left little permanent effect of any kind, and ended in a mere feeling of admiration for ingenuity, or perhaps dislike of paradox: on practical minds like Xenophon, its effect was merged in that of the preceptorial exhortation: but where the seed fell upon an intellect having the least predisposition or capacity for systematic thought, the negation had only the effect of driving the hearer back at first, giving him a new impetus for afterwards springing forward. The Sokratic dialectics, clearing away from the mind its mist of

¹ Plato, *Sophistês*, c. 17, p. 230, A. *μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νοουθητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν*, etc. Compare a fragment of Demokritus, in Mullach's edition of the *Fragm. Demokrit.* p. 175. Fr. Moral. 59. *Τὸν ολόμενον νόον ἔχειν ὁ νοουθετῶν ματαιοπονέει*.

Compare Plato, *Epistol.* vii, pp. 343, 344.

² Compare two passages in Plato's *Protagoras*, c. 49, p. 329, A, and c. 94, p. 348, D; and the *Phædrus*, c. 138–140, p. 276, A, E.

fancied knowledge, and laying bare the real ignorance, produced an immediate effect like the touch of the torpedo:¹ the newly-created consciousness of ignorance was alike unexpected, painful, and humiliating, — a season of doubt and discomfort; yet combined with an internal working and yearning after truth, never before experienced. Such intellectual quickening, which could never commence until the mind had been disabused of its original illusion of false knowledge, was considered by Sokratês not merely as the index and precursor, but as the indispensable condition, of future progress. It was the middle point in the ascending mental scale; the lowest point being ignorance unconscious, self-satisfied, and mistaking itself for knowledge; the next above, ignorance conscious, unmasked, ashamed of itself, and thirsting after knowledge as yet unpossessed; while actual knowledge, the third and highest stage, was only attainable after passing through the second as a preliminary.² This second, was a sort of pregnancy; and every mind either by nature incapable of it, or in which, from want of the necessary conjunction, it had never arisen, was barren for all purposes of original or self-appropriated thought. Sokratês regarded it as his peculiar vocation and skill, employing another Platonic metaphor, while he had himself no power of reproduction, to deal with such pregnant and troubled minds in the capacity of a midwife; to assist them in that mental parturition whereby they were to be relieved, but at the same time to scrutinize narrowly the offspring which they brought forth; and if it should prove distorted or unpromising, to cast it away with the rigor of a Lykurgian nurse, whatever might be the reluctance of the mother-mind to part with its new-born.³

¹ Plato, Men. c. 13, p. 80, A. *ὁμοίωτος τῇ πλατεῖα νύκτῃ τῇ θαλασσίᾳ.*

² This tripartite graduation of the intellectual scale is brought out by Plato in the Symposium, c. 29, p. 204, A, and in the Lysis, c. 33, p. 218, A.

The intermediate point of the scale is what Plato here, though not always, expresses by the word *φιλόσοφος*, in its strict etymological sense, "a lover of knowledge;" one who is not yet wise, but who, having learned to know and feel his own ignorance, is anxious to become wise, — and has thus made what Plato thought the greatest and most difficult step towards really becoming so.

³ The effect of the interrogatory procedure of Sokratês, in forcing on the minds of youth a humiliating consciousness of ignorance and an eager

There is nothing which Plato is more fertile in illustrating, than this relation between the teacher and the scholar, operating not by what it put into the latter, but by what it evolved out of him; by creating an uneasy longing after truth, aiding in the elaboration necessary for obtaining relief, and testing whether the doctrine elaborated possessed the real lineaments, or merely the delusive semblance, of truth.

There are few things more remarkable than the description given of the colloquial magic of Sokrates and its vehement effects, by those who had themselves heard it and felt its force. Its suggestive and stimulating power was a gift so extraordinary, as well to justify any abundance of imagery on the part of Plato to illustrate it.¹ On the subjects to which he applied himself, man and society, his hearers had done little but feel and affirm:

anxiety to be relieved from it, is not less powerfully attested in the simpler language of Xenophon, than in the metaphorical variety of Plato. See the conversation with Euthydēmus, in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, iv, 2; a long dialogue which ends by the confession of the latter (c. 39): 'Αναγκάζει με ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δηλονότι ἢ ἐμὴ φανλότης· καὶ φροντίζω μὴ κράτιστον ἔμοι σιγᾶν· κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι. Καὶ πάνν ἀθύρμῳς ἔχων ἀπηλθε· καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι: compare i, 1, 16.

This same expression, "thinking himself no better than a slave," is also put by Plato into the mouth of Alkibiadēs, when he is describing the powerful effect wrought on his mind by the conversation of Sokratēs (Symposion, c. 39, p. 215, 216): Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων καὶ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων εὐ μὲν ἡγούμην, τοιοῦτον δ' οὐδὲν ἔπασχον, οὐδὲ τεθορύβητό μου ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδ' ἡγανάκτει ὥς ἀνδράποδῶδ' ὡς διακειμένον. 'Αλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦτου τοῦ Μαρσύου πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω διετέσθην, ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὥς ἔχω.

Compare also the Meno, c. 13, p. 79, E, and Theætet. c. 17, 22, p. 148, E, 151, C, where the metaphor of pregnancy, and of the obstetric art of Sokratēs, is expanded: πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ αἱ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτ' αὐταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλονται νυκτὰς τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι. Ταύτην τε τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται — 'Ενίστε δὲ, αἱ ἂν μὴ μοι δόξωσιν ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοῦς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνν εὐμενῶς προμῶμαι, etc.

¹ There is a striking expression of Xenophon, in the Memorabilia, about Sokratēs and his conversation (i, 2, 14): —

"He dealt with every one just as he pleased in his discussions," says Xenophon: τοῖς δὲ διαλεγόμενοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως ἐβούλετο.

Sokratês undertook to make them think, weigh, and examine themselves and their own judgments, until the latter were brought into consistency with each other, as well as with a known and venerable end. The generalizations embodied in their judgments had grown together and coalesced in a manner at once so intimate, so familiar, yet so unverified, that the particulars implied in them had passed out of notice: so that Sokratês, when he recalled these particulars out of a forgotten experience, presented to the hearer his own opinions under a totally new point of view. His conversations — even as they appear in the reproduction of Xenophon, which presents but a mere skeleton of the reality — exhibit the main features of a genuine inductive method, struggling against the deep-lying, but unheeded, errors of the early intellect acting by itself, without conscious march or scientific guidance, — of the *intellectus sibi permissus*, — upon which Bacon so emphatically dwells. Amidst abundance of *instantiæ negativæ*, the scientific value of which is dwelt upon in the “*Novum Organon*,”¹ and

¹ I know nothing so clearly illustrating both the subjects and the method chosen by Sokratês, as various passages of the immortal criticisms in the *Novum Organon*. When Sokratês, as Xenophon tells us, devoted his time to questioning others: What is piety? What is justice? What is temperance, courage, political government? etc., we best understand the spirit of his procedure by comparing the sentence which Bacon pronounces upon the *first notions of the intellect*, — as radically vicious, confused, badly abstracted from things, and needing complete re-examination and revision, — without which, he says, not one of them could be trusted: —

“Quod vero attinet ad notiones primas intellectûs, nihil est eorum, quas *intellectus sibi permissus* conguessit, quin nobis pro suspecto sit, nec ullo modo ratum nisi novo judicio se stiterit, et secundum illud pronuntiatum fuerit.” (Distributio Operis, prefixed to the N. O. p. 168, of Mr. Montagu's edition.) “Serum sane rebus perditis adhibetur remedium, postquam mens ex quotidianâ vitæ consuetudine, et auditionibus, et doctrinis inquinatis occupata, et vanissimis idolis obsessa fuerit. . . . Restat unica salus ac sanitas, ut *opus mentis universum de integro resumatur*; ac mens, jam ab ipso principio, nullo modo sibi permittatur, sed perpetuo regatur.” (Ib. Præfatio, p. 186.) “Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesserae sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsæ (id quod basis rei est) confusæ sint et temere a rebus abstractæ, nihil in iis quæ superstruuntur est firmitudinis. Itaque spes est una in inductione verâ. In *notionibus nihil sani est*, nec in logicis, nec in physicis. Non *Substantia, non Qualitas, Agere, Pati, ipsum Esse, bonæ notiones sunt*; multo minus Grave, Leve, Dersum, Tenue, Humidum, Siccum, Generatio, Corruptio, Attrahere, Fugare, Elementum, Materia,

negative instances, too, so dexterously chosen as generally to show the way to new truth, in place of that error which they set aside,

Forma, et id Genus; sed omnes phantasticæ et male terminatæ. Notiones infimarum specierum, Hominis, Canis, et prehensionum immediatarum sensus, Albi, Nigri, non fallunt magnopere: *reliquæ omnes (quibus homines hactenus usi sunt) aberrationes sunt, nec debitæ modis a rebus abstractæ et excitatæ.*" (Aphor. 14, 15, 16.) "Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi imposuerit, *theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia de integro applicare.* Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries." (Aphor. 97.) "Nil magis philosophiæ officisse deprehendimus, quam quod res quæ familiares sunt et frequenter occurrunt, contemplationem hominum non morentur et detineant, sed recipiantur obiter, neque earum causæ quasi soleant; ut non sæpius requiratur informatio de rebus ignotis, quam attentio in notis." (Aphor. 119.)

These passages, and many others to the same effect which might be extracted from the Novum Organon, afford a clear illustration and an interesting parallel to the spirit and purpose of Sokratês. He sought to test the fundamental notions and generalizations respecting man and society, in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics: he suspected the unconscious process of the growing intellect, and desired to revise it, by comparison with particulars; and from particulars too the most clear and certain, but which, from being of vulgar occurrence, were least attended to. And that which Sokratês described in his language as "conceit of knowledge without the reality," is identical with what Bacon designates as the *primary notions*, the *puerile notions*, the *aberrations*, of the intellect left to itself, which have become so familiar and appear so certainly known, that the mind cannot shake them off, and has lost all habit, we might almost say all power, of examining them.

The stringent process — or electric shock, to use the simile in Plato's Menon — of the Sokratic elenchus, afforded the best means of resuscitating this lost power. And the manner in which Plato speaks of this cross-examining elenchus, as "the great and sovereign purification, without which every man, be he the great king himself, is unschooled, dirty, and full of uncleanness in respect to the main conditions of happiness," — καὶ τὸν ἐλεγχον λεπτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὐ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ μέγας βασιλεὺς ὢν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάρητον ὄντα· ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ ἀσχυρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ἃ καθαρῶτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; Plato, Sophist. c. 34, p. 230, E, — precisely corresponds to that "cross-examination of human reason in its native or spontaneous process," which Bacon specifies as one of the three things essential to the expurgation of the intellect, so as to qualify it for the attainment of truth: "Itaque doctrina ista de expurgatione intellectûs, ut ipse ad veritatem habilis sit, tribus redargutionibus absolvitur;

— there is a close pressure on the hearer's mind, to keep it in the distinct tract of particulars, as conditions of every just and consistent generalization; and to divert it from becoming enslaved to unexamined formulæ, or from delivering mere intensity of persuasion under the authoritative phrase of reason. Instead of anxiety to plant in the hearer a conclusion ready-made and accepted on trust, the questioner keeps up a prolonged suspense with special emphasis laid upon the particulars tending both affirmatively and negatively; nor is his purpose answered, until that state of knowledge and apprehended evidence is created, out of which the conclusion starts as a living product, with its own root and self-sustaining power consciously linked with its premises. If this conclusion so generated be not the same as that which the questioner himself adopts, it will at least be some other, worthy of a competent and examining mind taking its own

redargutione philosophiarum, redargutione demonstrationum, et redargutione rationis humane native." (Nov. Organ. Distributio Operis, p. 170, ed. Montagu)

To show further how essential it is, in the opinion of the best judges, that the native intellect should be purged or purified, before it can properly apprehend the truths of physical philosophy, I transcribe the introductory passage of Sir John Herschel's "Astronomy:"—

"In entering upon any scientific pursuit, one of the student's first endeavors ought to be to prepare his mind for the reception of truth, by dismissing, or at least loosening his hold on, all such crude and hastily adopted notions respecting the objects and relations he is about to examine, as may tend to embarrass or mislead him; and to strengthen himself, by *something of an effort and a resolve*, for the unprejudiced admission of any conclusion which shall appear to be supported by careful observation and logical argument; even should it prove adverse to notions he may have previously formed for himself, or taken up, without examination on the credit of others. *Such an effort is, in fact, a commencement of that intellectual discipline which forms one of the most important ends of all science.* It is the first movement of approach towards that state of mental purity which alone can fit us for a full and steady perception of moral beauty as well as physical adaptation. It is the "euphrasy and rue," with which we must purge our sight before we can receive, and contemplate as they are, the lineaments of truth and nature." (Sir John Herschel, Astronomy; Introduction.)

I could easily multiply citations from other eminent writers on physical philosophy, to the same purpose. All of them prescribe this intellectual purification: Sokratēs not only prescribed it, but actually administered it, by means of his elenchus, in reference to the subjects on which he talked.

independent view of the appropriate evidence. And amidst all the variety and divergence of particulars which we find enforced in the language of Sokratês, the end, towards which all of them point, is one and the same, emphatically signified, the good and happiness of social man.

It is not, then, to multiply proselytes, or to procure authoritative assent, but to create earnest seekers, analytical intellects, foreknowing and consistent agents, capable of forming conclusions for themselves and of teaching others, as well as to force them into that path of inductive generalization whereby alone trustworthy conclusions can be formed, that the Sokratic method aspires. In many of the Platonic dialogues, wherein Sokratês is brought forward as the principal disputant, we read a series of discussions and arguments, distinct, though having reference to the same subject, but terminating either in a result purely negative, or without any definite result at all. The commentators often attempt, but in my judgment with little success, either by arranging the dialogues in a supposed sequence or by various other hypotheses, to assign some positive doctrinal conclusion as having been indirectly contemplated by the author. But if Plato had aimed at any substantive demonstration of this sort, we cannot well imagine that he would have left his purpose thus in the dark, visible only by the microscope of a critic. The didactic value of these dialogues — that wherein the genuine Sokratic spirit stands most manifest — consists, not in the positive conclusion proved, but in the argumentative process itself, coupled with the general importance of the subject, upon which evidence negative and affirmative is brought to bear.

This connects itself with that which I remarked in the preceding chapter, when mentioning Zeno and the first manifestations of dialectics, respecting the large sweep, the many-sided argumentation, and the strength as well as forwardness of the negative arm, in Grecian speculative philosophy. Through Sokratês, this amplitude of dialectic range was transmitted from Zeno, first to Plato and next to Aristotle. It was a proceeding natural to men who were not merely interested in establishing, or refuting, some given particular conclusion, but who also — like expert mathematicians in their own science — loved, esteemed, and sought to improve the dialectic process itself, with the means of

verification which it afforded; a feeling, of which abundant evidence is to be found in the Platonic writings.¹ Such pleasure in the scientific operation,—though not merely innocent, but valuable both as a stimulant and as a guarantee against error, and though the corresponding taste among mathematicians is always treated with the sympathy which it deserves,—incurs much unmerited reprobation from modern historians of philosophy, under the name of love of disputation, cavilling, or skeptical subtlety.

But over and above any love of the process, the subjects to which dialectics were applied, from Sokratês downwards,—man and society, ethics, politics, metaphysics, etc., were such as particularly called for this many-sided handling. On topics like these, relating to sequences of fact which depend upon a multitude of coöperating or conflicting causes, it is impossible to arrive, by any one thread of positive reasoning or induction, at absolute doctrine, which a man may reckon upon finding always true, whether he remembers the proof or not; as is the case with mathematical, astronomical, or physical truth. The utmost which science can ascertain, on subjects thus complicated, is an aggregate, not of peremptory theorems and predictions, but of tendencies;² by studying the action of each separate cause, and combining them together as well as our means admit. The knowledge of tendencies thus obtained, though falling much short of certainty, is highly important for guidance: but it is plain that conclusions of this nature, resulting from multifarious threads of evidence, true only on a balance, and always liable to limitation, can never be safely detached from the proofs on which they rest, or taught as absolute and consecrated formulæ.³ They require to be kept

¹ See particularly the remarkable passage in the *Philêbus*, c. 18, p. 16, *seq.*

² See this point instructively set forth in Mr. John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, vol. ii, book vi, p. 565, 1st edition.

³ Lord Bacon remarks, in the *Novum Organon* (Aph. 71):—

“*Erat autem sapientia Græcorum professoria, et in disputationes effusa, quod genus inquisitioni veritatis adversissimum est. Itaque nomen illud Sophistarum—quod per contemptum ab iis, qui se philosophos haberi voluerunt, in antiquos rhetores rejectum et traductum est, Gorgiam, Protagoram, Hippiam, Polam—etiam universo generi competit, Platoni, Aristoteli, Zenoni, Epicuro, Theophrasto, et eorum successoribus, Chrysippo, Carneadi, reliquis.*”

in perpetual and conscious association with the evidences, affirmative and negative, by the joint consideration of which their truth is established; nor can this object be attained by any other means than by ever-renovated discussion, instituted from new and distinct points of view, and with free play to that negative arm which is indispensable as stimulus not less than as control. To ask for nothing but results, to decline the labor of verification, to be satisfied with a ready-made stock of established positive arguments as proof, and to decry the doubter or negative reasoner, who starts new difficulties, as a common enemy, this is a proceeding sufficiently common, in ancient as well as in modern times. But it is, nevertheless, an abnegation of the dignity, and even of the functions, of speculative philosophy. It is the direct reverse of the method both of Sokratēs and Plato, who, as inquirers, felt that, for the great subjects which they treated, multiplied threads of reasoning, coupled with the constant presence of the cross-examining elenchus, were indispensable. Nor is it less at variance with the views of Aristotle, — though a man very different from either of them, — who goes round his subject on all sides, states and considers all its difficulties, and insists emphatically on the necessity of having all these difficulties brought out in full force, as the incitement and guide to positive philosophy, as well as the test of its sufficiency.¹

Bacon is quite right in effacing the distinction between the two lists of persons whom he compares; and in saying that the latter were just as much sophists as the former, in the sense which he here gives to the word, as well as in every other legitimate sense. But he is not justified in imputing to either of them this many-sided argumentation as a fault, looking to the subjects upon which they brought it to bear. His remark has application to the simpler physical sciences, but none to the moral. It had great pertinence and value, at the time when he brought it forward, and with reference to the important reforms which he was seeking to accomplish in physical science. In so far as Plato, Aristotle, or the other Greek philosophers, apply their deductive method to physical subjects, they come justly under Bacon's censure. But here again, the fault consisted less in disputing too much, than in too hastily admitting false or inaccurate axioms without dispute.

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphysic.* iii, 1, 2-5, p. 995, a.

The indispensable necessity, to a philosopher, of having before him all the difficulties and doubts of the problem which he tries to solve, and of

Understanding thus the method of Sokratēs, we shall be at no loss to account for a certain variance on his part — and a still greater variance on the part of Plato, who expanded the method in writing so much more — with the sophists, without supposing the latter to be corrupt teachers. As they aimed at qualifying young men for active life, they accepted the current ethical and political sentiment, with its unexamined commonplaces and inconsistencies, merely seeking to shape it into what was accounted a meritorious character at Athens. They were thus exposed,

looking at a philosophical question with the same alternate attention to its affirmative and negative side, as is shown by a judge to two litigants, is strikingly set forth in this passage. I transcribe a portion of it: 'Ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργον τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λῦειν δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν. . . . Διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκεῖναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνω τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον, ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἰ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὗρηκεν, ἢ μὴ, γινώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. Ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν, τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκκοῦτα πάντων.

A little further on, in the same chapter (iii, 1, 19, p. 996, a), he makes a remarkable observation. Not merely it is difficult, on these philosophical subjects, to get at the truth, but it is not easy to perform well even the preliminary task of discerning and setting forth the ratiocinative difficulties which are to be dealt with: Περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ ῥᾳδίον καλῶς. Διαπορῆσαι means the same as διεξελεῖν τὰς ἀπορίας (Bonitz. *not. ad loc.*), "to go through the various points of difficulty."

This last passage illustrates well the characteristic gift of Sokratēs, which was exactly what Aristotle calls τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ καλῶς; to force on the hearer's mind those ratiocinative-difficulties which served both as spur and as guide towards solution and positive truth; towards comprehensive and correct generalization, with clear consciousness of the common attribute binding together the various particulars included.

The same care to admit and even invite the development of the negative side of a question, to accept the obligation of grappling with all the difficulties, to assimilate the process of inquiry to a judicial pleading, is to be seen in other passages of Aristotle; see *Ethic. Nikomach.* vii, 1, 5; *De Animā*, i, 2, p. 403, b; *De Cælo*, i, 10, p. 279, b; *Topica*, i, 2, p. 101, a: (*Χρήσιμος δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ*) πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω διαπορῆσαι, ῥᾶν ἐν ἐκάστοις κατοφόμεθα τάληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. Compare also Cicero, *Tusc. Disput.* ii, 3, 9.

along with others — and more than others, in consequence of their reputation — to the analytical cross-examination of Sokratês, and were quite as little able to defend themselves against it.

Whatever may have been the success of Protagoras or any other among these sophists, the mighty originality of Sokratês achieved results not only equal at the time, but incomparably grander and more lasting in reference to the future. Out of his intellectual school sprang not merely Plato, himself a host, but all the other leaders of Grecian speculation for the next half-century, and all those who continued the great line of speculative philosophy down to later times. Eukleidês and the Megaric school of philosophers, — Aristippus and the Kyrenaic, — Antisthenês and Diogenês, the first of those called the Cynics, all emanated more or less directly from the stimulus imparted by Sokratês, though each followed a different vein of thought.¹ Ethics continue to be what Sokratês had first made them, a distinct branch of philosophy, alongside of which politics, rhetoric, logic, and other speculations relating to man and society, gradually arranged themselves; all of them more popular, as well as more keenly controverted, than physics, which at that time presented comparatively little charm, and still less of attainable certainty. There can be no doubt that the individual influence of Sokratês permanently enlarged the horizon, improved the method, and multiplied the ascendent minds, of the Grecian speculative world, in a manner never since paralleled. Subsequent philosophers may have had a more elaborate doctrine, and a larger number of disciples who imbibed their ideas; but none of them applied the same stimulating method with the same efficacy; none of them struck out of other minds that fire which sets light to original thought; none of them either produced in others the pains of intellectual pregnancy, or extracted from others the fresh and unborrowed offspring of a really parturient mind.

Having thus touched upon Sokratês, both as first opener of

¹ Cicero (de Orator. iii, 16, 61; Tuscul. Disput. v, 4, 11): "Cujus (Socratis) multiplex ratio disputandi, rerumque varietas, et ingenii magnitudo, Platonis ingenio et literis consecrata, plura genera effecit dissentientium philosophorum." Ten distinct varieties of Sokratic philosophers are enumerated; but I lay little stress on the exact number.

the field of ethics to scientific study, and as author of a method, little copied and never paralleled since his time, for stimulating in other men's minds earnest analytical inquiry, I speak last about his theoretical doctrine. Considering the fanciful, far-fetched ideas, upon which alone the Pythagoreans and other predecessors had shaped their theories respecting virtues and vices, the wonder is that Sokratês, who had no better guides to follow, should have laid down an ethical doctrine which has the double merit of being true, as far as it goes, legitimate, and of comprehensive generality: though it errs, mainly by stating a part of the essential conditions of virtue¹ — sometimes also a part of the ethical end — as if it were the whole. Sokratês resolved all virtue into knowledge or wisdom; all vice, into ignorance or folly. To do right was the only way to impart happiness, or the least degree of unhappiness compatible with any given situation: now this was precisely what every one wished for and aimed at; only that many persons, from ignorance, took the wrong road; and no man was wise enough always to take the right. But as no man was willingly his own enemy, so no man ever did wrong willingly; it was because he was not fully or correctly informed of the consequences of his own actions; so that the proper remedy to apply was enlarged teaching of consequences and improved judgment.² To make him willing to be taught, the only condition required was to make him conscious of his own ignorance; the want of which consciousness was the real cause both of indocility and of vice.

That this doctrine sets forth one portion of the essential condi-

¹ In setting forth the ethical end, the language of Sokratês, as far as we can judge from Xenophon and Plato, seems to have been not always consistent with itself. He sometimes stated it as if it included a reference to the happiness, not merely of the agent himself, but of others besides; both as coördinate elements; at other times, he seems to speak as if the end was nothing more than the happiness of the agent himself, though the happiness of others was among the greatest and most essential means. The former view is rather countenanced by Xenophon, the best witness about his master, so that I have given it as belonging to Sokratês, though it is not always adhered to. The latter view appears most in Plato, who assimilates the health of the soul to the health of the body, an end essentially self-regarding.

² Cicero, de Orator. i, 47, 204.

tions of virtue, is certain; and that too the most commanding portion, since there can be no assured moral conduct except under the supremacy of reason. But that it omits to notice, what is not less essential to virtue, the proper condition of the emotions, desires, etc., taking account only of the intellect, is also certain; and has been remarked by Aristotle¹ as well as by many others. It is fruitless, in my judgment, to attempt by any refined explanation to make out that Sokratês meant, by "knowledge," something more than what is directly implied in the word. He had present to his mind, as the grand depravation of the human being, not so much vice, as madness; that state in which a man does not know what he is doing. Against the vicious man, securities both public and private may be taken, with considerable effect; against the madman there is no security except perpetual restraint. He is incapable of any of the duties incumbent on social man, nor can he, even if he wishes, do good either to himself or to others. The sentiment which we feel towards such an unhappy being is, indeed, something totally different from moral reprobation, such as we feel for the vicious man who does wrong knowingly. But Sokratês took measure of both with reference to the purposes of human life and society, and pronounced that the latter was less completely spoiled for those purposes than the former. Madness was ignorance at its extreme pitch, accompanied, too, by the circumstance that the madman himself was unconscious of his own ignorance, acting under a sincere persuasion that he knew what he was doing. But short of this extremity, there were many varieties and gradations in the scale of ignorance, which, if accompanied by false conceit of knowledge, differed from madness only in degree, and each of which disqualified a man from doing right, in proportion to the ground which it covered. The worst of all ignorance — that which stood nearest to madness — was when a man was ignorant of himself, fancying that he knew what he did not really know, and that he could do, or avoid, or endure, what was quite beyond his capacity; when, for example, intending to speak the same truth, he sometimes said one thing, sometimes another; or, casting up the same

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iii, 9, 4; Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. vi, 13, 3-5; Ethic. Eudem. i, 5; Ethic. Magn. i, 35.

arithmetical figures, made sometimes a greater sum, sometimes a less. A person who knows his letters, or an arithmetician, may doubtless write bad orthography or cast-up incorrectly, by design, but can also perform the operations correctly, if he chooses; while one ignorant of writing or of arithmetic, *cannot* do it correctly, even though he should be anxious to do so. The former, therefore, comes nearer to the good orthographer or arithmetician than the latter. So, if a man knows what is just, honorable, and good, but commits acts of a contrary character, he is juster, or comes nearer to being a just man, than one who does not know what just acts are, and does not distinguish them from unjust; for this latter *cannot* conduct himself justly, even if he desires it ever so much.¹

The opinion here maintained illustrates forcibly the general doctrine of Sokratês. I have already observed that the fundamental idea which governed his train of reasoning, was, the analogy of each man's social life and duty to a special profession or trade. Now what is principally inquired after in regard to these special men, is their professional capacity; without this, no person would ever think of employing them, let their dispositions be ever so good; with it, good dispositions and diligence are presumed, unless there be positive grounds for suspecting the contrary. But why do we indulge such presumption? Because their pecuniary interest, their professional credit, and their place among competitors, are staked upon success, so that we reckon upon their best efforts. But in regard to that manifold and indefinite series of acts which constitute the sum total of social duty, a man has no such special interest to guide and impel him, nor can we presume in him those dispositions which will insure his doing right, wherever he knows what right is. Mankind are

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iii, 9, 6; iv, 2, 19-22. *δικαιότερον δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου.* To call him the *juster* man of the two, when neither are just, can hardly be meant: I translate it according to what seems to me the meaning intended. So *γραμματικώτερον*, in the sentence before, means, comes nearer to a good orthographer. The Greek derivative adjectives in *-ικτός* are very difficult to render precisely.

Compare Plato, Hippias Minor, c. 15, p. 372, D, where the same opinion is maintained. Hippias tells Sokratês, in that dialogue (c. 11, p. 369, B), that he fixes his mind on a part of the truth, and omits to notice the rest.

obliged to give premiums for these dispositions, and to attach penalties to the contrary, by means of praise and censure; moreover, the natural sympathies and antipathies of ordinary minds, which determine so powerfully the application of moral terms, run spontaneously in this direction, and even overshoot the limit which reason would prescribe. The analogy between the paid special duty and the general social duty, fails in this particular. Even if Sokratês were correct as to the former,—and this would be noway true,—in making the intellectual conditions of good conduct stand for the whole, no such inference could safely be extended to the latter.

Sokratês affirmed that “well-doing” was the noblest pursuit of man. “Well-doing” consisted in doing a thing well after having learned it and practised it, by the rational and proper means; it was altogether disparate from good fortune, or success without rational scheme and preparation. “The best man (he said), and the most beloved by the gods, is he who, as an husbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry; as a surgeon, those of medical art; in political life, his duty towards the commonwealth. But the man who does nothing well, is neither useful, nor agreeable to the gods.”¹ This is the Socratic view of human life; to look at it as an assemblage of realities and practical details; to translate the large words of the moral vocabulary into those homely particulars to which at bottom they refer; to take account of acts, not of dispositions apart from act (in contradiction to the ordinary flow of the moral sympathies); to enforce upon every one, that what he chiefly required was teaching and practice, as preparations for act; and that therefore ignorance, especially ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, was his capital deficiency. The religion of Sokratês, as well as his ethics, had reference to practical human ends; nor had any man ever less of that transcendentalism in his mind, which his scholar Plato exhibits in such abundance.

It is indisputable, then, that Sokratês laid down a general ethical theory which is too narrow, and which states a part of the truth as if it were the whole. But, as it frequently happens with philosophers who make the like mistake, we find that he

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iii, 9, 14, 15.

did not confine his deductive reasonings within the limits of the theory, but escaped the erroneous consequences by a partial inconsistency. For example; no man ever insisted more emphatically than he, on the necessity of control over the passions and appetites, of enforcing good habits, and on the value of that state of the sentiments and emotions which such a course tended to form.¹ In truth, this is one particular characteristic of his admonitions. He exhorted men to limit their external wants, to be sparing in indulgence, and to cultivate, even in preference to honors and advancement, those pleasures which would surely arise from a performance of duty, as well as from self-examination and the consciousness of internal improvement. This earnest attention, in measuring the elements and conditions of happiness,

¹ Xenoph. Mem. ii, 6, 39. ὅσαι δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται ταύτας πάσας σκοπούμενος εὐρήσεις μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτη αὔξανόμενος. Again, the necessity of practise or discipline is inculcated, iii, 9, 1. When Sokratēs enumerates the qualities requisite in a good friend, it is not merely superior knowledge which he talks of, but of moral excellence; continence, a self-sufficing temper, mildness, a grateful disposition (c. ii, 6, 1-5).

Moreover, Sokratēs laid it down that continence, or self-control, was the very basis of virtue: τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς κρηπίδα (i, 5, 4). Also, that continence was indispensable in order to enable a man to acquire knowledge (iv, 5, 10, 11).

Sokratēs here plainly treats ἐγκράτειαν (continence, or self-control) as not being a state of the intellectual man, and yet as being the very basis of virtue. He therefore does not seem to have applied consistently his general doctrine, that virtue consisted in knowledge, or in the excellence of the intellectual man, alone. Perhaps he might have said: Knowledge alone will be sufficient to make you virtuous; but before you can acquire knowledge, you must previously have disciplined your emotions and appetites. This merely eludes the objection, without saving the sufficiency of the general doctrine.

I cannot concur with Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 78) in thinking that Sokratēs meant by *knowledge*, or *wisdom*, a transcendental attribute, above humanity, and such as is possessed only by a god. This is by no means consistent with that practical conception of human life and its ends, which stands so plainly marked in his character.

Why should we think it wonderful that Sokratēs should propose a defective theory, which embraces only one side of a large and complicated question? Considering that his was the first theory derived from data really belonging to the subject, the wonder is, that it was so near an approach to the truth.

to the state of the internal associations as contrasted with the effect of external causes, as well as the pains taken to make it appear how much the latter depend upon the former for their power of conferring happiness, and how sufficient is moderate good fortune in respect to externals, provided the internal man be properly disciplined, is a vein of thought which pervades both Sokratês and Plato, and which passed from them, under various modifications, to most of the subsequent schools of ethical philosophy. It is probable that Protagoras or Prodikus, training rich youth for active life, without altogether leaving out such internal element of happiness, would yet dwell upon it less; a point of decided superiority in Sokratês.

The political opinions of Sokratês were much akin to his ethical, and deserve especial notice, as having in part contributed to his condemnation by the dikastery. He thought that the functions of government belonged legitimately to those who knew best how to exercise them for the advantage of the governed. "The legitimate king or governor was not the man who held the sceptre, nor the man elected by some vulgar persons, nor he who had got the post by lot, nor he who had thrust himself in by force or by fraud, but he alone who knew how to govern well."¹ Just as the pilot governed on shipboard, the surgeon in a sick man's house, the trainer in a palæstra; every one else being eager to obey these professional superiors, and even thanking and recompensing them for their directions, simply because their greater knowledge was an admitted fact. It was absurd, Sokratês used to contend, to choose public officers by lot, when no one would trust himself on shipboard under the care of a pilot selected by hazard,² nor would any one pick out a carpenter or a musician in like manner.

We do not know what provision Sokratês suggested for applying his principle to practice, for discovering who was the fittest man in point of knowledge, or for superseding him in case of his becoming unfit, or in case another fitter than he should arise. The analogies of the pilot, the surgeon, and professional men generally, would naturally conduct him to election by the people, renewable after temporary periods; since no one of these profes-

¹ Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 10, 11.

² Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9.

sional persons, whatever may be his positive knowledge, is ever trusted or obeyed except by the free choice of those who confide in him, and who may at any time make choice of another. But it does not appear that Sokratês followed out this part of the analogy. His companions remarked to him that his first-rate intellectual ruler would be a despot, who might, if he pleased, either refuse to listen to good advice, or even put to death those who gave it. "He will not act thus," replied Sokratês, "for if he does, he will himself be the greatest loser."¹

We may notice in this doctrine of Sokratês the same imperfection as that which is involved in the ethical doctrine; a disposition to make the intellectual conditions of political fitness stand for the whole. His negative political doctrine is not to be mistaken: he approved neither of democracy, nor of oligarchy. As he was not attached, either by sentiment or by conviction, to the constitution of Athens, so neither had he the least sympathy with oligarchical usurpers, such as the Four Hundred and the Thirty. His positive ideal state, as far as we can divine it, would have been something like that which is worked out in the "*Cyropædia*" of Xenophon.

In describing the persevering activity of Sokratês, as a religious and intellectual missionary, we have really described his life; for he had no other occupation than this continual intercourse with the Athenian public; his indiscriminate conversation, and invincible dialectics. Discharging faithfully and bravely his duties as an hoplite on military service,—but keeping aloof from official duty in the dikastery, the public assembly, or the senate-house, except in that one memorable year of the battle of Arginusæ,—he incurred none of those party animosities which an active public life at Athens often provoked. His life was legally blameless, nor had he ever been brought up before the dikastery until his one final trial, when he was seventy years of age. That he stood conspicuous before the public eye in 423 B. C., at the time when the "*Clouds*" of Aristophanês were brought on the stage, is certain: he may have been, and probably was, conspicuous even earlier: so that we can hardly allow him less than thirty years of public, notorious, and efficacious discoursing, down to his trial in 399 B. C.

¹ Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 12: compare Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 56, pp. 469, 470.

It was in that year that Melétus, seconded by two auxiliaries, Anytus and Lykon, presented against him, and hung up in the appointed place, the portico before the office of the second or king-archon, an indictment against him in the following terms "Sokratês is guilty of crime: first, for not worshipping the gods whom the city worships, but introducing new divinities of his own; next, for corrupting the youth. The penalty due is—death."

It is certain that neither the conduct nor the conversation of Sokratês had undergone any alteration for many years past; since the sameness of his manner of talking is both derided by his enemies and confessed by himself. Our first sentiment, therefore, apart from the question of guilt or innocence, is one of astonishment, that he should have been prosecuted, at seventy years of age, for persevering in an occupation which he had publicly followed during twenty-five or thirty years preceding. Xenophon, full of reverence for his master, takes up the matter on much higher ground, and expresses himself in a feeling of indignant amazement that the Athenians could find anything to condemn in a man every way so admirable. But whoever attentively considers the picture which I have presented of the purpose, the working, and the extreme publicity of Sokratês, will rather be inclined to wonder, not that the indictment was presented at last, but that some such indictment had not been presented long before. Such certainly is the impression suggested by the language of Sokratês himself, in the "Platonic Apology." He there proclaims, emphatically, that though his present accusers were men of consideration, it was neither *their* enmity, nor *their* eloquence, which he had now principally to fear; but the accumulated force of antipathy,—the numerous and important personal enemies, each with sympathizing partisans,—the long-standing and uncontradicted calumnies,¹ raised against him throughout his cross-examining career.

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2, p. 18, B; c. 16, p. 28, A. "Ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμ-προσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλὴ μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐστίν. Καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἂν περ αἰρή — οὐ Μέλητος. οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ καὶ φθόνος."

The expression τῶν πολλῶν in this last line is not used in its most common signification, but is equivalent to τούτων τῶν πολλῶν.

In truth, the mission of Sokratês, as he himself describes it, could not but prove eminently unpopular and obnoxious. To convince a man that, of matters which he felt confident of knowing, and had never thought of questioning or even of studying, he is really profoundly ignorant, insomuch that he cannot reply to a few pertinent queries without involving himself in flagrant contradictions, is an operation highly salutary, often necessary, to his future improvement; but an operation of painful surgery, in which, indeed, the temporary pain experienced is one of the conditions almost indispensable to the future beneficial results. It is one which few men can endure without hating the operator at the time; although doubtless such hatred would not only disappear, but be exchanged for esteem and admiration, if they persevered until the full ulterior consequences of the operation developed themselves. But we know, from the express statement of Xenophon, that many, who underwent this first pungent thrust of his dialectics, never came near him again: he disregarded them as laggards,¹ but their voices did not the less count in the hostile chorus. What made that chorus the more formidable, was the high quality and position of its leaders. For Sokratês himself tells us, that the men whom he chiefly and expressly sought out to cross-examine, were the men of celebrity as statesmen, rhetors, poets, or artisans; those at once most sensitive to such humiliation, and most capable of making their enmity effective.

When we reflect upon this great body of antipathy, so terrible both from number and from constituent items, we shall wonder only that Sokratês could have gone on so long standing in the market-place to aggravate it, and that the indictment of Melêtus could have been so long postponed; since it was just as applicable earlier as later, and since the sensitive temper of the people, as to charges of irreligion, was a well-known fact.² The truth is, that as history presents to us only one man who ever devoted his life to prosecute this duty of an elenchic, or cross-examining missionary, so there was but one city, in the ancient world at

¹ Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσήσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν.

² Plato, Euthyphron, c. 2, p. 3, C. εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐβδίαβόλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς.

least, wherein he would have been allowed to prosecute it for twenty-five years with safety and impunity; and that city was Athens. I have in a previous volume noted the respect for individual dissent of opinion, taste, and behavior, among one another, which characterized the Athenian population, and which Periklês puts in emphatic relief as a part of his funeral discourse. It was this established liberality of the democratical sentiment at Athens which so long protected the noble eccentricity of Sokratês from being disturbed by the numerous enemies which he provoked: at Sparta, at Thebes, at Argos, Milêtus, or Syracuse, his blameless life would have been insufficient as a shield, and his irresistible dialectic power would have caused him to be only the more speedily silenced. Intolerance is the natural weed of the human bosom, though its growth or development may be counteracted by liberalizing causes; of these, at Athens, the most powerful was, the democratical constitution as there worked, in combination with diffused intellectual and æsthetical sensibility, and keen relish for discourse. Liberty of speech was consecrated, in every man's estimation, among the first of privileges; every man was accustomed to hear opinions, opposite to his own, constantly expressed, and to believe that others had a right to their opinions as well as himself. And though men would not, as a general principle, have extended such toleration to religious subjects, yet the established habit in reference to other matters greatly influenced their practice, and rendered them more averse to any positive severity against avowed dissenters from the received religious belief. It is certain that there was at Athens both a keener intellectual stimulus, and greater freedom as well of thought as of speech, than in any other city of Greece. The long toleration of Sokratês is one example of this general fact, while his trial proves little, and his execution nothing, against it, as will presently appear.

There must doubtless have been particular circumstances, of which we are scarcely at all informed, which induced his accusers to prefer their indictment at the actual moment, in spite of the advanced age of Sokratês.

In the first place, Anytus, one of the accusers of Sokratês, appears to have become incensed against him on private grounds. The son of Anytus had manifested interest in his conversation,

and Sokratês, observing in the young man intellectual impulse and promise, endeavored to dissuade his father from bringing him up to his own trade of a leather-seller.¹ It was in this general way that a great proportion of the antipathy against Sokratês was excited, as he himself tells us in the "Platonic Apology." The young men were those to whom he chiefly addressed himself, and who, keenly relishing his conversation, often carried home new ideas which displeased their fathers;² hence the general charge against Sokratês, of corrupting the youth. Now this circumstance had recently happened in the peculiar case of Anytus, a rich tradesman, a leading man in politics, and just now of peculiar influence in the city, because he had been one of the leading fellow-laborers with Thrasybulus in the expulsion of the Thirty, manifesting an energetic and meritorious patriotism. He, like Thrasybulus and many others, had sustained great loss of property³ during the oligarchical dominion; which perhaps made him the more strenuous in requiring that his son should pursue trade with assiduity, in order to restore the family fortunes. He seems, moreover, to have been an enemy of all teaching which went beyond the narrowest practicality, hating alike Sokratês and the sophists.⁴

While we can thus point out a recent occurrence, which had brought one of the most ascendent politicians in the city into special exasperation against Sokratês, another circumstance which weighed him down was, his past connection with the deceased Kritias and Alkibiadês. Of these two men, the latter, though he had some great admirers, was on the whole odious; still more from his private insolence and enormities than from his public treason as an exile. But the name of Kritias was detested, and deservedly detested, beyond that of any other man in Athenian history, as the chief director of the unmeasured spoliation and atrocities committed by the Thirty.

¹ See Xenoph. Apol. Sok. sects. 29, 30. This little piece bears a very erroneous title, and may possibly not be the composition of Xenophon, as the commentators generally affirm; but it has every appearance of being a work of the time.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 10, p. 23, C; c. 27, p. 37, E.

³ Isokrat. Or. xviii, cont. Kallimach. s. 30.

⁴ See Plato, Menon, c. 27, 28, pp. 90, 91.

That Sokratês had educated both Kritias and Alkibiadês, was affirmed by the accusers, and seemingly believed by the general public, both at the time and afterwards.¹ That both of them had been among those who conversed with him, when young men, is an unquestionable fact; to what extent, or down to what period, the conversation was carried, we cannot distinctly ascertain. Xenophon affirms that both of them frequented his society when young, to catch from him an argumentative facility which might be serviceable to their political ambition; that he curbed their violent and licentious propensities, so long as they continued to come to him; that both of them manifested a respectful obedience to him, which seemed in little consonance with their natural tempers; but that they soon quitted him, weary of such restraint, after having acquired as much as they thought convenient of his peculiar accomplishment. The writings of Plato, on the contrary, impress us with the idea that the association of both of them with Sokratês must have been more continued and intimate; for both of them are made to take great part in the Platonic dialogues, while the attachment of Sokratês to Alkibiadês is represented as stronger than that which he ever felt towards any other man; a fact not difficult to explain, since the latter, notwithstanding his ungovernable dispositions, was distinguished in his youth not less for capacity and forward impulse, than for beauty; and since youthful beauty fired the imagination of the Greeks, especially that of Sokratês, more than the charms of the other sex.² From the year 420 B.C., in which the activity of Alkibiadês as a political leader commenced, it seems unlikely that he could have seen much of Sokratês, and after the year 415 B.C. the fact is impossible; since in that year he became a permanent exile, with the exception of three or four months in the year 407 B.C. At the moment of the trial of Sokratês, therefore, his connection with Alkibiadês must at least have been a fact long past and gone. Respecting Kritias, we make out less; and as he was a kinsman

¹ *Æschinês*, cont. *Timarch.* c. 34, p. 74. *ὅτις Σωκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτρέψατο, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐπ' αὐτῇ πεπαιδευκός*, etc. *Xenoph. Mem.* i, 2, 12

² See *Plato* (*Charmidês*, c. 3, p. 154, C; *Lysis*, c. 2, p. 204, B; *Protagoras*, c. 1, p. 309, A), etc.

of Plato, one of the well-known companions of Sokratês, and present at his trial, and himself an accomplished and literary man, his association with Sokratês may have continued longer; at least a color was given for so asserting. Though the supposition that any of the vices either of Kritias or Alkibiadês were encouraged, or even tolerated, by Sokratês, can have arisen in none but prejudiced or ill-informed minds, yet it is certain that such a supposition was entertained; and that it placed him before the public in an altered position after the enormities of the Thirty. Anytus, incensed with him already on the subject of his son, would be doubly incensed against him as the reputed tutor of Kritias.

Of Melêtus, the primary, though not the most important accuser, we know only that he was a poet; of Lykon, that he was a rhetor. Both these classes had been alienated by the cross-examining dialectics to which many of their number had been exposed by Sokratês. They were the last men to bear such an exposure with patience, and their enmity, taken as a class rarely unanimous, was truly formidable when it bore upon any single individual.

We know nothing of the speeches of either of the accusers before the dikastery, except what can be picked out from the remarks in Xenophon and the defence of Plato. Of the three counts of the indictment, the second was the easiest for them to support, on plausible grounds. That Sokratês was a religious innovator, would be considered as proved by the peculiar divine sign, of which he was wont to speak freely and publicly, and which visited no one except himself. Accordingly, in the "Platonic Defence," he never really replies to this second charge. He questions Melêtus before the dikastery, and the latter is represented as answering, that he meant to accuse Sokratês of not believing in the gods at all;¹ to which imputed disbelief Sokratês answers with an emphatic negative. In support of the first count, however, — the charge of general disbelief in the gods recognized by the city, — nothing in his conduct could be cited; for he was exact in his legal worship like other citizens, and even more than others, if Xenophon is correct.² But it would

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 14, p. 26, C.

² Xen. *Mem.* i, 2, 64; i, 3, 1.

appear that the old calumnies of the Aristophanic "Clouds" were revived, and that the effect of that witty drama, together with similar efforts of Eupolis and others, perhaps hardly less witty, was still enduring; a striking proof that these comedians were no impotent libellers. Sokratês manifests greater apprehension of the effect of the ancient impressions, than of the speeches which had been just delivered against him: but these latter speeches would of course tell, by refreshing the sentiments of the past, and reviving the Aristophanic picture of Sokratês, as a speculator on physics as well as a rhetorical teacher for pleading, making the worse appear the better reason.¹ Sokratês, in the "Platonic Defence," appeals to the number of persons who had heard him discourse, whether any of them had ever heard him say one word on the subject of physical studies;² while Xenophon goes further, and represents him as having positively discountenanced them, on the ground of impiety.³

As there were three distinct accusers to speak against Sokratês, so we may reasonably suppose that they would concert beforehand on what topics each should insist; Melêtus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lykon would dwell on the political grounds of attack. In the "Platonic Apology," Sokratês comments emphatically on the allegations of Melêtus, questions him publicly before the dikasts, and criticizes his replies: he makes little allusion to Anytus, or to anything except what is formally embodied in the indictment; and treats the last count, the charge of corrupting youth, in connection with the first, as if the corruption alleged consisted in irreligious teaching. But Xenophon intimates that the accusers, in enforcing this allegation of pernicious teaching, went into other matters quite distinct from the religious tenets of Sokratês, and denounced him as having taught them lawlessness and disrespect, as well towards their parents as towards their country. We find mention made in Xenophon of accusatory grounds similar to those in the "Clouds;" similar also to those which modern authors usually advance against the sophists.

Sokratês, said Anytus and the other accusers, taught young

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 3, p. 19, B.

² Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 3, p. 19, C.

³ Xen. *Mem.* i, 1, 13.

men to despise the existing political constitution, by remarking that the Athenian practice of naming archons by lot was silly, and that no man of sense would ever choose in this way a pilot or a carpenter, though the mischief arising from bad qualification, was in these cases far less than in the case of the archons.¹ Such teaching, it was urged, destroyed in the minds of the hearers respect for the laws and constitution, and rendered them violent and licentious. As examples of the way in which it had worked, his two pupils Kritias and Alkibiadēs might be cited, both formed in his school; one, the most violent and rapacious of the Thirty recent oligarchs; the other, a disgrace to the democracy, by his outrageous insolence and licentiousness;² both of them authors of ruinous mischief to the city.

Moreover, the youth learned from him conceit of their own superior wisdom, and the habit of insulting their fathers as well as of slighting their other kinsmen. Sokratēs told them, it was urged, that even their fathers, in case of madness, might be lawfully put under restraint; and that when a man needed service, those whom he had to look to, were not his kinsmen, as such, but the persons best qualified to render it: thus, if he was sick, he must consult a surgeon; if involved in a lawsuit, those who were most conversant with such a situation. Between friends also, mere good feeling and affection was of little use; the important circumstance was, that they should acquire the capacity of rendering mutual service to each other. No one was worthy of esteem except the man who knew what was proper to be done, and could explain it to others: which meant, urged the accuser, that Sokratēs was not only the wisest of men, but the only person capable of making his pupils wise; other advisers being worthless compared with him.³

He was in the habit too, the accusation proceeded, of citing the worst passages out of distinguished poets, and of perverting them to the mischievous purpose of spoiling the dispositions of youth, planting in them criminal and despotic tendencies. Thus he quoted a line of Hesiod: "No work is disgraceful; but indolence is disgraceful:" explaining it to mean, that a man might

¹ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9.

² Xen. Mem. i, 2, 12.

³ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 49-53.

without scruple do any sort of work, base or unjust as it might be, for the sake of profit. Next, Sokratês, was particularly fond of quoting those lines of Homer, in the second book of the Iliad, wherein Odysseus is described as bringing back the Greeks, who had just dispersed from the public agora in compliance with the exhortation of Agamemnôn, and were hastening to their ships. Odysseus caresses and flatters the chiefs, while he chides and even strikes the common men; though both were doing the same thing, and guilty of the same fault; if fault it was, to obey what the commander-in-chief had himself just suggested. Sokratês interpreted this passage, the accuser affirmed, as if Homer praised the application of stripes to poor men and the common people.¹

Nothing could be easier than for an accuser to find matter for inculcation of Sokratês, by partial citations from his continual discourses, given without the context or explanations which had accompanied them; by bold invention, where even this partial basis was wanting; sometimes also by taking up real error, since no man who is continually talking, especially extempore, can always talk correctly. Few teachers would escape, if penal sentences were permitted to tell against them, founded upon evidence such as this. Xenophon, in noticing the imputations, comments upon them all, denies some, and explains others. As to the passages out of Hesiod and Homer, he affirms that Sokratês drew from them inferences quite contrary to those alleged;² which latter seem, indeed, altogether unreasonable, invented to call forth the deep-seated democratical sentiment of the Athenians, after the accuser had laid his preliminary ground by connecting Sokratês with Kritias and Alkibiadês. That Sokratês improperly depreciated either filial duty or the domestic affections, is in like manner highly improbable. We may much more reasonably believe the assertion of Xenophon, who represents him to have exhorted the hearer "to make himself as wise, and as capable of rendering service, as possible; so that, when he wished to acquire esteem from father or brother or friend, he might not sit still, in reliance on the simple fact of relationship, but might earn such feeling by doing them positive good."³ To tell a young

¹ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 56-59.

² Xen. Mem. i, 2, 59.

³ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 55. Καὶ παρεκάλει ἐπιμελίσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον

man that mere good feeling would be totally insufficient, unless he were prepared and competent to carry it into action, is a lesson which few parents would wish to discourage. Nor would any generous parent make it a crime against the teaching of Sokratēs, that it rendered his son wiser than himself, which probably it would do. To restrict the range of teaching for a young man, because it may make him think himself wiser than his father, is only one of the thousand shapes in which the pleading of ignorance against knowledge was then, and still continues occasionally to be, presented.

Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that these attacks of Anytus bear upon the vulnerable side of the Sokratic general theory of ethics, according to which virtue was asserted to depend upon knowledge. I have already remarked that this is true, but not the whole truth; a certain state of the affections and dispositions being not less indispensable, as conditions of virtue, than a certain state of the intelligence. An enemy, therefore, had some pretence for making it appear that Sokratēs, stating a part of the truth as the whole, denied or degraded all that remained. But though this would be a criticism not entirely unfounded against his general theory, it would not hold against his precepts or practical teaching, as we find them in Xenophon; for these, as I have remarked, reach much wider than his general theory, and inculcate the cultivation of habits and dispositions not less strenuously than the acquisition of knowledge.

The censures affirmed to have been cast by Sokratēs against the choice of archons by lot at Athens, are not denied by Xenophon. The accuser urged that "by such censures Sokratēs excited the young men to despise the established constitution, and to become lawless and violent in their conduct."¹ This is just the same pretence, of tendency to bring the government into hatred and contempt, on which in former days prosecutions for public libel were instituted against writers in England, and

είναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἔαν τε ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἔαν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἔαν τε ὑπ' ἄλλον τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκείῳ εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελῇ, ἀλλὰ πεῖράται, ὅφ' ὧν ἂν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.

¹ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9. *τοὺς δὲ τοιοῦτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθέσθι ὥσης πολιτείας, καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους.*

on which they still continue to be abundantly instituted in France, under the first President of the Republic. There can hardly be a more serious political mischief than such confusion of the disapproving critic with a conspirator, and imposition of silence upon dissident minorities. Nor has there ever been any case in which such an imputation was more destitute of color than that of Sokratês, who appealed always to men's reason and very little to their feelings; so little, indeed, that modern authors make his coldness a matter of charge against him; who never omitted to inculcate rigid observance of the law, and set the example of such observance himself. Whatever may have been his sentiments about democracy, he always obeyed the democratical government, nor is there any pretence for charging him with participation in oligarchical schemes. It was the Thirty who, for the first time in his long life, interdicted his teaching altogether, and were on the point almost of taking his life; while his intimate friend Chærephon was actually in exile with the democrats.¹

Xenophon lays great emphasis on two points, when defending Sokratês against his accusers. First, that his own conduct was virtuous, self-denying, and strict in obedience to the law. Next, that he accustomed his hearers to hear nothing except appeals to their reason, and impressed on them obedience only to their rational convictions. That such a man, with so great a weight of presumption in his favor, should be tried and found guilty as a corruptor of youth, — the most undefined of all imaginable charges, — is a grave and melancholy fact in the history of mankind. Yet when we see upon what light evidence modern authors are willing to admit the same charge against the sophists, we have no right to wonder that the Athenians when addressed, not through that calm reason to which Sokratês appealed, but through all their antipathies, religious as well as political, public as well as private — were exasperated into dealing with him as the type and precursor of Kritias and Alkibiadês.

After all, the exasperation, and the consequent verdict of guilty, were not wholly the fault of the dikasts, nor wholly brought about by his accusers and his numerous private enemies. No such verdict would have been given, unless by what we must

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 5, p. 21, A; c. 20, p. 32, E; *Xen. Mem.* 1, 2, 31.

call the consent and concurrence of Sokratēs himself. This is one of the most important facts of the case, in reference both to himself and to the Athenians.

We learn from his own statement in the "Platonic Defence," that the verdict of guilty was only pronounced by a majority of five or six, amidst a body so numerous as an Athenian dikastery; probably five hundred and fifty-seven in total number,¹ if a confused statement in Diogenes Laërtius can be trusted. Now any one who reads that defence, and considers it in conjunction with the circumstances of the case and the feelings of the dikasts, will see that its tenor is such as must have turned a much greater number of votes than six against him. And we are informed by the distinct testimony of Xenophon,² that Sokratēs approached his trial with the feelings of one who hardly wished to be acquitted. He took no thought whatever for the preparation of his defence; and when his friend Hermogenēs remonstrated with him on the serious consequences of such an omission, he replied, first, that the just and blameless life, which he was conscious of having passed, was the best of all preparations for defence; next, that having once begun to meditate on what it would be proper for him to say, the divine sign had interposed to forbid him from proceeding. He went on to say, that it was no wonder that the gods should deem it better for him to die now, than to live longer. He had hitherto lived in perfect satisfaction, with a consciousness of progressive moral improvement, and with esteem, marked and

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 25, p. 36, A; Diog. Laërt. ii, 41. Diogenes says that he was condemned by two hundred and eighty-one *ψηφοις πλείοσι τῶν ἀπολυσούσων*. If he meant to assert that the verdict was found by a majority of two hundred and eighty-one above the acquitting votes, this would be contradicted by the "Platonic Apology," which assures us beyond any doubt that the majority was not greater than five or six, so that the turning of three votes would have altered the verdict. But as the number two hundred and eighty-one seems precise, and is not in itself untrustworthy, some commentators construe it, though the words as they now stand are perplexing, as the aggregate of the majority. Since the "Platonic Apology" proves that it was a majority of five or six, the minority would consequently be two hundred and seventy-six, and the total five hundred and fifty-seven.

² Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 4, seq. He learned the fact from Hermogenēs, who heard it from Sokratēs himself.

unabated, from his friends. If his life were prolonged, old age would soon overpower him; he would lose in part his sight, his hearing, or his intelligence; and life with such abated efficacy and dignity would be intolerable to him. Whereas, if he were condemned now, he should be condemned unjustly, which would be a great disgrace to his judges, but none to him; nay, it would even procure for him increase of sympathy and admiration, and a more willing acknowledgment from every one that he had been both a just man and an improving preceptor.¹

These words, spoken before his trial, intimate a state of belief which explains the tenor of the defence, and formed one essential condition of the final result. They prove that Sokratēs not only cared little for being acquitted, but even thought that the approaching trial was marked out by the gods as the term of his life, and that there were good reasons why he should prefer such a consummation as best for himself. Nor is it wonderful that he should entertain that opinion, when we recollect the entire ascendancy within him of strong internal conscience and intelligent reflection, built upon an originally fearless temperament, and silencing what Plato² calls "the child within us, who trembles before death;" his great love of colloquial influence, and incapacity of living without it; his old age, now seventy years, rendering it impossible that such influence could much longer continue, and the opportunity afforded to him, by now towering above ordinary men under the like circumstances, to read an impressive lesson, as well as to leave behind him a reputation yet more exalted than that which he had hitherto acquired. It was in this frame of mind that Sokratēs came to his trial, and undertook his unpremeditated defence, the substance of which we now read in the "Platonic Apology." His calculations, alike high-minded and well-balanced, were completely realized. Had he been acquitted after such a defence, it would have been not only a triumph over his personal enemies, but would have been a sanction on the part of the people and the popular dikastery to his teaching, which,

¹ Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 9, 10.

² Plato, Phædon, c. 60, p. 77, B ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβείται. Τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον, ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

indeed, had been enforced by Anytus,¹ in his accusing argument, in reference to acquittal generally, even before he heard the defence: whereas his condemnation, and the feelings with which he met it, have shed double and triple lustre over his whole life and character.

Prefaced by this exposition of the feelings of Sokratês, the "Platonic Defence" becomes not merely sublime and impressive, but also the manifestation of a rational and consistent purpose. It does, indeed, include a vindication of himself against two out of the three counts of the indictment; against the charge of not believing in the recognized gods of Athens, and that of corrupting the youth; respecting the second of the three, whereby he was charged with religious innovation, he says little or nothing. But it bears no resemblance to the speech of one standing on his trial, with the written indictment concluding "Penalty, Death," hanging up in open court before him. On the contrary, it is an emphatic lesson to the hearers, embodied in the frank outpouring of a fearless and self-confiding conscience. It is undertaken, from the beginning, because the law commands; with a faint wish, and even not an unqualified wish, but no hope, that it may succeed.² Sokratês first replies to the standing antipathies against him without, arising from the number of enemies whom his cross-examining elenchus had aroused against him, and from those false reports which the Aristophanic "Clouds" had contributed so much to circulate. In accounting for the rise of these antipathies, he impresses upon the dikasts the divine mission under which he was acting, not without considerable doubts whether they will believe him to be in earnest;³ and gives that interesting exposition of his intellectual campaign, against "the conceit of knowledge without the reality," of which I have already

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, C.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2, p. 19, A. Βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἡμῖνον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάννυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστι. Ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω δὴ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 20, D. Καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισιν ὑμῶν παίζειν—εὐ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Again, c. 28, p. 37, E. Ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ σοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἔσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ.

spoken. He then goes into the indictment, questions Melætus in open court, and dissects his answers. Having rebutted the charge of irreligion, he reverts again to the imperative mandate of the gods under which he is acting, "to spend his life in the search for wisdom, and in examining himself as well as others;" a mandate, which if he were to disobey, he would be then justly amenable to the charge of irreligion;¹ and he announces to the dikasts distinctly, that, even if they were now to acquit him, he neither could nor would relax in the course which he had been pursuing.² He considers that the mission imposed upon him is among the greatest blessings ever conferred by the gods upon Athens.³ He deprecates those murmurs of surprise or displeasure, which his discourse evidently called forth more than once,⁴ though not so much on his own account as on that of the dikasts, who will be benefited by hearing him, and who will hurt themselves and their city much more than him, if they should now pronounce condemnation.⁵ It was not on his own account that he sought to defend himself, but on account of the Athenians, lest they by condemning him should sin against the gracious blessing of the god; they would not easily find such another, if they should put him to death.⁶ Though his mission had spurred him on to indefatigable activity in individual colloquy, yet the divine sign had always forbidden him from taking active part in public proceedings; on the two exceptional occasions when he had stood publicly forward,—once under the democracy, once under the oligarchy,—he had shown the same resolution as at present; not to be deterred by any terrors from that course which he believed to be just.⁷ Young men were

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, A. ² Plato Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, B.

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, A, B. *ολομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.*

⁴ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, B.

⁵ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, B. *καὶ γὰρ, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, δνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες—ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἶον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμε μείζον βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.*

⁶ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, E. *πολλοὺ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἑμαντοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἑμῶν μὴ τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ βρῶνως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὕρησете, etc.*

⁷ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 20, 21, p. 33.

delighted as well as improved by listening to his cross-examinations; in proof of the charge that he had corrupted them, no evidence had been produced; neither any of themselves, who, having been once young when they enjoyed his conversation, had since grown elderly; nor any of their relatives; while he on his part could produce abundant testimony to the improving effect of his society, from the relatives of those who had profited by it.¹

"No man (says he) knows what death is; yet men fear it as if they knew well that it was the greatest of all evils, which is just a case of that worst of all ignorance, the conceit of knowing what you do not really know. For my part, this is the exact point on which I differ from most other men, if there be any one thing in which I am wiser than they; as I know nothing about Hades, so I do not pretend to any knowledge; but I do know well, that disobedience to a person better than myself, either god or man, is both an evil and a shame; nor will I ever embrace evil certain, in order to escape evil which may for aught I know be a good.² Perhaps you may feel indignant at the resolute tone of my defence; you may have expected that I should do as most others do in less dangerous trials than mine; that I should weep, beg and entreat for my life, and bring forward my children and relatives to do the same. I have relatives like other men, and three children; but not one of them shall appear before you for any such purpose. Not from any insolent dispositions on my part, nor any wish to put a slight upon you, but because I hold such conduct to be degrading to the reputation which I enjoy; for I *have* a reputation for superiority among you, deserved or undeserved as it may be. It is a disgrace to Athens, when her esteemed men lower themselves, as they do but too often, by such mean and cowardly supplications; and you dikasts, instead of being prompted thereby to spare them, ought rather to condemn them the more for so dishonoring the city.³ Apart from

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 22.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, B. Contrast this striking and truly Sokratic sentiment about the fear of death, with the commonplace way in which Sokratês is represented as handling the same subject in Xenoph. Memor. i, 4, 7.

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 23, pp. 34-35. I translate the substance and not the words.

any reputation of mine, too, I should be a guilty man, if I sought to bias you by supplications. My duty is to instruct and persuade you, if I can ; but you have sworn to follow your convictions in judging according to the laws, not to make the laws bend to your partiality ; and it is your duty so to do. Far be it from me to habituate you to perjury ; far be it from you to contract any such habit. Do not, therefore, require of me proceedings dishonorable in reference to myself, as well as criminal and impious in regard to you, especially at a moment when I am myself rebutting an accusation of impiety advanced by Melétus. I leave to you and to the god, to decide as may turn out best both for me and for you.”¹

No one who reads the “Platonic Apology” of Sokratês will ever wish that he had made any other defence. But it is the speech of one who deliberately foregoes the immediate purpose of a defence, persuasion of his judges ; who speaks for posterity, without regard to his own life : “*solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis.*”² The effect produced upon the dikasts was such as Sokratês anticipated beforehand, and heard afterwards without surprise as without discomposure, in the verdict of guilty. His only surprise was, at the extreme smallness of the majority whereby that verdict was passed.³ And this is the true matter for astonishment. Never before had the Athenian dikasts heard such a speech addressed to them. While all of them, doubtless, knew Sokratês as a very able and very eccentric man, respecting his purposes and character they would differ ; some regarding him with unqualified hostility, a few others with respectful admiration, and a still larger number with simple admiration for ability, without any decisive sentiment either of antipathy or esteem.

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 24, p. 35.

² These are the striking words of Tacitus (Hist. ii, 54) respecting the last hours of the emperor Otho, after his suicide had been fully resolved upon, but before it had been consummated : an interval spent in the most careful and provident arrangements for the security and welfare of those around him : “*ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis.*”

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 25, p. 36, A. Οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θανατάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμὸν. Οὐ γὰρ ᾤμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ’ ὀλίγον ἐσσεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ, etc.

But by all these three catégories, hardly excepting even his admirers, the speech would be felt to carry one sting which never misses its way to the angry feelings of the judicial bosom, whether the judges in session be one or a few or many, the sting of "affront to the court." The Athenian dikasts were always accustomed to be addressed with deference, often with subservience: they now heard themselves lectured by a philosopher who stood before them like a fearless and invulnerable superior, beyond their power, though awaiting their verdict; one who laid claim to a divine mission, which probably many of them believed to be an imposture, and who declared himself the inspired uprooter of "conceit of knowledge without the reality," which purpose many would not understand, and some would not like. To many, his demeanor would appear to betray an insolence not without analogy to Alkibiadês or Kritias, with whom his accuser had compared him. I have already remarked, in reference to his trial, that, considering the number of personal enemies whom he made, the wonder is, not that he was tried at all, but that he was not tried until so late in his life: I now remark in reference to the verdict, that, considering his speech before the dikastery, we cannot be surprised that he was found guilty, but only that such verdict passed by so small a majority as five or six.

That the condemnation of Sokratês was brought on distinctly by the tone and tenor of his defence, is the express testimony of Xenophon. "Other persons on trial (he says) defended themselves in such manner as to conciliate the favor of the dikasts, or flatter, or entreat them, contrary to the laws, and thus obtained acquittal. But Sokratês would resort to nothing of this customary practice of the dikastery contrary to the laws. Though *he might easily have been let off by the dikasts, if he would have done anything of the kind even moderately*, he preferred rather to adhere to the laws and die, than to save his life by violating them."¹ Now no one in Athens except Sokratês, probably, would have construed the laws as requiring the tone of oration which he adopted; nor would he himself have so construed them, if he had been twenty

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 4, 4. 'Εκείνος οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι· ἀλλὰ βράδιως ἂν ἀφεθείς ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προεῖλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθάνειν, ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.

years younger, with less of acquired dignity, and more years of possible usefulness open before him. Without debasing himself by unbecoming flattery or supplication, he would have avoided lecturing them as a master and superior,¹ or ostentatiously asserting a divine mission for purposes which they would hardly understand, or an independence of their verdict which they might construe as defiance. The rhetor Lysias is said to have sent to him a composed speech for his defence, which he declined to use, not thinking it suitable to his dignity. But such a man as Lysias would hardly compose what would lower the dignity even of the loftiest client, though he would look to the result also; nor is there any doubt that if Sokratês had pronounced it, — or even a much less able speech, if inoffensive, — he would have been acquitted. Quintilian,² indeed, expresses his satisfaction that Sokratês maintained that towering dignity which brought out the rarest and most exalted of his attributes, but which at the same time renounced all chance of acquittal. Few persons will dissent from this criticism; but when we look at the sentence, as we ought in fairness to do, from the point of view of the dikasts, justice will compel us to admit that Sokratês deliberately brought it upon himself.

If the verdict of guilty was thus brought upon Sokratês by his own consent and coöperation, much more may the same remark be made respecting the capital sentence which followed it. In Athenian procedure, the penalty inflicted was determined by a separate vote of the dikasts, taken after the verdict of guilty. The accuser having named the penalty which he thought suitable, the accused party on his side named some lighter penalty upon himself; and between these two the dikasts were called on to make their option, no third proposition being admissible. The prudence of an accused party always induced him to propose, even against himself, some measure of punishment which the dikasts

¹ Cicero (de Orat. i, 54, 231): "Socrates ita in iudicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed *magister aut dominus videretur esse iudicum*." So Epiktêtus also remarked, in reference to the defence of Sokratês: "By all means, abstain from supplication for mercy; but do not put it specially forward, that you *will* abstain, unless you intend, like Sokratês, purposely to provoke the judges." (Arrian, Epiktêt. Diss. ii, 2, 18.)

² Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 15, 30; xi, 1, 10; Diog. Laërt. ii, 40.

might be satisfied to accept, in preference to the heavier sentence invoked by his antagonist.

Now Melétus, in his indictment and speech against Sokratês, had called for the infliction of capital punishment. It was for Sokratês to make his own counter-proposition, and the very small majority, by which the verdict had been pronounced, afforded sufficient proof that the dikasts were no way inclined to sanction the extreme penalty against him. They doubtless anticipated, according to the uniform practice before the Athenian courts of justice, that he would suggest some lesser penalty; fine, imprisonment, exile, disfranchisement, etc. And had he done this purely and simply, there can be little doubt that the proposition would have passed. But the language of Sokratês, after the verdict, was in a strain yet higher than before it; and his resolution to adhere to his own point of view, disdaining the smallest abatement or concession, only the more emphatically pronounced. "What counter proposition shall I make to you (he said) as a substitute for the penalty of Melétus? Shall I name to you the treatment which I think I deserve at your hands? In that case, my proposition would be that I should be rewarded with a subsistence at the public expense in the prytaneum; for that is what I really deserve as a public benefactor; one who has neglected all thought of his own affairs, and embraced voluntary poverty, in order to devote himself to your best interests, and to admonish you individually on the serious necessity of mental and moral improvement. Assuredly, I cannot admit that I have deserved from you any evil whatever; nor would it be reasonable in me to propose exile or imprisonment, which I know to be certain and considerable evils, in place of death, which may perhaps be not an evil, but a good. I might, indeed, propose to you a pecuniary fine; for the payment of *that* would be no evil. But I am poor, and have no money: all that I could muster might perhaps amount to a mina: and I therefore propose to you a fine of one mina, as punishment on myself. Plato, and my other friends near me, desire me to increase this sum to thirty minæ, and they engage to pay it for me. A fine of thirty minæ, therefore, is the counter-penalty which I submit for your judgment."¹

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 26, 27, 28, pp. 37, 38. I give, as well as I can, the substantive propositions, apart from the emphatic language of the original.

Subsistence in the prytaneum at the public expense, was one of the greatest honorary distinctions which the citizens of Athens ever conferred; an emphatic token of public gratitude. That Sokratês, therefore, should proclaim himself worthy of such an honor, and talk of assessing it upon himself in lieu of a punishment, before the very dikasts who had just passed against him a verdict of guilty, would be received by them as nothing less than a deliberate insult; a defiance of judicial authority, which it was their duty to prove, to an opinionated and haughty citizen, that he could not commit with impunity. The persons who heard his language with the greatest distress, were doubtless Plato, Krito, and his other friends around him; who, though sympathizing with him fully, knew well that he was assuring the success of the proposition of Melêtus,¹ and would regret that he should thus throw away his life by what they would think an ill-placed and unnecessary self-exaltation. Had he proposed, with little or no preface, the substitute-fine of thirty minæ with which this part of his speech concluded, there is every reason for believing that the majority of dikasts would have voted for it.

The sentence of death passed against him, by what majority we do not know. But Sokratês neither altered his tone, nor manifested any regret for the language by which he had himself seconded the purpose of his accusers. On the contrary, he told the dikasts, in a short address prior to his departure for the prison, that he was satisfied both with his own conduct and with the result. The divine sign, he said, which was wont to restrain him, often on very small occasions, both in deeds and in words, had never manifested itself once to him throughout the whole day, neither when he came thither at first, nor at any one point throughout his whole discourse. The tacit acquiescence of this infallible monitor satisfied him not only that he had spoken rightly, but that the sentence passed was in reality no evil to him; that to die now was the best thing which could befall him.² Either death was tantamount to a sound, perpetual, and dreamless sleep, which in his judgment would be no loss, but rather a gain, compared with the present life; or else, if the common

¹ See Plato, Krito, c. 5, p. 45, B.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 81, p. 40, B; c. 33, p. 41, D

mythes were true, death would transfer him to a second life in Hades, where he would find all the heroes of the Trojan war, and of the past generally, so as to pursue in conjunction with them the business of mutual cross-examination, and debate on ethical progress and perfection.¹

There can be no doubt that the sentence really appeared to Sokratês in this point of view, and to his friends also, after the event had happened, though doubtless not at the time when they were about to lose him. He took his line of defence advisedly, and with full knowledge of the result. It supplied him with the fittest of all opportunities for manifesting, in an impressive manner, both his personal ascendancy over human fears and weakness, and the dignity of what he believed to be his divine mission. It took him away in his full grandeur and glory, like the setting of the tropical sun, at a moment when senile decay might be looked upon as close at hand. He calculated that his defence and bearing on the trial would be the most emphatic lesson which he could possibly read to the youth of Athens; more emphatic, probably, than the sum total of those lessons which his remaining life might suffice to give, if he shaped his defence otherwise. This anticipation of the effect of the concluding scene of his life, setting the seal on all his prior discourses, manifests itself in portions of his concluding words to the *dikasts*, wherein he tells them that they will not, by putting him to death, rid themselves of the importunity of the cross-examining *elenchus*; that numbers of young men, more restless and obtrusive than he, already carried within them that impulse, which they would now proceed to apply; his superiority having hitherto kept them back.² It was thus the persuasion of Sokratês, that his removal would be the signal for numerous apostles, putting forth with increased energy that process of interrogatory test and spur to which he had devoted his life, and which doubtless was to him far dearer and more sacred than his life. Nothing could be more effective than his lofty bearing on his trial, for inflaming the enthusiasm of young men thus predisposed; and

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 32, p. 40, C; p. 41, B.

² Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 30, p. 39, C.

the loss of life was to him compensated by the missionary successors whom he calculated on leaving behind.

Under ordinary circumstances, Sokratês would have drunk the cup of hemlock in the prison, on the day after his trial. But it so happened that the day of his sentence was immediately after that on which the sacred ship started on its yearly ceremonial pilgrimage from Athens to Delos, for the festival of Apollo. Until the return of this vessel to Athens, it was accounted unholy to put any person to death by public authority. Accordingly, Sokratês remained in prison, — and we are pained to read, actually with chains on his legs, — during the interval that this ship was absent, thirty days altogether. His friends and companions had free access to him, passing nearly all their time with him in the prison; and Krito had even arranged a scheme for procuring his escape, by a bribe to the jailer. This scheme was only prevented from taking effect by the decided refusal of Sokratês to become a party in any breach of the law; ¹ a resolution, which we should expect as a matter of course, after the line which he had taken in his defence. His days were spent in the prison, in discourse respecting ethical and human subjects, which had formed the charm and occupation of his previous life: it is to the last of these days that his conversation with Simmias, Kebês, and Phædon, on the immortality of the soul is referred, in the Platonic dialogue called "Phædon." Of that conversation the main topics and doctrines are Platonic rather than Sokratic. But the picture which the dialogue presents of the temper and state of mind of Sokratês, during the last hours of his life, is one of immortal beauty and interest, exhibiting his serene and even playful equanimity, amidst the uncontrollable emotions of his surrounding friends, — the genuine, unforced persuasion, governing both his words and his acts, of what he had pronounced before the dikasts, that the sentence of death was no calamity to him, ² — and the unabated maintenance of that earnest interest in the improvement of man and society, which had for so many years formed both his paramount motive and his active occupation. The details of the last scene are given with minute fidelity, even down to the moment of his dis-

¹ Plato, Krito, c. 2, 3, *seq.*

² Plato, Phædon, c. 77, p. 84, E.

solution; and it is consoling to remark that the cup of hemlock — the means employed for executions by public order at Athens — produced its effect by steps far more exempt from suffering than any natural death which was likely to befall him. Those who have read what has been observed above respecting the strong religious persuasions of Sokratês, will not be surprised to hear that his last words, addressed to Krito immediately before he passed into a state of insensibility, were: "Krito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius: discharge the debt, and by no means omit it."¹

Thus perished the "parens philosophiæ," the first of ethical philosophers; a man who opened to science both new matter, alike copious and valuable; and a new method, memorable not less for its originality and efficacy, than for the profound philosophical basis on which it rests. Though Greece produced great poets, orators, speculative philosophers, historians, etc., yet other countries having the benefit of Grecian literature to begin with, have nearly equalled her in all these lines, and surpassed her in some. But where are we to look for a parallel to Sokratês, either in or out of the Grecian world? The cross-examining elenchus, which he not only first struck out, but wielded with such matchless effect and to such noble purposes, has been mute ever since his last conversation in the prison; for even his great successor Plato was a writer and lecturer, not a colloquial dialectician. No man has ever been found strong enough to bend his bow; much less, sure enough to use it as he did. His life remains as the only evidence, but a very satisfactory evidence, how much can be done by this sort of intelligent interrogation; how powerful is the interest which it can be made to inspire; how energetic the stimulus which it can apply in awakening dormant reason and generating new mental power.

It has been often customary to exhibit Sokratês as a moral preacher, in which character probably he has acquired to himself the general reverence attached to his name. This is, indeed, a true attribute, but not the characteristic or salient attribute, nor that by which he permanently worked on mankind. On the other hand, Arkesilaus, and the New Academy,¹ a century and

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, c. 155, p. 118, A.

² Cicero, *Academ. Post.* i, 12, 44. "Cum Zenone Arcesilas sibi omne

more afterwards, thought that they were following the example of Sokratēs — and Cicero seems to have thought so too — when they reasoned against everything; and when they laid it down as a system, that, against every affirmative position, an equal force of negative argument might be brought up as counterpoise. Now this view of Sokratēs is, in my judgment, not merely partial, but incorrect. He entertained no such systematic distrust of the powers of the mind to attain certainty. He laid down a clear, though erroneous line of distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. About physics, he was more than a skeptic; he thought that man could know nothing; the gods did not intend that man should acquire any such information, and therefore managed matters in such a way as to be beyond his ken, for all except the simplest phenomena of daily wants; moreover, not

certamen instituit, non pertinaciā aut studio vincendi (ut mihi quidem videtur), sed earum rerum obscuritate, quæ ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem, et jam ante Socratem, Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnes pene veteres; qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri, posse, dixerunt. . . . Itaque Arcesilas negabat, esse quidquam, quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere in occulto." Compare *Academ. Prior. ii*, 23, 74: de *Nat. Deor. i*, 5, 11.

In another passage (*Academ. Post. i*, 4, 17) Cicero speaks (or rather introduces Varro as speaking) rather confusedly. He talks of "illam Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nullā affirmatione adhibitā, consuetudinem disserendi;" but a few lines before, he had said what implies that men might, in the opinion of Sokratēs, come to learn and know what belonged to human conduct and human duties.

Again (in *Tusc. Disp. i*, 4, 8), he admits that Sokratēs had a positive ulterior purpose in his negative questioning: "vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi: nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur."

Tennessmann (*Gesch. der Philos. ii*, 5, vol. ii, pp. 169-175) seeks to make out considerable analogy between Sokratēs and Pyrrho. But it seems to me that the analogy only goes thus far, that both agreed in repudiating all speculations not ethical (see the verses of Timon upon Pyrrho, *Diog. Laërt. ix*, 65). But in regard to ethics, the two differed materially. Sokratēs maintained that ethics were matter of science, and the proper subject of study. Pyrrho, on the other hand, seems to have thought that speculation was just as useless, and science just as unattainable, upon ethics as upon physics; that nothing was to be attended to except feelings, and nothing cultivated except good dispositions.

only man could not acquire such information, but ought not to labor after it. But respecting the topics which concern man and society, the views of Sokratês were completely the reverse. This was the field which the gods had expressly assigned, not merely to human practice, but to human study and acquisition of knowledge; a field, wherein, with that view, they managed phenomena on principles of constant and observable sequence, so that every man who took the requisite pains might know them. Nay, Sokratês went a step further; and this forward step is the fundamental conviction upon which all his missionary impulse hinges. He thought that every man not only might know these things but ought to know them; that he could not possibly act well, unless he did know them; and that it was his imperious duty to learn them as he would learn a profession; otherwise, he was nothing better than a slave, unfit to be trusted as a free and accountable being. Sokratês felt persuaded that no man could behave as a just, temperate, courageous, pious, patriotic agent, unless he taught himself to know correctly what justice, temperance, courage, piety, and patriotism, etc., really were. He was possessed with the truly Baconian idea, that the power of steady moral action depended upon, and was limited by, the rational comprehension of moral ends and means. But when he looked at the minds around him, he perceived that few or none either had any such comprehension, or had ever studied to acquire it; yet at the same time every man felt persuaded that he did possess it, and acted confidently upon such persuasion. Here, then, Sokratês found that the first outwork for him to surmount, was, that universal "conceit of knowledge without the reality," against which he declares such emphatic war; and against which, also, though under another form of words and in reference to other subjects, Bacon declares war not less emphatically, two thousand years afterwards: "*Opinio copiæ inter causas inopiæ est.*" Sokratês found that those notions respecting human and social affairs, on which each man relied and acted, were nothing but spontaneous products of the "*intellectus sibi permissus,*" of the intellect left to itself either without any guidance, or with only the blind guidance of sympathies, antipathies, authority, or silent assimilation. They were products got together, to use Bacon's language, "from much faith and much chance, and from

the primitive suggestions of boyhood," not merely without care or study, but without even consciousness of the process, and without any subsequent revision. Upon this basis the sophists, or professed teachers for active life, sought to erect a superstructure of virtue and ability; but to Sokratês, such an attempt appeared hopeless and contradictory — not less impracticable than Bacon in his time pronounced it to be, to carry up the tree of science into majesty and fruit-bearing, without first clearing away those fundamental vices which lay unmolested and in poisonous influence round its root. Sokratês went to work in the Baconian manner and spirit; bringing his cross-examining process to bear, as the first condition to all further improvement; upon these rude, self-begotten, incoherent generalizations, which passed in men's minds for competent and directing knowledge. But he, not less than Bacon, performs this analysis, not with a view to finality in the negative, but as the first stage towards an ulterior profit; as the preliminary purification, indispensable to future positive result. In the physical sciences, to which Bacon's attention was chiefly turned, no such result could be obtained without improved experimental research, bringing to light facts new and yet unknown; but on those topics which Sokratês discussed, the elementary data of the inquiry were all within the hearer's experience, requiring only to be pressed upon his notice, affirmatively as well as negatively, together with the appropriate ethical and political end; in such manner as to stimulate within him the rational effort requisite for combining them anew upon consistent principles.

If, then, the philosophers of the New Academy considered Sokratês either as a skeptic, or as a partisan of systematic negation, they misinterpreted his character, and mistook the first stage of his process — that which Plato, Bacon, and Herschel call the purification of the intellect — for the ultimate goal. The elenchus, as Sokratês used it, was animated by the truest spirit of positive science, and formed an indispensable precursor to its attainment.¹

There are two points, and two points only, in topics concerning man and society, with regard to which Sokratês is a skeptic; or

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 7, p. 22, A. *δεῖ δὲ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι, ὡς περ τινας πόρους ποιοῦντος, etc.*

rather, which he denies ; and on the negation of which, his whole method and purpose turn. He denies, first, that men can know that on which they have bestowed no conscious effort, no deliberate pains, no systematic study, in learning. He denies, next, that men can practise what they do not know ;¹ that they can be just, or temperate, or virtuous generally, without knowing what justice, or temperance, or virtue is. To imprint upon the minds of his hearers his own negative conviction, on these two points is, indeed, his first object, and the primary purpose of his multi-form dialectical manœuvring. But though negative in his means, Sokratēs is strictly positive in his ends ; his attack is undertaken only with distinct view to a positive result ; in order to shame them out of the illusion of knowledge, and to spur them on and arm them for the acquisition of real, assured, comprehensive, self-explanatory knowledge, as the condition and guarantee of virtuous practice. Sokratēs was, indeed, the reverse of a skeptic ; no man ever looked upon life with a more positive and practical eye ; no man ever pursued his mark with a clearer perception of the road which he was travelling ; no man ever combined, in like manner, the absorbing enthusiasm of a missionary,² with the acuteness, the originality, the inventive resource, and the generalizing comprehension, of a philosopher.

His method yet survives, as far as such method can survive, in some of the dialogues of Plato. It is a process of eternal value and of universal application. That purification of the intellect, which Bacon signalized as indispensable for rational or scientific progress, the Sokratic elenchus affords the only known instrument for at least partially accomplishing. However little that instrument may have been applied since the death of its

¹ So Demokritus, *Fragm.* ed. Mullach, p. 185, Fr. 131. *οὐτε τέχνη, οὐτε σοφίη, ἐφικτὸν, ἢν μὴ μάθη τις.....*

² Aristotle (*Problem.* c. 30, p. 953, Bek.) numbers both Sokratēs and Plato (compare Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 2) among those to whom he ascribes *φύσιν μελαγχολικὴν*, the black bile and ecstatic temperament. I do not know how to reconcile this with a passage in his *Rhetoric* (ii, 17), in which he ranks Sokratēs among the *sedate* persons (*σώφιστον*). The first of the two assertions seems countenanced by the anecdotes respecting Sokratēs (in Plato, *Symposium*, p. 175, B ; p. 220, C), that he stood in the same posture, quite unmoved, even for several hours continuously, absorbed in meditation upon some idea which had seized his mind.

inventor, the necessity and use of it neither have disappeared, nor ever can disappear. There are few men whose minds are not more or less in that state of sham knowledge against which Sokratês made war: there is no man whose notions have not been first got together by spontaneous, unexamined, unconscious, uncertified association, resting upon forgotten particulars, blending together disparates or inconsistencies, and leaving in his mind old and familiar phrases, and oracular propositions, of which he has never rendered to himself account: there is no man, who, if he be destined for vigorous and profitable scientific effort, has not found it a necessary branch of self-education, to break up, disentangle, analyze, and reconstruct, these ancient mental compounds; and who has not been driven to do it by his own lame and solitary efforts, since the giant of the colloquial elenchus no longer stands in the market-place to lend him help and stimulus.

To hear of any man,¹ especially of so illustrious a man, being condemned to death on such accusations as that of heresy and alleged corruption of youth, inspires at the present day a sentiment of indignant reprobation, the force of which I have no desire to enfeeble. The fact stands eternally recorded as one among the thousand misdeeds of intolerance, religious and political. But since amidst this catalogue each item has its own peculiar character, grave or light, we are bound to consider at what point of the scale the condemnation of Sokrates is to be placed, and what inferences it justifies in regard to the character of the Athenians. Now if we examine the circumstances of the case, we shall find them all extenuating; and so powerful, indeed, as to reduce such inferences to their minimum, consistent with the general class to which the incident belongs.

¹ Dr. Thirlwall has given, in an Appendix to his fourth volume (Append. vii, p. 526, *seq.*), an interesting and instructive review of the recent sentiments expressed by Hegel, and by some other eminent German authors, on Sokratês and his condemnation. It affords me much satisfaction to see that he has bestowed such just animadversions on the unmeasured bitterness, as well as upon the untenable views, of M. Forchhammer's treatise respecting Sokratês.

I dissent, however, altogether, from the manner in which Dr. Thirlwall speaks about the sophists, both in this Appendix and elsewhere. My opinion, respecting the persons so called, has been given at length in the preceding chapter.

First, the sentiment now prevalent is founded upon a conviction that such matters as heresy and heretical teaching of youth are not proper for judicial cognizance. Even in the modern world, such a conviction is of recent date; and in the fifth century B.C. it was unknown. Sokratês himself would not have agreed in it; and all Grecian governments, oligarchical and democratical alike, recognized the opposite. The testimony furnished by Plato is on this point decisive. When we examine the two positive communities which he constructs, in the treatises "De Republicâ" and "De Legibus," we find that there is nothing about which he is more anxious, than to establish an unresisted orthodoxy of doctrine, opinion, and education. A dissenting and free-spoken teacher, such as Sokratês was at Athens, would not have been allowed to pursue his vocation for a week, in the Platonic Republic. Plato would not, indeed, condemn him to death; but he would put him to silence, and in case of need send him away. This, in fact, is the consistent deduction, if you assume that the state is to determine what is orthodoxy and orthodox teaching, and to repress what contradicts its own views. Now all the Grecian states, including Athens, held this principle¹ of interference against the dissenting teacher. But at Athens, though the principle was recognized, yet the application of it was counteracted by resisting forces which it did not find elsewhere by the democratical constitution, with its liberty of speech and love of speech, by the more active spring of individual intellect, and by the toleration, greater there than anywhere else, shown to each man's peculiarities of every sort. In any other government of Greece, as well as in the Platonic Republic, Sokratês would have been quickly arrested in his career, even if not severely punished; in Athens, he was allowed to talk and teach publicly for twenty-five or thirty years, and then condemned when an old man. Of these two applications of the same mischievous principle, assuredly the latter is at once the more moderate and the less noxious.

Secondly, the force of this last consideration, as an extenuating circumstance in regard to the Athenians, is much increased, when we reflect upon the number of individual enemies whom Sokratês made to himself in the prosecution of his cross-examining process.

¹ See Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 3, p. 3, D.

Here were a multitude of individuals, including men personally the most eminent and effective in the city, prompted by special antipathies, over and above general convictions, to call into action the dormant state-principle of intolerance against an obnoxious teacher. If, under such provocation, he was allowed to reach the age of seventy, and to talk publicly for so many years, before any real Melétus stood forward, this attests conspicuously the efficacy of the restraining dispositions among the people, which made their practical habits more liberal than their professed principles.

Thirdly, whoever has read the account of the trial and defence of Sokratês, will see that he himself contributed quite as much to the result as all the three accusers united. Not only he omitted to do all that might have been done without dishonor, to insure acquittal, but he held positive language very nearly such as Melétus himself would have sought to put in his mouth. He did this deliberately, — having an exalted opinion both of himself and his own mission, — and accounting the cup of hemlock, at his age, to be no calamity. It was only by such marked and offensive self-exaltation that he brought on the first vote of the dikastery, even then the narrowest majority, by which he was found guilty: it was only by a still more aggravated manifestation of the same kind, even to the pitch of something like insult, that he brought on the second vote, which pronounced the capital sentence. Now it would be uncandid not to allow for the effect of such a proceeding on the minds of the dikastery. They were not at all disposed, of their own accord, to put in force the recognized principle of intolerance against him. But when they found that the man who stood before them charged with this offence, addressed them in a tone such as dikasts had never heard before and could hardly hear with calmness, they could not but feel disposed to credit all the worst inferences which his accusers had suggested, and to regard Sokratês as a dangerous man both religiously and politically, against whom it was requisite to uphold the majesty of the court and constitution.

In appreciating this memorable incident, therefore, though the mischievous principle of intolerance cannot be denied, yet all the circumstances show that that principle was neither irritable nor predominant in the Athenian bosom; that even a large body of collateral antipathies did not readily call it forth against any indi-

vidual; that the more liberal and generous dispositions, which deadened its malignity, were of steady efficacy, not easily overborne; and that the condemnation ought to count as one of the least gloomy items in an essentially gloomy catalogue.

Let us add, that as Sokratês himself did not account his own condemnation and death, at his age, to be any misfortune, but rather a favorable dispensation of the gods, who removed him just in time to escape that painful consciousness of intellectual decline which induced Demokritus to prepare the poison for himself, so his friend Xenophon goes a step further, and while protesting against the verdict of guilty, extols the manner of death as a subject of triumph; as the happiest, most honorable, and most gracious way, in which the gods could set the seal upon a useful and exalted life.¹

It is asserted by Diodorus, and repeated with exaggerations by other later authors, that after the death of Sokratês the Athenians bitterly repented of the manner in which they had treated him, and that they even went so far as to put his accusers to death without trial.² I know not upon what authority this statement is made, and I disbelieve it altogether. From the tone of Xenophon's "Memorabilia," there is every reason to presume that the memory of Sokratês still continued to be unpopular at Athens when that collection was composed. Plato, too, left Athens immediately after the death of his master, and remained absent for a long series of years: indirectly, I think, this affords a presumption that no such reaction took place in Athenian sentiment as that which Diodorus alleges; and the same presumption is countenanced by the manner in which the orator Æschinês speaks of the condemnation, half a century afterwards. I see no reason to believe that the Athenian dikasts, who doubtless felt themselves justified, and more than justified, in condemning Sokratês after his own speech, retracted that sentiment after his decease.

Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 3: —


"Denique Democritum postquam matura vetustas
Admonuit memores motus languescere mentis,
Sponte sua letho sese obviu obtulit ipse."


(Lucretius, iii, 1052.)


² Diodor. xiv, 37, with Wesseling's note; Diog. Laërt. ii, 43; Argument. ad Isokrat Or. xi, Busiris.

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